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Abstract 
 
 
 
Stakeholder Perspectives on Corporate Governance and Accountability 
for Development in Zambia 
 
 
 
Poor corporate governance has been cited as one of the impediments contributing to poor 
economic performance in most African countries. The New Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD) has recognised corporate governance as one of the fundamental 
factors for Africa’s economic emancipation. Since independence in 1964, Zambia has 
undergone a number of political and economic reforms in search of economic prosperity, 
but meaningful development has continued to be elusive. This thesis focuses on corporate 
governance’s implications for Zambia’s development from a stakeholder perspective. The 
last two decades have witnessed a worldwide renaissance in corporate governance and 
recognition of its importance for economic development has stimulated research that 
examines the inter-play between the two concepts not only in the developed world, but in 
developing nations as well. Building on NEPADs assertion, the current study sheds light on 
corporate governance’s potentiality to enhance Zambia’s economic performance by 
examining in detail the views of a wide and diverse range of stakeholders. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
 
For many years, the major preoccupation of the world’s least developed countries has been 
the attainment of significant and sustainable economic growth. The world’s richest nations 
have come to the aid of these countries by providing resources in the form of aid, loans and 
grants. However, despite such help substantive levels of development have continued to 
elude the nations concerned. In this context, Boutros-Ghali
1
 (1992), in his report to the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, articulated that:  
“Without development, long-term enjoyment of human rights and democracy will 
prove illusory, for [G]ood Governance, democracy, participation, an independent 
judiciary, the rule of law and civil peace are conditions necessary for economic 
progress” (p. 105-115).  
 
Since independence in 1964, Zambia has undergone a number of political and economic 
reforms aimed at energising its economy, but meaningful progression has failed to 
materialise. A number of reasons, both internal and external, have been advanced for the 
failure, including the country’s traumatic pre-independence colonial history, the economic 
shocks of the 1970s
2
, extractive imperialism and economic policies that left the country 
heavily indebted (and largely dependent) on external hand-outs for survival. Scholarly 
literature indicates that legitimate governance underpins strong economic performance 
(Ndulu and O’Connell, 1999; Akokpari, 2004; Visser et al., 2006; Hansungule, 2008) and in 
its absence it is fallacious to expect significant economic development (Amoako, 2003; 
NEPAD, 2007). The post-independence era witnessed pre-determinate political and 
economic reforms in Zambia that were intended to repudiate colonial institutional 
                                                          
1
United Nations Secretary General (1992). 
2
During the 1970s, Africa went through economic and social dilemmas resulting in deteriorating national 
income, budget deficits, chronic balance-of-payments and heavy indebtedness.   
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inheritance in favour of the philosophy of indigenisation (Zambianisation) that eliminated 
the capital accumulation and growth interests supported by the former colonial 
administrators, giving birth to state-led inward-looking industrialisation policies that kept 
serious investors at bay. This radical transformation resulted in the state taking charge of 
over 80% of the country’s economic activity (Turok, 1980; Mwanawina and Mulungushi, 
2002). It was at this stage that ‘good’ governance became illusive in most African countries 
(Ndulu and O’Connell, 1999; Akokpari, 2004) with Zambia being no exception (Turok, 
1980). 
 
1.2 The Concept of ‘Good’ Governance 
 
Although efforts to explain development failures in the world’s poorest countries have 
provided useful insights into the complex nature of the development process - especially 
given the diverse nature of the nations concerned - there has been a realisation that several 
endogenous factors have been given inadequate attention in the economic advancement 
paradigm, one of the most important of these being governance. According to the World 
Bank (1992), ‘good governance’ is “synonymous with robust development management, 
efficiency resource management and at the core of this is a system of accountability” (p. 1). 
It is therefore evident that the World Bank believes meaningful development to require the 
taking on board of issues of accountability and transparency, supported by a sound legal 
framework. This view is echoed by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission 
for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Africa Development Bank (ADB). While 
development should put more emphasis on achieving production capacities, rule of law, civil 
and political rights, high quality government policies and agencies, effective mechanisms of 
conflict management and private and public sector effectiveness, it is widely accepted that 
achievement of these objectives requires an established and robust system of governance 
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(NEPAD, 2007). Similarly, the Economic Commission for Africa (2005) contends that 
“without progress in governance, all other reforms will have limited impact” (p.133). The 
problem of governance has been identified as one of the main contributors to economic 
policy failures in Africa (Diedhiou, 2006). In other words, governance remains a central 
factor in the quest for Zambia’s economic development. Indeed, the World Bank (1989)
3
 
holds crises in governance directly responsible for Africa’s policy failure and economic 
stagnation
4
, and has since identified the concept as a focus for its attempts to resolve 
Africa’s economic deterioration.  
 
Africa remains the continent with the highest population growth rate, largest population of 
refugees, highest poverty levels and the lowest per capita incomes on earth (Ginther et al., 
1995; Visser et al., 2006). Visser et al. (2006) note that almost half of the 81 poorest 
countries in the world are located in Africa while Katito and Aggad (2009) report that 
almost half of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population lives below the World Bank’s poverty line 
of $1.25 per day; 34 of the 54 nations are classified as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC). Using real GDP per capita data for 21 Sub-Saharan African nations over a 34 year 
period, Ndulu and O’Connell (1999) find long-term growth to be very slow relative to 
developing countries outside Africa, although Africa has continued to under-perform against 
almost all high-priority indicators of development (Katito and Aggad, 2009). Defective 
governance, a lack of delivery on development goals and the failure to positively change the 
lives of ordinary citizens has left many Africans bewildered and disappointed (Obadina, 
2000). In this context, Hansungule (2008) argues that: 
“One of Africa’s greatest problems since independence is simply governance… 
[The] governance deficit is ‘independent’ Africa’s perennial headache and therefore 
it is good that there finally is this recognition that Africa owes Africa a large debt to 
put things right as far as governance is concerned” (p. 2). 
                                                          
3
The World Bank has been a leading agency and partner for development, particularly in Africa.  
4
The World Bank (1989) argues that: “Underlying the litany of Africa's development problems is a crisis of 
governance” (p. 60).  
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In a quest for solutions to Africa’s entrenched development problems, the continent has 
witnessed a number of economic programmes, but most of these have left little or no 
significant development mark on the continent. These programmes include: the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs); the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery (MAP); 
the OMEGA Plan; the Global Compact for Africa Recovery (GCAR); and the New African 
Initiative (NAI) which was in October 2001 renamed the New Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD) (Akokpari, 2004). However, Collier (1991) argues that most of 
these schemes were externally engineered and funded, and failed to achieve the intended 
objectives because African governments claimed that they did not ‘own’ them. In this sense, 
the NEPAD, a development programme under the patronage of the African Union (AU), is 
viewed by many Africans as a home grown initiative and therefore has greater potential. 
  
It should be noted that governance and development are both controversial concepts in terms 
of both definitions and working frameworks. However, according to the NEPAD 
framework, good governance involves:  
“… the creation of the conducive socio-economic, legal, political and institutional 
environments to foster the state’s material strength; to free people from the evils of 
abject poverty, preventable diseases, ignorance, squalor and idleness; to provide the 
citizenry with the voice to choose those who rule over them, to hold those in power 
accountable when they do not work for the greater good, to demand transparent 
structures and to fight down socially regressive policies, and to treat every citizen 
equal without regard to gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and creed” (NEPAD, 2007 
p. 6). 
 
NEPAD unbundles governance into three constituents: political governance; economic 
governance; and corporate governance. As presented in Figure 1.1 below, it is clear that the 
inter-play between the three is important in the context of any attempt to achieve sustainable 
development. Figure 1.1 also indicates some of the key characteristics on which good 
governance rests. According to the ESCAP good governance characteristics include inter-
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alia: accountability; transparency; consensus; participation; rule of law; responsiveness; 
effectiveness; efficiency; equity; and inclusivity.  
 
 Figure 1.1 NEPAD’s Conceptualisation of Good Governance 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This figure shows how NEPAD unbundles governance into three dimensions: political, economic and 
corporate. Source: The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP).  
 
 
Based on this conceptualisation, the current study focuses on Zambian stakeholders’ 
perceptions of corporate governance’s implications for the country’s development through 
the accountability lens as diagrammatically marked by the dotted line in Figure 1.1 above. 
The establishment of NEPAD marked the first step toward the recognition of the importance 
of good governance in general - and corporate governance in particular - for Africa’s 
development (Armstrong, 2003; Amoako, 2003; Akokpari, 2004; Rossouw, 2005). Here, 
Amoako (2003) states that:    
“In Africa, where there has been an historical record of bad governance, improving 
the governance environment has been given a central place in the New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)” (p. 2). 
 
Accountable Consensus Oriented Transparent 
Characteristics of good governance 
Rule of Law Responsive Effective and 
Efficient 
Equitable and 
Inclusive 
Participatory 
Development 
 
Good Governance 
Political Governance Economic Governance 
Corporate Governance 
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According to the IMF (2007), the term ‘governance’ covers a wide spectrum ranging from 
government to non-government delivery systems. This dissertation, however, focuses on a 
single thematic area of governance, namely corporate governance, having contextualised it 
within the broad governance notion. The focal point for the current study is Zambian 
people’s perceptions of corporate governance’s implications for national development. The 
underlying thesis is that the absence of (or weak) corporate governance has been a 
significant obstacle to Zambia’s development.  
 
1.3 Corporate Governance  
There has been a worldwide renaissance in the study and recognition of corporate 
governance (Mallin, 2009; Solomon, 2010) both in theoretical terms and regarding its 
practical importance for corporate and national economic health (Berglof and Thadden, 
1999; Cadbury, 2002; ECA, 2002; Oman, 2003; Akokpari, 2004; OECD, 2004a; Charkham 
and Ploix, 2005; Wu, 2005; Vaughn and Ryan, 2006; NEPAD, 2007; Tsamenyi and Uddin, 
2008; Arun and Turner, 2009). In particular, corporate governance-driven scandals and 
failures around the world have demonstrated how “defective” governance schemes can 
affect the lives of millions of people (Oman, 2003; Kiichiro, 2007). Although Zambia has its 
own experience of corporate governance shortcomings, particularly in the banking sector, 
failure to document and properly investigate such scandals makes it difficult for most 
Zambians to comprehend the severity of the consequences. The need for effective corporate 
governance has become crucial as globalisation and the competition for external investment 
have opened up Africa’s economies for investment (Siddiqui, 2010). The quality of 
corporate governance is not only important for individual companies and their boards, but 
for the entire economy of the country (Argüden, 2010). In this regard, the Global Corporate 
Governance Forum (GCGF) notes that: 
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“Corporate Governance has become an issue of worldwide importance. The 
Corporation has a vital role to play in promoting economic development and social 
progress. It is the engine of growth internationally, and increasingly responsible for 
providing employment, public and private services, goods and infrastructure. The 
efficiency and accountability of the corporation is now a matter of both private and 
public interest, and governance has, thereby, come to the head of the international 
agenda.” 
 
Although the corporate governance debate in developed nations has been couched in the 
terminology of the principal-agent model, there is conclusive evidence to suggest that the 
ultimate objective for such reforms is macro-economic attainment (see e.g. the Cadbury 
Report, 1992; OECD, 1999, (revised 2004); King Report, 1994 (revised 2002); GCGF, 
2003). Indeed, a strong relationship between corporate governance and economic 
performance has been reported in the literature (Berglof and Thadden, 1999; OECD, 2004a; 
Solomon, 2010). However, despite the abundant literature noting the importance of 
corporate governance in strengthening economic outcomes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Oman, 2003), in Zambia very little policy reform has been initiated in line with these 
pronouncements. Serious corporate governance awareness came to prominence with the 
establishment of the Institute of Directors of Zambia (IODZ) in 2000, augmented by the 
introduction of a corporate governance code by the Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE) in 2005 
and the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) code in 2009. Establishment of corporate 
governance codes to supplement corporate law has emerged as the common methodology 
for corporate governance awareness (Adekoya, 2011). Nonetheless, recent trends indicate 
that there has been a growing interest in corporate governance, especially with the 
emergence of economic reforms that saw the re-birth of the free market economy and the 
abandonment of the socialist policies that bestowed the state with the power to control 80% 
of the economy through direct enterprise control. However, numerous challenges continue to 
impinge on Zambia’s corporate governance reforms including: a lack of appropriate 
legislation; weak institutional and regulatory frameworks; inadequate enforcement; and 
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rampant corruption. For example, prior studies indicate that the strength of a country’s 
corporate governance framework is dependent on the effectiveness of the institutions, both 
legal and regulatory, coupled with robust public governance systems (Roe, 2005; Dabor and 
Adeyemi, 2009). While the debate outlined in this section indicates that there is no 
universally accepted definition of corporate governance, for the purposes of this study 
corporate governance is defined as:    
“…the system of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, 
which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders 
and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business activity” (Solomon, 
2010 p. 6).  
 
This definition goes beyond corporate boundaries to include corporate social responsibility, 
broadened accountability and stakeholder inclusivity. This pervasiveness is intended to align 
the study with the complex cultural, political and economic factors that characterise most 
African countries. 
 
1.4 Research Focus 
The fact that poor corporate governance is now cited as one of the most important 
contributors to poor economic performance in developing nations couples with the 
NEPAD’s assertion that corporate governance is one of the necessary conditions for Africa’s 
economic emancipation. Given this context, the present study focuses on examining 
Zambian stakeholders’ perceptions of the implications of corporate governance for the 
nation’s economic performance. The study’s emphasis is on the capture of perceptions from 
a diverse stakeholder base in Zambia, but it must be acknowledged that perception-based 
data are open to interpretation. Nonetheless, stakeholder views are likely to provide valuable 
insights about peoples’ understanding of corporate governance and its implications for 
Zambia’s economic performance. In addition, specific interest is directed towards the notion 
that firms are the generators of economic wealth; the way in which corporations are directed 
and controlled has emerged as a major policy concern for many developing countries (Wu, 
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2005) but there is a dearth of prior studies of the issue, either specific to Zambia or Africa in 
general. 
 
As Zambia is a developing nation, examples will be drawn wherever appropriate from 
emerging economies in other parts of the world. However, Zambia has been chosen as the 
main focus of this study on the grounds that, despite inheriting a healthy economy by 
developing nation standards at independence in 1964, the country has failed to achieve 
meaningful development in the decades since. The Norwegian Agency for Development 
Corporation (NADC), (2002) asserts that Zambia maintained a: 
“fairly liberal economic policy in the years immediately after independence. At 
Independence, Zambia was a middle-income country, among the richest in Africa 
and with a per capita GDP at the level of South Korea” (p. 5). 
 
However, in 1985, the World Bank re-classified Zambia from a ‘low-middle’ income to a 
‘low’ income country while in 1990, the United Nations formally labelled Zambia as a ‘least 
developed country’ (Saasa and Carlsson, 2002). Although other factors, such as the decline 
in copper prices on which the country’s economy is anchored and the economic shocks of 
the 1970s bear some responsibility, poor governance is believed to have played a major role 
in hampering Zambia’s performance in most internationally-agreed metrics for measuring 
wealth and economic performance (Bates and Collier, 1995; Saasa and Carlsson, 2002). 
 
The focus of the present thesis differentiates it from most other governance-related studies in 
Africa, in the sense that its scope is individual-country specific
5
. Additionally, while 
abundant literature has blamed political instabilities for the governance crisis and 
consequential slowdown in economic progressions across the continent (e.g. Ginther et al., 
1995; Hossain, 1995; Roe, 2003; Visser et al., 2006; Cooper, 2007; Wanyama et al., 2009; 
Armah and Amoah, 2010), Zambia has remained relatively peaceful and politically stable 
since independence, spared from the worst ravages of the conflicts that engulfed the 
                                                          
5
With South Africa as an exception 
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continent. Zambia’s economic stagnation is therefore worthy of detailed study, where the 
role of factors un-related to civil upheaval requires illuminating.   
 
1.5 Research Objectives  
Corporate governance has emerged as one of the key determinants of efficient economic 
performance (Berglof and Thadden, 1999; ECA, 2002; Oman, 2003; Akokpari, 2004; 
OECD, 2004a; Wu, 2005; Vaughn and Ryan, 2006; NEPAD, 2007; Tsamenyi and Uddin, 
2008; Arun and Turner, 2009). Numerous researchers have investigated corporate 
governance in developed nations and several have examined corporate governance in Africa 
as a whole. However, individual African countries have not enjoyed such levels of 
investigation. Whilst developing economies are beginning to receive attention in this area 
(Brennan and Solomon, 2008), there has been no detailed research undertaken in a Zambian 
context to investigate the role of corporate governance in the country’s economic non-
progression. Even though research has begun emerging in the African context, the typical 
(although not exclusively) continent-wide approach ignores individual countries’ contextual 
specificities in terms of political, economic, cultural and historical factors. Because 
developing nations like Zambia are part of the global economy, Reed (2002) calls for 
investigations of corporate governance in such countries to fully incorporate the interaction 
between the factors influencing corporate governance in developed nations and those giving 
rise to corporate governance in (the very different political and economic environment of) 
developing nations (Rabelo and Vasconncelos, 2002). In this context, the present study is 
important because it focuses exclusively on Zambia. 
 
The central objective of the current thesis is to analyse corporate governance in Zambia by 
investigating key stakeholders’ perceptions about its implications for the country’s 
economic performance. In doing so, the study examines and evaluates the extant levels of 
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corporate governance in Zambia as a basis for economic development. Following NEPAD’s 
declaration that corporate governance is one of the prerequisites for Africa’s economic 
enfranchisement, the objective is to detect the legitimacy of the notion based on the 
interpretation of Zambian stakeholders’ perceptions, properly contextualised in domestic 
circumstances. Taking into account the de facto assumptions that governance rests on 
accountability and transparency and that any reforms aimed at enhancing economic 
performance must embrace these principles (World Bank, 1989), the overarching objective 
of this thesis is to interpret stakeholder perceptions regarding the interplay between 
corporate governance and the country’s economic performance through the accountability 
lens. In the context of the on-going debate, the study attempts to identify the drivers, 
benefits and challenges faced by Zambia in its pursuit of corporate governance reform. 
Using Zambia as a case study, the thesis intends to provide a detailed account of the 
country’s corporate governance situation, stakeholders’ perceptions of the latter’s 
implications for Zambia’s development and, using the accountability lens, examine whether 
or not the governance and development paradigm can seek theoretical refuge in the 
country’s accountability shortcomings. From the research background, focus, motivation 
and objectives, the following research questions have been derived: 
1. What is the perceived current state of corporate governance in modern-day Zambia? 
2. To what extent do the people of Zambia understand effective corporate governance 
as a necessary condition for the country’s economic development? 
3. What role do Zambians see for accountability in aiding attempts to better governance 
practices and economic performance? 
 
1.6 Motivation and Significance of the Current Research 
Corporate governance has become a topic of enormous significance the world over 
(Cadbury, 2002; Mallin, 2009; Solomon, 2010). Although the economic importance of 
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effective corporate governance has started gaining acceptance in many developing nations 
(Solomon, 2010), the dearth of related research in a nation such as Zambia makes it 
problematic for the population to appreciate its importance. The knowledge gap resulting 
from the lack of research into the (evolving) nature of corporate governance, coupled with 
the increasing demand for corporate governance and accountability in Zambia, is the 
motivation for conducting the current study. The widely-made claim that corporate 
governance matters most for developing countries (Babic, 2003; Oman, 2003; McGee, 2008; 
Siddiqui, 2010), suggests that conducting an investigation of this kind in a developing 
country such as Zambia provides both opportunities and challenges for research in the area. 
In this context, the study makes a significant contribution to the existing literature by 
tackling head-on some key issues surrounding reforms, implementation and observance of 
corporate governance practices. 
  
In the light of this discussion, it is clear that a case study of Zambia should provide useful 
lessons regarding both constraints on and prospects for effective corporate governance from 
a developmental perspective. The study also provides insights regarding the association 
between corporate governance and economic performance, thereby furnishing the nation’s 
policymakers with information that will usefully inform future political and economic 
reforms. In addition, answers are sought regarding the question of the extent to which 
NEPAD’s governance notion holds in the Zambian context, thereby challenging regulators 
to ensure that improving corporate governance and greater accountability are given priority 
in the country’s search for economic recovery. In this regard, the premise that corporate 
governance’s implications for Zambia’s development deserve empirical research appears 
well founded.  
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 1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is comprised of ten chapters as outlined below. Following this introduction, 
Chapter Two offers a brief background about Zambia’s geographical location, an historical 
perspective, its political and economic context as well as extant education, legal and 
regulatory environments. The aim of the chapter is to provide insights into the country’s 
specific governance credentials as most research in this area concentrates on Africa as a 
homogenous unit disregarding individual country specific issues. Chapter Three discusses 
the general frameworks and theories that underpin corporate governance and the literature 
on African in so far as it relates to the subject of the study. This chapter is used as a lens for 
prioritising the literature on corporate governance in Africa on the basis of its proportionate 
relevance to Zambia’s circumstances. Chapter Four then highlights and discusses the key 
prior studies as well as setting out Zambia’s three economic governance phases in the 
context of the literature on corporate governance drivers and challenges, including 
institutional independence.  
 
Chapter Five details the theoretical framework adopted for the current study. The corporate 
governance and economic performance paradigm have been conceptualised around an 
accountability base, which is used in turn to interpret the findings. In addition, the traditional 
cultural context, which takes account of Africa’s cross-cultural dynamics and their 
implications for corporate governance and conventional accountability, is also briefly 
discussed. Chapter six establishes and justifies the methodological assumptions supporting 
the interpretive research paradigm adopted for the current study. The chapter also outlines 
the data collection methods in terms of their appropriateness for the specific research to be 
conducted; the choice of semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire survey as the 
primary methods are described and explained. Chapter Seven begins the presentation of the 
empirical results by outlining and analysing the findings from interviews that focus on the 
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corporate governance landscape in Zambia as a basis for economic performance. Economic 
performance is itself the focus of Chapter Eight, where investigation of perceptions about 
corporate governance’s implications for Zambia’s development is presented. The role of 
accountability is also discussed in the chapter, in the context of corporate governance and 
development with special reference to the notion that ‘proper run firms are the generators of 
the country’s wealth’. The central concerns in Chapters Seven and Eight are carried over to 
Chapter Nine, where findings from the larger-sample questionnaire survey are described. 
Bringing together the themes in the three empirical chapters, Chapter Ten concludes the 
thesis by summarising the research findings, offering some policy recommendations, 
highlighting the contributions made to knowledge, exposing the limitations that have 
emerged in the research process, providing suggestions for future research and presenting 
closing remarks.      
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CHAPTER TWO 
NATIONAL BACKGROUND: ZAMBIA 
2.1   Introduction  
Tordoff and Molteno (1974) suggest that “It is trite, but true, that every nation is a product 
of its past” (p. 1). Application of Tordoff and Molteno’s suggestion to the present study 
implies that the current Zambian environment cannot be fully understood without an 
appreciation of its historical background. This approach is particularly important in Africa, 
where a background of trauma and instability - both absolute and relative to other continents 
- exists (Visser et al., 2006). In this regard, the authors argue that understanding these 
experiences can help in understanding the de facto governance structures and their 
contextual dimensions in individual countries and the continent as a whole. This chapter 
therefore provides a discussion of Zambia’s geographical location, its history (both before 
and after independence) as well as its political, economic, education, legal and regulatory 
environments. The chapter also provides a brief overview of the nation’s corporate 
governance system that is expanded in Chapter Four. This information is intended to provide 
a codified, coherent picture of Zambia that underpins and contextualises the empirical 
research presented in the thesis. The chapter also outlines the forces and events that have 
shaped the varied manifestations of developmental factors, structures and control systems 
seen in Zambia today. These structures and control systems have had a profound effect on 
the quality of the country’s extant governance, legal and regulatory frameworks and may 
help to explain the situation obtaining in Zambia today. A large and burgeoning literature 
suggests that ‘good’ corporate governance depends to a large extent on an effective political, 
legal and well-functioning regulatory environment (e.g. Sheng et al., 2004; Cooper, 2007; 
Rezaee, 2007; McGee, 2008; Wanyama et al., 2009).  
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Rosenbaum (1999) posits that history has a tangible effect in what is currently obtaining in a 
number of countries, giving an example of the USA’s historical concern about public 
accountability; the author observes that this is reflected at virtually all levels of government 
through a variety of institutional structures designed to encourage openness, citizen 
participation and public accountability. This contextualising has provided valuable insights 
into how the United States handles its governance issues politically and economically, and 
why accountability and openness are important concepts for most Americans. 
 
Figure 2.1 Map of Zambia and the neighbouring Countries 
 
Source: United Kingdom, Foreign and Commonwealth Office website (2009). 
 
Zambia’s geographical location is a key influence on the nation’s political and economic 
potential. As can be seen from Figure 2.1 above, Zambia is a landlocked country in South - 
Central Africa surrounded by eight countries, namely Angola to the west; the Democratic 
Republic of Congo to the north; Tanzania to the north east; Malawi to the east; and  
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia to the south. The country has a tropical 
climate and consists mostly of high plateau that rises to 8,503 feet (2,592m) in the Mafinga 
hills, with these and other mountainous regions dissected by river valleys (Holmes and 
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Wong, 2008). Zambia has a total area of about 752,614 sq km, slightly smaller than the UK 
and France combined (McIntyre, 2008) and slightly larger than Texas (Williams, 2003) 
making it the 39
th
 largest country in the world. The total consists of land of 740,724 sq km 
and water of 11,890 sq km (IBP, 2008). The country is sparsely populated, with around 73 
ethnic groups occupying the nation’s nine provinces. The population is concentrated mainly 
around Lusaka in the south and the Copperbelt in northern Zambia; although Lusaka is the 
largest urban centre, Copperbelt towns together constitute the largest concentration of urban 
population (Williams, 2003). According to the latter, Zambia’s population as at the census 
date of October 2000 was 10,285,631, but by 2005 it was estimated to be about 11.7 million 
(IBP, 2008).  
Lusaka is Zambia’s capital and largest city, located in the southeast with a population of 
about 2 million people (Malomo and Wint, 2003). The northern part of Lusaka includes the 
“Copperbelt”. The Copperbelt province is an area in Zambia that is rich in minerals, 
especially cobalt and copper deposits; these resources are the backbone of Zambia's 
economy through the copper revenues they provide (Mulenga, 2003). The zone that 
stretches to the Democratic Republic of Congo is believed to contain one of the world’s 
largest accumulations of copper and cobalt deposits with over 3 billion tons of high grade 
copper sulphide ore thought to exist (McGowan et al., 2005). Zambia’s climate is 
characterised by three seasons: a cool dry season between April and August; a hot dry 
season from August to November; and a warm wet season between November and April 
(Williams, 2003)
6
.  
 
 
                                                          
6
Zambian temperatures average 30° C to 35° C, except in June and July when the mean falls to between 5° C 
and 10° C (Williams, 2003). 
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2.2     The History and People of Zambia 
 
2.2.1 Migratory Origins 
 
No particular group of people in Zambia can claim to be indigenous, as all the extant tribes 
originally migrated from outside the perimeters of the modern nation. However, Zambia’s 
history can be traced to the original small Bushmen who occupied the land several thousand 
years ago (Carwardine, 1988). These indigenous hunter-gatherer occupants, who lived in 
caves and rock shelters, were displaced or absorbed by more advanced migrating tribes, and 
in the fourteenth century people who made and used iron, kept livestock, grew crops and 
lived in man-made houses began to occupy Zambia from the north (Holmes and Wong, 
2008). The major waves of Bantu speaking immigrants - who brought with them advanced 
technology - began arriving in the fifteenth century, with the greatest influx occurring 
between the late seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries (Taylor, 2006)
7
. As Holmes and 
Wong (2008) note: “The Bantu immigrants were mining and smelting iron and copper, 
baked clay and beakers 1,500 years ago and making weapons …with the metals” (p. 18) 
and, together with other immigrants, the Bantu are what gave rise to the ancestors of present 
day Zambians. The new immigrants immediately established a number of kingdoms, among 
them Kazembe-Lunda in the north (settled around the lower Luapula River) and Bemba in 
the north-east. While these immigrants came from the Luba and Lunda tribes of the southern 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola to the north, the Ngoni and Chewa - fleeing 
Shaka and the Boers from the south - established kingdoms in the east, with the Lozi people 
settling in the west around the upper Zambezi River. Meanwhile the Tonga - a Bantu ethnic 
group - settled in the southern part of Zambia that neighbours Zimbabwe (Roberts, 1976). 
Despite the variety in geographical roots, Roberts (1976) contends that the seventy plus 
tribes that make up modern Zambia co-exist relatively well and that most Zambians share 
                                                          
7
See also Carwardine (1988). 
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important elements of social and cultural traditions that may reflect a common inheritance 
from a long established matrilineal tradition.  
 
2.2.2 David Livingstone and the British 
Apart from the Portuguese incursions, Zambia lay untouched by European explorers until a 
visit by the Scottish Missionary David Livingstone in the 1850s (Taylor, 2006). The visit 
was widely reported in London and the British became interested in dominating the area; the 
first hand information provided by Livingstone’s first visit provided the impetus as there 
was very little known in Europe about the country’s potential up to that point. Although 
Britain saw this as an opportunity to extend their power and dominion in Africa, Carwardine 
(1988) claims that Livingstone’s intention was to help put an end to slavery which he 
referred to at the time as the “great open sore of the world”  
   
As a landlocked country, far from the coasts of both the Indian and the Atlantic oceans 
respectively, it was perhaps unsurprising that Zambia received comparatively scant 
European attention in the ‘scramble for Africa’.  According to Taylor (2006) the phrase 
“scramble for Africa” reflected not only a geographical division but a rush by European 
powers to divide Africa’s assets as quickly as possible. Visser et al. (2006) argue that some 
of Africa’s unique experiences include the fact that even its boundaries were determined by 
the European colonial powers, with little regard for geography, local communities or 
resource distribution. 
 
Many European explorers prophesised religious interests, which they combined with 
commercial and political aims to underpin their imperialistic approach. For example, when 
Livingstone returned to the UK in 1856, he announced in Cambridge that “I go back to 
Africa to try to make a path for commerce and Christianity” (Cox, 2008 p.148; Rotberg 
1972, p.4). In this regard, missionaries claimed the commercial dimension was meant to 
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sustain their missions rather represent an end in themselves. The British consolidated their 
commercial and political interests in Southern Africa indirectly through the British South 
Africa Company (BSAC) which, by 1891, had established full territorial control of what 
came to be called Zambia (Taylor, 2006). The mineral rights were secured for the British via 
the obtainment of concessions through local chiefs in exchange for protection from 
intruders. In 1888, Northern and Southern Rhodesia (modern day Zambia and Zimbabwe) 
were proclaimed a ‘British sphere of influence’ and in the 1890s Cecil Rhodes' BSAC 
established imperial rule north of the Zambezi, launching a wave of mineral prospecting and 
exploitation of other natural resources such as timber, ivory and animal skins in the territory 
it called North-Western Rhodesia (Taylor, 2006). In 1953 Northern Rhodesia and Southern 
Rhodesia were joined with Nyasaland (Malawi) to form the federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland under the control of the British. English was used as the official language for the 
colonies, including in Zambia, to bring together more than 72 ethnic tribes and languages. 
As a result, English became dominant in Zambia to the extent that even today, almost all 
schools introduce English at the earliest stages of education
8
.  
 
2.3 The Political Environment 
  
2.3.1 Before Independence 
 
Wanyama et al. (2009) contend that a sound political environment is vital for good corporate 
governance. Similarly, Ginther et al. (1995) argue that inherent in the concept of sustainable 
development is the need for a political system that provides for a robust system of 
governance. A ‘good’ political environment in this context is one which provides a 
conducive environment for governance, both legal and regulatory. However, in most African 
countries political instability means that such foundations are likely to be lacking (Wanyama 
                                                          
8
English is also the official language of business.   
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et al., 2009). In Zambia, the modern political system began to emerge around the 1890s, 
when the BSAC signed a series of treaties with local leaders culminating, in 1911, with the 
establishment of Northern Rhodesia (Williams and Hackland, 1988). It is believed that 
Rhodes’ original intention was to extend British rule from Cairo to the Cape, a plan that was 
ultimately foiled by the Belgians and the Germans (Carwardine, 1988). During the first 
decade of BSAC occupation of the territory, white settlers were attracted and began to arrive 
in Northern Rhodesia to work in the BSAC mines, establish farms and undertake other 
commercial activities (Taylor, 2006). The copper mining in particular led to an influx of 
Europeans in Northern Rhodesia, although white settlement never reached the levels it had 
done in Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in the short-lived Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland (UK, FCO, 2009). 
 
BSAC rule ended in 1923 when the administration of Northern Rhodesia was handed over to 
the colonial office in London and Zambia became a de facto British colony (Tordoff and 
Molteno, 1974). In 1953, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and 
Nyasaland (Malawi) collectively formed the Central African Federation (Taylor, 2006). 
Under this arrangement, copper revenues from Zambia were channelled to further Southern 
Rhodesia’s development while Nyasaland contributed the human and natural resources 
unjustly needed to enhance the socio-economic position of the white-dominated Southern 
Rhodesia (Taylor, 2006). Taylor’s observation regarding the Central Africa Federation is 
that Zimbabwe benefitted more from its establishment than did Zambia and Malawi, the two 
countries that were responsible for substantial economic growth in Zimbabwe. Zambia in 
particular lost funds that might otherwise have been invested productively in its own 
development (Taylor, 2006). It seems reasonable to assume that the aim of the British in 
bringing together the three countries was for Zambia and Malawi to provide resources for 
sustainable development in the relatively white-dominated Zimbabwe.   
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The break-up of the federation in 1963 paved the way for the establishment of Northern 
Rhodesia as an independent state. By this time there were a number of nationalist 
movements in Southern Africa and elsewhere. Kenneth Kaunda (see below) a strong 
supporter of the Black Nationalist movements that had sprung-up around Africa formed, 
along with Harry Nkumbula, the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (NRANC) 
which later became the African National Congress (ANC) (Carmody, 1992). This 
development represented the first real independence movement, but the two individuals 
ultimately separated in dispute over how to co-operate with the colonial powers; Kaunda 
formed the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) in 1958 which was later banned and 
Kaunda imprisoned (Tordoff and Molteno, 1974). In 1960 Kaunda re-emerged under the 
banner of a new party - the United National Independence Party (UNIP) - which was 
instrumental in the achievement of independence for Zambia in 1964. UNIP won the pre-
independence elections and Kaunda was named Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia in 
January 1964 (Tordoff and Molteno, 1974; Williams and Hackland, 1988). He remained in 
that position until independence was formalised on 24 October 1964.  
  
2.3.2   After Independence 
 
Zambia’s first republic reflected a multi-party participatory political system of governance. 
At independence Zambia faced many challenges, not least of which was the fact that the 
country did not have the human resources needed to run either the government or the 
economy; a consequence, there was a lot of initial reliance on foreign expertise (Mwenda 
and Muuka, 2004). The other major post-independence challenge related to commercial 
activities being hampered by conflicts in the region, as Zambia shared borders with 
countries that were still fighting for independence from white-dominated rule; external 
influence was therefore still felt within the new nation’s boundaries (Cawthra et al., 2007). 
This not only affected trade, but also raised security concerns as well. Kaunda was elected 
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the first Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia in January 1964
9
 (Lipschutz and Rasmussen, 
1989) as the country then employed the British system of government; this was changed 
later in the year to a presidential system with Kaunda becoming the first president. 
Socialism
10
 was the common ideology among newly-independent African countries 
including Zambia; many Africans believed that this philosophy focused on sharing 
economic resources in a traditional African way and ran counter to the western capitalistic 
model
11
.  Under such arrangements, governments were seen to have a firm control of the 
country’s economy and political governance with benefits in terms of equality expected to 
flow. 
 
After the protests that followed the 1968 presidential elections, on 17 June 1969 a 
referendum regarding a change to a one-party system (with UNIP as the sole political entity) 
was conducted and the proposal supported; (Europa Publications, 2004) in 1972, Zambia 
thus became a one-party state, with all other political parties banned. Before this point, there 
were two other significant political parties in Zambia, namely: the African National 
Congress (ANC), under Nkumbula, and the United Progressive Party (UPP) led by Simon 
Kapwepwe, former vice-president under Kaunda (Kalley et al., 1999). However, UNIP had 
become more dominant and increasingly intolerant of other political parties prior to the 
referendum and Kaunda saw the new one-party system as the final step to total control of the 
nation (Ihonvbere, 1996).  The first elections under the new system were held in 1973 and 
Kaunda was the sole candidate. Kaunda’s mandate was renewed in December 1978, 
followed by further votes in October 1983 and on 26 October 1988. Nonetheless, in the late 
                                                          
9
Table 1 provides details of Zambia’s presidential administration since independence.   
10
Kaunda allowed the creation of a personality cult, alongside development of a left-leaning nationalist-
socialist ideology called ‘Zambian Humanism’; its principles included: Man at the center; the dignity of 
Man; non-exploitation of Man by Man; equal opportunities for all; hard work and Self-reliance;  working 
together; the extended family and loyalty; and Patriotism. Similar forms of African socialism were 
introduced, inter-alia, in Ghana by Kwame Nkrumah ("Consciencism") and Tanzania by Julius Nyerere 
("Ujamaa"). 
11
Although many African politicians of the 1950s and 1960s were prophetic of socialism, definitions and 
interpretations of this term varied considerably from country to country. 
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1980s, pressure started to mount on UNIP’s monopoly power and this, coupled with a failed 
coup attempt and economic hardships following massive increases in the prices of basic 
foodstuffs when food subsidies were removed, resulted in food riots and protests in the 
major cities of the country. The domestic unrest sparked off by the price rises developed into 
demands for a more democratic system of government and the growing pressure eventually 
led to the formation, in 1990, of the “Movement for Multi-party Democracy” (MMD) 
(McIntyre, 2008). This movement brought together prominent Zambians who opposed the 
one-party state, alongside labour leaders and UNIP defectors. Kaunda finally conceded to 
pressure and in 1990 he signed legislation to end UNIP’s monopoly on power, with a new 
constitution being enacted in 1991 that allowed for more than one presidential candidate.  
 
On 31 October 1991 the first multi-party elections were held for both presidential and 
parliamentary positions; the MMD’s candidate Frederick Chiluba won the former with over 
80 % of the vote (McIntyre, 2008). In the parliamentary elections, the MMD captured 125 of 
the 150 elected seats with UNIP winning the rest (Europa Publications, 2004). Chiluba ruled 
the country from 1991 to 2001 under the new constitution
12
; his attempt to campaign for a 
third term met strong opposition from within his party, opposition parties, NGOs and civil 
society as a whole, leading to defection of some senior party members to either join the 
opposition or form their own political parties. The third multi-party Presidential, 
parliamentary and local government elections were held on 27
th
 December 2001, which the 
MMD-sponsored presidential candidate Levy Mwanawasa won by a narrow margin; on this 
occasion the opposition parties won the majority of parliamentary seats. The fourth multi-
party elections were conducted in 2006; again the MMD candidate won without achieving a 
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The executive branch of Zambian government is filled by an elected president. Presidents serve terms of five 
years and are limited to two terms. The vice-president is appointed by the president. 
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parliamentary majority (McIntyre, 2008). However, while attending an African Union (AU) 
meeting in Egypt, in 2008 Mwanawasa suffered a stroke, and he died in France in August of 
that year. Following Mwanawasa's death, vice-president Rupiah Banda succeeded him as 
temporary president until the emergency election on 30
th 
October, 2008 which Banda won 
by a narrow margin (40%) over opposition leader Michael Sata (38%) (ECZ, 2008). Banda 
could therefore complete the remainder of Mwanawasa’s last 5-year presidential term 
running to 2011. The September 2011 elections were won by opposition leader Micheal Sata 
(43%) under the Patriotic Front (PF) banner (ECZ, 2011). By African and developing 
nations’ standards generally - and particularly in comparison to many of its near neighbours 
- modern Zambia is a peaceful country and continues to enjoy political stability. Table 1 
summarises the key political milestones. 
TABLE: 1 Presidential administrations of Zambia 
Year President Party Method of 
Change 
Percentage of vote 
EMERGING DEMOCRACY 
1964 - 1968 Kenneth Kaunda UNIP Elections  
1968 - 1973 Kenneth Kaunda UNIP Elections  
17 June 1969 Referendum voted for change to one-party system and UNIP as a sole 
political party. 
ONE-PARTY SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE 
1973 - 1978 Kenneth Kaunda UNIP Elections 88.8%  yes vote 
1978 - 1983 Kenneth Kaunda UNIP Elections 80.7%  yes vote 
1983 - 1988 Kenneth Kaunda UNIP Elections 95%     yes vote 
1988 - 1991 Kenneth Kaunda UNIP Elections 95.5%  yes vote 
MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE 
1991 - 1995 
1996 - 2000  
2001 - 2005 
2006 - 2008 
2008 - 2011 
2011 -  
Frederick Chiluba 
Frederick Chiluba 
Levy Mwanawasa 
Levy Mwanawasa 
Rupiah Banda 
Micheal Sata  
MMD 
MMD 
MMD 
MMD 
MMD 
PF 
Elections  
Elections 
Elections 
Elections 
Elections 
Elections 
 
80% 
73% 
29% 
43% 
40% 
43%   
 
Note: This table provides details of the presidential elections in Zambia in the post-independence era. 
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2.4    The Economic Environment 
 
2.4.1 Political Economy 
 
As noted earlier, Zambia’s economy is largely based on copper and cobalt mining and, as a 
result, it had one of the most buoyant economies in Africa at independence (Ihonvbere, 
1996). The continued increase in copper prices in the 1960s boosted the country’s economy 
and government investment levels. In fact, the Rhodesia-Nyasaland Federation’s mis-
application of copper revenues has been suggested as one of the reasons why Northern 
Rhodesia decided to pull out of the Federation (Ihonvbere, 1996). Breaking away from the 
federation thus meant that all the copper revenues could now be retained in Zambia and the 
country enjoyed a balanced external trading account, based on the export of copper which 
provided over 90% of export earnings and supported over 50% of the government’s budget 
and investment in many sectors such as health and education which were considered key to 
development (Ihonvbere, 1996).  
  
As mentioned earlier, at independence Zambia inherited a weak human resource situation. In 
particular, the country did not have much needed trained and experienced indigenous 
personnel that could implement development-oriented policies
13
. Examining the impact of 
indigenisation on the Zambian economy, Beveridge (1974) maintains that the country lacked 
skilled labour at independence partly, because the colonial powers neglected training and 
education for the locals as a strategy to effect full control over them. At independence the 
country’s economy was completely controlled by foreign investors, but this ownership 
structure was viewed as another type of colonialism and helping to motivate the change to 
government control in the late 1960s (Turok, 1989). However, Zambia’s geographical 
location adversely affected its developmental programmes; in particular, the nation was 
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Its neighbours in the north and south were in a relatively stronger position in this regard (Tordoff and 
Molteno, 1974). 
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surrounded by countries that were hostile and/or politically unstable, making trade very 
problematic. Transportation of goods to and from both the Indian and the Atlantic coasts in 
this environment became almost impossible (Beveridge, 1974). 
 
As alluded to earlier, like other newly independent African countries, Zambia adopted a 
socialist-based ideology, in this case called ‘Humanism’. Many newly-independent African 
states believed socialism would deliver and give them the power to take full control of their 
economies; (Ake, 1996) Kaunda and his government held a view that Humanism advocated 
the collective means of production and distribution of goods in a way best suited to 
Zambia’s needs. Most newly-independent African states adopted a socialist ideology that 
reflected the Soviet Union’s experience, which at the time was itself the role model for 
development in much of Eastern Europe
14
. There appear to be several reasons why the 
Soviet model was adopted in emergent African nations; firstly, before it collapsed, the 
Soviet Union boasted of a successful socialist economy and therefore the newly independent 
African countries saw the Soviet philosophy as a facilitator of macro-economic 
development
15
. Secondly, African states regarded socialism as the only real alternative to 
capitalism and adopting an ideology different from that of the former colonial masters was 
seen as an emancipatory tool. Thirdly, there was a belief that only socialist economies could 
attend to social welfare and that separate units of economic activity should be integrated into 
society on the basis of shared ownership.  
 
2.4.2 Nationalisation and Reforms 
 
Zambia had a large domestic capitalist system at this point but, as a demonstration of the 
new political and economic philosophy of nationalism, legitimised by reference to 
                                                          
14
In fact in 1971 Zambia signed a number of trade agreements with the Soviet Union (Kalley et al, 1999).  
15
The Soviet Union grew at impressive rates in the 1950s and registered a respectable performance in the 1960s 
(Njølstad 2004, p.88). There is a general agreement that the Soviet economy began to decline in the early 
1970s, a decline from which it never recovered (Clarke 1993, p.57).  
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Humanism, extensive nationalisations and economic reforms took place. This move was 
followed by the Mulungushi and Matero Reforms of 1968 and 1969 respectively that 
outlined a major structural shift in the Zambian economy; in particular, the government 
declared its intention to acquire 51% equity holdings in a number of large industrial 
concerns (Scott, 1978) and more than 26 key foreign-owned firms. According to Beveridge 
(1974), the cost of the 51% shares acquired by the government was to be paid at book value 
out of the firms’ future earnings. These entities were to come under the control of a 
parastatal conglomerate named the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO)
16
 
(Beveridge, 1974; Tordoff and Molteno, 1974). The Zambian government had also acquired 
majority holdings in the domestic operations of the two major foreign mining corporations, 
the Anglo American Corporation and the Rhodesia Selection Trust (RST)
17
 (Tordoff, 1980), 
and a new parastatal body called the Mining Development Corporation (MINDECO)
18
 was 
created. Another parastatal, called the Finance and Development Corporation (FINDECO), 
was set up to allow the government to gain control of banks, insurance companies and 
building societies. In 1970, Kaunda had announced the planned takeover of foreign banks, 
building societies and insurance companies (Kalley et al., 1999). However, several foreign-
owned banks, including Barclays Bank, Standard Chartered Bank and Grindlays Bank 
successfully resisted these moves (Tordoff, 1980). 
  
In 1971, INDECO, MINDECO, and FINDECO were brought together under an omnibus 
parastatal, the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO), thus creating one of the 
largest companies in sub-Saharan Africa, with President Kaunda as Chairman of the Board 
                                                          
16
INDECO was the holding company comprising: under agriculture - tobacco and sugar, fertilizers, feed and 
grain bags, corn milling, rural hotels, rural commercial and small-scale industrial development and fisheries; 
under manufacturing - tires, explosives, fabric and spirits; under transport – pipeline and trucking companies 
and two hotels (Beveridge, 1974). 
17
These later became the Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines (NCCM) and Roan Consolidated Mines  
(RCM), respectively 
18
MINDECO was created to take control of all the mining companies. 
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(Tordoff, 1980). Muma (2008) asserts that this large public sector, structured on the 
philosophy of ‘Humanism’, was created with forward and backward linkages to cut off 
competition from the private sector, raising a number of corporate governance issues; for 
example, twelve out of the twenty-two directors of ZIMCO were members of the Central 
Committee of the ruling UNIP (Bates and Colliers, 1995). Through the government, Kaunda 
had now established de facto control of Zambia’s manufacturing, mining and financial 
sectors; the parastatals were seen as an important arm of the party and all workers were 
expected to accept the philosophy of Humanism and subscribe to it (Tordoff, 1980). In 1982, 
NCCM and RCM were merged into the giant Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) 
entity (Tordoff, 1980). Ihonvbere (1996) argues that whilst the restructuring was nominally 
undertaken to benefit Zambians at large, “The process of expanding state control put vast 
resources and privileges at the disposal of the Zambian elite” (p. 51). At this point the state 
controlled economic activity ranging from mining conglomerates to bakeries. 
 
The ruling party became so powerful that Kaunda saw himself as the father of the nation, the 
main hero of the struggle and even the personification of the nation (Ihonvbere, 1996). With 
the parastatals in place, the political elite were able to extract surpluses and accumulate 
capital to support political programmes because at this point there was no practical 
distinction between the ruling party and the government. As Ihonvbere (1996) points out, 
this extensive state intervention in, and control of, the economy resulted directly in increased 
corruption, waste and mismanagement; for examples, jobs were being offered on the basis of 
political affiliation. 
 
2.4.3 Crisis and IMF Intervention 
 
The nationalisation of foreign and private companies by the Zambian government arguably 
came at the wrong time, as this was a period in which global oil prices rose sharply while 
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copper prices fell, consequently resulting in a decline in Zambian export earnings. In 1973, 
the nation experienced severe financial hardship, and this was seen by many as the starting 
point for what became a long slump in the economy of a once prosperous country. Copper 
revenues, which between 1965 and 1973 accounted for over 35% of Zambia’s GDP, over 
90% of all export earnings and 45% of total Zambian government revenues (Zacher, 1993) 
had halved in value on the world market by 1975. The following year, the balance-of-
payments crisis, coupled with a bid to revamp the economy, led to Zambia becoming 
massively indebted to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As McIntyre (2008) notes: 
“The drop in the prices of copper crippled Zambia’s economy. Efforts to stabilise 
the world copper price through a cartel of copper-producing countries, similar to the 
oil-producing (OPEC)-countries failed” (p.10).  
 
For mining companies, the sharp increase in the cost of production (reflecting increased oil 
prices along with the rapid decrease in income due to the fall in copper prices) was 
potentially fatal. In addition, inflation was rampant, running at over 60% in 1986 (Kalinda 
and Floro, 1992) and 190% in 1992 (Saasa and Carlsson, 1996). National long-term 
development plans were then instituted under the direction of a National Commission for 
Development Planning (NCDP) and the Transitional Development Plan (1964-66) which 
was later followed by the First National Development Plan (1966-71). However, these 
endeavours were all thrown into disarray, forcing the government to concentrate on short- 
term plans instead (Tordoff, 1980). According to Tordoff, the first two national planning 
programmes failed because, to many Zambians, ‘Zambianisation’
19
 meant little other than 
the replacement of departing colonial officers whilst having no significant effect on the 
economic situation. The ambitious Third National Development Plan (1978-83) with a 
broad-range of objectives and targets failed for similar reasons. Ultimately, all the three 
national development plans suffered from a lack of human resources and financial support 
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The ‘Zambianisation’ philosophy was developed to increase indigenous control of the economy by the 
replacement of foreign businesses with African or Zambian businesses 
 33 
(Kalumba and Freund, 1989). In the meantime, the IMF proposed measures to resuscitate 
the Zambian economy, the most significant of these being diversification, as the IMF had 
observed that the country’s ‘over-dependency’ on copper mining had made the economy 
vulnerable to shifts in copper prices and recommended action in this regard. Other measures 
proposed included; the ending of price controls; devaluation of the Zambian currency; 
reductions in government expenditure; cancellation of subsidies on food and agricultural 
fertilizer and targeted price rises for farm produce. However, these measures were being 
proposed at a time when the country’s economic meltdown was being felt by ordinary 
Zambians to such an extent that the attempt to remove food subsidies resulted in massive 
food riots and protests in the major cities around the country. For a government that 
appeared to be slowly losing its political grip, the IMF-driven decisions were extremely 
unpopular. In 1986, a government official publicly blamed the IMF for the economic 
problems in the country and a decision to free Zambia from its influence was made (Rakner, 
2003). The subsequent New Economic Recovery Programme (NERP) introduced in 1988 
reflected the government’s desire to escape from the pressures of foreign creditors but it 
proved so unpopular that it too was terminated (Rakner, 2003), forcing the government to go 
back to the IMF in 1989. As a result, the government announced its intention to partially 
privatise the parastatals. 
 
At this time, Zambia was rated as one of the most indebted nations in the world, relative to 
its gross domestic product. By mid-1989, Kaunda’s one-party political system was losing 
public support, as the people began advocating a multi-party system. Pressure was thus 
mounting on both the economic and political fronts, forcing Kaunda to change the 
constitution to allow for a multi-party system of political governance. In November 1991, 
Kaunda was forced to cut his presidential term and call multi-party elections which he lost to 
the opposition leader Frederick Chiluba. The new government immediately embarked on an 
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extensive programme of economic reforms aimed at liberalising an economy which had 
reached rock bottom. The new government endorsed free market policies, reversing state-
ownership of enterprises through the Privatisation Act of 1992, which gave the legal basis 
and responsibility to the Zambia Privatisation Agent (ZPA) for all government privatisation 
(ZPA, 2009)
20
.  
 
2.4.4 Privatisation and debt-relief in the Post-Kaunda era 
 
Privatisation in Zambia came about primarily as a practical way of recapitalising the SOEs 
and allowing them to operate efficiently and viably (ZPA, 2009). However, other reasons 
were advanced for the policy, including: mismanagement, monopolistic behaviour in 
manufacturing industries and the lack of competition common in parastatals (ZPA, 2009). 
However, on closer inspection it is clear that underpinning most of the stated aims of 
privatisation was a desire to develop a more robust system of what would now be described 
as corporate governance. The drive for privatisation in Zambia was a key part of an 
economic reform programme called the “Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)”
21
, 
intended to help create a private sector-driven economy with little interference from the 
Government. The privatisation of SOEs also relieved the government of Zambia of the 
mammoth losses continually created by the parastatal companies. 
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The MMD government which took power in 1991 included privatisation in its manifesto as a centrepiece of 
economic reform. They were of the view that a large number of SOEs were consuming extensive resources 
from the state in the form of investment requirements and subsidies, whilst achieving negative returns for 
Government; also, several members of the SOEs’ management were allegedly not accountable for 
commercial returns, but for political patronage instead and, therefore, the new government was required to 
remove all political interference in the running of the SOEs. 
21
Structural Adjustment Programmes are economic policies which countries must follow in order to qualify for 
new World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans, and to help them make debt repayments on 
the older debts owed to commercial banks, governments and the World Bank. Although SAPs are designed 
for individual countries, they have common guiding principles and features which include: export-led 
growth; privatisation; liberalisation; and efficiency. SAPs generally require countries to: devalue their 
currencies against the dollar; lift import and export restrictions; balance their budgets and not overspend; and 
remove price controls and state subsidies.   
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In the year 2000, Zambia met the performance criteria
22
 to qualify for the Highly Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief programme. The HIPC initiative was launched in 1996 by 
the IMF and World Bank, with the aim of ensuring that no poor country faces a debt burden 
it cannot manage (IMF, 2009a). After receiving debt relief of approximately US $6 billion, 
the post-debt relief period saw Zambia record significant economic growth (averaging 4.5%) 
and for the first time in 30 years inflation fell to single digits (McIntyre, 2008). The debt 
relief freed up resources for social spending and the government had some breathing space 
to implement further economic reforms (IMF, 2009b); many believed that Zambia would 
now be able to withstand economic shocks such as falls in copper prices which have a direct 
effect on the economy. To help accelerate progress towards the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs)
23
, the HIPC initiative was supplemented by the Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative (MDRI) which allows for 100% relief on eligible debts by three multilateral 
institutions (the IMF, the World Bank, and the African Development Fund (AfDF)) for 
countries completing the HIPC Initiative process (IMF, 2009a). The IMF has supported 
Zambia's efforts in the past with policy advice, lending, technical assistance and poverty 
reduction. However, copper mining is still central to Zambia’s economic prospects and 
concerns remain that the economy is not sufficiently diversified to cope with a collapse in 
international copper prices (Europa Publications, 2004). Despite the efforts outlined in this 
section, Zambia remains among the poorest countries in the world (McIntyre, 2008).  
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For example, countries must commit to poverty reduction through policy changes and demonstrate a good 
track-record over time. The IMF and World Bank provide interim debt relief in the initial stage, and when a 
country meets its commitments, full debt-relief is provided.             
23
The eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) - which range from halving extreme poverty to halting 
the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education, all by the target date of 2015 - form a 
blueprint agreed to by all the world’s countries and all the world’s leading development institutions. They 
have galvanized unprecedented efforts to meet the needs of the world’s poorest (United Nations, 2010). 
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2.5     The Legal Environment 
 
2.5.1 History and Colonial Influence  
 
As a former British protectorate, Zambia has retained the English common law system. La 
Porta et al. (2007) note that the historical origin of a country's laws is highly correlated with 
a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with economic outcomes; this 
theory is often referred to as the “Legal Origins Theory.” According to this theory, a 
country’s state of development may reflect - to a large extent - the extant legal system, 
which itself will have been influenced by origin, in particular the common law/civil law 
dimension
24
. La Porta et al. (2002), the argument appears to broadly favour the English-
derived common law model which, the authors suggest, is associated with greater economic 
growth than the French civil law, Scandinavian or German models. The La Porta et al. 
analysis characterises French civil law-based systems as exhibiting heavy regulation, 
relatively poor property rights, more corruption, less political freedom and a propensity not 
to leave a favourable post-colonial legacy, especially in Africa
25
. 
  
The extent to which the Legal Origins Theory holds true or adequately describes reality in a 
nation such as Zambia is still debatable; for example, concern in Mozambique about the 
continued application of colonial law was argued by the United Nations (2005) as having 
more to do with the manner of Portugal’s withdrawal from Mozambique (and the ensuing 
civil wars) than with the character of the civilian legal system the Portuguese left behind. 
Modern Zambia has a dual legal system, comprising the customary and constitutional law 
existing in English common law. The Zambian legal system is thus based primarily on 
common law traditions
26
. In fact, in the Zambian constitution there is a provision for the 
British Acts Extension Act, which provides for the extension or application of certain British 
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Gleaser and Shleifer (2002 pp. 1193) argue that the modern laws in many countries that were colonised are 
heavily influenced by their colonisers. 
25
This tendency is in line with the arguments of Djankov et al. (2002, pp. 17 and 34).  
26
Cross and Miller (2007) noted the presence of common law systems in former British protectorates. 
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Acts to Zambia, and for amendments to certain British Acts in their application to Zambia 
(National Assembly of Zambia, 2006)
27
.  
 
2.5.2 Branches of the Law 
   
Three main branches of law underpin Zambia’s legal system. These are the executive, 
legislative and judiciary. The constitution operates at the centre of the three arms to 
articulate their roles and responsibilities. The executive is headed by the president who 
draws his powers and authority from the constitution; he or she is mandated to dissolve the 
national assembly, establish and dissolve government ministries and departments subject to 
the approval of the national assembly (United Nations, 2005). The executive branch of 
Zambia’s government advises on policy decisions and carries out government programmes. 
The president is the chief executive and appoints a cabinet of senior officials to direct the 
work of government ministries. The president is elected directly by universal suffrage for a 
term of five years and may be re-elected only once.  Zambia’s legislative power rests with 
the national assembly where the republican president is also a member. The president is 
mandated by the constitution to call parliament to sit and order elections. With the power 
vested in him/her, he/she gives final approval to laws enacted by parliament although he/she 
does not take part in the deliberations of parliament. The legislative branch of government 
makes laws and represents citizens. Legislative power is exercised by bills passed by the 
National Assembly and assented to by the President in order to become law. The 
constitution stipulates that parliament shall consist of 160 members, 150 elected by universal 
suffrage and 8 nominated by the president, plus the speaker and the president (National 
Assembly of Zambia, 2006). Apart from enacting laws, the national Assembly also approves 
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Chapter 11 of the Laws of Zambia also formally outlines the extent to which the Law of England applies in 
the Republic of Zambia. 
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proposals for taxation and public expenditure and, to a large extent, keeps the work of the 
Government under scrutiny and review (Judiciary of Zambia, 2009). 
 
2.5.3 The Zambian Court System  
The Zambian judiciary system is made up of courts arranged in a strict hierarchy (United 
Nations, 2005). This is the branch of government that enforces the law. Zambian courts are 
arranged as follows: the Supreme Court; the High Courts; the Subordinates or Magistrate’s 
Courts; the Industrial Relations Court; and the Local Courts
28
 and any other courts as may 
be prescribed by an Act of parliament. The President appoints the Chief Justice (subject to 
ratification by national assembly) as well as the Director of Public Prosecutions and the 
Attorney General, the latter being the principal legal adviser to the government. The judges 
of the Supreme Court and the High Courts are subject to ratification by the National 
Assembly, also appointed by the President, while the magistrates who preside over the 
subordinate courts are appointed by the Judicial Service Commission. The conduct of the 
judges is governed by the provisions of the Judicial Code of Conduct Act, 1999 (Alemika, 
2009), while a Judicial Complaints Authority has also been established
29
. Common law is 
administered by several high courts, which have authority to hear criminal and civil cases 
and appeals from lower courts
30
. The Supreme Court is the highest and final court of appeal 
in Zambia (Judiciary of Zambia, 2009). The statutory provisions are adequate to guarantee 
judicial independence, but political influence and problems such as poor funding, trial 
delays, lack of training for local court judges and corruption have consequently resulted in 
the judiciary failing to attract and retain professional staff (Transparency International, 
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See also Judiciary of Zambia (2009). 
29
Members of the commission are appointed by the President subject to ratification by Parliament. The findings 
of the commission on misconduct by a judge are forwarded to appropriate authority for action (including the 
Director of Public Prosecutions) for prosecution, where necessary.  
30
Resident magistrate's courts are also established at various centres.   
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2007; Alemika, 2009)
31
. In order to enhance judicial independence these inadequacies need 
to be addressed because an independent judicial system not only enforces the rule of law but 
also aids economic development (Wanyama et al., 2009)
32
. 
2.5.4 Post Colonial Trends 
The legal system in Zambia was established during British colonial rule, though at the time 
the principle of separation of executive, legislative and judicial branches was not observed 
as colonial administrative officers exercised both legislative and judicial powers. Alemika 
(2009) argues that under colonial rule, the judiciary and legislative branches of law were 
viewed as instruments of administration rather than as providers of checks and balances to 
the executive. However, even in post-colonial Zambia, the executive organ is still dominant, 
to the extent of eroding the powers, independence, performance and integrity of the 
legislature and judiciary, despite the nation’s elaborate de facto constitution. The English 
common law on which the Zambian laws are founded have undergone a number of changes 
to suit the modern social and economic environment while the bulk of Zambian laws remain 
unchanged and therefore not responsive to the modern social and economic environment 
(MFNPD, 2004), arguably because mainly government’s persistence involvement in the 
economic management of the country (Rackner, 2003). The 1991 political and economic 
reforms have altered the situation slightly but the regulatory framework and the legal 
infrastructure remain very weak in Zambia (MFNPD, 2004). This lack of robustness in turn 
has had a negative impact on the development and regulation of corporate governance in 
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However, recent developments - especially the building of more court offices and court rooms and increased 
budgetary allocations - should help mitigate some of the problems faced by the judiciary. For example, the 
government of Norway provided about US$3million towards the construction of the new magistrates’ courts 
complex in Lusaka while Sweden spent about US$650,000 furnishing the court buildings, China provided 
electrical typewriters, and the German Technical Cooperation Agency helped develop training programmes 
(Institute for Security Studies, 2009).  
32
Rule of law aids economic development by enhancing the enforcement of contractual rights and obligations 
and thereby promoting economic investment, productivity and opportunities with positive impacts on 
employment, incomes, poverty reduction and avoiding economic-induced conflicts and insecurity. 
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Zambia. Several African studies have highlighted the serious consequences that a weak legal 
system can have on governance standards, as well as a growing perception amongst Africans 
that this issue is harming Africa’s development in a tangible way
33
.   
2.6    The Regulatory Environment 
 
2.6.1 Risk and Investment 
 
According to USAID (2009), one of the reasons for the historically poor performance of 
many African countries in attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is the risk associated 
with such ventures on the continent. Mugerwa et al. (1998) maintain that Africa is generally 
perceived to be a high risk continent for investment and is thus less open to international 
trade. Mugerwa et al. note that “While global foreign direct investment reached $100 billion 
in 1995, with 65% going to Asia and 27% to Latin America, only 5% went to Africa” 
(p.122). Such risks are often suggested as reflecting irresponsible political behaviour that 
leads inevitably to political instability and crises in governance (Boubakri et al., 2005; 
Visser et al., 2006). Weak investor protection and inefficient institutions are some of the 
factors making Africa a high risk investment environment and hindering the quality of 
governance (Boubakri et al., 2005; Doidge et al., 2007). In these environments, the legal 
system is usually weak and the law cannot adequately protect investors - the extent of civil 
order, taxation, domestic price controls, production restrictions, even government itself can 
change at any time (Doidge et al., 2007; Wanyama et al., 2009). Although political risk can 
be managed, it is often difficult in practice because of uncertainties surrounding its nature 
(De Hoyos, 1999). The presence of political risks and uncertainty about the future 
complicates the theoretical simplicity of calculating costs and benefits (Lax, 1983). Equally, 
it could be argued that an efficient functioning economy will not be realised unless there is a 
stable political system providing the necessary framework. However, Harms (2000) argues 
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See, for example, Wanyama et al. (2009) who report evidence relating to Uganda   
 41 
that many developing nations have in fact reformed and improved their regulatory 
frameworks (although not sufficiently to attract significant capital inflows). Here, the 
USAID (2009) point out that: 
“While this risk is sometimes associated with macroeconomic conditions and 
political stability, more often it arises from the poorly formulated policies, 
inappropriate regulations, and onerous bureaucratic requirements that continue to 
frustrate business start-up and operations in Southern Africa” (p.1).  
 
As argued above, Africa - and Zambia in particular - cannot formulate robust policies in the 
context of a serious governance crisis. 
 
2.6.2 Corporate Governance and Regulation in Modern Day Zambia 
 
The importance of the preceding issues for Zambia is evident in the nation’s on-going shift 
from command economy to market-based economy that began in 1991, with far reaching 
reforms aimed at supporting, regulating and protecting private enterprise. However, there is 
as yet no legislature that specifically covers corporate governance. Regulation therefore 
occurs via the corporate governance code developed for Lusaka Stock Exchange-listed 
companies, introduced in 2005
34, 35
. The government has a critical role in providing an 
enabling environment for all businesses, from SMEs to large national and global firms while 
also fostering an environment conducive for increased internal and external investment. 
Several developments are currently underway to improve the regulatory framework and 
enhance investment in the country, but a number of regulatory impediments appear to be 
affecting the development of competitive free markets; these include a lack of capacity to 
enforce the law and other regulation as well as Government’s continued ownership and 
control of major utility companies (Chulu, 2006). 
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This is detailed in section 2.8 below 
35
Notwithstanding the absence of specific legislation relating to corporate governance, several Acts of 
parliament and other instruments have an impact in this regard. The notable ones are outlined in Appendix 
2.1.   
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2.7      Education 
2.7.1 Historical Context 
A number of studies have linked education to democratic behaviour and attitudes, as well as 
being an indicator of socio-economic position (Garrison, 1979). In addition, recent studies of 
sub-Saharan Africa (e.g Wanyama, 2006) have explicitly linked educational deficiencies to 
weaknesses in extant corporate governance mechanisms. Before independence, the colonial 
powers attempted to shape the schooling process to support their own ends, as they had little 
interest in promoting native education (Carmody, 1992)
36
. At independence, there was a 
huge deficit in terms of educated indigenous Zambians capable of running the government 
and the economy; one manifestation of this was that the country only had 107 university 
graduates (RZ-MOE, 2009). Zambians began to realise that access to education was not only 
a means for a few to achieve privileged positions in society, but was also important for 
economic advances across society as a whole. The Zambian government thus began a 
programme of sweeping changes in the education sector. Specific reforms included changes 
in education policies and - critically - infrastructure development to support these moves 
(Silanda et al., 1999). More schools were built around the country; this was done with a 
sense of urgency to redress an area of neglect by the colonisers. The country then witnessed 
a remarkable acceleration in education, to the extent that between 1964 and 1972, annual 
secondary school enrolments increased from about 14,000 to 61,000 (Crowder, 2003). These 
expansions were challenged by limited resources, both financial and in terms of capacity, as 
more and more Zambians demanded exposure to education. Government efforts here were 
supplemented by the missionaries and the private sector. The private school system emerged 
mainly because of the poor quality of education in government-run schools and the lack 
                                                          
36
In this context, Posner (2003) noticed that by the time they got involved in education, missionaries were 
already operating close to 2000 schools in Northern Rhodesia with combined enrolments of more than 
89,000. 
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therein of infrastructure, personnel and other resources
37
. Private schools were dominated by 
Christian churches (Waters, 2008). The high standards in privately-run schools, especially 
those run by the church, as noted by Grace and O’Keefe (2007) became the first choice for 
quality education seekers all over the world, Zambia included. Before and just after 
independence, educational development in Zambia was in fact dominated by missionaries, a 
state of affairs which reflected British colonial influence (Ragsdale, 1986). Although the 
government asked churches to surrender schools to the state after independence, to date 
there are a good number of schools in Zambia that are still being run by missionaries 
(Carmody, 2000). The pro-colonial education system had a number of certification levels 
that resembled those in the British system
38
.  
2.7.2 The Modern Zambian System 
Zambia’s modern education structure provides broad-based childhood education with a 
sharp apex at the higher education level (RZ-MOE, 2009). According to the Ministry of 
Education, the system begins with early childhood education based on recognition of the 
importance of early experiences in the development of a child’s social, physical, mental and 
emotional capacities. Following (optional) pre-school, Zambians embark on seven years of 
primary education, which has the stated aim of laying the foundation on which all further 
education must build. The completion of primary education leads to secondary education 
which has duration of five years
39
.  Although a number of education reforms are now taking 
place, admission to secondary education is based on performance in examinations at the end 
of primary education implying that not all children are expected to proceed to secondary 
education. There are more secondary schools than there are colleges and universities in 
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English was adopted as the official language of instruction in Zambian schools and all subjects except the 
vernacular languages were taught in English. However, in rural schools pupils still continue to receive their 
primary education in their respective vernacular languages.    
38
In fact, for many years, secondary school education was formally supervised by the University of London.   
39
This is divided into junior secondary (grade 8 to 9) and senior secondary (grade 10 to 12). 
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Zambia and therefore the demand for admission to higher institutions is far from being 
satisfied (SARPN, 2008). Equally, higher education is very limited as there are very few 
well-established universities and in any case most Zambians cannot afford the fees (Banda, 
2007; SARPN, 2008). The two main universities are the University of Zambia
40
 and the 
Copperbelt University
41
. Those that do make it to state universities have access to state 
bursaries targeted at poor and vulnerable students; the majority are now receipients of 
extensive government support (RZ-MOE, 2009). 
The bottlenecks in terms of higher education - and the selection hurdles associated with it - 
mean that the majority of those who enter the Zambian school system fail to go onto third 
level education. In recognition of this problem, continuing education systems have been 
made a priority in the new education structure (RZ-MOE, 2009). Before 1991, the Ministry 
of General Education Youth and Sport and the Ministry of Higher Education, Science and 
Technology controlled education in Zambia, but now the two are split into the Ministry of 
Science and Technology and the Ministry of Education with the latter taking charge of 
primary education, secondary education, teacher training and universities. The Ministry of 
Education is in charge of formulating education policy and overseeing the operation of all 
educational institutions, including the two universities
42
. 
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The University of Zambia is Zambia's largest university, founded in 1966. It has a student population of 
about 10,000.      
41
In recent years a number of universities have emerged but these are still in their infancy and offer a limited 
range of courses. These include: the Catholic University; Mulungushi University; Zambia Open University; 
Cavendish University; Zambia Adventist University; Northrise University; and the University of Lusaka.   
42
The technical and vocational institutions are exempt, falling under the remit of the Ministry of Science and 
Technology instead.  
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2.8      Corporate Governance in Zambia  
 
2.8.1 Governance and Development 
 
The concept of corporate governance is very new in Zambia, only becoming a concern in 
recent years. However, the country now appears to have seen the need for stronger 
governance in listed and non-listed companies, as well as for parastatals and the government 
itself (Lungu, 2005). As noted earlier, the country has seen a number of economic models 
being used by the government to try and ensure that economic recovery is embedded fully, 
but all have proved futile. Lungu contends that the heightened focus on the notion reflects 
on-going concerns in Zambia regarding how the economy is being run and the way 
companies are directed and controlled. Zambia, like most African countries, is now 
committed to reforms that are aimed at fostering economic development, and improved 
corporate governance is one of the agenda items in this context. However, in practice the 
drive for better governance is galvanised by several different factors. Firstly, there has been 
a realisation of the strong link between corporate governance and development (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Berglof and Thadden, 1999; ECA-SA, 2005; Wu, 2005; NEPAD, 2007; 
Okike, 2007; Solomon, 2010). Consistent and substantive economic development has eluded 
Zambia for a long time and the findings of Claessens (2003), who documents evidence of a 
positive role for corporate governance in the development of emergent nations, suggests 
where Zambian priorities might usefully lie. In this context, the IFC (2007) argues that 
“Good corporate governance is a public good and can be considered a pillar of sustainable 
economic development on a par with good environmental and social practices”. 
 
2.8.2 Governance Failures 
 
The proliferation of corporate scandals and crises internationally is well documented and 
itself represents one of the key catalysts for the current focus on the way companies are run 
(Wanyama et al., 2009). However, Wanyama et al. maintains that these systematic failures 
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are not restricted to developed economies. Indeed, a number of liquidations in Zambia, 
especially in the banking sector, have been attributed to the absence of ‘good’ corporate 
governance practices (Zambia National Assembly, 2008). A study to review the banking 
sector reforms and bank regulatory failure in Zambia by Maimbo (2001) reveals that nine 
banks collapsed between 1995 and 1998. The corporate scandals and failures that the 
country witnessed in the banking and financial services industry during this period 
unearthed serious flaws and lapses in the governance arrangements of banks and similar 
financial institutions as well as the broader issue of state regulation of the sector (MFNPD, 
2004). The events exposed the weak regulatory environment that banks and other financial 
institutions operate within. Although the situation has been partly addressed through the 
introduction of a code for financial institutions (Bank of Zambia, 2006) much more needs to 
be done (IODZ, 2009).  
 
Nonetheless, to minimise failures in the banking sector, in 2006, the BOZ issued guidelines 
on corporate governance
43
. This initiative was in addition to the introduction of the Banking 
and Financial Services Act, Cap 387 of the Laws of Zambia (Constitution of Zambia, 2006) 
which provides for the regulation and conduct of banking and financial services in Zambia. 
The economic reforms of the 1990s witnessed extensive transfers of company ownership 
from government to private investors; this both reflected and resulted in the large-scale 
privatisation of SOEs, sparking the need for stronger corporate governance practices in the 
private sector (Lungu, 2005). According to Lungu, the introduction of these codes is 
evidence of Zambians coming to understand that improving corporate governance is vital for 
economic prosperity. Corporate governance is now regularly viewed as a remedy for 
developing countries’ poor record on corruption
44
 (Wanyama, 2006; Wanyama et al., 2009; 
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These are detailed in Chapter Four, where Zambian corporate governance is discussed in detail.  
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As evidenced by consistently poor rankings on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (Transparency 
International, 2007).    
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Tangari and Mwenda, 2001). In addition to corruption, the Anglo-American Corporation’s 
pull out of Zambia’s main mining conglomerate in 2002 just two years after acquiring the 
company has had major impact. In particular, this led to the government appointing a task 
force to save the mines from total collapse and a number of corporate governance challenges 
for the country emerged (Kaleyi, 2002; Kaunda, 2002). 
  
2.8.3 Governance Initiatives and Current Regulation 
  
Major recent initiatives to promote corporate governance in Zambia in the light of these 
events include: the establishment of the Institute of Directors of Zambia (IODZ) in 2000; the 
appointment of the Task Force to Save Konkola Copper Mines (KCM) in the year 2002; the 
development of a corporate governance code for LuSE listed and quoted companies in 2005; 
and the development of a corporate governance code by the IODZ for Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) in Zambia. These initiatives - together with support from regional and 
international corporate governance bodies - have shaped the direction of corporate 
governance in the country
45
. The notable regional and international corporate governance 
bodies include: the International Finance Corporation (IFC); the Commonwealth 
Association for Corporate Governance (CACG); the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD); the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD); the World Bank; the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the Global Corporate 
Governance Forum (GCGF); the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA); the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM); the King Report; and the Cadbury Report.  
 
Corporate governance regulation in Zambia today is based on the Lusaka Stock Exchange’s 
listing rules and its voluntary corporate governance code. All listed firms are encouraged to 
abide by the exchange’s corporate governance code and so, as in the UK, it is the stock 
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Good governance-conditional Donor Aid has played, and continues to play, a significant role in improving 
corporate governance (Santiso, 2001). 
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market authorities who are charged with ensuring compliance. The formation of the 
exchange in 1994 represented a key part of the government’s economic reform programme 
aimed at developing the nation’s financial and capital market and supporting and enhancing 
private sector initiatives. The Lusaka Stock Exchange is also expected to attract foreign 
portfolio investment by promoting Zambia as an emerging capital market with potentially 
high investment returns. Another important role of the Exchange is to facilitate the 
divestiture of Government ownership in parastatals and realise the objectives of creating a 
broad and wide shareholding ownership amongst the citizenry via a fair and transparent 
process (LuSE, 2008). However, the corporate governance framework in Zambia depends 
on the company law regime and other Zambian laws that relate to corporate governance 
matters, for example the Companies Act, Cap 388 of the Laws of Zambia (Constitution of 
Zambia, 2006) which govern corporate activity in Zambia. This Act provides for the 
formation, management, administration and winding-up of companies, the registration of 
charges over the undertakings or properties of companies, and the registration of foreign 
companies doing business in Zambia. 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
  
The aim of this chapter has been to provide an overview of historical and contemporary 
Zambia, to provide context for the empirical analysis presented later in the thesis. In 
particular, the material presented here is intended to help explain why a study of governance 
in the nation’s corporate sector (including its relationship with economic development) is 
likely to be important and of relevance to a country with Zambia’s political and economic 
circumstances. In addition, the discussion in the chapter should provide the basis for 
explanations given later in the thesis for observed practice as well as the normative 
recommendations made in the conclusion. In this context, the chapter has attempted to 
demonstrate Zambia’s huge reliance on copper as a single primary export, making the 
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country highly vulnerable to swings in commodity prices. It is widely accepted that the 
Zambian economy suffered for many years because of state protection and the reforms 
undertaken in the early 1990s to shift from government control to an open-market system 
have also been noted representing, as they do, a redirection of the country’s economic 
philosophy. The reforms have been accompanied by a range of institutional developments, 
at corporate level, in terms of market regulation and even as regards education. Having set 
out the context for the present study, the thesis continues by examining in detail the most 
relevant literature pertaining to the empirical work. Chapter Three discusses the body of 
work on corporate governance in general, before Chapter Four focuses on the situation in 
Zambia specifically, where some of the issues touched on in the present chapter are explored 
in more detail. Given this scenario, the remainder of this thesis is aimed, at investigating 
whether, and how, further improvements to Zambia’s corporate governance might benefit 
the population of a nation which, while relatively stable politically, still ranks among 
Africa’s poorest and requires significant inward investment.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW: GLOBAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE 
        
      GOVERNANCE 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the elements of the extensive corporate governance 
literature that are most relevant to the present study. Corporate governance has recently 
emerged as a mainstream topic and is now one of the most common phrases in global 
business (Solomon, 2010). Similarly, Mallin (2009) argues that: “...corporate governance 
and its everyday usage in the financial press is a new phenomenon of the last fifteen years or 
so” (p. 13). Corporate governance has emerged as a national and international issue 
(Cadbury, 2002) and one of the most widely discussed topics in business today because of 
the serious consequences that weaknesses therein (or its absence) can have on shareholders, 
employees and their pensions, suppliers of goods and services to corporations and 
economies at large. Though not a completely new concept, corporate governance’s revival is 
perhaps a manifestation of the fact that the principles and regulations surrounding the 
manner in which modern corporations are directed and controlled needs to be revisited 
(Dragneva and Simons, 2001). More than ever before, corporate governance issues are being 
widely researched and heavily debated, attracting considerable attention from both 
academics and practitioners in finance, accounting, management studies, business strategy, 
public policy, law, economics and society at large. 
  
Although Dallas (2004) argues that corporate governance has always been integral to 
business practices, the concept has today become an interdisciplinary topic because its 
boundaries are no longer synonymous with corporate confinements (Sloan, 2001 p. 337; 
Aoki, 2003; Babic, 2003; Clarke, 2004). The growing interest in corporate governance is 
manifested in the increasing body of academic research in the area; voluminous books on 
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the topic are written every year and studies of corporate governance appear regularly in 
almost all top academic journals
46
. The number of centres that have been established to co-
ordinate academic research on corporate governance around the world is also expanding
47
, 
while numerous other public corporate governance platforms have emerged that are not 
purely academic in nature but contribute significantly to corporate governance 
developments, reforms and practices
48
; there are also numerous institutes of directors all 
over the world performing a similar function including in Zambia. The international nature 
of some of these bodies reflects the tendency for modern corporate governance to cut across 
regional and international bodies while their number points to the importance of the topic.   
 
3.2 Corporate Governance Revival 
 
The revived interest in corporate governance is two dimensional. The first relates to the 
increasingly dispersed share ownership patterns and conflicts of interest that accompany the 
separation of ownership and control in more and more nations as large scale privatisations 
take place, and, second, the increase in the number and magnitude of high profile corporate 
scandals that have exposed weaknesses in current practice. The latter has led to sweeping 
laws and regulations in several countries which some scholars argue are ill-considered and 
may actually harm the corporation (Lipton and Lorsch 1992). However, Iskander and 
Chamlou (2000) believe that the new laws and regulations “are not meant to shackle the 
corporations but rather to balance the spirit of enterprise with greater accountability” (p. 1). 
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Notably: Corporate Governance: An International Review Journal (published by Blackwell); Corporate 
Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society (published by Emerald); and The British 
Accounting Review (published by Elsevier).   
47
E.g. the Centre for corporate governance research – The University of Birmingham, (2010); The Centre for 
corporate governance - (London Business School, 2010); Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and 
Performance - (Yale School of Management, 2010); The Corporate Governance Center – (University of 
Tennessee, 2010).  
48
For example, the OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance (Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, 2010); The Global Corporate Governance Forum, an International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) multi-donor trust fund facility located within IFC Advisory Services (International Finance 
Corporation, 2010); and The Commonwealth Association of Corporate Governance (2010). 
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The scandals have however, left many questioning whether the laws and regulation in place 
today are adequate to protect shareholders from abuse by their own agents. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and La Porta et al. (2000) identify shareholder protection from insider 
appropriation as crucial with both laws and their enforcement the main determinants. 
However, Lipton and Lorsch (1992 p. 1) argue that the problem is not the laws and 
regulations themselves, but is instead failures by those entrusted with the management of 
corporations (i.e. the directors) to make the system work. Similarly, Dallas (2004) believes 
that: 
“…there is the risk of cynical manipulation by companies or individuals who may 
wish to ‘game’ the system by creating a façade of high governance standards while 
hiding a rot that is concealed beneath the surface” (p. 4). 
  
Behind the laws and regulations, there appears to be an assumption that there will always be 
people of integrity to ensure the systems operate as designed. However, the corporate world 
has in the recent past witnessed managers who have elected to pursue their interests above 
those of shareholders, consequently short-circuiting the system. 
 
3.3 Corporate Governance Defined 
Corporate governance has attracted extensive public interest because of its apparent 
importance in aiding accountability, fairness, transparency, disclosure, the economic health 
of corporations and its ultimate contribution to economic development (Solomon, 2010). Its 
interdisciplinary nature poses great challenges for researchers in terms of attaining a 
universally accepted definition, and as a result, several definitions have emerged. The 
concept is sometimes poorly defined or defined to cover one aspect of corporate governance 
which, when considered from a different discipline, may be misleading (Mallin, 2009). A 
continuum of corporate governance definitions now exists, ranging from those that focus 
entirely on investors and the corporation’s responsibility to maximise wealth for them 
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(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Nganga et al., 2003) to those that focus on a wider perspective, 
responsive to the needs of different stakeholder groups (OECD, 2004b; Solomon, 2010). 
 
While these two broad classes of attempt to pin down the notion of corporate governance are 
evident in the literature, Plessis et al. (2005) note that: “One thing that is clear about the 
concept of corporate governance is that there is no set definition as to what it means” (p. 1), 
while Lee (2006) argues that: “Corporate governance appears to have as many meanings as 
it has its users” (p. 29), and Solomon (2007) states simply that: “there is no single, accepted 
definition of corporate governance” (p. 12). In relation to a corporation, Monks and Minow 
(2004) compared the definition of a corporation to the parable of the three blind men: 
“anyone who tries to come up with a definition is like the blind men who tried to 
describe an elephant - one feeling the tail and calling it a snake, one feeling the leg 
and calling it a tree and one feeling the side and calling it a wall” (p. 9). 
 
A number of researchers appear to have defined corporate governance so as to befit their 
specific interests in the area. For example, the South African King Report I in 1994 on 
corporate governance was highly influenced by the country’s special circumstances 
prevailing at the time, particularly the belief that the wealth of the nation was concentrated 
in the (minority) white population in the immediate post-apartheid era (Iheduru, 2004). The 
numerous suggested definitions of corporate governance are perhaps an indication that the 
debate surrounding the subject is far from trending towards convergence. Based on this brief 
background it is only fair to list a few of these various definitions rather than just 
mentioning one. 
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3.3.1 The Cadbury Committee’s Definition of Corporate Governance 
The Cadbury Committee, set up in May 1991 to investigate corporate governance
49
 levels in 
the United Kingdom, produced one of the first detailed reports on modern corporate 
governance, and provided the following in terms of a definition: “Corporate governance is 
the system by which companies are directed and controlled” (Cadbury Report, 1992 p. 15). 
The 1992 report established itself as a blue print for subsequent reports in Britain and 
elsewhere. The Cadbury Committee identified the critical roles of shareholders as 
appointing directors and auditors and ensuring that the sound governance structure needed to 
protect their interests in the corporation exists. The report also points out that central to 
modern corporate governance practices is the notion of the board of director’s responsibility 
for the governance of their companies. Sternberg (2004) puts it this way: “…shareholders 
choose the destination, the directors determine the route, and the executives drive the car” 
(p. 42). This approach calls for the establishment of governance structures and processes 
through which management can be made accountable to shareholders with the objective of 
enhancing shareholder value. The Cadbury definition was also adopted by the South 
Africa’s report on corporate governance, the King Report I (1994) and the UK’s Hampel 
Committee that published its Final Report on corporate governance in 1998
50
. While the 
Hampel Committee made no attempts to re-define corporate governance it made the explicit 
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The report, published in December 1992, confined itself to the “Financial Aspects” of corporate governance. 
The committee was set up by the Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange, and the 
accountancy profession. The report applied to London Stock Exchange (LSE) listed companies reporting 
after 30th June 1993. Since then a whole series of revised codes have been issued in the UK, most recently 
(June 2010, the UK Corporate Governance Code) but the ‘comply or explain’ basis and substantive 
requirements have remained similar most pertinently the new code quotes and reiterates the Cadbury 
definition of corporate governance terming it “Classic”   
50
“We can accept the Cadbury committee’s definition of corporate governance as ‘the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled’ (report, paragraph 2.5). It puts the directors of a company at the 
centre of any discussion on corporate governance, linked to the role of the shareholders, since they appoint 
the directors. This definition is of course a restrictive one. It excludes many activities involved in managing a 
company which may nevertheless be vital to the success of the business” (p. 11). 
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claim (absent from Cadbury) that whilst the board is ‘responsible for relations with’ main 
potential stakeholders, accountability is due only to equity holders. 
  
Chambers (2002) argues that the Cadbury definition focused excessive attention on the 
control side of governance at the expense of formulation of policy and strategy 
development. This, according to Chambers (2005), has diverted boards’ attention away from 
direction and strategy and on to accountability, audit, risk management and control matters. 
However, Chambers (2005) explains that the UK’s bias towards control could have 
prevented the spectacular corporate governance catastrophes at WorldCom and Enron in the 
USA. Other scholars perceive the Cadbury definition as being too narrowly-focused, as it 
(like those that followed in the UK) concentrates on the relationship between a company and 
the owners (Sheikh and Rees, 1995; Solomon, 2010). However, Sir Adrian Cadbury later 
offered a broader corporate governance definition thus: 
“Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and 
social goals and between individual and communal goals…the aim is to align as 
nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society” (Cadbury, 
1999 p. iv). 
  
Despite the sheer number of corporate governance definitions, the original Cadbury 
terminology has not been disputed to any major extent. In fact, it is widely recognised in the 
field of corporate governance and continues to be used as the basis of other definitions; for 
example, The King II Report of 2002 and the Global Corporate Governance Forum in 2003. 
Dallas (2004) argues that the genesis of the current debates and modern literature on 
corporate governance is, to a large extent, espoused by the work done by the UK’s Cadbury 
Committee in the early 1990s. 
  
3.3.2        Shleifer and Vishny’s Definition of Corporate Governance 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) defined corporate governance as follows:  
“Corporate governance deals with the way in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” (p. 737).  
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This is the definition that most supporters of the shareholder model (i.e. the traditional 
Anglo-American theory) of corporate governance embrace. The assumption in the above 
wording is that corporate actions are directed at achieving the objectives established by the 
owners and, in this case, lenders. This is what Sternberg (2004) argues is the “official” 
objective relevant to corporate governance; according to Sternberg, anything beyond this 
constitutional purpose violates corporations’ very reason for being. Because ownership and 
control are separated, corporate governance in this context is viewed as a mechanism for 
aligning managers’ actions to the corporate purpose established by shareholders; 
accountability in this sense is discharged towards achieving the latter (Sternberg, 2004). 
Whilst directors are assumed to have a fiduciary duty to carry out business in the best 
interests of the company’s current and future shareholders, Brennan and Solomon (2008) 
argue that such an approach is sometimes viewed as narrowly-focused because it excludes 
the wider community of other stakeholder groups that participate in the success of the 
corporation (see Coleman, 2007 and Solomon, 2010). 
3.3.3 The OECD Definition of Corporate Governance 
 
Since 1999, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has 
been responsible for advancing the corporate governance agenda in OECD member 
countries and its principles have influenced the development of codes in many developing 
nations. The OECD (2004b) views corporate governance as involving: 
“…a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the 
structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. [To] provide 
proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the 
interest of the company and its shareholders and should facilitate effective 
monitoring. The presence of an effective corporate governance system, within an 
individual company and across an economy as whole, helps to provide a degree of 
confidence that is necessary for the proper functioning of a market economy” (p. 11). 
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Teresa (2004) argues that the OECD principles of corporate governance grew out of the 
Cadbury Committee’s Report, and its definition of corporate governance is an extension of 
the latter’s definition. Without disputing the Cadbury, the OECD went further by embracing 
governance relations and exploring the benefits of good practice for both corporations and 
economies. There is recognition that corporations no longer act independently from the 
societies in which they operate; how firms relate to society is therefore crucial in a corporate 
governance setting. Because of its relatively wide perception, the OECD definition is 
viewed as broad and more pervasive than many others (Jesover and Kirkpatrick, 2005).  
 
3.3.4 Solomon’s Definition of Corporate Governance 
 
Solomon (2010) also acknowledges that corporate governance is relatively new as a 
mainstream subject and, coupled with its dynamic nature, this leads to definitions sometimes 
varying across and even within national boundaries. However, Solomon views corporate 
governance definitions that are restricted to the traditional finance paradigm (shareholder-
centric) as narrow. Influenced by the current trend for broadened corporate governance 
frameworks, Solomon (2010) instead defines corporate governance as follows: 
“…the system of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, 
which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders 
and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business activity” (p. 6). 
  
Solomon’s definition thus embraces a number of issues that have attracted renewed attention 
in recent years, such as broadened accountability and corporate social responsibility 
premised on a stakeholder inclusivity approach. This perspective is particularly relevant for 
Africa where there have been calls for a broader governance paradigm that accommodates 
the continent’s complex cultural, political and economic factors (Wanyama et al., 2009). 
 
3.3.5 Nganga et al.’s Definition of Corporate Governance 
 
Nganga et al. (2003) defined corporate governance as: “...the set of mechanisms through 
which outside investors are protected against expropriation by insiders” (p. 6). The authors 
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defined insiders as including managers, major shareholders (individuals, other firms, family 
interests and/or governments) as well as large creditors (e.g. banks), while outsiders 
encompass equity investors, providers of debt, minority shareholders etc. Nganga et al. 
describe corporate governance as “simply the prevention of theft” (p. 4) and so their 
definition is very different in emphasis from the other three. These authors take a radical 
look at corporate governance, seeing it as a mechanism for the “prevention of theft” by those 
that have a management role in the firm. ‘Theft’ is clarified in the study as including: 
outright theft of assets, transfer pricing, excessive executive compensation and diversion of 
funds to projects that do not benefit the suppliers of finance. According to Lungu (2005), the 
abuses mentioned by Nganga et al. are some of the most prevalent across corporate Africa as 
whole.      
Accountability, transparency, integrity and investor protection are common themes in all the 
above definitions. Following Solomon (2010)’s argument that corporate governance 
definitions fall on a spectrum (narrow to broad), the Cadbury Report (1992), Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) and Nganga et al. (2003) all tend to focus on the relationship between the 
company and its shareholders, thereby ignoring a number of stakeholder groups that 
participate in the creation of wealth for the company; they therefore fall on the narrow end 
of the spectrum. At the other end of the spectrum lies the OECD (2004b)’s and Solomon 
(2010)’s definitions, which are broad-based, and more stakeholder inclusive. While the 
Cadbury definition has formed the basis of corporate governance codes the world over, this 
study adopts Solomon (2010)’s definition. The reason for this choice is laid out in detail in 
the theoretical framework chapter.  
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3.4       Developments in the Theory of Corporate Governance 
3.4.1  Overview 
 
While there is a large literature that examines development of corporate governance’s 
theoretical underpinnings, these have generally emanated from scholars in developed 
nations; theoretical work pertaining to Africa is scant. There is a general consensus that the 
development of corporate governance in Africa should be viewed in the context of its 
relationship to development, democracy, state effectiveness and the market (NEPAD, 2007). 
Nevertheless, Mallin (2009)’s broad theoretical framework is discussed here as many of the 
concepts appear to be of relevance in both emerging and developed contexts. 
 
3.4.2 Agency Theory 
Agency theory is one of the best known and most widely used theories across the business 
and finance discipline (Spence and Zeckhauser, 1971; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 
1980). Agency theory is customarily considered the genesis for debate on corporate 
governance (Smith, 1838; Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Coleman, 2007). As Berle and Means (1932) note, the fundamental agency 
problem in modern firms reflects the separation of management and control; academic 
investigation of agency theory relates to conflicts of interest that arise between self-
interested people with different interests in the same assets and organisations, primarily 
managers and owners. Whilst acknowledging that various agency relationships exist in 
Zambian firms, the present study focuses on the wider stakeholder perspective models.  
Recognising the separation of providers of capital from the executive management creates 
the tension which agency theory purports to diffuse (Lu and Battern, 2001). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) defined an agency relationship as follows: 
“[A] contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating 
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some decision making authority to the agent. If both parties to the relationship are 
utility maximisers, there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act 
in the best interests of the principal” (p. 5). 
 
Mallin (2007) describes agency theory in similar terms as follows:  
“Agency theory identifies the agency relationship where one party, the principal, 
delegates work to another party, the agent. The agency relationship can have a 
number of disadvantages relating to the opportunism or self-interest of the agent: for 
example, the agent may not act in the best interests of the principal, or the agent may 
act only partially in the best interests of the principal” (p. 12). 
In both definitions, agency theory is viewed as explaining the relationship between 
principals (shareholders) and agents (company executives); Eisenhardt (1989) argues that 
from this perspective the theory can be seen as focussing on solutions to the conflict 
between principal and agent and resolving differences in risk preferences when the parties 
have different attitudes in this regard (see Mallin, 2007, 2009). The principal-agent concept 
and the separation of ownership and control have been cited as explanations of the 
controversy surrounding the relationship between shareholders and directors in the modern 
corporation (Berle and Means, 1932). Agency theory is thus pertinent to any corporate 
governance debate as it predicts (and influences) the structure and composition of boards 
and (more generally) the balance of power between the capital providers and directors 
(Cadbury, 2002).  However, critics of the theory describe it as having a narrow focus 
because of its concentration on stock price (Hirsch and Friedman, 1986), while others 
describe it as one-sided because it excludes other relevant participants (Perrow, 1986). 
Whilst this study does not explicitly employ agency theory as its theoretical lens, some of 
the central tenets of the model are evident in Zambia (i.e. the separation of capital provision 
from executive functions) and therefore the issues are explored further in the theory chapter.   
3.4.3  Stakeholder Theory  
In contrast to agency theory, stakeholder theory proposes a broader corporate answerability 
that extends beyond shareholders. Coleman (2007) argues that by identifying shareholders 
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as the only interest group in the corporate entity agency theory exposes its narrowness, 
thereby prompting the proponents of stakeholder theory to call for a balance between the 
competing interests of diverse stakeholders. In this context, stakeholder theory explains the 
role of corporate governance in Zambia than agency theory. Freeman (1984) defines a 
stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of 
the organisation’s objectives” (p. 46), while an earlier analysis, by Dill (1975), viewed 
stakeholder relationships in terms of influence and responsibility; one dimension of the latter 
relates to firms’ influence on stakeholders while another exists in terms of the stakeholders’ 
impact on the firm. By implication, stakeholders’ levels of interest and power in the firm 
differ. Solomon (2010) notes that stakeholder theory is framed on the premise that company 
success is achieved through broader participation, implying that accountability should also 
be broadened to embrace the many stakeholder groups that participate directly and indirectly 
in achieving corporate purposes (see e.g. McDonald and Putty, 1979; Coleman, 2007). 
These participants include shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, 
communities and the general public (Solomon, 2010). Freeman et al. (2010) argue that the 
early proponents of the stakeholder concept focused on ‘primary’ stakeholders
51
, i.e. those 
people without whose support the organisation would cease to exist. However, according to 
this author, this approach was perceived to be narrow as it excluded a number of stakeholder 
groups, including environment and society. This realisation was the first step towards a 
broader view, and the conceptualisation of a ‘stakeholder’ now typically includes suppliers, 
customers, stockholders, employees, the media, political action groups, communities, 
governments and the environment (Mallin, 2009; Freeman et al., 2010; Solomon, 2010). 
Evan and Freeman (1993) propose that corporations should act for the benefits of its 
stakeholders (the principle of “corporate legitimacy”) and must balance stakeholders’ and 
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Primary stakeholders would include employees, suppliers, customers, financial institutions and the local 
communities in which the corporation conducts business. 
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corporate interests (the “stakeholder fiduciary” principle). Each version of the theory has its 
own implications for corporate governance structures and monitoring mechanisms (Mallin, 
2009). As will be argued in detail later in this thesis, the stakeholder notion is central to 
many of the governance reports to emerge in Africa, as well as the broader cultural norms of 
the continent (Wanyama et al., 2009).   
   
3.4.4 Transaction Cost Economics 
The term transaction cost economics (TCE) covers a broad range of phenomena across 
disciplines. Whilst this thesis ultimately adopts a broader stakeholder-oriented approach, 
many of the key ideas in TCE are relevant to organisations in the developing world, not least 
the mechanisms used for efficient interaction in an environment where resources are scarce. 
While acknowledging that there is a very thin line between agency theory and transaction 
cost theory, Solomon (2010) notes that despite both approaches focusing on aligning the 
interests of managers (agents) and shareholders (principals), agency theory employs the 
individual agent as the unit of analysis while TCE uses the transaction. Mallin (2009) 
believes TCE as a theory that: “…views the firm as a governance structure whereas agency 
theory views the firm as a nexus of contracts” (p. 17). Similarly, Shelanski and Klein (1995) 
describe TCE as trying to explain: 
“…how trading partners choose, from the set of feasible institutional alternatives, the 
arrangement that offers protection for their relationship-specific investments at the 
lowest total cost” (p. 337). 
 
Shelanski and Klein argue that certain governance structures affect the management of 
transactions better than others and so TCE focuses on how the principal can be protected 
from the hazards associated with contracts across a range of relationships. Problems of 
intentionally rational behaviour (bounded rationality) and opportunism imply that agents 
(managers) organise transactions in their best interest and this propensity needs to be 
checked (Mallin, 2009; Solomon, 2010). Because the world is complex, economic agents are 
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rational, with (in most cases) outcomes that are not verifiable and contracts that are typically 
incomplete (Williamson, 1979; Harts, 1995; Shelanski and Klein, 1995). According to 
Shelanski and Klein, the incompleteness of contracts exposes investors to hazards, and they 
call for appropriate governance structures to be developed to address this. The 
appropriateness of governance structures depends on the characteristics of the relationship. 
Consistent with this theme, Williamson (1984) affirms that an appropriate governance 
structure should minimise the costs of any conflict of interest in a relationship (as opposed to 
realigning incentives). In this context, Shelanski and Klein (1995) argue that TCE can be 
seen as the “study of alternative institutions of governance” (p. 337). 
 
3.4.5 Stewardship Theory 
 
Whilst agency theory has dominated modern corporate governance research, it has several 
purported weaknesses and limitations. For example, the analysis restricts itself to economic 
assumptions (Doucouliagos, 1994) and excludes a number of important organisational 
factors (Davis et al., 1997). Davis et al. (1997) argue that stewardship theory instead defines 
relationships that are based on behavioural aspects: “in which managers are not motivated 
by individual goals, but rather are stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives of 
their principals” (p. 21). In this context, agency theory is seen as a ‘fire fighting’ theory 
whereas stewardship theory is not, because it is assumed that agents do not depart from the 
interests of their principals. Davis et al. (1997) argue that even where the interests are not 
perfectly aligned, the agent under stewardship opts for co-operation rather than defection. 
Coleman (2007) emphasises the distinguishing feature of stewardship theory as that of 
replacing: “… the lack of trust to which the agency theory refers with respect for authority 
and inclination to ethical behaviour” (p. 4). The similarity between the agency and 
stewardship theories is that they both “assume a strong relationship between the success of 
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the organization and the principal’s satisfaction” (Davis et al., 1997 p. 25), hence they both 
emphasise the owner’s interests. 
   
3.4.6    Theories - A Corporate Governance Implication 
Despite globalisation, selecting the right lens for investigation of a particular country is 
difficult as corporate governance paradigms employed in practice continue to differ across 
nations (Berglof and Thadden, 1999; Cornelius and Kogut, 2003). Some of these differences 
reflect ownership patterns, business culture and the strength of the legal and regulatory 
systems in given countries (La Porta et al., 1997).  In this context, each theory has its own 
implications for corporate governance (Mallin, 2009). Although each theory implies 
particular corporate governance institutions, Hirsch et al. (1987) argue that agency theory is 
the commanding paradigm underlying early corporate governance research. This assertion is 
manifested by the fact that in many countries - both developed and developing - companies 
are run primarily for the benefit of shareholders, in the context of: a commercial focus; a 
profitability and efficiency orientation; ownership concentrated in a few hands (with strong 
de facto power over management, sometimes through an executive chairman); imperfect 
information asymmetry; and poor protection for minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 
1997).   
Modern agency theory emphasises the asymmetry of information and, in this context, views 
corporate governance as a mechanism that limits agents’ potential to engage self-serving 
behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Iskander and Chamlou, 2000; Roe, 2005; Fernando, 2009; Love, 2010); many governance 
reforms witnessed around the world intended to reduce managerial control rights are set-out 
on this basis. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency theory is premised on the 
understanding that managers will not act in the best interests of shareholders unless 
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appropriate governance structures are implemented in the large corporation. In achieving 
this, the board of directors has been identified as being crucially important (Tricker, 1984) 
and every major report devotes significant attention to its structure, balance and 
responsibility.  
However, Solomon (2010) argues that corporate governance, being a dynamic multi-
disciplinary paradigm, is more pervasive in nature and the plethora of issues it raises go 
beyond the ambit of the needs of suppliers of finance and perhaps requires an inter-
disciplinary approach (see Babic, 2003; OECD, 2004b); even if shareholder wealth is 
maximised, there is no reason to assume all obligations would necessarily be satisfied. On 
the other hand, Harts (1995) argues that corporate governance is only necessary if there is 
uncertainty about some futuristic actions not specified in the initial contract; specifically, he 
argues that: “corporate governance issues arise wherever contracts are incomplete and 
agency problems exist” (p. 688).   
 
3.5     Corporate Governance in Developed Countries 
Recent decades have seen the concept of corporate governance evolve into a central theme 
in academic and professional debates (Burton et al., 2004, Solomon, 2010). Though in one 
sense not a new subject for discussion (many of the issues discussed by Berle and Means 
(1932) resonate with key aspects of the concept) it has seen a marked revival, particularly in 
developed countries, sparked by high profile governance failures around the globe (Babic, 
2003). These events have forced the attention of governments, regulators, corporations, 
investors and the general public on to the costly repercussions of weaknesses in the 
corporate sector and the need to prevent these in the future (Jesover and Kirkpatrick, 2005). 
Although the empirical context of this thesis is based on analysis of a developing country, 
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the debate in developed countries has influenced much of the debate in the former and is 
therefore examined here prior to analysis of the developing world. 
  
The debates converge on a range of issues affecting investor protection, the roles and 
responsibilities of stakeholders, the powers and responsibilities of boards of directors, 
finance, strategic management and general company performance (Berglof and Thadden, 
1999; Babic, 2003). As corporate governance underpins the debate on economic 
development, Berglof and Thadden (1999) argue that the preoccupation of most countries 
and stock exchanges is the development of corporate governance guidelines that help attract 
the capital needed for growth in a globalised marketplace. However, corporate governance is 
not only a highly relevant paradigmatic concept for countries seeking development, but is 
also important for nations that have attained higher levels of development (Wu, 2005). 
Corporate governance is a necessity for rich economies as it can induce the institutional 
changes required for improved economic performance; it is still receiving significant 
attention in developed economies including the US in this context (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Shkolnikov, 2002; Oman, 2003). Hill (2007) notes that apart from the philosophical 
differences, particularly between the US and other developed countries, there are other 
variations, especially concerning board structure with the single tier board prevalent in the 
Anglo-American model and the two-tier board more commonly-embraced in Germany, 
Eastern Europe, France and several other European countries. The US and the UK have 
predominantly dispersed share ownership patterns, with very strong institutional shareholder 
activism. However, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that, despite the dissimilarities, 
developed countries in general have relatively robust corporate governance systems because 
they are anchored on developed governance institutions. 
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3.5.1    Momentum for Corporate Governance Change in Developed Countries 
Most early analyses cite the neoclassic principal-agent framework as the catalyst for 
corporate governance developments and reforms around the world (Babic, 2003). However, 
over time the basis of the debate has changed in the wake of a number of events in the 
corporate world and general theorising regarding the role of the modern firm. A series of 
crises at corporate level have served to emphasise ‘good’ governance not only as an agency 
measure, but also as a tool for attracting the investment required for growth and 
development. Technological advances, globalisation, corporate scandals and investor 
activism are some of the specific events often cited as having spurred on the corporate 
governance debate over the past two decades (Berghe, 2002; Rezaee, 2007).  
 
Charkham and Ploix (2005) pin-point the globalisation-led loosening of restrictions on the 
movement of capital (coupled with the increased opportunities for cross-border investment) 
as one of the key drivers of corporate governance reforms in developed countries. However 
shareholder activism, Berghe (2002) contends, has become overly influential, particularly in 
developed countries where the mechanism has received a lot of attention. The implication 
for investors is that exploring only firms (and markets) that offer a good return on 
investment along with effective protection for the suppliers of finance will be beneficial. 
  
The well-publicised failures of high profile companies (and the consequential impacts on 
stakeholders and economies at large, particularly in developed countries) underpin the 
corporate governance revival and reforms in such countries. Mallin (2007)
52
 describes the 
impact as follows:      
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Some of the companies whose collapses have been blamed on poor corporate governance include:  Barings 
Bank in 1995; Enron in 2001;  the financial scandals surrounding the third largest food retailer in the world, 
Royal Ahold in 2003; the collapse of Parmalat in 2003; HIH, one of  Australia’s largest insurers, which 
became one of the biggest corporate collapses with debts of over $A5 billion and liquidation in 2001; and the 
China Aviation Oil Holding Company, which suffered a near collapse after losing some $US550 million on 
speculative oil derivatives trading in 2004.  Mallin (2007) provides a fuller list. 
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“These corporate collapses have had an adverse effect on many people: shareholders 
who have seen their financial investment reduced to nothing; employees who have 
lost their jobs and, in many cases, the security of their company pension, which has 
also evaporated overnight; suppliers of goods and services to the failed companies; 
and the economic impact on the local and international communities in which the 
failed companies operated” (p. 1). 
    
Shkolnikov (2002) argues that ‘bad’ or ‘lacking’ corporate governance not only leads to 
corporate scandals, but has far reaching implications; this suggestion is echoed by Wanyama 
(2006) thus:  
“If any company is not properly managed and it collapses or gets a problem, the 
effect of the corruption or poor management goes beyond the managers” (p. 56). 
  
This line of thought is consistent with the most recent scholarly literature on corporate 
governance (see e.g., Arun and Turner, 2009; Claessens and Bruno, 2010). Financial 
scandals and corporate failures have resulted in the emergence of new laws and regulations 
(Obanida, 2000; Hill, 2005; De Nicolo et al., 2008; Claessens and Bruno, 2010); some 
countries have vigorously pursued the mandatory regulation route (for example, the US), 
while others have preferred a voluntary approach (for example, the UK) (Claessens and 
Bruno, 2010). Irrespective of approach, however, the failures identified inadequacies in 
extant corporate governance systems that needed addressing. Rezaee (2007) argues that 
corporate laws and regulations in the US have become the drivers of corporate governance 
as they determine how companies are established, define shareholder rights and establish 
fiduciary duties of directors and officers.   
 
3.5.2 Properly Run Firms as Drivers of Wealth 
 
The concept that ‘properly’ run firms are the drivers of wealth has influenced developed 
countries to strive towards reforming their stock exchanges and firms, making them more 
attractive to both domestic and international investors by ensuring protection against risk 
(Ireland et al., 2001; Hart et al., 2003). Markets and firms that achieve this objective are 
likely to attain a huge competitive advantage over others (Hart et al., 2003). In this context, 
Enriques (2009) argues that: 
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“Poor investor protection mechanisms and institutions are a heavy competitive 
disadvantage in the competition for investors” (p. 7). 
  
The theory is quickly being absorbed in developing nations and Africa in particular. Okike 
(2007) writing about corporate governance in Nigeria, states that:  
“In recognition of the vital role that the modern corporation plays in the economic 
development of any nation, and the need to ensure good governance of these 
corporations, there has been an upsurge in global initiatives to provide governance 
principles for the effective management and control of these corporations” (p. 173). 
 
 
Consistent with the notion, the IFC (2008) EU Internal Market Commissioner Frits 
Bolkestein said that: 
  
“Company law and corporate governance are right at the heart of the political 
agenda, on both sides of the Atlantic. That’s because economies only work if 
companies are run efficiently and transparently. We have seen vividly what happens 
if they are not: investment and jobs will be lost; and in the worst cases, of which 
there are too many, shareholders, employees, creditors and the public are ripped off” 
(p. 3). 
 
There is overwhelming scholarly evidence to suggest that proper governance of corporations 
has become crucial
53
 in terms of wealth creation. The following three quotations support this 
concept: 
“… proper governance of companies will become as crucial to the world economy 
as the proper governing of countries” (Wolfensohn, 1999). 
 
“... over the last century the corporation has become society’s principal agent of 
economic activity and development” (Oman, 2003 p. 7). 
“There is… a need to stress the importance of individual companies to every 
country’s economy since prosperity so largely hinges on the way they are run” 
(Charkham and Ploix, 2005 p. 1). 
 
Similarly, Bottomley (2007) points out that: 
“Corporations are so much a part of our lives that their role is usually taken for 
granted, going unnoticed until the occurrence of some dramatic event brings it to our 
attention…. Principally it is corporations that supply or control our access to goods 
and services, work and leisure, knowledge and information. The activities of 
corporations’ shape or influence national economies. …. They contribute to the 
provision of social welfare and national development, either in partnership with or by 
taking over from the work of governments” (p. 1). 
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For example, Oman (2003) suggests that: “Institutions of corporate governance facilitate and stimulate the 
performance of corporations, the principal forces behind economic wealth in society. The institutions of 
corporate governance ensures corporate conformance with investors’ and society’s interests and expectations 
by limiting the abuse of power, the stealing or siphoning-off corporate assets, the moral hazard, and the 
significant wastage of corporate controlled resources” ( p. 3).    
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Corporations in developed countries are widely viewed as engines for wealth creation 
(Ireland et al., 2001; Hart et al., 2003). While Charkham and Ploix (2005) applaud this 
theory, they stress that the role of individual firms should not only be seen as that of 
maximising returns on investment, but also as an element of social cohesion. The advent of 
globalisation has led to increases in firm size through cross-border mergers and acquisitions, 
with resulting changes in ownership structures that Blowfield and Murray (2008) cite as 
some of the key drivers of corporate governance reforms. Having outlined the key issues 
surrounding and arising from the governance debate in the developed world, the discussion 
now turns to developing nations, the site of this thesis’s empirical research. 
 
3.6 Corporate Governance in Developing Countries 
Berglof and Thadden (1999) argue that the implications and importance of corporate 
governance varies according to national levels of development, with Oman (2003) 
suggesting that: “The quality of corporate governance matters greatly for developing 
countries” (p. v). Scholarly literature appears to suggest that a need for ‘good’ corporate 
governance is more pressing for - and matters most to - countries in transition rather than 
those already developed (Babic, 2003; Oman, 2003; McGee, 2008; Siddiqui, 2010). This 
argument is based on the premise that developing countries have been relatively slow to 
establish the institutions and infrastructure needed to facilitate meaningful corporate 
governance systems (Wanyama et al., 2009). Although most developing countries have 
made significant strides in this regard, Dallas (2004) argues that the concept is still in its 
nascent stage, although Pascal (2002) acknowledges that conceptualisation of corporate 
governance in developing countries is inevitably much more complicated due to the many 
challenges that characterise these nations. In particular, developing countries have been 
characterised as having: weak institutions; poor infrastructure; complicated tax systems; 
confusing accounting standards; absence of the rule of law; politicisation of the business 
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sector; weak enforcement agencies and frail stock markets, all of which create challenges for 
those concerned with improving corporate governance practices (Pascal, 2002; Babic, 2003). 
While corporate governance reforms in most developed countries revolve around agency 
theory (Gilson, 1996; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Vinten, 2001), in developing countries - 
where ownership and control are predominantly concentrated - (La Porta et al., 1997), 
reforms are often couched in terms of a multiplicity of issues (Wanyama et al., 2009); for 
example, using Bangladesh as a case study, Siddiqui (2010) finds that the challenges 
affecting corporate governance development in emerging countries include:  
“high ownership concentration, reluctance of the corporate sector to raise funds 
through the capital markets, lack of shareholder activism, availability of bank 
financing, and poor enforcement and monitoring of regulations” (p. 1). 
 
The numerous idiosyncrasies that challenge corporate governance in developing countries 
makes it difficult for such nations to embrace the theories that have influenced the debate in 
developed countries (Babic, 2003). However, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the non-
existence of corporate governance mechanisms in developing countries could be responsible 
for the insurmountable developmental challenges that emerging countries face. On the other 
hand, Plender (1999) characterises the World Bank and the OECD as having prescribed 
corporate governance standards for the developing world that have been shaped in (and for) 
the richest nations on the planet. Plender finds this practice politically contentious and 
noxious. Notwithstanding the unsuitability inherent in transplanting corporate governance 
templates designed for developed markets, the World Bank and OECD have established 
institutionalised programmes that acknowledge and identify problematic specificities such as 
the economic, social, legal and cultural circumstances underlying individual developing 
countries’ corporate governance weaknesses
54
. 
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Cooper (2007) notes that: “Given the wide range of countries categorized as ‘developing countries’ that are at 
various stages and levels of development; their different legal traditions; their diverse cultural practices; the 
existence of capital markets in some countries and the absence of capital markets in others; the presence of 
credit rating agencies and credit bureaux in some countries but not in others; the several forms of 
corporations existing in almost all developing countries - such as State-owned enterprises (SOEs), publicly-
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3.6.1     Drivers of Corporate Governance in Developing Countries 
Although a host of theory-driven rationales cite the separation of ownership and control 
(along with corporate failures) as the major drivers of governance development around the 
world (e.g. Babic, 2003; Mallin, 2007; Solomon, 2010) for developing countries, the need 
for reform in this area derives from a wider range of factors, including pressure from 
international (donor-led) economic reforms as well as more general development aims 
(Vaughn and Ryan, 2006; Tsamenyi and Uddin, 2008). A desire for economic prosperity, 
coupled with integration into the global economy, has ranked highly amongst the catalysts 
for corporate governance change in the developing world (Tsamenyi and Uddin, 2008). 
  
Arun and Turner (2009) argue that the demands of the new world order espoused by 
globalisation envisage corporate governance as an integration tool; debates on corporate 
governance in many developing countries are therefore inescapably affiliated to the 
opportunities for economic development, with globalisation ranking among the top drivers. 
Arun and Turner also contend that as developing countries liberalise their economies, 
corporate governance standards are playing an important role in strengthening the regulatory 
platform of the private sector. The protection of private owners and consumers is a common 
theme in the developing nation literature, with calls for governance - particularly in terms of 
legal and regulatory frameworks - featuring regularly (Obanida, 2000; Arun and Turner, 
2009). Arun and Turner pin-point poor corporate governance mechanisms as having led to 
the financial crises in South-East Asia and Brazil, events which illustrate that developing 
countries are not immune to corporate scandals and failures; corporate governance, clearly 
matters therefore, regardless of a country’s level of development. Developing countries, 
characterised by weak capital bases often exhibit heavy dependency on external financing 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
listed corporations, cooperatives, closely-held corporations, and family-owned corporations; one must be 
careful, as always, not to generalize” (p. 2). 
 
 74 
(Mitchell, 2003) and robust corporate governance practices become particularly important in 
this context (Siddiqui, 2010). As developing countries compete for external capital, Oman 
(2003) argues that the need for transparency and accountability has become a major driving 
force for corporate governance. In the light of these arguments, the present chapter proceeds 
by examining the literature on governance in the corporate sector of developing nations, first 
by examining those pertaining to emerging nations outside Africa and then detailing studies 
in the continent itself. 
    
3.6.2 Corporate Governance in Developing Countries - Outside Africa 
Ikonnikov (2002) identifies corporate scandals in Russia and the Asian financial crisis as 
some of the major catalysts for governance improvements in the developing world. 
Similarly, Parker et al. (2008) believe the quest for increased investment in developing 
countries has resulted in massive privatisation programmes as part of a series of economic 
reforms that prioritise sound governance practices. A comparative overview of corporate 
governance in Eastern European countries
55
 by the OECD revealed that the current state of 
corporate governance in the region has been shaped by the process of transition from 
planned to market economy (OECD, 2004a) and it is to this region that the discussion now 
turns. 
 
3.6.2.1 Eastern Europe 
 
Desired membership of the European Union has been cited as one of the main influences on 
corporate governance change in the developing countries of Eastern Europe (Akokpari, 
2004; McGee, 2008). Good governance is indeed a fundamental requirement of EU 
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Defined by the OECD as: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
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membership
56
, with McGee (2008) arguing explicitly that: “The EU integration process will 
serve as a source of constant and steady pressure to improve corporate governance” (p. 14-
15). However, Mallin (2007) cites the transition from state-owned enterprises to public 
corporations (where corporate governance is generally expected to be better) during the dis-
integration of the USSR into constituent countries as the major push for good governance 
reforms
57
. Mallin (2007) argues that the level of corporate governance in the region was, to a 
large extent, associated with the method of privatisation used and the ultimate ownership 
structure resulting. Dominant ownership varies across countries in the region with 
significant degrees of state leverage, although Berglof and Pajuste (2005) argue that the 
trend appears to be shifting towards private ownership. With globalisation and the need to 
attract direct foreign investment providing other pressures for reform in the region (Dallas, 
2004; McGee, 2008), the debate about the need for corporate governance improvements in 
developing economies has reached an all-time high. 
  
3.6.2.2 The Asian financial crisis 
 
The 1997-98 Asian financial crisis dramatically exposed governance and institutional 
deficiencies in the region’s corporate sector (Warner 1998; IMF, 1998). In a cross-firm 
analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the East Asian financial crisis, Mitton 
(2002) notes that: “Weak corporate governance has frequently been cited as one of the 
causes of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 to 1998” (p. 215), while Jonson and Shleifer 
(2000) argue that: “Weak corporate governance ... appears to make companies and countries 
vulnerable to large collapses” (p. 113). The Asian crisis is the most widely cited blueprint of 
corporate governance failure in developing countries (Dallas, 2004). In terms of specific 
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Membership in the EU is based on meeting conditions such as democratic reforms and other economic 
targets. Countries that have undertaken reforms and been admitted to EU include: Cyprus; the Czech 
Republic; Estonia; Hungary; Latvia; Lithuania; Malta; Poland; Slovakia; and Slovenia (Akokpari, 2004).      
57
According to Mallin (2007), under the command economy in USSR companies were not under pressure to 
make profits because their objectives were defined not in those terms, but instead in terms of socialist goals 
such as full employment.  
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causes, Shkolnikov (2002) holds “opaque market regulations” responsible for the Asian 
crisis, while Corsetti et al. (1998) cite inappropriate micro-economic policy and banking 
sector behaviour
58
. However, Johnson et al. (2000), La Porta et al. (1998) and Mitton (2002) 
all point to (de facto) corporate governance deficiencies
59
 as being critical contributors to the 
extent of the problems. 
  
3.6.2.3 Latin America 
 
Although the region has not experienced the generalised wave of corporate governance 
shocks and failures that have been felt across much of the globe, Chong and López-de-
Silanes (2007) argue that the impact and lessons of international corporate governance 
failures should act as a wakeup call for the region
60
. Chong and López-de-Silanes (2007) 
contend that, as in other developing countries, corporate governance reforms have taken 
centre stage in Latin America with major drivers being the spill-over effects of failures in 
other regions and the competition for scarce capital in the globalised economy. Similarly, 
Bedicks and Arruda (2006) point to globalisation, technological change, defined control, 
concentration of ownership and the need to attract investment as some of the drivers of 
governance changes. With the exception of Chile, capital markets in Central and South 
America have not performed as well as those in other developing regions (Chong and 
López-de-Silanes, 2007). However, initiatives such as the Latin American Institute of 
Corporate Governance (ILACG) and the Latin American Corporate Governance Network 
(LACGN) (with the support of the International Financial Corporation and the OECD)
61
 
have been influential in the promotion of best practice in the region through the exchange of 
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Johnson et al. (2000) argue that: “The Bangkok Bank of Commerce is a well-documented example of 
expropriation by managers that worsened as the bank’s financial troubles deepened” (p. 142). 
59
For example, Mitton (2002) notes that weaknesses in legal institutions and shareholder rights enforcement led 
to loss of investor confidence in the market, resulting in lower capital inflows and higher outflows. 
60
Although Mallin (2007) points to the adverse effects of the globe economic down turn of the 1990s as one of 
the reference points for increased demand for more transparency and accountability in the region.  
61
The OECD’s white paper on corporate governance in Latin America is an official report published in 2003 on 
regional corporate governance which stresses, among other things, the importance of good corporate 
governance in the Latin American region (Bedicks and Arruda, 2006).  
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research data and knowledge as well as the strengthening of local institutions (Bedicks and 
Arruda, 2006). For example, in 2000 Chile revised its company law framework with a view 
to strengthening corporate governance while in 2004, Argentina published its first code of 
corporate governance and Brazil revised its code to cover audit, risk management and 
training of boards (Solomon, 2010). 
   
3.7 Corporate Governance in Africa 
 
Inspection of scholarly literature reveals that while much has been written about corporate 
governance in developed countries, reference to Africa remains fragmented and limited 
(Rossouw et al., 2002; Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003; Visser, 2006; Solomon, 2010). 
Although little attention has been devoted to the continent, Agaye and Gwilliam (2008) 
confirm that country-specific studies are beginning to emerge and these now include: 
Botswana (Josiah et al., 2010); Ghana (Mensah, 2003); Zimbabwe (Muranda, 2006; 
Bondamakara, 2010); Kenya (Gatamah, 2001; Mwaura, 2003); Nigeria (Wallace, 1990; 
Okike, 2007); South Africa (Rossouw, 2002, 2005); and Uganda (Wanyama, 2006; 
Wanyama et al., 2009). However, as Wanyama et al. (2009) argue, ‘Western’ focused 
analysis of corporate governance had virtually monopolised the literature in the area until 
recently; this neglect has led to a lack of knowledge and appreciation for corporate 
governance and its impact on Africa (Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003). Clearly, 
investigations of whether or not Africa requires a different system from that obtaining in 
developed countries requires detailed understanding of the African context, yet this issue has 
rarely been examined (Wanyama et al., 2009). Moreover, the scant literature on Africa 
makes it difficult to tease out common theoretical themes that influence corporate 
governance reforms on the continent. Lungu and Kapena (2010) argue that the neo-classic 
model of corporate governance, based on the separation of ownership and control, is not 
applicable to Africa, a continent characterised by the dominance of state-controlled 
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enterprises whose ownership and management structures derive from a single source, 
namely the government. Indisputably, extant literature on Africa posits the de facto 
circumstance that corporate governance practices in Africa are highly influenced by the 
continent’s distinct cultural, political, historical, legal and regulatory considerations, making 
comparison with developed nations problematic (Wanyama, 2006; Rezaee, 2007; Wanyama 
et al., 2009). 
 
 3.7.1 Africa’s Demand for Corporate Governance 
Africa has its own unique political, economic and institutional arrangements, distinctive 
from other regions of the world (Visser, 2006). This idiosyncratic context demands a broad 
corporate governance perspective that goes beyond the narrow view of inter-relations 
between managers and the providers of capital (Ikonnikov, 2002; Tsamenyi and Uddin, 
2008). While, as discussed earlier in this thesis, there is no universally-accepted definition of 
corporate governance, African attempts to address the notion (e.g. the King Report) appear 
to favour an all-inclusive approach that balances the interests of shareholders with those of 
other stakeholders, including the community in which corporations reside (Okeahalam and 
Akinboade, 2003; Rossouw, 2005). As the political landscape across the continent begins to 
change for the better, with a significant reduction in the extent of political conflict (both 
internal and external), many Africans now believe that conditions are favourable for 
development (Ong’ayo, 2008). In addition, a realisation of the important role that good 
corporate governance can play in charting a developmental agenda for the continent has 
emerged (Kilgour, 1998; Rahaman, 2010). Kilgour (1998) argues that Africa must look 
beyond its colonial past for solutions to the current problems and, to this effect, NEPAD has 
identified corporate governance as one of the key challenges that needs serious attention in 
the attempt to improve Africa’s economic fortunes (ECA, 2002; Amoako, 2003). The ECA 
(2002) put forward a resolution (agreed by the Heads of State and Government 
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Implementation Committee (HSGIC) of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development), at 
its first meeting in October 2001 regarding key priorities, namely: 
“… to prioritize the enhancement of good governance and to seek the assistance of 
the ECA, to lend its expertise to develop guidelines for promoting good economic 
and corporate governance in Africa. Good economic and good corporate governance 
are fundamental preconditions for the renewal of Africa” (p. 5). 
 
Investors around the globe are increasingly focusing on corporate governance in their 
investment decisions (Nganga et al., 2003); therefore, the resolution to prioritise corporate 
governance in Africa can be seen as an attempt to make the continent attractive for 
investment (Lungu, 2005). For Lungu, the impediments to Africa’s development (such as 
macroeconomic stability, poverty reduction, accountability and transparency) are all a result 
of ‘bad’ governance. 
  
3.7.2 Corporate Governance Drivers in Africa 
 
The contextualisation of corporate governance in Africa has not only been applauded by its 
citizens, but also by partners such as aid donors and the many multinational corporations 
who operate on the continent, some for a long time (Rwegasira, 2000). The drivers of 
corporate governance in Africa stretch beyond the problematic separation of ownership and 
control that provide the context for reforms in most developed countries. Instead, corporate 
failures, African nations’ quest to attract finance for growth, international donor-led 
economic reforms, integration into the global market and the postulated positive correlation 
between corporate governance and development are some of the major drivers of change in 
the continent (Wanyama et al., 2006).  
 
Scholarly literature highlights a positive correlation between corporate governance and 
development (World Bank, 1981; World Bank, 1989; Kilgour, 1998; Ndulu and O’Connell, 
1999; Kaufmann et al., 1999; ECA, 2002; Amoako, 2003; Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003; 
Mitchell, 2003; Akokpari, 2004; NEPAD, 2007). This association, coupled with the private 
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sector’s increasing need for capital investment, has spurred many African countries into the 
search for financial resources outside internal boundaries, thereby pushing to the fore the 
need for better corporate governance practices (Amoako, 2003; Okeahalam and Akinboade, 
2003; Akokpari, 2004; NEPAD, 2007). Some scholars characterise that the proliferation of 
corporate governance in Africa as being driven more by a search for legitimacy than by 
economic imperatives (Siddiqui, 2010). However, Chulu, (2006) contest that a number of 
countries on the continent engage in major corporate governance reforms to ‘excite’ donors 
when there is pressure to solicit foreign direct investment from the developed world. 
Similarly, investigating corporate governance in developing countries, Cooper (2007) argues 
that African leaders want to conceptualise corporate governance as a tool for tapping into 
the pool of financial resources both on domestic and international markets. Cooper argues 
that Africa’s Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was inspired by this factor. 
 
3.7.2.1 Corporate Failures in Africa 
 
Wanyama et al. (2009) argue that while reporting of corporate governance failures in Africa 
has taken place, the continent has not been spared the type of problems evident in the 
world’s richest nations. For example, between 1991 and 1994, 34 Nigerian banks collapsed 
(Lindgren et al., 1996); 26 went into liquidation in 1998 alone (Ogowewo and Uche, 2006). 
In Zambia itself, nine banks were closed between 1995 and 1998 (Maimbo, 2002a) and in 
Kenya, 2 local banks and 10 non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) were shut or taken over 
between 1984 and 1989 with a further 5 local banks and 10 NBFIs taken over by the Central 
Bank of Kenya (CBK) in 1993/94 (Brownbridge, 2002). In 1999, four banks collapsed in 
Uganda (Wanyama et al., 2006). The few scholarly articles on corporate governance in 
Africa (e.g. Visser et al., 2006) appear to suggest that while corporate governance failures in 
developed countries such as the UK and the US have been reported and analysed in great 
detail, Africa has yet to document its own failures (Wanyama et al., 2009). Such 
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experiences, Wanyama et al. argue, should serve as a lesson from which other countries can 
learn.   
 
3.7.2.2 Globalisation and the Scramble for Investors 
 
The onset of globalisation
62
, with unlimited movements of capital across borders, 
accelerated the need for corporate governance reforms in developing countries (Oman, 
2003). For example, Armstrong et al. (2005) note that corporate governance developments 
in South Africa were largely driven by the country’s exposure to globalisation in the post-
apartheid era. Globalisation has the propensity to escalate competition across borders; 
significantly complicating the firms’ competitive environment (Hitt et al., 2007) making it 
difficult for countries with poor governance practices to compete favourably (Lewis, 2003). 
As a result, global forces, when combined with technological advances, may lie behind 
many of the corporate governance reforms seen not only in Africa, but the world over 
(Berghe, 2002; Charkham and Ploix, 2005; Rezaee, 2007). Just like other developing 
countries, corporate governance in African nations is mostly being driven by the scramble 
for scarce investors (Mensah, 2002) in the new global capital markets. While many scholars 
believe Africans should determine their own future by exploring home-grown solutions to 
its plethora of problems, real investment issues cut across the globe (Katito and Aggad, 
2009). Africa’s reforms are both economic and political with the latter contestualised in 
multi-partism which allows more citizens to participate in political activities and reign in 
irresponsible governments (Ndulu and O’Connell, 1999; Oy’ango, 2008). Economic 
reforms, on the other hand, have focused on privatisation to surrender the mis-managed 
state-owned enterprises to private owners (Josiah et al., 2010). 
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According to Hitt et al. (2007), a global economy is one in which goods, services, people, skills and ideas 
move freely across geographic borders     
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3.7.2.3 Privatisation 
 
Privatisation’s success or failure is largely dependent on the quality of the country’s 
institutional framework, particularly its corporate governance systems (Dyck, 2001; Ayogu 
and Fosu, 2002; Josiah et al., 2010). Variability (and weaknesses) in extant corporate 
governance practices underlie the problematic nature of privatisation in most of the 
developing world, including Africa (Denis and McConnell, 2003; Bekaert and Harvey, 
2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; Johnson and Shleifer, 2004). Africa’s poor corporate 
governance record, coupled with a wholesale privatisation process that takes no regard of 
indigenous particularisation, further complicates privatisation programmes on the continent 
(Josiah, 2010). Boubakri et al. (2005) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) contend that the weak 
governance mechanisms and structures affect privatised companies adversely, particularly in 
developing countries; specific issues include legal structures, security of property rights and 
the enforcement of contracts. Privatisation in seclusion, Parker and Kirkpatrick (2005) 
argue, does not consummate its theoretical argument because it lacks the facets of 
governance; in this context, privatisation is viewed as one of the drivers of corporate 
governance in developing countries. 
   
3.7.3 Corporate Governance Initiatives in Africa 
 
Since the realisation of the importance of corporate governance on the continent, Africa has 
experienced a number of reforms in the quest to contextualise the governance paradigm. 
According to Rossouw (2005), the most noteworthy  initiatives responsible for Africa’s 
corporate governance developments include, among others, those emanating from: the 
World Bank (WB); the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP); the Commonwealth Association for Corporate 
Governance (CACG); the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD); the Pan-African Consultative Forum on Corporate Governance (PACFCG); the 
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(South African) King Report on corporate governance and organisations; as well as 
professional bodies such as the institutes of directors and professional accountancy bodies
63
.  
 
3.7.3.1 The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) 
 
The interplay between governance and development orchestrated the establishment of the 
New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), a development programme under the 
auspices of the African Union (AU) and designed to address Africa’s developmental 
challenges, including the crisis of governance (Akokpari, 2004). Top of NEPAD’s agenda 
are economic, corporate and political governance as well as peace and security (Akokpari, 
2004). To monitor progress on governance issues, NEPAD conceptualised Africa’s Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM) by which Africa’s progress towards good governance is 
assessed
64
. Although NEPAD has been branded a ‘capitalist agglomeration’ with little 
consultation (Bond, 2003; Akokpari, 2004), the programme has led to the dispensation of 
Overseas Development Aid (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) to the continent. 
  
3.7.3.2 The King Report 
 
The King Reports (I, II and III) on corporate governance in South Africa has been the 
fulcrum for corporate governance reforms in Africa as a whole and are viewed positively by 
many Africans as it represents a home-grown initiative which blends ‘conventional’ 
standards and nations into Africa’s cultural context (Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003; 
Gstraunthaler, 2010). For example, the King Report renders priority to discipline, 
transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility, fairness and social responsibility 
(IoDSA, 2002). According to Solomon (2010), the first King Report is responsible for 
making formal the process of corporate governance reform in Africa, and its stakeholder-
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Others include the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the 
Global Corporate Governance Forum (GCGF), the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), and the variuos 
UK reports and codes.   
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The assessment is also used as a benchmark for attracting aid (Akokpari, 2004). 
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oriented approach has been identified as helping distinguish its position on governance 
reform. The author contends that enshrining a code of business ethics for companies and 
their stakeholders makes the King Report one of the most forward-looking codes. While the 
King Report has been recognised internationally as an all-embracing code on corporate 
governance (PWC, 2002), its stance that: “The stakeholder concept of being accountable to 
all legitimate stakeholders must be rejected….” (King Report, 2002 p. 5) raises a number of 
questions as to its earlier endorsement of a social dimension and inclusive corporate 
governance position (Solomon, 2010). It is not clear, how the King Report intends to strike a 
balance between these two conflicting paradigms and embrace its commitment to a broad-
based participative corporate governance code in the interest of a wide range of 
stakeholders. 
  
3.7.3.3 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
 
Consistent with other corporate governance standards, the ultimate goal of the OECD 
principles of corporate governance is that of economic prosperity, viz:  
“…the OECD shall promote policies designed to achieve the highest sustainable 
economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in member 
countries” (OECD 1999, p. 2). 
  
Jesover and Kirkpatrick (2005) described the OECD principles as a reflection of the global 
consensus as regards the relationship between corporate governance and economic vitality 
and stability. The OECD’s basic principles on corporate governance have been recognised 
as an international benchmark and are widely adopted and applied across continents, 
including in countries outside the OECD (Jesover and Kirkpatrick, 2005; Barker, 2010). 
Nganga et al. (2003) notes that the CACG and the OECD principles of corporate governance 
have featured strongly in many African countries’ codes. The explanation for the claimed 
universal applicability of the OECD principles is their assumed cross-border applicability 
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since they were not designed for a specific stock exchange or country
65
. Fernando (2009) 
argues that their general nature makes them useful as they can be modified easily to fit the 
local cultures and markets:  
“…the OECD principles represent the minimum standard that countries with 
different traditions could agree upon, without being unduly prescriptive. In 
particular, they are equally applicable to countries with a civil and common law 
tradition, different levels of ownership concentration, and models of board 
representation” (Fremond and Capaul, 2002  p. 9). 
 
However, Lu and Batten (2001, p. 1) argue that standards set for a wide spectrum of 
countries with different cultures and varying levels of economic and legal development 
makes the standards vulnerable. Clarke (2007) takes a similar view, arguing that: “To 
assume that all countries will adapt to the same corporate governance structures is 
unrealistic” (p. 265). 
 
Clarke (2007) argues that the OECD underestimated the difficulties of deriving a set of 
standards that can fit nations at all stages of economic and legal development, without 
embracing issues that are particular to certain countries. Africa’s cultures, for example, have 
a major impact on corporate governance frameworks, in both behavioural and normative 
aspects (see Wanyama et al., 2009). In this respect, cultural and social differences and the 
historically contrasting legal, financial and institutional structures are some of the most 
challenging barriers to application of the OECD standards across Africa. 
   
3.7.3.4 Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance 
 
There is a stronger need than ever for the harmonisation of national initiatives to deal with 
cross-border corporate governance problems (CACG, 1999c; IFC, 2008). One of the 
initiatives aimed at promoting corporate governance practices at the international level is the 
establishment of the Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance, which notes its 
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For example, the US reforms contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 were a specific response to local 
issues which, Ribstein (2002) argues, closely tracked the contours of America’s failures such as Enron and 
WorldCom. 
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commitment: “… to a uniform approach on corporate governance issues internationally” 
(CACG, 1999b, p. 4). The shift towards regional or cross-border corporate governance, 
Charkham and Ploix (2005) argue, is premised on the belief that companies face problems 
that are universal in nature. The Commonwealth has a diverse membership, including 
countries with seemingly very different cultural and political dimensions. The CACG offers 
training and technical support to a number of African countries, including Zambia, 
Botswana, Mozambique, Mali, and Gambia (Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003). This effort 
has helped a number of countries in drafting corporate governance codes, but a central 
concern remains regarding the assumption that all countries operate at the same level of 
legal, social and economic developments; perhaps as a result, the standards appear to have 
an Anglo-American corporate governance tone (Shkolnikov, 2002). 
  
3.7.4    Nature of Corporate Governance Practices in Africa 
In Africa, extant literature suggests that the term ‘corporate governance’ is perceived and 
discussed in terms far broader than those of the neoclassical model, where the separation of 
management and ownership dominates (Mensah, 2003). Africa’s unique cultural, political, 
accounting, social and ethical factors attract serious consideration as they underpin debates 
regarding corporate governance reforms across the continent (McGee, 2008; Wanyama et 
al., 2009). Africa’s historical experiences are dramatically different from other continents, 
and Visser et al. (2006) argues that understanding of this allows for more light to be shed on 
the systems that underpin the corporate sector. According to Nganga et al. (2003), imported 
corporate governance models - especially as practiced by multinational corporations - have 
yielded few benefits for Africa. However political instability, coupled with the weak legal 
and regulatory frameworks that manifest most African countries, suggests according to 
Cooper (2007), a general governance problem. This author suggests, therefore, that 
corporate governance in Africa should be viewed in the context of country-level governance. 
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Similarly, Mitchell (2003) argues that “It is not possible to create and run an island of good 
corporate governance in a sea of poor or underdeveloped public governance” (p. 22). 
 
3.7.4.1 Corporate Governance Models - the African Perception 
Most African countries face the challenge of selecting a corporate governance model that 
fits a complex social-economic environment. While Rwegasira (2000) disputes the 
superiority of any particular model in terms of support for economic performance, Rossouw 
(2005) argues that the all-inclusive stakeholder model is predominant in most African 
codes
66
 because it embraces the African belief system of communal values and consensus 
(see Wanyama, 2006 and Solomon, 2010). Rwegasira (2000) argues that Africa needs a 
model that is not only development oriented, but brings together all stakeholders in unison. 
More specifically, the model for Africa should fit into the culture that reflects 
communitarian stakeholder theory (Mbiti, 1989; Gyekye, 2003) or ‘ubuntu’, which Mbiti 
(1989) translates to mean “‘I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am’” (p. 
110). Gstraunthaler (2010) points to the communitarian philosophy as an important 
paradigm in the African way of living and doing business, with employees’ benefits often 
reflecting more than simple salaries and pensions. Hayes (2006) submits that companies 
operating in African environments characterised by overwhelming social issues must adopt a 
communitarian philosophy because they are under compulsion to fill gaps in social services, 
health and infrastructure for their employees which many governments are unable to (or 
choose not to) fulfil. Similarly, Angaye and Gwilliam (2008) argue that multinational 
companies operating in Southern Africa normally find themselves involved in the delivery 
of social welfare programmes in their communities; however attaining these goals in 
practice, Gstraunthaler (2010) argues, is difficult especially for businesses in the global 
economy. 
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With the exception of Nigeria 
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In this context, the King Report (2002) argues that accountability to all stakeholders is 
unworkable in practice:   
“The stakeholder concept of being accountable to all legitimate stakeholders must be 
rejected for the simple reason that to ask boards to be accountable to everyone would 
result in their being accountable to no one” (p. 6). 
 
However, the African model calls for regular engagement between managers and other 
stakeholders (OECD, 2004b; Rossouw, 2005). The OECD (2004b) maintains that while 
there is no single accepted model of good corporate governance, an organisation’s 
governance principles have certain common (non-binding) elements that embrace different 
models. Notwithstanding this point, taking note of the diverse cultural issues across borders 
on the continent, the ECA (2002) encourages each African country to identify those 
corporate governance elements that provide a ‘good fit’ with its circumstances. Again 
though, the practicalities of normative suggestions are not straightforward to deal with; 
scholars have acknowledged the complexities in identifying a corporate governance model 
that fits a particular country in the face of cultural, historical and environmental differences 
(e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Nganga et al., 2003; Mitchell, 2003; Fan, 2009). For 
example, Gustavson et al. (2009) questions the rationale for replicating the Anglo-American 
model in Sub-Saharan Africa without accounting for the cultural differences between 
America and Africa.  
According to Mallin (2009), four theories underpin the development of corporate 
governance, namely: agency; stakeholder; transaction economics; and stewardship. As noted 
earlier, on the spectrum of theories agency lies on one extreme (narrow) end while the 
stakeholder analysis occupies the other (broad) extreme. However, and notwithstanding this 
generalisability, corporate governance in practice is strongly influenced by factors such as 
legal and regulatory institutions, levels of development and societal culture (Wanyama et al., 
2009). Stakeholder theory, which views the corporation as a social entity with a wider 
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responsibility, seems to fit into the African’s way of living and doing business (Wanyama, 
2006). However, the first King Report (1994) acknowledges inherent complexity in any 
corporate governance system that attempts to satisfy the needs of many different stakeholder 
groups. Perhaps as a result of this reality, the question of whether a country should 
contextualise a particular model or leave it to the uninterrupted mechanisms of market forces 
to resolve, remains controversial and subject to debate (Rwegasira, 2000).  
3.8 Corporate Governance Challenges in Africa 
In Africa, where the root cause of corporate governance difficulties is more than 
institutional, Fan (2009) argues that transplanting the systemic approaches of (well- 
structured) Western countries may not be the right cure for the many challenges facing the 
corporate sector on the continent (Wanyama et al., 2009). Fan’s view is that corporate 
governance failures in developing nations are a side effect of institutional weaknesses, hence 
requiring a top-down approach (Wanyama et al., 2010); some of these institutions may be in 
the economic, legal and political spheres (see Roe, 2003). The OECD (2004b) notes that:  
“Corporate governance is only part of the larger economic context in which firms 
operate that includes, for example, macroeconomic policies and the degree of 
competition in product and factor markets. The corporate governance framework 
also depends on the legal, regulatory, and institutional environment” (p. 12). 
 
However, the idiosyncratic conditions of each country in Africa provide both constraints and 
opportunities for corporate governance (NEPAD, 2007); these issues are now examined in 
more detail. 
  
3.8.1 Africa’s Peculiarities: Weak Institutional Arrangements 
Amoako (2003) argues that good corporate governance requires the existence of efficient 
and accountable institutions, but most African countries do not yet possess these (Rossouw, 
2005; Wanyama et al., 2009). African countries have a number of unique economic and 
political peculiarities that demand critical attention when the construction of corporate 
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governance systems is being considered (see Kilgour, 1998; Rwegasira, 2000; Wolfensohn, 
2002; Nganga et al., 2003; Rossouw, 2005). These idiosyncrasies generate a plethora of 
challenges including the lack of a sound legal and regulatory framework, weak enforcement 
of laws and a lack of commercial expertise amongst judges and lawyers (Kilgour, 1998; 
Wolfensohn, 2002; Nganga et al., 2003; Rossouw, 2005; Wanyama et al., 2009). Here, 
Brautigam and Knack (2004) assert that:  
“Poor quality institutions, weak rule of law, an absence of accountability, tight 
controls over information, and high levels of corruption still characterise many 
African states today” (p. 1). 
  
Africa’s unique socio-political features and their theoretical deviations from those 
underpinning ‘mainstream’ corporate governance analyses are fundamental to an 
understanding of the latter in Africa as they may offer both opportunities and challenges for 
alternative frameworks (Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003). The authors argue that this does 
not necessarily imply a need for the development of different standards for Africa, but 
simply suggests designing them in such a way that they are cognisant of the specific 
characteristics of African states. While Rwegasira (2000) contends that failure is inevitable 
if governance models ignore the peculiarities of individual African countries, the ECA 
(2002) disputes the assumption that Africa’s institutional constraints represent a rationale for 
abandoning corporate governance on the continent. However, notwithstanding debate 
regarding Africa’s institutional deficiencies, interest in corporate governance appears to be 
gaining ground (Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003) and this is manifested in the upsurge of 
corporate governance codes on the continent (Mensah, 2002; Rossouw, 2005; Wanyama et 
al., 2009). Common to all these analyses though is an acknowledgement of the impact of 
political upheaval, and this issue is now addressed.  
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3.8.2 Political Instability 
Threats to investors arise not just from the separation of ownership and control, but also 
from political strife and public governance crises (Fifield et al., 2005). Political factors have 
been a particularly major element in African life, with implications for governance practices 
across the continent today (Visser et al., 2006; Wanyama et al., 2009). In this context, 
Ginther et al. (1995) argue that: “Minimum standards of good governance should include 
political stability” (p. 11) while Roe (2003) suggests that: 
“Before a nation can produce, it must achieve social peace. Factories that fail to 
produce because of internal turmoil or external upheaval are less valuable than those 
that produce smoothly. If conflict is expected, investors invest reluctantly, or not at 
all, and the factory is not built. Or investors search for the organisational form that 
minimises the chances and costs of conflict. Dampening turmoil, or insulating the 
firm from it, can be a strong force in shaping firms’ ownership and governance” (p. 
1). 
   
While the above factors may not be serious considerations in developed countries, Roe 
(2003) argues that in Africa - where politics are characterised by coups, dictatorships and 
illegitimate governments - this factor is worth serious consideration not only for investment 
decisions, but for the broader analysis of corporate behaviour; in this context, Armah and 
Amoah (2010) define political stability to simply reflect good governance. The empirical 
analysis in this thesis focuses on the role of corporate governance in influencing 
development and Hossain (1995) specifically notes that development and good governance 
require effective political and legal institutions: 
“… inherent in the concept of sustainable development is the need for a political 
system which provides for effective citizen participation in decision making and for 
good governance” (p. 20). 
  
Lack of respect for constitutional rights is one of the factors igniting upheavals in Africa, as 
witnessed in the recent elections in Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe
67
 (Ong’ayo, 
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Zimbabwe’s recent elections were characterised by “widespread use of violence, intimidation and coercion 
which formed the backbone of the government’s strategy to cow the electorate into supporting ZANU-PF, 
not support (the opposition) MDC or staying away from polling places. Opposition supporters were beaten, 
tortured and sometimes even killed, particularly in rural areas, by ZANU-PF youth militia and war veterans 
unleashed to terrorise the electorate into supporting the ruling party. These actions were taken with 
complicity of the police and with total impunity” (International Crisis Group, 2002 p.3).  
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2008; Bondamakara, 2010). For example, Uganda experienced no less than four coup d’états 
between 1962 and 1986 (Wanyama et al., 2006; 2009) with sub-Saharan Africa as a whole 
experiencing 56 military coups (excluding failed attempts) between 1956 and 1984 
(Mcgowan and Johnson, 1984). By 1988, Bratton and van de Walle (1997) identified 11 
countries under military oligarchies, 16 operating a plebiscitary one-party system and 13 
with a ‘competitive’ one-party system
68
. With this pervasive political instability, it is clearly 
likely to be difficult to instil investor confidence, both amongst Africans and extra-
continental. A high probability of a coup d’état reduces the incentives for investment (Ndulu 
and O’Connell, 1999); an obvious governance implication of this is that the institutions on 
which robust corporate governance might depend are either non-existent or weak (Wanyama 
et al., 2009). However, enormous strides have been made to change the African political 
landscape through domestic political protests,  especially as people begin to understand the 
broader implications of ‘bad’ politics and the consequences of governance structures that are 
autocratic and oppressive (Kilgour, 1998; Ndulu and O’Connell, 1999; Obanida, 2000; 
Akokpari, 2004; Ong’ayo, 2008). 
  
3.8.3 Shareholder Activism 
Connelly et al. (2010) argue that firm ownership in itself constitutes both an internal and 
external control mechanism and these are influential de facto forms of corporate governance. 
Similarly, Ryan and Schneider (2002) define investor activism as:  
“…the use of power by an investor either to influence the process or outcome of a 
given portfolio firm or to evoke large-scale change in processes or outcomes across 
multiple firms through the symbolic targeting of one or more portfolio firms” (p. 
555). 
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As noted in chapter two, Zambia changed from a multi-party political system inherited from the colonial 
government to a one-party system through a referendum in 1972.  
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Implicit in this view is the notion that shareholders
69
, as suppliers of finance, have an 
important role to play in improving corporate governance in their investee companies (Ryan 
and Schneider, 2002; Dai, 2007; Connelly et al., 2010). Despite much scholarly evidence 
consistent with this view in the world’s richest nations, the concept is yet to be empirically 
tested to any meaningful extent in Africa. Indeed, shareholder activism on the continent is at 
a low point, to the extent where Nganga et al. (2003) argue that even in annual general 
meetings institutional investors are unwilling to take management to task. This lack of 
shareholder activism partly reflects the predominantly family and otherwise concentrated 
ownership structures common in most developing countries (Singh, 1995; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999). Theoretical and empirical research indicates that the 
identity of large shareholders matters in corporate governance (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000; 
Fidrmuc et al., 2006). Thus, a lack of business knowledge amongst most African investors 
may bear a significant share of the blame for the weak extent of shareholder activism 
therein. 
  
3.8.4 Privatisation 
The late 1990s witnessed a number of economic reforms in Africa in the shape of economic 
liberalisations; these were followed by a scramble for external investment as post-colonial 
indigenisation programmes appeared to have failed to deliver substantive development in 
many of the countries concerned (Ndulu and O’Connell, 1999). Most African countries 
welcomed privatisation as it represented a possible means for reforming pervasive 
indigenised economies (Stiglitz, 2008). Boubakri et al. (2005) argue that privatisation was 
not only the centrepiece of reform in Africa, but it had become a world-wide phenomenon 
and accepted model of corporate structural change
70
. The conventional rationale for 
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Particularly institutional shareholders.  
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“Both in the developed and developing countries, the mantra of privatisation has become 'common sense' 
economics, an indispensable process in development whereas the period of dominance of 'state owned 
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privatisation focuses on perceived enhancements to firm performance under private 
ownership (Jones et al., 1998
71
; Chirwa, 2001; Bortolotti et al., 2002; Shenshinski and 
Lopez-Calva, 2003; Boubakri et al., 2005; Josiah, 2010), as well as: the attendant reduction 
(or elimination) of loss burdens on the government’s part (Temu and Due, 1998; Hirsch and 
Osborne, 2000); improved service delivery through competition (Plane, 1992; Dilger et al., 
1997; Durant et al., 1998; Ugaz, 2003); better resource allocation (Megginson and Netter, 
2001); and a significant positive effect on growth (Plane, 1997; Fundanga and Mwaba, 
1997; Barnett, 2000). However, critics argue that a privatisation rationale focused on 
profitability without the consideration of other factors such as jobs, skills, pensions, income 
distribution and general welfare, needs re-examination to embrace the full impact of such a 
change in resource allocation and provision (Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2005; Josiah et al., 
2010). Some commentators have specifically pointed to privatisation in Africa as being 
narrowly-focused and open to question (Josiah et al., 2010). In Africa, privatisation has been 
characterised as bringing about a loss of revenue for government (Stiglitz, 2008), benefiting 
the elite (Nellis, 2005) and having a negative impact on growth (Cook and Uchida, 2003; 
Filipovic, 2005). More generally, Josiah et al. (2010) argue that the process in Africa to date 
has been primarily economic crisis-driven as opposed to representing a policy with clear and 
unambiguous long term goals.    
 
3.8.4.1   Privatisation and Corporate Governance 
Privatisation in the African context, i.e. where weak governance institutions abound and 
developed capital markets (as well as information about the economy) are lacking, differs 
from conventional (generally Western) conceptualisation (Bos, 1987; Ariyo and Jerome, 
1999; Josiah et al. 2010). Boubakri et al. (2005) argue that “… unlike developed countries, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
enterprises' in developing countries has been portrayed very much as 'politics' imposed over economics” 
(Paliwala, 2000).  
71
Jones et al. (1998) analysed 81 privatised companies in Cote d’Ivoire and found that newly-privatised 
companies were more profitable in private hands.   
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many developing countries lack an established institutional framework for efficient 
corporate governance” (p. 769). Privatisation poses a number of challenges in countries with 
weak governance institutions and Wu (2005) holds this factor responsible for the plunder of 
resources that regularly occurs during privatisation (Black et al., 2000; Stiglitz, 2008). 
Strong corporate governance practices can support the privatisation process and level the 
playing field by setting up rules and regulatory frameworks for the newly-privatised 
companies (Pascal, 2002). In the absence of this platform, the new enterprises may struggle 
in a global economy dominated by well-established (and governed) companies and hence 
become economically vulnerable and destined for failure (Boubakri et al., 2005). However, 
the presence of independent market regulators should improve de facto governance 
standards and build investor confidence and investment (Josiah et al., 2010). 
 
3.8.5 Corruption 
Corruption is endemic in Africa and has led not only to the loss of colossal sums of money 
meant for developmental programmes, but also the dwindling of donor aid to the continent 
(Hussein, 2005); this author notes that: 
“the AU estimated in August 2004 that Africa loses US$148 billion to corruption 
annually, or 25% of the continent’s gross domestic product (GDP)” (p. 3). 
 
Political sensitivities and legal inconsistencies have made the definition of corruption 
controversial; as Nahamya (1995) points out: “…there is quiet clearly no single accepted 
definition of corruption…” (p. 402). Despite differences in definitions and interpretations, 
corruption essentially entails the abuse or misuse of public office for selfish and personal 
gain (Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Wu, 2005) which undermines good governance (Nahamya 
1995; Matenga, 1998; Hussein, 2005). Rampant corruption has been adduced as one of the 
main constraints to trade and development in most African countries (Mensah et al., 2003). 
While corruption is a worldwide problem, it has made attracting the levels of capital relevant 
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for sustainable growth particularly challenging in Africa (Nahamya, 1995; Matenga, 1998; 
Hussein, 2005). 
  
Corruption is associated with ‘bad’ governance, which itself is a characteristic of most poor 
countries (Shkolnikov, 2002; Wu, 2005). However, Shkolnikov recognises the controversies 
and debates surrounding the concept, arguing that: “whether they are corrupt because they 
are poor, or they are poor because they are corrupt” (p. 2) is an important question. Because 
corruption is a menace in all sectors of the economy, Shkolnikov (2002)
72
 argues that 
improved corporate governance mechanisms have the potential to eliminate opportunities 
for corrupt activities.  
 
3.8.5.1   Corruption and Corporate Governance 
Robust corporate governance systems can expedite economic objectives through the 
provision of a conducive investment climate, the reconstruction of governance institutions, 
improving market conditions and the overall eliminating of opportunities for corruption 
(Shkolnikov, 2002). In this context, Shkolnikov suggests that:  
“Realisation of the benefits of corporate governance, especially in combating 
corruption has led to the increased attention to the issue in every part of the world” 
(p. 3). 
  
In addition, Shkolnikov (2002 posits that Africa’s opaque political systems - with barely any 
checks and balances on public accountability - make the continent fertile for corruption. The 
author further argues that: 
“Corporate governance is a critical focal point in creating safeguards against 
corruption and mismanagement, while promoting fundamental values of a market 
economy in a democratic society. These values include accountability, transparency, 
rule of law, fairness, responsibility, and ownership rights” (p. 10). 
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“…by demanding transparency in corporate transactions, in accounting and auditing procedures, in 
purchasing, and in all of the myriad individual business transactions corporate governance attacks the supply 
side of the corruption relationship. Corruption drains companies resources and erode competitiveness driving 
away investors” (Shkolnikov, 2002 p. 5).  
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The central theme of corporate governance is that of promoting accountability, transparency 
and fairness; in this regard, the notion has been suggested as having great significance as an 
anti-corruption tool (Wu, 2005). 
 
3.8.6 Globalisation 
On-going globalisation in real and financial asset markets has reduced trade barriers, 
increased cross-border interaction and raised the levels of competition faced by firms and 
nations at a global scale (Daniel, 2004; Rezaee, 2007). Standard free-market economic 
thinking and theory suggest that it would be right to expect all countries to benefit from 
globalisation (Krugman and Venables, 1995). However, rather than benefiting all nations, 
the latter authors assert that globalisation has the propensity to generate benefits for some at 
the sacrifice of others, indeed, Daniel (2004) argues that the benefits of integration into the 
global economy will only be attained in a particular nation if its governance institutions are 
comparable with those of other global players are in place. For example, Prasad et al. (2003) 
note that countries with strong governance tend to do better at attracting FDI needed for 
growth. In this context, any apparent surface homogeneity in economic systems can conceal 
great structural differences between industrial centres and ‘peripheral’ countries (Prebisch, 
1964). Moreover, globalisation exposes companies to fierce international competition, 
which by implication, means that countries with unsound corporate governance mechanisms 
will find it extremely unsettling; in this environment, the ECA (2002) argues, investors 
behave as if the world economy is borderless. Similarly, the CACG (1999b) suggest that:  
“As regulatory barriers between national economies are removed and global 
competition for capital increases, investment capital will follow the path to those 
countries and corporations that have adopted efficient governance standards” 
(CACG, 1999b, p. 1). 
  
In contrast to the much vaunted benefits of globalisation, Detomasi (2002) points to its 
propensity for weakening important governance elements. But Armstrong et al. (2005) 
subscribe to a contrary view, arguing that the corporate governance reforms in South Africa 
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that led to development of King Report 1 were largely driven by competitiveness and the 
country’s re-integration into the global economy. Most African countries have not, however, 
benefited from the favourable effects of globalisation because of institutional deficiencies 
that in turn reflect the poor quality of domestic economic policies (ECA, 2002). 
 
3.9     Corporate Governance and Development 
 
Central to the empirical context of this thesis is the extent of any link between development 
and corporate governance. The Overseas Development Institute (2006) contends that there is 
a strong association between governance and development, stating that:  
“The relationship between governance and development has risen up the 
international policy agenda. There is widespread agreement that governance matters 
- intrinsically and for improvements in economic and social outcomes” (ODI, 2006 
p. 1)  
 
The World Bank (1989) argues that: “underlying the litany of Africa's development 
problems is a crisis of governance” (p. 60). In spite of governance not being a new concept 
in Africa, Ogendo (1995) argues that its interplay with development is a relatively recent 
paradigm on the continent. The shift in the development paradigm to include governance as 
a key factor is likely to be important because recognition of the causal relationship between 
governance and development has been lacking in Africa (NEPAD, 2007). However, the 
considerable difficulties inherent in trying to reach a consensus on the meaning of the terms 
‘governance’ and ‘development’ have made the definitions elusive - establishing these in an 
indisputable manner is beyond the immediate goals of this thesis. In the present study, the 
word ‘development’ is used in the context of the term ‘economic development’, which is 
concerned with improving the well-being of the general population and the conditions of 
countries (Hensley, 1971). As regards the (more general) ‘governance’ concept, the 
following broad definition offered by Kaufmann et al. (1999) is adopted here: 
“…the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound 
policies, … the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern 
economic and social interactions among them” (p. 4). 
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This broad definition touches on almost all aspects of governing, including at the political 
and economic levels. This thesis focuses on corporate governance as an element of 
economic governance; however, political and economic governances in general (and the 
interplay between them) are also highly relevant as they lay the platform for corporate 
governance debates. As noted earlier, the term ‘corporate governance’ is subject to 
continued lively debate. While much has been written about political and economic 
governance in general, this thesis identifies and examines corporate governance and the role 
it can play in economic development. The key extant literature in this regard is now 
outlined. 
 
There is scant literature examining the specific link between corporate governance and 
development in Africa (Hope, 2002). However, empirical evidence on the general 
relationship between governance standards and economic outcomes is in abundance 
(Feinberg, 1998; Kaufmann et al., 1999; Rwegasira, 2000; Arun and Turner, 2009). 
Consistent with the theoretical and empirical literature underpinning corporate governance, 
the ultimate objective of the reforms in developed countries is evidently economic 
development (see e.g. the Cadbury Report, 1992; OECD, 1999, (revised 2004b); King 
Report, 1994 (revised 2002); GCGF, 2003). Oman (2003) argues that studies of Brazil, 
Chile, India and South Africa all authenticate the importance of corporate governance in 
development
73
. In this context, the OECD suggests that: 
“The presence of an effective corporate governance system, within an individual 
company and across an economy as a whole, helps to provide a degree of confidence 
that is necessary for the proper functioning of a market economy. As a result, the 
cost of capital is lower and firms are encouraged to use resources more efficiently, 
thereby underpinning growth” (p. 13). 
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Oman (2003) suggests that: “… Corporate governance matters for development, more than is widely 
perceived, because it can contribute greatly to achieving sustained productivity growth in developing 
countries’ real economies” (p. 1).   
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Sound economic governance contextualises corporate governance and thus underpins ‘good’ 
economic performance (World Bank, 1981; World Bank, 1989; ECA, 2002; Akokpari, 
2004; Arun and Turner, 2009). 
  
As discussed earlier in this chapter, concern with corporate governance is no longer 
confined to corporations and their owners, but instead spans a multiplicity of economic 
activities as they are the drivers of wealth (Wolfensohn, 1999; Oman, 2003; Charkham and 
Ploix, 2005), hence corporate governance cannot be ignored in the development paradigm.  
Corporate governance is a prerequisite for national economic development and an entry tool 
into the global pool of capital (ECA, 2002; Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003)
74
. Indeed a 
range of studies suggest that Africa now realises the importance of governance for economic 
empowerment (Kilgour, 1998; Kaufmann et al., 1999; Ndulu and O’Connell, 1999; ECA, 
2002; Mitchell, 2003; Akokpari, 2004) and as a powerful tool in the battle to alleviate 
poverty in Africa (IFC, 2010). While corporate governance may have a direct link to firm 
performance, the World Bank argues that its ultimate role - especially in developing 
countries - should be in alleviating poverty. The logic underpinning such an approach is set 
out by Rahman (2010) thus: 
“Good corporate governance can result in more efficient allocation of capital and 
therefore encourage higher levels of efficiency, quality, and competitiveness 
throughout the national economy. This will, in turn, help boost private sector 
development, create more jobs, improve quality of living, and ultimately lead to 
poverty alleviation” (p. 2). 
 
A lack of ‘good’ corporate governance makes it difficult to attract sufficient capital, 
threatening the very existence of individual firms (and the macro-economy), thereby 
exacerbating poverty (Shkolnikov, 2002). 
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According to the OECD (2004) “Corporate governance is only part of the larger economic context in which 
firms operate that includes, for example, macroeconomic policies and the degree of competition in product 
and factor markets. The corporate governance framework also depends on the legal, regulatory, and 
institutional environment. In addition, factors such as business ethics and corporate awareness of the 
environmental and societal interests of the communities in which a company operates can also have an 
impact on its reputation and its long-term success” (p. 12). 
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3.9.1     Aid, Governance and Development 
 
As outlined in Chapter Four of this thesis, Zambia is a major donor aid destination country 
(Burnside and Dollar, 1997; Andersson et al., 2000; World Bank, 2009c). Foreign aid can be 
categorised into three groups: humanitarian, military and economic development assistance 
(Ayittey, 2010). In Africa, most of the debate about aid is focused on the latter and it is this 
area on which this discussion concentrates. Africa has received significant aid in the post-
colonial era, but this has not resulted in significant improvements to economic outcomes, 
with some scholars even referring to it as ‘wasted’ (Lamprecht, 2005; Foldvary, 2005; 
Booth, 2005; Shah, 2010). Comments such as: “Africa is often held up as a prime example 
of wasted aid” (United Nations, 2006 p. 10) or “aid poured down the drain” (Visser et al., 
2006 p. 11) are typical.  
 
The significant aid flow to Zambia has, however, failed to record a considerable mark on the 
country’s development (Burnside and Dollar, 1997; Andersson et al., 2000), which these 
authors blame on the governance standards. These assertions have also been acknowledged 
in the country’s Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) of 2006 by arguing that Zambia 
can only benefit from increased development aid if the governance standards are improved 
(see Chapter Four) and that foreign assistance through development aid constitutes an 
important financing source (Sixth National Development Plan, 2011). In this regard, foreign 
assistance targeted at development with ‘good’ governance conditionality is viewed as one 
of the driving forces for corporate governance in Zambia, under such conditions; aid has the 
propensity to help transform the country’s economy. Brautigam and Knack (2004) point to 
South Korea, Taiwan and Botswana as examples where this has been the case. Foreign aid 
assistance has not only targeted development but, in most cases, donors have also used it as 
a conduit for improving governance in recipient countries. In this regard, and in addition to 
threat of aid suspension, the inclusion by major donor groups of governance conditionality 
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in the development assistance eligibility criteria is viewed as one way of enhancing 
corporate governance and accountability, particularly in developing nations where such 
institutions are conventionally weak (Akokpari, 2004; Neumayer, 2004; Hout, 2007). 
However, political elites, who are the architects of Africa’s poor extant governance, have 
continually outmanoeuvred the good governance conditionality and the external pressures 
more generally (Akokpari, 2004; Ayittey, 2010). 
 
While it is expected that aid might be affiliated with improved corporate governance in 
recipient nations, Knack (2001) contends that the link is unproven (see Meessen, 1995). 
However, scholar’s views of the impact of aid on accountability, governance and 
development remain mixed (Nherere, 1995; Sobhan, 2003; Brautigam and Knack, 2004; 
Carbaugh, 2009). While the Netherlands and the World Bank have both used governance 
indicators in aid recipient selectivity mechanism (Hout, 2007), Brautigam and Knack (2004) 
note that aid levels have continued to increase even in African countries that rank highly on 
poor governance record indices. Noteworthy, development aid should inspire ‘poor’ 
governance nations to reform (Burnside and Dollar, 1997). 
 
3.9.2 Zambia’s Experience 
The empirical site for this thesis is Zambia. Despite the lack of attention to the nation’s 
corporate sector in the literature, a number of points are worth highlighting in the 
development context. Zambia is a country where significant aid has failed to leave a 
significant mark due to, among other things, governance failures (Burnside and Dollar, 
1997; Andersson et al., 2000). The Swedish government is heavily involved in aid to 
Zambia, but through its budget financing has recently expressed dissatisfaction with the 
manner in which the Zambian government has been utilising the development co-operation 
fund. Reporting for the Post Newspapers, Zulu (2010) writes:   
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“Swedish Ambassador to Zambia Marie Andersson de Frutos has said the Swedish 
people are not happy with the manner in which development cooperation funds 
meant to address poverty are being managed. ‘Sometimes we find ourselves in a 
situation where we have to freeze funds due to mismanagement…’”. 
 
The Swedish Ambassador’s concern came in the wake of a scam unearthed at the Zambian 
Ministry of Health in 2009 in which over K10 billion (Zambian currency) was allegedly 
misappropriated. Akokpari (2004) argues that aid through budget funding has offered new 
opportunities for Africa’s ruling elites to strengthen patron-client relationships and it is poor 
governance on the African continent which has facilitated this misappropriation, leading 
ultimately to reductions in aid levels (Brautigam and Knack, 2004). For example, Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa went down from US$28.6 billion in 1990 to 
US$16.4 billion in 2000 (Bentsi-Enchill 1997; Asante, 2003 p. 16). It is this reality which 
points to the need for a study such as this of governance in Zambia’s corporate sector and 
the nature and extent of any consequences for development. 
  
3.10    Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a detailed review of the literature relating to governance in Africa; 
given the empirical focus of the thesis, the discussion devoted significant attention to the 
practical implications of variability in governance standards, particularly the effect on 
economic outcomes, including development. The key conclusions that can be reached on the 
basis of this review are that the quality of governance is of tremendous importance, not only 
for corporate entities and their shareholders, but to all stakeholders - including society - as it 
provides a level of assurance for transparency and enhanced accountability while promoting 
the efficient and effective use of limited resources for development goals. The implications 
regarding economic development are particularly pertinent in Zambia, a country that is still 
searching for meaningful levels of development as well as a coherent and robust 
underpinning for any such governmental strategy. The drivers of corporate governance can 
be summarised into two broad themes: (i) corporate failures; and (ii) companies’ and 
 104 
countries’ hunt for investment, competitiveness and access to regional and international 
markets and capital. Corporate governance has, therefore, become a prerequisite for national 
economic development. Having provided a discussion of the issues relating to the need for 
(and relationships between) “good” corporate governance and significant development at the 
general level, the next chapter focuses on the specific issues relating to Zambia.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ZAMBIA 
 
4.1       Introduction  
Corporate governance has emerged as a major global policy concern following the spate of 
disastrous corporate scandals in developed countries around the world (Mallin, 2009; 
Solomon, 2010). According to Wu (2005), the underlying strength of the countries 
witnessing many of the problems is a clear indication that no country is invulnerable to the 
impact of defective corporate governance standards and practices (see Shkolnikov, 2002; 
Jesover and Kirkpatrick, 2005; Arun and Turner, 2009; Wanyama, 2006; Wanyama et al., 
2009). The concerns over firms’ conduct and performance have resulted in significant 
attention being paid to the concept of corporate governance with the debate not being 
restricted to the efficient running of private and public enterprises, but extended to 
government ministries, trade unions, charities, churches, local authorities and educational 
institutions (Ronan, 2004). Debates regarding corporate governance span a range of 
disciplines including corporate behaviour and economic development (Babic, 2003). 
However, while the notion of corporate governance has grown in prominence around the 
world, it is a relatively new phenomenon in Zambia (APRM Country Self-Assessment 
Report, 2010). The World Bank (2009b) argues that while it is true that without good public 
governance there can be no growth, it is equally true that good corporate governance is 
essential if there is to be meaningful growth. The dearth of corporate governance literature, 
particularly regarding its attachment to development in emerging countries suggests a 
peculiar - and anomalous - departure from a fundamental paradigm affecting development in 
such nations (see Wanyama et al., 2009). This thesis is designed to help fill this gap. 
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While the US, Europe and developed countries elsewhere responded expeditiously to the 
series of scandals with targeted reforms (Berglof and Thadden, 1999), in many African 
countries corporate governance, just like political reforms, have been embraced reluctantly 
(Chulu, 2006). As Gruzd (2008) argues, the accountability and transparency that follow 
good corporate governance are usually in constant tension with the powers and prerogatives 
of the authoritative politics that characterise the majority of African countries. In such cases 
governments tend to design policies and institutions that are intolerant of transparency and 
accountability and therefore guarantee self-entrenchment and self-enrichment at the expense 
of national prosperity (Gruzd, 2008). In this context, Wanyama et al. (2009) argue that 
political, economic, accounting, social and ethical frameworks have a critical ascendancy in 
terms of corporate conduct. 
  
This chapter focuses on the state of corporate governance in Zambia, the site of the 
empirical work in the thesis. The discussion follows on the significant factors driving 
corporate governance developments within the nation as well as the institutional and 
legislative arrangements and initiatives that have helped shape debate regarding the concept 
in Zambia. Effective corporate governance practices infuse the democratic values of 
fairness, accountability, responsibility, and transparency into corporations and are vital for 
both political harmony and economic prosperity (Post, 2002; Obong’o, 2009). However, for 
a country such as Zambia to achieve these aims there must be political will and wider 
participation in the governance reforms. As Ogendo (1995) argues, governance remains a 
central factor in the quest for sustainable development in African nations. 
  
4.2   An Overview of Corporate Governance in Zambia 
As alluded to in Chapter Two, Zambia’s economy is anchored on copper production - a 
legacy of the pre-independence era - which accounts for over 70% of export earnings 
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(Coldough, 1997; Andersson et al., 2000; Lungu and Kapena, 2010). According to Lungu 
(2005) and Chulu (2006), Zambia’s economic governance has witnessed three major phases, 
starting with the open market economy of the pre-independence and immediate post-
independence era (1960 - 1969), followed by the state run, demand economy covering the 
period 1970 - 1990, before the nation reverted back to a free market based-economy as a 
result of changes in political governance in the early 1990s. Zambia’s current corporate 
governance and regulation orientation has been modelled on these three phases of economic 
governance, each of which has its own implications (Lungu, 2005; Chulu, 2006). In order to 
explore an evolutionary pattern in governance, the focus now turns to the three distinct 
periods. 
 
4.2.1 The First Phase of Economic Governance, 1960 - 1969 
Zambia’s economic management in the first phase was based on the well-established 
(colonial) market economy system driven by the private sector (Chulu, 2006). Mulwila 
(1980) argues that the government’s economic policies during this period were focused on 
development anchored by private sector investment that was in turn facilitated by the state 
providing a conducive environment for business. Mulwila (1980) contends that, this strategy 
was a realisation of the importance of the private sector in economic development, as 
manifested in most developed economies. The economy at this stage was dominated by 
foreign companies with ownership structures and governance models reflecting the Anglo-
American model, while government intervention was restricted to the provision of services, 
particularly in rural areas where it was neither practical nor profitable for the private sector 
to operate (Turok, 1980; Mulwila, 1980; Chulu, 2006). However, company regulation was 
based on the British Companies Acts of 1948 (Chulu, 2006). 
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4.2.2 The Second Phase of Economic Governance, 1970 - 1990 
4.2.2.1  The Drive for Change 
As in many newly-independent African countries, Zambia’s private sector was dominated 
by foreign businesses, creating an impression that despite independence, economic 
management was still in the hands of non-Zambians, including the former colonial powers 
(Tordoff, 1980; Turok, 1980; Mwanawina and Mulungushi, 2002; Chiumya, 2004). There 
was also an assumption that, left to its own devices, the private sector would have no 
incentive for pursuing the economic transformation programmes supported by government 
(Andersson et al., 2000), leading to the need for state intervention in the allocation of 
resources. These concerns were expressed in a statement by the then President of the country 
when he stated that: “Political independence without economic independence is 
meaningless” (Kaunda 1968). This thinking led to the nationalisation reforms and was the 
genesis of the second phase of economic management. 
     
4.2.2.2   Economic Indigenisation Programmes 
The indigenisation programmes that inspired many newly-independent African countries 
stimulated the creation of state-owned enterprises in Zambia. This programme began with 
the reformulating of ownership structures, with the state acquiring 51% shareholdings in 26 
major private companies (Brownbridge, 1998) (Foreign banks
75
 and mines
76
 were excluded); 
However, the sweeping Matero economic reforms of 1969 that followed the Mulungushi 
programme of the previous year ushered in new government policies that saw the state 
acquire controlling interests in the mining companies that were initially side-lined
77
 (Turok, 
1980). It is argued that the genesis of indigenisation programmes was (partly) a response to 
foreign exploitation at the hands of multinational corporations that dominated the economy 
                                                          
75
The state did not invest to this extent in the foreign banks as they were incorporated outside Zambia. 
76
The state argued that control (and more time) was needed with the mines as they were at the heart of 
Zambia’s economy.    
77
On 11 August 1969 the state acquired a 51% controlling interest in the giant copper mining companies which 
constituted the main pillar of the economy (Turok, 1980 p.  468). 
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(Turok, 1980), dominance which many Zambians viewed as a new de facto form of 
colonialisation. Effectively the state became the majority shareholder for both control and 
decision-making purposes; in this context, Simwinga (1980) argues that government now 
controlled enterprises through the board of directors, chaired by the Minister under whose 
portfolio the company resided, despite this model not being provided for in the extant 
Companies Act. However, like private companies, government’s control of state-owned 
companies derives from the conventional rights and privileges of shareholders in capitalist 
systems (Simwinga, 1980). Moreover, according to Turok (1979) government representation 
and consequential control at board level was the main rationale for the state’s acquisition of 
majority shareholdings in key private companies. Turok (1980) asserts further that 
government’s presence was not motivated by resource mobilisation but instead reflected a 
desire for effective control. With this ownership and control structure, Simwinga (1980) 
argues that investment decisions vested in the board of directors always championed 
government policy objectives. Between the 1960s and the early 1970s, favourable world 
copper prices might have propelled the Zambian government into pushing for total state 
control of the mines, which were ultimately nationalised in 1969 (Beveridge, 1974; Lungu 
and Kapena, 2010). Maimbo (2002b) contends that by the mid-1970s, Zambia had become a 
model of effective public sector led-economic system. While the intentions may have had 
some positive impacts at the time, the negative political consequences resulted in dis-
investment and poor economic performance (Lungu, 2005). 
 
4.2.2.3   Economic Performance and the Failure of State-Owned Enterprises 
 In the early 1990s, Zambia’s debt burden swelled to over US$6.5 billion (Poku, 2002), over 
216% of GDP, ranking the country among the most indebted nations in the world. The 
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‘Zambianisation’
78
 of key aspects of the economy, along with interventionist economic 
policies as well as the use of parastatals for ethnic patronage and intermittent restructuring 
are among the factors cited for the poor performance of Zambian corporate entities and, 
ultimately, the entire macro-economy (Simwinga, 1980; Tordoff, 1980; Brownbridge, 1998; 
Maimbo, 2002b). Simwinga further argues that state-owned enterprises subjected to delays 
and bureaucratic tendencies - as well as constrained budgetary allocations - were always 
overshadowed by private companies. Similarly, Kikeri et al. (1994) contend that many state-
owned enterprises could not sustain themselves and, hence, became a burden on the national 
treasury. For Clausen (1993), it is impediments such as “negative” state intervention in the 
economy that triggered worldwide promotion of the private sector in the management of 
national economies. However, even at the time, many established voices argued that over-
extending the role of the state in economic development perverts economic performance 
(e.g. World Bank, 1981). 
     
4.2.2.4   Corporate Governance Implications 
Lungu (2005) argues that state control over public companies had major implications for 
corporate governance standards in the management of the Zambian economy, particularly in 
the 1970 - 1990 phase of economic governance. Cook and Kirkpatrick (1997) argue that the 
most fundamental corporate governance implications in this type of environment relate to 
state-owned enterprises’ difficulties in operating as business entities while at the same time 
paying close attention to government objectives which, in most cases, are politically and 
socially-oriented. This disorientation gives rise to a dislocation in the corporate governance 
framework. According to Chulu (2006), the state pursued the stakeholder theory to its 
extremes, leading to the suffocation of Zambia’s publicly-owned enterprises. For Turok 
                                                          
78
Zambianisation is a philosophy that was formally intended to put the management of the Zambian economy 
into domestic hands. This approach dictated that most foreign employees be replaced by Zambians, after  
which the Mulungushi and Matero economic reforms of 1968 and 1969 respectively saw the government’s 
control of the country’s economy extended over a wide range of activities (Tordoff, 1980 p. 51).   
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(1980), the state’s resolve to consolidate its presence in all economic activities by bringing 
together each of the active sectors (the Mining Development Corporation (MINDECO); the 
Finance and Development Corporation (FINDECO); and the Industrial Development 
Corporation (INDECO); under the umbrella of the Zambia Industrial and Mining 
Corporation (ZIMCO), with the country’s President, Kenneth Kaunda, as Chairman of the 
Board provided serious difficulties in terms of progress in the corporate governance area
79
. 
Chulu (2006) reveals that at the inception of ZIMCO, the President appointed boards of 
directors as well as managing directors and general managers of subsidiary companies, 
violating not only the extant Companies Act, but also any conventional notion of ‘good’ 
corporate governance. In 1989, the director general and head of ZIMCO’s management, plus 
12 of the 22 ZIMCO directors were members of the central committee in Zambia’s ruling 
party (Bates and Collier, 1995). In practice, the board was accountable to the president 
(Mulwila, 1980; Chulu, 2006) and the latter assumed the role of de facto board at ZIMCO, 
with all board leadership and appointments vested in him. In this context, Mulwila’s point of 
view is that:   
“In practice the significance of the shareholders of ZIMCO has been vitiated in that 
certain of their powers such as powers of appointment of directors and of policy 
making are exercised by the president and the central government. The shareholders 
merely ratify what has already been decided in government corridors. To this extent 
ZIMCO's retention of shareholders is for window dressing rather than of substance” 
(Mulwila, 1980; p. 138). 
 
ZIMCO had 121 state-owned enterprises under its control and was involved in virtually all 
the activities of the Zambian economy; according to Simwinga (1977), the amalgamation of 
all state-owned organisations meant that ZIMCO became the largest firm in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, ranking 123
rd
 in size among corporations outside the USA. The arrangement thus 
meant that control of nearly all industrial production in Zambia resided with the President. 
State control extended to almost everything, from bakeries
80
 to mining conglomerates 
                                                          
79
A further description of this matter was provided in Chapter Two. 
80
E.g. Super loaf bakery, a parastatal company controlled by the Zambian government.    
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(Chulu, 2006). However, Solomon (2007) points out that unfettered power vested in one 
person is a reflection of bad corporate governance practices and indeed this was a problem 
in the Enron case. Similarly, the UK’s Cadbury Report (1992) emphasises that shareholders 
have a role in ensuring that an appropriate governance structure exists. In particular, the 
Cadbury Report recognises the role of the chairman in corporate governance as fundamental 
in providing leadership and checks and balances; Zambian practice at the time was clearly 
far removed from any such ideal models. 
 
4.2.3 The Current Phase of Economic Governance (from 1990). 
The economic hardships experienced by Zambians during the Second Phase of Economic 
Governance prompted calls for political governance reforms that would bring about 
improvements to economic governance (Lungu, 2005; Chulu, 2006). This aim was achieved 
in 1991 when, as outlined in Chapter Two of this thesis, the country moved from a one-party 
to a multi-party system. The change in political governance drove a shift to an open-market 
economic system, with large-scale privatisation of state-owned enterprises, liberalisation of 
the financial market and a major reduction in government’s control over the running of the 
economy (Kpundeh and Riley, 1992; Chiumya, 2004; Lungu, 2005; Chulu, 2006). The de-
nationalisation programme characterised the third phase of Zambia’s economic management 
and added further to the growing interest in corporate governance across the nation. In this 
context, the Financial Sector Development Plan for Zambia (FSDP, 2004) recognises 
corporate governance as key to the country’s economic performance, stating that: 
“The financial sector in Zambia requires institutions that are managed with integrity, 
probity and transparency in their effort to contribute positively to society. To this 
end, there is a need for appropriate education, legislation and codes of best practice 
to facilitate the adoption of good corporate governance principles” (p. iii) 
81
 
 
                                                          
81
Similarly, Kuwema (2011) notes the Institute of Directors in Zambia (IODZ)’s belief that corporate 
governance is a fundamental tool for any economic development of a country.  
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Having discussed the broad political and economic governance context, the chapter now 
moves to a discussion of governance issues in the Zambian corporate sector. 
 
4.3 Corporate Governance Developments in Zambia 
 
Africa has not been spared the corporate governance difficulties well-documented in the 
developed world (Wanyama et al. 2009). In fact, Zulu (2009) reports the Civil Society for 
Poverty Reduction (CSPR)’s observation that what Zambia has been experiencing recently 
is no less than the total collapse of corporate governance. The CSPR’s argument is based on 
what they referred to as a ‘collapsed’ political leadership that lacks accountability and 
allows abuse of public office. Similar sentiments were echoed following the Zambian 
government’s removal of the abuse of office clause from the Anti-Corruption Commission 
(ACC) Act, opening more avenues for rampant abuse of public resources (Zulu, 2009). A 
number of factors have been cited as catalysts for the growing interest in corporate 
governance in the country. Notable among these are: systematic corporate failures; the 1991 
change in political governance and reforms; the establishment of the Save Konkola Copper 
Mines (KCM) Task Force in 2002; and Zambia’s consistently poor ranking on the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI). These issues are now discussed in detail. 
 
4.3.1 Corporate Failures - Zambian Experience 
The well documented failures of some high profile companies in the US, Europe and Asia, 
revealed serious weaknesses in corporate governance regulations (Sternberg, 2004). While 
developed economies moved swiftly to prevent further corporate scandals and failures, in 
developing countries like Zambia the concept of corporate governance is relatively novel, 
and has yet to permeate through the nation’s key industries. In Zambia, however, systematic 
corporate scandals coupled with disastrous social and economic circumstances have left 
wider society questioning in whose interest organisations are run. Though failures in 
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developed countries monopolise the corporate governance literature (Wanyama et al., 2009), 
Zambia has its own story to tell. Brownbridge (1998) argues that the country’s failures were 
initially viewed as politically motivated. The author cites the controversies that surrounded 
the collapse of the Capital Bank in 1991. In this context, but as Maimbo (2002a) notes, 
between 1995 and 1998, Zambia experienced more corporate failures, particularly in the 
banking sector, with nine banks collapsing
82
.  
 
4.3.2   Reasons Cited for Failures 
The common reasons cited by Maimbo (2002a) and others for the systematic bank failures 
in Zambia are largely associated with high levels of non-performing loans, excessive 
‘connected lending’ to related parties and a high level of insider borrowing. To this effect, 
Maimbo states that: 
“[The] BOZ attributed MBBZ’s failure to insider abuse, incompetent management 
coupled by an ineffective Board of Directors, and foreign exchange exposure risks” 
(p. 34). 
  
Smith (1996) cites managerial incompetence and ineffective boards of directors as reminders 
of the bad corporate governance practices that influenced institutional investors and the 
board of directors to remove the chief executive officer at Kmart Corporation in 1995. 
Similarly, Financial System Supervision Department (FSSD), (1996) notes that BOZ 
attributed the African Commercial Bank’s failure to: “abuse of insider borrowers coupled 
with the ineffective Board of Directors, which was easily manipulated by one major 
shareholder” (p. 10)
83
. The literature associated the failures with several macro and micro 
                                                          
82
Meridien BIAO bank, the fourth largest bank in Zambia, was placed into compulsory liquidation on 18 
August 1995 (Brownbridge, 1998; Maimbo, 2000a; Maimbo, 2002) followed by the African Commercial 
Bank and Commerce Bank in the same year (Brownbridge, 1998; Maimbo, 2000; Maimbo, 2002a; Maimbo, 
2002b). In 1997, the Lima Bank, the Prudence Bank, the Credit Africa Bank and the Manifold Investment 
Bank collapsed, followed by the First Merchant Bank in February 1998 (Maimbo, 2002). The Zambia Export 
and Import Bank Limited (EXIM) Bank ceased trading at around the same time, while the Co-operative 
Bank was closed in 1997 in the face of governance-related issues. Other banks that were closed following 
allegations of money laundering and deteriorating financial performance include: Union Bank, the United 
Bank of Zambia and the National Savings and Credit Bank (International Business Publication, 2008).   
83
See also Brownbridge (1996; 1998). 
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factors, but weaknesses in de facto governance in the banking sector were identified as a key 
issue (Brownbridge, 1996; FSSD, 1996; 1998; Maimbo, 2000a; 2001; Mwenda, 2002; 
Chiumya, 2004)
84
. To this effect, the central bank (Bank of Zambia) through the Financial 
Sector Development Plan of 2004 recognises corporate governance as one of the main issues 
to be addressed to protect banks from further governance turmoil (Times of Zambia, 2005). 
  
With the collapse of many local banks, foreign banks came to monopolise the banking 
system in Zambia (Brownbridge, 1998; Maimbo, 2002a). Elsewhere in the economy 
Agriflora Ltd, the country’s biggest commercial rose-flower grower, collapsed in 2005 
(Food and Agriculture Organization, 2009) reducing horticultural export revenue from 
US$45m in 2003 to about US$36m in 2004 (Export Board of Zambia, 2005; Regoverning 
Markets, 2007). Lungu (2005) holds poor governance responsible for the failure, suggesting 
that the issue pervaded across both industrial and financial sectors. There have been many 
other failures in the Zambian private sector and among the nation’s state-owned enterprises 
but, as alluded to earlier, such failures are mostly associated with broad political issues (see 
Brownbridge, 1998). However, in 2008, the Zambian parliament revealed that a substantial 
number of the liquidations in the early 1990s may have been due to the non-existence of 
robust corporate governance principles (Zambia National Assembly, 2008); the report 
further argued that:  
“…there must have been some element of unethical business conducts such as 
creative accounting which could have led to the collapse of some of these 
companies” (p. 2).  
 
The committee contended that corporate governance is not only a tool for increasing the 
flow of investment to corporations in Zambia, but has economic development implications 
for the country as well. They argue further that efficient companies or business enterprises 
are those that will create wealth, employment and revenue for the treasury and, 
                                                          
84
Nchite (2000) summarised the reasons put forward by different scholars as simply representing ‘poor 
governance’. 
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consequently, lead to economic growth
85
. In this context, the parliamentary committee 
claims that ‘good’ corporate governance is a prerequisite for national economic 
development.  
 
4.3.3 Changes in Political Governance in 1991 
The change in Political Governance in 1991 that led to the transition to a market economy 
represents one of the major drivers of corporate governance in Zambia. During this era, 
serious corporate governance issues emerged as the immediate aftermath of political reforms 
saw large scale privatisation of state-owned enterprises. Though the decline in economic 
activity was closely associated with the global oil crisis and the decline in world copper 
prices, it can also be argued that the state-owned enterprises (which by 1991 represented 
over 80% of all economic activity (Turok, 1980; Mwanawina and Mulungushi, 2002; 
USAID, 1997) were seriously defective in terms of governance structures. Indeed, some of 
them had become so complex that they became a breeding ground for manipulation and 
mismanagement, not least ZIMCO (Turok, 1980). 
 
4.3.4   Privatisation 
The shift in economic policy meant that most companies under state control were 
surrendered to private owners. However, this change in firm ownership posed significant 
corporate governance challenges for Zambia. The Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA) 
established in 1992
86
 was mandated to plan, implement and control the privatisation of the 
nation’s state-owned enterprises, in cooperation with the government, by selling them to 
those who were seen as more competent to run them (ZPA, 2009). Between 1991 and 2006, 
over 260 companies were privatised
87
. As has been the case with privatisation programmes 
                                                          
85
The Cadbury Report (1992) expresses very similar sentiments for UK (see Cadbury Report, 1992, Section 
1.1). 
86
Through the Privatisation Act No.21 1992. 
87
According to the ZPA’s Privatisation Status Report for 2006, by July 2006, in addition to 260 privatised 
firms, another 2 had negotiations completed while a further 22 were “under preparation.”  
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across much of Africa, concerns were raised over the social impact, as companies were 
being sold without any attempt being made to assess these effects (see Josiah et al., 2010). In 
some cases the state did not even know who was responsible for the retrenchment packages 
because ZPA’s Social Impact Department had a limited role to play in this area (ZPA, 
2009). Banda (2009) concludes that the government appeared to only be interested in 
disposing of companies, and had no programme for (or concern about) other factors such as 
social implications.  
4.3.5   Privatisation and corporate governance 
Privatisation is viewed by many as a means of improving corporate governance through 
structural corporate reform (Dyck, 2001; Boubakri et al., 2005). For Zambia, Chulu (2006) 
argues that privatisation has the propensity to minimise incidents of neo-patrimonialism and 
opportunism amongst political clientele that are prevalent in state-controlled enterprises. 
Private control has been suggested as leading directly to improved corporate governance 
(Jones et al., 1998; Owen, 2004) with some scholars explicitly positing that there has been a 
shift in the privatisation debate from efficiency and competition issues to broader 
governance concerns (Johnson and Shleifer, 2004; Kim, 2004). The incentive and ability to 
work towards cost efficiency and make enterprises attractive to investors is what Owen 
(2004) argues drives fully privatised enterprises towards ‘better’ corporate governance 
practices than state-owned enterprises. The author believes that managers of ‘properly-run’ 
companies are expected to observe the tenets of good corporate governance practices such as 
accountability, transparency, fairness and responsibility as opposed to their counterparts in 
the state-controlled sector, who work under severe political pressures.  
Lungu (2005) points to poor qualifications amongst state-appointed CEOs and board 
members as being a significant challenge. Similarly, the ZPA (2009) argues that ‘negative’ 
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political interventions such as governmental determination of pricing
88
, politically-blocked 
investment and state employment policies based on political patronage proved counter-
productive. The ZPA also points to factors such as losses
89
, deterioration in trade, debt 
burdens, a lack of capital investment and significant internal mismanagement as some of the 
corporate governance challenges that arise in state-owned enterprises. Likewise, Dyck 
(2001) argues that:  
“Unless developing countries embrace a corporate governance perspective, 
privatisation is unlikely to provide the benefits of improved performance with 
accountability” (p. 59).  
There are a number of specific cases where privatisation has been claimed to have improved 
corporate governance in Zambia. Speaking during the official listing ceremony that marked 
the completion of the privatisation of the country’s biggest commercial bank, the Zambia 
National Commercial Bank (ZANACO), the Minister of Finance observed that the listing 
marked a significant step on the road to achieving good corporate governance and 
sustainable growth (Lusaka Times, 2008). Following privatisation, the bank’s capital had 
more than doubled while profitability had improved substantially (Sinyangwe, 2009a). In the 
same vein, Johnson and Shleifer (2004) point out that privatised firms that did not embrace 
corporate governance performed poorly, frequently being “tunnelled” by their management. 
However, critics of privatisation in Africa, for example, Josiah et al. (2010) argue that 
privatisation that is focused on profitability without meaningful consideration for social 
factors is at best controversial and is most likely to lead to major harm for much of society. 
Similar sentiments were expressed by Lungu and Kapena (2010) who posit that the 
privatisation of Zambia’s mines has resulted in the deterioration of infrastructure and service 
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As Zambia’s economy has become more open, pricing has become more competitive. In addition, 
international and domestic transportation costs can be a considerable factor in selling goods (Doing Business 
in Zambia, 2010).  
89
Parastatal losses led to a significant burden on the tax payer (ZPA, 2009). 
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provision in the nation’s mining towns. While Gallhofer and Haslam (2007) point to the lack 
of transparency and disclosure between the government and the buyers in such cases, the 
new owners of ZANACO, Rabobank Group, claim to have paid particular attention to the 
issue of corporate governance
90
. While privatisation of state-owned enterprises is viewed as 
a means of improving corporate governance, Okeahalam and Akinboade (2003) suggest that 
the African experience has led to the resurfacing of inherent governance conflicts in most 
newly-privatised companies; these are in turn associated with a lack of independence and 
significant cronyism. Similarly, Krasniqi (2008) argues that any privatisation process that 
lacks transparency has the propensity to create opportunities for corruption, asset stripping 
and a tendency to generate disrespect for private ownership; as a result, the process may fail 
to achieve its intended purpose. Nonetheless, effective corporate governance practices in 
newly-privatised companies are viewed as useful tools for attracting investment (Wanyama 
et al., 2009), as well as lowering the cost of capital (Krasniqi, 2008), improving 
productivity, capturing new export markets, recreating the lost jobs and expanding the 
nation’s tax base (ZPA, 2009).  
4.3.6 Anglo-American Corporation’s sudden pull out of the Mines 
 
The sudden pull out of Anglo-American Corporation from Zambia’s mining giant Konkola 
Copper Mines (KCM) in 2002, and the appointment in the same year of a task force to save 
the mines from total collapse, is another event that led many Zambians to question 
governance issues in the privatised companies. The decision to pull out just two years after 
acquiring 51% shares in the mining company was viewed by many as not only damaging to 
the Zambian economy, but also as a violation of good governance principles (MIS, 2009). 
Anglo-American Corporation cited heavy financial losses caused by unexpectedly low 
copper prices as the reason for the pull-out, but analysts argued that this was not a ‘fair’ 
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 The group has also endorsed the principles of the Dutch corporate governance code embraced by the parent 
company (Rabobank, 2009). 
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justification (MIS, 2009). For example, just after the corporation pulled out the price trend 
reversed, with copper reaching a new record high in the year 2005 (KCM Plc, 2009; Lungu 
and Kapena, 2010). 
  
4.3.6.1   Corporate Governance Implications 
Anglo-American Corporation took advantage of the Zambian government’s desperation to 
negotiate huge concessions using procedures that lacked transparency and full disclosure 
(Kaleyi, 2002; Donge, 2008)
91
. Examples of the concessions wrought include: a low fixed 
power rate of 2 cents per kilowatt for 20 years; tax exemptions for 5 years; exemption from 
paying duty; and government agreeing to assume the company’s debt as well as paying for 
redundancies, bearing the cost of environmental liabilities and assuming US$770 million of 
the company’s credit liabilities (Kaleyi, 2002); Anglo thus fell in a position to make an offer 
of US$90 million spread over 7 instalments covering 7 years (Kaleyi, 2002). Lungu and 
Kapena (2010) argue that:  
“The privatisation of the ZCCM …triggered a major debate concerning corporate 
governance and the corporate social responsibility performance of Zambia’s mining 
industry” (p. 58).  
The World Bank accused Anglo of breaching corporate governance rules regarding the 
manner in which the KCM pull-out was handled (Kaleyi, 2002); while in August 2002 
Friends of the Earth International (FOEI) published a report in which they critiqued the 
firm’s activities in Zambia. Specifically, the FOEI claimed that the company had violated 
the OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises
92
, but it also noted that Anglo had 
obtained secret agreements on tax, royalty payments, repatriation of profits and non-liability 
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Donge (2008) suggests that the discussions took place in ‘secrecy’. 
92
OECD guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are recommendations addressed by governments to 
multinational enterprises operating in or from adhering countries. They provide voluntary principles and 
standards for responsible business conduct in a variety of areas including employment and industrial 
relations, human rights, environment, information disclosure, combating bribery, consumer interests, science 
and technology, competition, and taxation (http://www.oecd.org). 
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for past and future pollution (FOEl, 2002). Similarly, it was reported in Africa Confidential 
(2001) that: 
“Zambian activists accuse the mining giant Anglo-American of breaching the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's code of conduct when 
the copper mines were privatized. In a test case for the OECD's code, the 
Copperbelt-based group Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE) has complained to 
Britain's Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The CBE accuses Anglo of having 
broken OECD rules on competition, taxation, environmental protection and 
disclosure, when it bought several mines on the Copperbelt through its subsidiary 
Konkola Copper Mines (KCM)”  
The debate on the conduct of Anglo’s period of investment in Zambia raised governance 
issues regarding both the manner in which negotiations were conducted during the sale and 
the company’s conduct thereafter; for example, Donge (2008) argues that the government’s 
chief mine privatisation negotiator between 1997 and 1999 was a former chairman and chief 
executive of the same mines. Donge further observes that negotiations about development 
agreements were conducted behind closed doors, with the documents being withheld from 
public scrutiny and no opportunity for those affected to query the deal
93,
 
94
. Ultimately, 
however, the controversies surrounding the events at Konkola Copper Mines led to the 
establishment of the Save Konkola Copper Mines Task Force, some of the activities of 
which are discussed in the empirical chapters of this thesis.  
4.3.7 Chinese Investment in Zambia and Corporate Governance 
Chinese investment in Africa, Zambia in particular, has grown rapidly in recent decades 
(Haglund, 2009; Adam, 2010). According to Claassen et al. (2012), by 2008 China’s 
Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) in the continent rose to US$5.49 billion, 
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Other allegations include Anglo America’s Corporation’s failure to comply with IFC guidelines on disclosure 
and environmental legislation and entering into a secret deal with the Zambian government to forgo payment 
of proper compensation to workers and the clean-up of toxic sites.   
94
The organisation Rights and Accountability in Development (2002) also blamed Anglo America’s 
manipulation of: the privatisation regime; the anti-competitive practices during the sale negotiations; the 
tabling of extraordinary tax concessions; the extent of continued social provision; employment; 
redundancies; training and co-operation with local business; environmental deregulation; and disclosure and 
accountability (see Inter-African Network for Human Rights and Development, 2002). 
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covering 45 of Africa’s 53 countries, with Zambia receiving the third highest figure of $73 
million after South Africa and Nigeria. However, opinions regarding China’s involvement in 
Africa appear to be divided, with terms such as: ‘new form of colonialism’, ‘the new 
Sinophobia’, ‘China’s scramble for Africa’, ‘China’s conquest of Africa’, ‘China’s new 
mercantilism in Africa’ being used in this context (Li, 2010). Notwithstanding these 
concerns, the significant role that such investment plays in the continent’s growth is widely 
recognised (Claassen et al., 2012). However, from China’s point of view, the involvement in 
Africa appears to be not only commercial, but social and political as well (Claassen et al., 
2012), with Tull (2006) describing China’s relationship with Africa as commercial, political 
and diplomatic. 
 
With China taking a significant interest in Zambia, it has become imperative that, for 
inclusivity purposes, this new investment is given attention in corporate governance 
discussions (Haglund, 2009). In this regard, this section of the chapter is designed to briefly 
outline the implications of increased Chinese investment for corporate governance and 
development in Zambia. Haglund (2009) argues that, like many African nations, Zambia’s 
regulatory capacity constraints and weaknesses in accountability, coupled with state 
intervention, makes the country vulnerable to the dictates of foreign investors’ governance 
characteristics. This, Haglund maintains, partly influences the relationship between China 
and Zambia. Similarly, Adam (2010) believes that China’s no-strings-attached method of 
investment, reinforced by its foreign policy in Africa which is based on, inter-alia, mutual 
respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other’s internal 
affairs (Haglund, 2008) appears to be more attractive for many African leaders than does the 
support offered by most Western financiers, with its transparency and accountability strings 
(Clapham, 1999). In most cases, particularly in this context, the strings-attached investment 
is interpreted to refer to flows of investment that have ‘good’ governance conditionalities 
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attached. It is this type of conditionality, practiced by most Western financial institutions 
and countries, which irritates the majority of the African political elites because it limits 
their access to resources for personal gain (Haglund, 2008). Here, the author states that: 
“Some African rulers may find Chinese investment attractive because the Chinese 
discourse of development, unlike that of the West, does not embed pressure to 
reform and strengthen participatory democracy, good governance and human rights” 
(p. 552) 
 
Adam (2010) argues that such an approach, which lacks any commitment to transparency 
and accountability, has very little benefit for the majority of stakeholders in terms of 
development. 
 
4.3.7.1 Implications for Corporate Governance 
  
Past decades have witnessed growing attention to corporate governance in both developed 
and developing economies (Cadbury, 2002; Dallas, 2004; Mallin, 2009; Solomon, 2010). 
This trend has seen the emergence of numerous systems and codes in developed economies 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Babic, 2003), a pattern that has slowly been replicated in 
developing nations (Solomon, 2010) with most governments surrendering SOEs to private 
entrepreneurs with a view to strengthening corporate governance (Josiah et al., 2010). 
However, Lin (2001) questions China’s capacity to improve corporate governance, 
particularly in SOEs, without undergoing the common process of privatisation as, Lin 
argues, politicians are not the best enforcers of corporate governance standards. This is 
evidenced in China’s approach to investment in Africa which, as noted above, Adam (2010) 
refers to as taking place on a ‘no-strings-attached’ basis. Some commentators argue that this 
approach has little chance of emancipating Africa (Clapham, 1999; Haglund, 2008; Adam, 
2010), a continent bedevilled with governance and accountability difficulties (World Bank, 
1989).  The approach contrasts with the view held by most scholars that investors are 
increasingly demanding corporate governance reforms in investee countries (CACG, 1999; 
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Gibson, 2003; Nganga et al., 2003; Oman, 2003; Lungu, 2005) with some investors seeing 
corporate governance as a key influence on investment decisions in emerging markets like 
Zambia. 
 
Zambia, like most African nations, has legal and regulatory deficiencies (Li, 2010) which 
some observers argue provide opportunities for foreign investors to impose their emblematic 
governance characters (Haglund, 2009). In this context, Li (2010) argues that: 
“The terms of investment, inadequate labour laws and the failure of the Zambian 
government to implement related laws are also contributing factors. These problems 
are Copperbelt-wide rather than specific to Chinese companies” (p.10). 
 
and: 
  
“Chinese investors and contractors can do a good job while adhering to the required 
standards. However, just like other investors, the Chinese are prone to take 
advantage of the loopholes in the system. You therefore need to put your foot down 
and ensure that things get done the way they should be done” (p14). 
     
This reasoning is consistent with Haglund (2009)’s assertion that in the absence of robust 
legal and regulatory mechanisms China will exploit gaps in governance regimes. On the 
other hand, Alden (2007) posits that Chinese investment has worked well in developed 
countries, with strong corporate governance regulation and monitoring evident, although the 
same activity has been portrayed as China taking full advantage of Zambia’s anaemic 
political, legal and regulatory environment (Haglund, 2009; Li, 2010). Li (2010) further 
points out that Chinese companies operating in Zambia have earned themselves a bad 
reputation regarding environmental practices, corporate social responsibility, health and 
safety standards, poor labour remuneration, failure to embrace the culture of the local 
societies in which they work and live
95
 and the regular recruitment of casual workers from 
China (see Haglund, 2009). 
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For example, (Li, 2010) notes that: “The enterprise culture of Chinese companies is different to Western 
companies. Western managers treat Zambian employees as their small brothers. For instance, the Western 
managers will use the same toilet as the Zambian workers, but in Chinese companies, the Chinese have their 
own toilet. It seems the Chinese like to put up barriers.”  
 126 
One of the issues affecting Chinese companies in terms of corporate governance appears to 
relate to the fact that the largest Chinese multinationals operating in Zambia are state-
owned. For example, Chambishi Copper Mine is owned by the Non-Ferrous Company–
Africa (NFCA) a subsidiary of the state-owned China Nonferrous Metal Mining (Group) 
Company (CNMC); this organisation also owns Chambishi Copper Smelter (CCS) and has 
an 85% stake in Luanshya Copper Mine (Li, 2010). In this regard, Haglund (2009) maintains 
that although the Chinese government is not involved in the routine actions of Chinese firms 
abroad, China’s central government remains influential in promoting outward investment 
and the governance features of its SOEs to ensure that policy objectives are congruent with 
government objectives. This author further reports that by 2007, of the seven key copper 
mining companies in Zambia, only China Nonferrous Metal Mining (Group) Company 
(CNMC) was a government-controlled enterprise, while the rest were private
96
, “at a time 
when most multinationals operating in Africa are private, large Chinese investors … are 
frequently state-owned” (Haglund, 2009 p. 557)
97
. While the governance difficulties are not 
only confined to Chinese SOEs (Li, 2010), it is commonly-accepted that corporate 
governance standards in SOEs are not high (Lin, 2001; Qiang, 2003; Wong, 2004). In this 
regard, Lin (2001) argues that China’s continued influence as owner and financier of SOEs 
is partly responsible for weakened corporate governance in such enterprises (see Haglund, 
2008); the author maintains that SOEs generally suffer from: “core governance deficiencies 
such as conflicting objectives, excessive political interference, and lack of transparency” 
(p.6) and that “politicians and bureaucrats are typically poor overseers of SOEs” (p.9). The 
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In 2007, key players in Zambia’s copper mining sector included: Kansanshi, owned by First Quantum 
(Canadian) – FTSE, TSX; Konkola Copper Mines, owned by Vedanta (Indian) – FTSE; Mopani Copper 
Mines, owned by Glencore (Swiss-Registered) – Private equity; Chambeshi Metals, owned by Enya 
Holdings, (Nertherlands – Registered) – Private equity); Bwana Mkubwa, owned by First Quantum 
(Canadian) – FTSE, TSX; NFC Africa, owned by China Nonferrous Metal Mining (Group) Company 
(China) – Government owned; Chibuluma, owned by Metorex (South Africa) – JSX.  
97
See also Frost and Ho (2005). 
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other problematic area for Chinese investment stems from the fact that, in most cases, 
Chinese and Zambian politicians are highly involved in the negotiations of investment, 
resulting in political embeddedness (Haglund, 2009). 
  
The extent of inter-company transactions between Chinese firms operating in Zambia, and 
their parent companies in China, combined with Zambia’s limited regulatory capacity to 
enforce international accounting standards is blamed by Haglund (2009) for impaired 
accountability, loopholes for tax evasion and accounting irregularities. Here, Haglund 
(2008) reports that: 
“Among the five international mining companies operating in Zambia for which 
annual financial statements where available for the last three years, only NFC 
Africa’s accounts had received any auditor qualifications (and did so in every year). 
NFC’s auditors Deloitte & Touche cite unavailability of information that makes them 
‘unable to determine whether proper accounting records have been maintained’” (p. 
558). 
    
Similarly, most Chinese firms’ pursuit of maximum output at minimal cost results in neglect 
for labour and environmental laws, reduced investment in health and safety systems, poor 
staff training, limited social responsibility and ignoring of corporate governance standards 
(Haglund, 2009; Li, 2010). Equally, balancing economic gains and diplomatic objectives 
further problematises Chinese investment in Africa (Haglund, 2008). However, 
commentators argue that while Chinese firms may have taken advantage of the deficient 
political and regulatory environment in Zambia - characterised by outdated legislation and 
weak enforcement mechanisms - the responsibility for and sanctioning of non-observance of 
local laws and regulation lies squarely with the Zambian government (Haglund, 2008; 
Haglund, 2009; Li, 2010). The last few years have nonetheless witnessed a slight 
improvement in the behaviour of some Chinese firms’ operating in Zambia (Li, 2010), 
mainly due to a change in in the latter’s government in September 2011, coupled with 
widespread local and international criticisms. Given this context, corporate governance 
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reform must be seen as non-negotiable if the Zambian population is to benefit from the lack 
of strings attached to the Chinese windfall. 
     
4.3.8 Corruption in Zambia 
  
The National Anti-Corruption Policy (NACP) contends that: “Corruption has been and still 
is a significant impediment to good governance in Zambia” (NACP, 2009 p. i). Zambia’s 
government, through the National Capacity Building Programme Poverty Reduction 
Strategy, characterised corruption as not only a governance conundrum but also as a 
challenge to social and economic development (NACP, 2009). NACP (2009) defines 
corruption as: 
“ soliciting, accepting, obtaining, giving, promising or offering of gratification by 
way of a bribe or other personal temptation or inducement or the misuse or abuse of 
a public office or authority for private advantage or benefit through bribery, 
extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, rushed trials, and electoral 
malpractices” (p. v). 
 
Corruption appears to have filtered through the cultural characteristics of many African 
countries, becoming an expected element of every social transaction (Chabal and Daloz, 
1999; Taylor, 2006b). While corruption is viewed as a barrier to development and good 
governance (Mensah et al., 2003), most developing countries lack the political will and 
institutional capacity to deal with the scourge (see Joseph, 2003). Cain (2007) argues that 
the world’s poorest countries are in fact the most vulnerable to corruption, consistent with 
this notion, David (2006) observes that nine of the sixteen most seriously corrupt nations on 
earth are in Africa. However, a combination of factors ranging from poor education, under-
developed and inappropriate institutional arrangements and, sometimes, political instability 
that characterise most African countries is what Mbaku (2007) argues provide incentives for 
corruption. Zambia has not been spared these problems and it is on Zambia that the analysis 
now focuses.  
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4.3.8.1   Zambia’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) Ranking 
The Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
98
 is a system operated by Transparency International 
(TI) composed of twelve polls and surveys from nine different independent institutions that 
are used to accumulate the displayed ratings for each country (Radcliffe, 2010). The lower 
the ranking the better the country compares in relative terms. The CPI score indicates the 
level of public-sector corruption in a country/territory as perceived by business people, 
academics and risk analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). 
Though some business communities view the CPI as controversial, Radcliffe (2010) argues 
that it is a useful tool that provides transparency especially when dealing with developing 
countries. As can be seen from Table 4.1, Zambia has a consistently poor ranking on the 
CPI, finding itself always in the bottom half, suggesting that the extent of corruption within 
its borders is both pervasive and persistent. 
  
Table 4.1 Perceived Levels of Corruption in Zambia 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
CPI Score 3.4 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.8 3.0 
No. of Countries 90 91 102 133 146 158 163 179 180 180 
Ranking 57 75 77 92 102 107 101 123 115 99 
Source: Table constructed by author based on data from Transparency International (TI)-The Corruption 
Perceptions Surveys and indices (2000 – 2009); “CPI’s Corruption Perceptions Index” 
TI (2008) note Zambia’s poor performance on the index, stating that: 
“Zambia performed consistently poorly in past iterations of Transparency 
International’s (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI), scoring around 2.6 between 
2002 and 2007, indicating that corruption in Zambia is consistently perceived as 
rampant and endemic by the various CPI sources” (TI, 2008).  
Similarly, the World Bank (2004c) ranks corruption seventh on the list of constraints to 
doing business in Zambia while CIP (2009) cite corruption as a ‘major’ problem. The latter 
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TI defines corruption as simply the abuse of public office for private gain (TI, 2009). 
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organisation argues that corruption costs the nation’s businesses hundreds of dollars in lost 
time while the government loses millions in forgone tax revenue (see World Economic 
Forum, 2008)
99
. 
 
4.3.8.2   Corporate Governance as a Means of Fighting Corruption 
Zambia’s fight against corruption is co-ordinated via the Anti-Corruption Commission 
(ACC) an agency established to spearhead the fight against immoral conduct (ACC, 2009). 
Pereira (2008) advocates ethical corporate governance as a means of fighting corruption, 
arguing that while legal provisions are necessary in this context, they are not sufficient (see 
Okike, 2007). Similarly, Zambia’s Deputy Finance Minister, Chileshe Kapwepwe, states 
that:  
“ … each one of us, as stakeholders, has a role to play. For the private sector, this 
includes initiating internal reforms by way of embracing good corporate governance 
practices and pushing for policy reforms in areas where corruption is rampant. For 
civil society, it entails checks and balances by advocating for transparency in 
business dealings and transactions in both the public and private sectors” (Kapekele, 
2010). 
Despite the growing concern that corruption is linked to bad governance, very little has been 
done in Zambia to embrace robust corporate governance practices as an alternative to legal 
institutions (IODZ, 2009c)
100
. A focus on de facto corporate governance practices rather 
than de-jure rules has been suggested as an effective tool because this approach has at its 
heart the core values of accountability, transparency, fairness and responsibility that make it 
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According to the World Bank survey, Zambian firms spend an average of 1.7% of total revenue on bribes in 
order to get things done and an average of 3.7% of constant value for government deals (World Bank, 
2004a). However, a survey conducted by the World Bank Enterprises Surveys (WBES) revealed that while in 
2002 46% of firms identified corruption as a major constraint to doing business in Zambia, the figure had 
fallen to 12.5% by 2007 (World Bank, 2007).  
100
Although in 2007, Zambia’s president acknowledged that the business community needed to engage in 
‘good’ corporate governance practices as an alternative way of fighting corruption (Times of Zambia, 2007).    
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hard for individuals and companies to engage in corruption (Stapenhurst and Langseth, 
1997; Anassi, 2004; OECD, 2004b; Mbaku, 2007; CIPE, 2008)
101
.  
4.4 Corporate Governance Initiatives in Zambia 
A number of recent initiatives have been launched to support the development of an 
improved corporate governance system in Zambia. These include the creation of the Lusaka 
Stock Exchange (LuSE) in 1994 and the establishment of the Institute of Directors of 
Zambia (IODZ) in 2000, both of which are now described. 
4.4.1   The Institute Of Directors of Zambia (IODZ)  
The IODZ was established in April 2000 and was the first association established purely to 
promote high standards of corporate governance practices in the country. According to the 
IODZ, its focus is on promoting excellence in corporate governance, representing directors’ 
interests (and facilitating their professional development), inculcating the highest possible 
standards of ethics and providing an effective voice for company directors as a way of 
supporting the economic well-being of Zambia. This initiative was applauded by donors and 
international funding organisations, some of whom use good governance as a condition for 
accessing their funds. Krasniqi (2008) observes that: 
“The Institute of Directors of Zambia (IODZ), a CIPE partner, is one of the leading 
organizations that have worked to institute and develop the concept of corporate 
governance in business practices in Zambia” (p. 11).  
 
The IODZ has a stated commitment to promoting the practice of sound and effective 
corporate governance principles in all companies and organisations. To this end, it runs 
corporate governance courses and seminars for executive and non-executive directors, chief 
executives and senior managers in private and public companies as well as regulatory 
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The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) points out that corporate governance - as an 
alternative to legal remedies - goes beyond just fighting corruption, and also creates investor demand for 
enhanced transparency and accountability (UNDP, 1998).  
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institutions and NGOs (IODZ, 2009c). The institute is also working with learning 
institutions with a view to developing and running specialised academic courses in corporate 
governance
102
; sensitising Zambia's top companies and organisations by holding workshops 
and seminars on corporate governance, directorship and board effectiveness is one of their 
objectives (IODZ, 2009a)
103
. The IODZ have also been working with government officials 
on good corporate governance practices at state level as both the government and IODZ 
have recognised the importance of corporate governance in the economic growth of a nation 
(IODZ, 2009a).   
 
4.4.2   IODZ’s Corporate Governance Code for SMEs in Zambia 
 
With the assistance of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the support of the Centre 
for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), and in partnership with the Institute of Chartered 
Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA), the IODZ has developed a voluntary corporate 
governance code of best practice
104
 (IODZ, 2009a). The code is targeted at small and 
medium enterprises in Zambia which remain under-developed, but contribute significantly 
to the creation of wealth for individuals and the country as a whole (IODZ, 2009a). The 
IODZ has raised concerns that as long as many SMEs operate outside the realm of the 
Lusaka Stock Exchange, widespread compliance with standards will remain elusive. In this 
context, it is viewed that in Zambia, like in most African countries, more value is likely to 
emerge from robust corporate governance codes created outwith stock exchanges because 
only a few companies would normally be listed thereon.  
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The IODZ have just signed a memorandum of understanding with the Zambia Insurance Business College 
(ZIBCT) with a view to working towards the institution of a full-time course in corporate governance at the 
institution. 
103
Institutions that have benefited from such workshops and seminars include: Zambia Wildlife Authority; 
Roads Fund Agency; Roads Development Agency; Road Traffic And Safety Agency; National Airports 
Corporation Ltd; Programme Against Malnutrition; Zambian Breweries Plc; Energy Regulation Board; 
Barclays Bank Zambia Plc; National Council for Construction and; the Copperbelt Environment Project 
e.t.c (IODZ, 2009).   
104
The corporate governance code for small and medium-sized enterprises was also endorsed by the Lusaka 
Stock Exchange. The Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE) has included compliance with the code as a condition 
for SMEs listing on the LuSE.  
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In the introductory remarks to the code, the IODZ states that:  
“Zambia has embarked on an economic programme under the Private Sector 
Development Programme in which the economy is going to be driven by the private 
sector and which aims at attracting foreign investment. … Good corporate 
governance will go a long way in making Zambia a more attractive place to do 
business. …While corporate governance is principally viewed as a matter for large 
(and listed) companies, a reputation of good governance among the SMEs is also 
important…” (IODZ Corporate Governance Code, 2009 p. 2). 
 
The code also focuses on the board of directors as gatekeepers of ‘good’ corporate 
governance practices. However, in the same way as Chulu (2006) raised concerns regarding 
the BOZ and LuSE codes, there appears to be nothing ‘Zambian’ in the IODZ code as the 
principles are simply a combination of a few selected ‘good’ corporate governance practices 
from other codes issued around the world; the extent to which the code is relevant in terms 
of addressing Zambia’s business environment specificities is therefore a pertinent issue. This 
approach contrasts with the OECD’s argument that individual countries’ distinguishable 
legal, economic and cultural circumstances should influence the choice of corporate 
governance frameworks (OECD, 2004b).  
4.4.3   The Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE) 
Theory suggests that the primary role of capital markets lies in facilitating the allocation of 
scarce resources amongst competing uses (see e.g. Merton and Bodie, 1995). Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine (1996) argue that a well-developed and organised exchange is a catalyst for 
economic development and can help defuse the dichotomy of ownership and control while 
the FSDP highlights the importance of a well-functioning financial market in a global 
economic environment, particularly as regards the allocation of resources and support for 
economic growth (Merton and Bodie, 1995; FSDP, 2004). The creation of the Lusaka Stock 
Exchange (LuSE) in February 1994, with preparatory technical assistance from the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the World Bank, did indeed prove to be a major 
factor in the development and regulation of corporate governance in Zambia (LuSE, 
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2008)
105
. The establishment of the LuSE was part of the broader economic reform 
programme created to facilitate the privatisation process
106
. The development of stock 
markets is widely claimed to be a critical element in a financial system that encourages 
economic development (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1996; Okeahalam and Akinboade, 
2003). The specific corporate governance benefits to a nation of operating a successful stock 
market have also been recognised, particularly in terms of the role of institutional investors 
(UNEPFI, 2005; IFC, 2009a). However, Jordan and Lubrano (2002) argue that “the 
relationship of the capital markets to corporate governance is neither simple nor linear; 
rather, it is more in the nature of a complex feed-back loop, a dynamic process responsive to 
many factors” (p. 328).   
4.4.4   The LuSE Corporate Governance Code 
On 1
st
 January 2005, a corporate governance code developed by the LuSE and endorsed by 
the IODZ became effective for all listed and quoted companies (www.luse.co.zm). In the 
preamble to the code the LuSE states that: 
“World over, the need for good governance has taken centre stage. …LuSE could not 
be left behind in this development as it realised the need for specific norms for our 
capital market. A capital market cannot be said to be functioning effectively without 
strict adherence to the principles of good corporate governance. The code is therefore 
intended to provide clear guidelines aimed at enhancing Corporate Governance as 
well as to obtain a baseline indication of core governance standards and practices in 
companies listed or quoted on the Lusaka Stock Exchange” (LuSE Corporate 
Governance Code, 2005 p. ii) 
  
                                                          
105
In its first two years of operation, the LuSE and the associated Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
were funded by the UNDP and the Government of Zambia (LuSE, 2008).  
106
For the government the exchange came at the right time to facilitate the divestiture of government ownership 
in state-owned enterprises. As at 28 June 2010, there were 22 companies listed on LuSE, namely: African 
Explosives Zambia Plc, Zambia Bata Shoe Company Plc, British American Tobacco Zambia Plc, BP 
Zambia Plc, Cavmont Capital Holdings Zambia Plc, Copperbelt Energy Corporation Plc, Zain, Lafarge 
Cement Zambia Plc, Farmers House Plc, Farmers House Preference Shares, Investrust Bank Trust Plc, 
National Breweries Plc, Pamodzi Hotel Plc, Standard Chartered Bank Plc, Shoprite Holdings Ltd, Zambeef 
Products Plc, Metal Fabricators of Zambia Plc, Zambian Breweries Plc, ZCCM Investments Holdings Plc, 
Zambia National Commercial Bank, Zambia Sugar Plc and Zambia Sugar Rights Issue. Source: Lusaka 
Stock Exchange (www.luse.co.zm). 
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The detailed provisions of the LuSE code are built around nine themes: boards and directors; 
board committees; legal and compliance; external audit; internal audit; risk; integrated 
sustainability reporting; disclosure and stakeholder communication; and organisation and 
integrity. The code essentially takes the form of a collection of points from the most 
commonly-recommended practices in reports from across the world, including the Cadbury 
and King Reports (Chulu, 2006). In terms of enforcement and compliance, the LuSE code 
has adopted a ‘comply or explain’ mechanism, similar to that found in the UK, but the LuSE 
directive to all listed companies asking them to embrace the code received a mixed response 
(LuSE, 2009). The LuSE has further stated that its code must be made available to all 
stakeholders and be referred to in an annual report by way of the extent of compliance. The 
LuSE has made it clear that compliance with the code will be monitored and breaches 
properly dealt with, however a lack of appreciation for the concept has led to non-
compliance by some business entities (Zambia National Assembly, 2008). Similarly, the 
absence of laws and regulation that are specific to corporate governance
107
 - and, 
consequently, bodies to regulate and supervise corporate governance in Zambia - makes it a 
challenge for enforcement. Although most stock exchanges, particularly those in developing 
economies, suffer from the lack of a clearly defined and accepted economic rationale 
(Marone, 2003), the creation of the Lusaka Stock Exchange has been viewed by many as a 
suitable mechanism to enhance corporate governance and ensure that public companies 
adhere to best practice in their companies; this in turn should make companies in Zambia 
more attractive to investment and aid them in creating the wealth needed to support the 
economic well-being of the country (LuSE, 2009).  
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As reported by the Zambia Parliamentary Committee on Governance – see Section 4.7.2 of this thesis. 
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4.5 External Corporate Governance Initiatives and Influences 
Lungu (2005) argues that international forums have contributed significantly to the raised 
interest in corporate governance in Africa. In this context, several non-domestic initiatives 
have also contributed (directly or indirectly) to the corporate governance reform process in 
Zambia and these are outlined here.  
4.5.1   The International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
 
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) plays a major role in supporting African 
companies and encouraging improvements in corporate governance practices. The IFC has 
increasingly recognised how important sound corporate governance practices are in terms of 
providing a favourable investment environment and contributing to (private sector-led) 
development in Africa (IFC, 2009b). The IFC characterises its effort in this regard in Sub-
Saharan Africa thus:  
“The IFC, through the Global Corporate Governance Forum (GCGF), cosponsors the 
Pan African Consultative Forum on Corporate Governance (PACFCG), which has 
been a cornerstone for raising awareness of corporate governance in Sub-Saharan 
Africa since 2001. Focus is now on a practical phase of activity geared towards 
improving corporate governance in the region” (IFC, 2009b). 
 
 
4.5.2   The Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CACG) 
 
The Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CACG) was established in 
April 1998 in response to the Edinburgh Declaration of the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government meeting in 1997 to promote excellence in corporate governance and business 
practices and facilitating the development of appropriate institutions through the 
Commonwealth (CACG, 1999a). In 1999, the Commonwealth Secretariat (and the World 
Bank) published its principles for corporate governance with the stated intention of 
improving corporate governance standards amongst Commonwealth members. Zambia, 
being a member of the Commonwealth since 1964, fully participates in CACG programmes 
such as workshops designed to promote corporate governance in Zambia (CACG, 2009). 
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For example, in 2003 Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Investment Holdings (ZCCM-IH) 
adopted the Code of Corporate Governance for Boards of Directors in Zambia which is 
largely derived from the guidelines developed by the Commonwealth Association of 
Corporate Governance (ZCCM-IH, 2009)
108,
 
109
.  
 
4.5.3   The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
 
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was established in 2001 as a 
strategic framework programme of the Organisation of African Union (OAU) and is 
intended to develop an integrated socio-economic development framework for Africa. 
NEPAD has been described as a strategic re-establishment of African countries, ‘Made in 
Africa by Africans’. Corporate governance is one of the key prerequisites on the NEPAD list 
of requirements for African countries to move forward in their quest for sustainable 
development (NEPAD, 2009). NEPAD has a voluntary peer-review mechanism that allows 
countries’ extant corporate governance practices to be reviewed (Makayi, 2009).  
 
4.5.4   African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 
 
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which traces its origins to NEPAD, is a self-
monitoring mechanism voluntarily acceded to by member states of the African Union (AU) 
(APRM, 2009). One of the mechanism’s main aims is the fostering of economic growth and 
sustainable development through the implementation of codes and standards of corporate 
governance. Zambia acceded to the APRM on 22
nd
 January 2006 (APRM, 2009) and is 
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ZCCM-IH has implemented some of the recommendations outlined in the CACG code which aim to 
enhance transparency and accountability. The guidelines include the following: 
1. The company is headed by an effective independent non-executive Board of Directors. 
2. The Board monitors and evaluates the implementation of strategies policies, management performance 
criteria and business plans 
3. The Board holds meetings regularly to discuss activities, policies or strategies related to the company’s 
purposes and for which the Board is responsible. 
4. The Board using its discretion has appointed the Audit, Remuneration and Investments Committees. 
5. The Board ensures that all stakeholders are effectively informed about the operations of the company  
109
Wanyama et al. (2009) argue that corporate governance approaches in Africa are significantly influenced by 
the Commonwealth Association of Corporate Governance. 
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therefore required to produce a country self-assessment report to be reviewed by other 
member states with the aim of promoting transparency and accountability, and strengthening 
governance practices. In particular, four areas are assessed: (i) Democracy and Good 
Political Governance; (ii) Economic Governance and Management; (iii) Corporate 
Governance; and (iv) Socio-economic Governance. 
   
4.5.5   Zambia’s APRM Country Self-Assessment Report on Corporate Governance 
 
To give a wider governance perspective to the report, participants are drawn from 
government, private sector and civil society. Zambia has so far managed to put together a 
National Programme of Action and a draft Country Self-Assessment Report. The report 
adopts a corporate governance definition similar to the one espoused by the Cadbury Report 
(1992) for the United Kingdom. The APRM Country Self-Assessment Report (2010) states 
that: 
“… in the Zambian context, corporate governance will be understood to refer to the 
system and practices through which an organisation directs and controls itself and 
the people associated with it, i.e., “a system by which corporations are directed, 
controlled and held to account” (p. 221). 
    
There is also a clear realisation in the report that corporate governance affects not only the 
corporate community, but national economic performance as well; the latter represents the 
primary focus of the present study. Consistent with the available literature on corporate 
governance in Zambia, the APRM report acknowledges the fact that the concept remains 
fairly new in the country. Nonetheless, it identifies eight principles on which sound 
corporate governance practice is anchored and which therefore form the basis for the self-
assessment of the country’s corporate governance performance. These are: discipline, 
transparency, independence, accountability, integrity, fairness, social responsibility, 
efficiency and effectiveness
110
. In the report’s view, these principles play a crucial role in 
                                                          
110
A questionnaire survey conducted by the Country Self-Assessment Team on corporations’ compliance with 
the eight principles generated the following results: discipline 52%; transparency 29%; independence 46%; 
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attracting the investment needed for economic growth in a market economy. Although the 
Zambian government has adopted and ratified a number of international standards and codes 
on governance
111
, it appears that there is still a lack of political will. In this context, 
Wanyama et al. (2009) argue that the adoption and publication of governance guidelines 
alone is not sufficient to minimise corporate misconduct; only a fundamental shift in 
political and other frameworks will have leverage on corporate behaviour. 
  
Consistent with the notion that current national practices leave room for improvement, the 
Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC), a state-owned organisation, currently 
operates without a board of directors. Other parastatal organisations including Zambia 
Railways Limited (ZRL) and Times Printpak
112
 have also operated without a board, contrary 
to both the Companies Act and most common understandings of “sound” corporate 
governance practices (Auditor General’s Report, 2008). In addition, the Zambia Postal 
Services Corporation (ZAMPOST) operated with only two board members instead of the 
required eight during the period September 2008 to April 2009. Undeterred by established 
corporate governance principles - local and foreign - the two board members proceeded to 
hold board meetings irregularly, netting K72,334,215 in the form of allowances without 
providing their minutes for audit scrutiny, again contrary to the law and corporate 
governance principles as stated in the three leading codes in the country. 
  
This evidence is consistent with Chulu (2006)’s argument that any claims of embracing 
corporate governance in the country are mere rhetoric. According to the Auditor General’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
accountability 35%; integrity 23%; responsibility 37%; social responsibility 43%; and efficiency and 
effectiveness 46% (Zambian Country Self-Assessment Report, 2010 p.221)  
111
According to Zambia’s Country Self-Assessment Report, the country has adopted the following 
International Corporate Governance Standards and Codes: NEPAD Framework Document; OECD and 
Commonwealth principles of corporate governance; IASs and IFRSs; Core Principles of Effective Banking 
Supervision; Core Principles for Securities and Insurance Supervision and Regulation; African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights; Thirty –nine (39) Labour Codes; Codes on Industrial and Environmental Safety 
and Hygiene; e.t.c. 
112
Zambia Railways Limited operated without a board during the period from January 2004 to March 2006 and 
Times Printpak operated without a board of directors for nine months from January to October 2007. 
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Report (2008), it can be argued that a lack of sound corporate governance practices in 
certain Zambian parastatal organisations has provided fertile ground for the emergence of 
vices such as questionable salary structures, tax evasion on retirement and gratuities, 
undelivered supplies, poor record keeping, failure to establish audit committees, failure to 
rotate auditors, non-remittance of statutory obligations, poor management and 
implementation of projects, failure to follow tender procedures, failure to renew board 
mandates
113
 and, in some cases, the chairman sitting on all the sub-committees of the Board. 
The Auditor General’s Report (2008) concluded by stating that:  
“As can be observed from the list of unresolved issues, there has been little or no 
follow-up action by the affected parastatals and it is likely that if timely action is not 
taken by the Executive, the unresolved matters will increase to the extent that 
recommendations of the Committee on Parastatal Bodies will be rendered 
meaningless” (p. 146). 
 
Other challenges noticed in the Country Self-Assessment Report include the problem 
whereby although economic governance has evolved from government control to market 
economy, many of the laws responsible for sound corporate governance practices have not 
been revised in line with the challenges that accompany a liberalised economic system
114
. A 
lack appreciation of detail suitably trained and experienced human resource and institutional 
capacity in the institutions charged with ensuring compliance are other challenges identified 
in the assessment report. Notwithstanding these issues, Liche (2009) argues that insufficient 
country-wide research and consultation was carried out in preparation for the reports. Liche 
further highlights the voluntary nature of the APRM process as a weakness because failure 
to complete the process within the recommended time period does not attract any sanctions 
from peers. In this context, it is obviously difficult to claim credibility for the process of 
governance development, although Zambia’s Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) 
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The ZNBC Board was appointed on 12th September, 2002, for a term of three years. Contrary to the Act, 
there was no evidence to indicate that the Board members tenure of office had been renewed for a second 
three year term ending on 11th September 2008. As of May 2009 the directors had continued holding office.  
114
“The third report on corporate governance in South Africa became necessary because of the new Companies 
Act no.71 of 2008 (‘the Act’) and changes in international governance trends” (Institute of Directors in 
Southern Africa, 2009 p. 5). 
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(2006) recognises that: “a positive APRM report will further enhance Zambia’s 
opportunities of benefiting from more development aid from cooperating partners as well as 
creating investor confidence in the country” (p. 255). 
 
4.5.6   The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
  
The World Bank, in collaboration with other cooperating partners, has been working on 
strengthening public service and economic management by supporting the Public 
Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability (PEMFA) Programmes in Zambia; 
this involvement has the stated aim of improving effectiveness and institutional capacity in 
the public sector and strengthening institutional accountability (World Bank, 2009a). The 
IMF (2000) points out that strong economic performance and financial sustainability 
requires sound institutions and good governance; in this context, they have been promoting 
transparency and accountability and offering technical support as a way of championing 
robust corporate governance practices in public and private institutions in Zambia. More 
tangibly, certain IMF financial support programmes have specific governance 
conditionalities
115
, and in attempting to fulfil these, the Zambian government has promised 
to institute the highest standards of corporate governance and transparency (IMF, 2000). The 
good governance conditionality archetype acts as a check to ensure that government 
promises are fulfilled. 
   
4.5.7   The Global Corporate Governance Forum (GCGF) 
 
The Global Corporate Governance Forum (GCGF) is a multi-donor trust fund facility 
founded by the World Bank Group and the OECD and operated via the IFC’s Business 
Advisory Services (GCGF, 2009). Recognising that strengthening corporate governance is 
an essential part of creating the climate necessary for development, the forum aims to 
                                                          
115
For example, IMF funding for the development of the electricity sector through a state-owned power utility 
company (ZESCO) has conditions that call for improving the efficiency and corporate governance of the 
utility company (IMF, 2009a). 
 142 
promote corporate governance by initiating and supporting corporate governance 
conferences in partnership with the IODZ (GCGF, 2009). 
  
4.5.8   Economic Commission for Africa - Southern Africa (ECA – SA) 
 
The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) was established by the United Nations (UN) 
in 1958 as one of the UN's five regional commissions to promote the economic and social 
development of member states. The commission, among other priorities, focuses on 
promoting good governance and the fight against corruption in Africa (UN-ECA, 2009). 
Through workshops, ECA-SA has been sensitising its members to the importance of 
corporate governance in accelerating Africa’s economic development (ECA-SA, 2005). 
 
4.5.9   The King Report 
 
The King Committee’s Report and Code of Practice for Corporate Governance in South 
Africa published in 1994 (revised in 2002) continue to stimulate corporate governance in 
Africa (Wanyama et al., 2009), including Zambia (ECA-SA, 2005; Fundanga, 2006). Both 
the LuSE and IODZ corporate governance codes have extensively referenced the King 
Report, emphasising the ethical, social and environmental issues raised therein (Fundanga, 
2006). The IODZ has spearheaded the crusade to embrace corporate governance principles 
popularised in the South African King Report as the authors are viewed as being closer to 
the Zambian environment than those involved in other reports (Fundanga, 2006).  
 
4.5.10   The Cadbury Report 
 
The UK’s Cadbury Report, published in 1992 for companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange, has influenced the development of corporate governance in many countries, 
including Zambia (IODZ, 2009b). As the first King Report was framed on the Cadbury 
Report, the IODZ has also galvanised support for the latter indeed since the publication of 
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the Cadbury Report numerous similar reports have appeared across the globe
116
, with Dallas 
(2004) arguing that in fact all recent codes of corporate governance have been born out of 
Cadbury. 
 
4.6    Development Aid and Corporate Governance in Zambia 
 
4.6.1 Development Aid Failure in Zambia 
 
The World Bank (2009c) noted that Zambia is one of several countries that have depended 
on grants and donor aid for a “lengthy” period. In the Sixth National Development Plan 
(2011), the Zambian government has reaffirmed the importance of development aid by 
stating that “development assistance will continue to constitute a vital financing source” (p. 
15) through budget support. According to Odén and Wohlgemuth (2011), between 2000 and 
2005 aid accounted for an average 43% (the highest being 53% in 2001) of the total 
Zambian budget (see Wohlgemuth and Saasa, 2008). However, Burnside and Dollar (1997) 
argue that aid has failed to spur any significant development in Zambia. Similarly, 
Andersson et al. (2000) note that, despite significant increase in both donor funds (rising to 
US$ 11 billion between 1991 and 1993) and the number of donor agencies (rising to about 
150)
117
, Zambia’s economy has performed poorly. The authors cite a lack of transparency 
and governance and institutional reforms for the failure of aid in Zambia. A critical 
evaluation of economic policies in recipient countries before donors commit to aid for 
poverty reduction and growth is needed (Burnside and Dollar, 1997; Andersson et al., 2000). 
For Burnside and Dollar, the argument is based on empirical evidence that an upward trend 
in aid flow to Zambia (Andersson et al., 2000) was accompanied by a growing lack of 
coherence in fiscal and monetary policies; thus some scholars (Brautigam and Knack, 2004; 
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Including in the UK itself where the 2012 “UK Corporate Governance Code” is the seventh overall code to 
emerge since Cadbury. 
117
The United Kingdom was the major bilateral donor during the 1970s, providing about 25% of Zambia’s total 
bilateral aid (Simson, 1985) with the USA and Sweden contributing 15% and 13% respectively. Other 
donors include (West) Germany, Japan, Canada, Netherlands and Norway (Andersson et al, 2000).  
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Lamprecht, 2005; Fordvary, 2005; Booth, 2005; United Nations 2006; Shah, 2010) argue 
that aid dependency results in practice in waste and bad governance in many cases. In this 
context, the World Bank (1998) stated that “There is no value in providing large amounts of 
money to a country with poor policies” (p. 17).  
 
4.6.2 Aid Conditionality a Means of Improving Governance 
 
A World Bank Policy Research Report assessing aid revealed that countries with “poor” 
institutions and “bad” policies experienced failure with 52% of projects, four times the rate 
in countries with “good” governance (World Bank, 1998). According to the World Bank, 
donor finance that enforces accountability and good governance can spur development and 
good governance conditionality (Burnside and Dollar, 1997). Kaufmann and Kraay (2010) 
point out that: “Scholars, policymakers, aid donors, and aid recipients acknowledge the 
importance of good governance for development” (p. 2). Similarly, Presbitero (2008) argues 
that the Multi-donor Debt Reduction Initiative (MDRI) explicitly adopts governance 
conditionality, sometimes based on an ex-ante commitment by debtor governments, when 
selecting its recipient countries. As noted in Chapter Two of this thesis, under these terms 
Zambia qualified for cancellation of debt to the IMF, World Bank and Africa Development 
Bank, reducing the country’s foreign debt from over US$ 7 billion to about US$ 500 million 
(Odén and Wohlgemuth, 2011). However, the governance conditionality has always been a 
source of conflict in Zambia, with donors frequently being attacked for raising concerns 
over accountability, transparency and the country’s commitment to fighting corruption 
(Silwamba, 2009). Recently the Swedish government and other key donors withdrew their 
support from the (aid-driven) Ministry of Health in Zambia following revelations about the 
misuse of around K27 billion (£3.5 million) donor funds by certain government officials 
(Sinyangwe, 2009b). 
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4.7      The Corporate Governance Regulatory Framework in Zambia 
 
4.7.1 Background 
 
Corporate governance, as defined by Cadbury, is the process by which companies are 
directed and controlled (Cadbury Report, 1992) although Otobo (1997) argues that in 
practice this is subject to rules and standards that are themselves enshrined in corporate 
governance frameworks. For Otobo, the rules are meant to level the playing field for all 
participants in the market with this aim being underpinned by enforcement and compliance 
monitoring. Similarly, Tsumba (2002) states that: “Corporate governance depends on the 
quality of economic, regulatory, fiscal, institutional, and judicial structures, which in turn are 
influenced by a given country’s political disposition” (p. 286) (see Wanyama et al., 2009). 
In this regard, the ECGI (2009) states that:  
“A proper governance framework is of fundamental importance in strengthening the 
performance of economies, in particular those in development and transition, and 
helping to discourage fraud and mismanagement”  
  
Many authors argue that the quality of corporate governance is subordinate to the country’s 
legal and regulatory frameworks (La Porta et al., 2000; Denis and McConnell, 2003; Berglöf 
and Claessens, 2004; OECD, 2004a; Berglof and Pajuste, 2005; Rossouw, 2005; Wanyama 
et al., 2009). For Berglöf and Claessens (2004) what separates developed and developing 
economies in this context is the administration of the rule of law. According to the OECD 
(2004b), an effective corporate governance framework should:  
“... promote transparent and efficient markets, be consistent with the rule of law and 
clearly articulate the division of responsibilities among different supervisory, 
regulatory, and enforcement authorities” (p. 17). 
 
Seamless fusion between the laws of a country and its corporate governance codes should be 
at the core of any proposed legal and regulatory framework (Wanyama et al., 2009). 
However, private law imposition is often favoured over public enforcement, particularly in 
countries with institutional deficiencies (Black and Kraakman, 1996; Hay et al., 1996; La 
Porta et al., 2006) given the contextual complexities, Berglof and Pajuste (2005) contend 
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that corporate governance law and regulation should be as unambiguous as possible, 
including the enforcement thereof, and this is an essential requirement for meaningful 
reform. Whatever regulation is favoured, Denis and Connell (2003) argue it must be founded 
on strong accountability, responsibility, transparency and fairness. It is on these four core 
corporate governance principles that the IODZ code is founded. However, La Porta et al. 
(2000) note that: “When investors finance firms, they typically obtain certain rights or 
powers that are generally protected through the enforcement of regulations and laws” (p. 6), 
but the same authors point out that rules which protect investors are typically drawn from 
several different sources, including company law, security, bankruptcy, takeover 
competition laws and also from stock exchange regulations and accounting standards; this 
multi-layered system leads to differences in ensuring that a consistent set of founding 
principles emerges
118
. 
  
4.7.2 Zambia’s Extent Legal and Regulatory Structures 
  
As noted earlier, Zambia does not have any legislation that specifically addresses corporate 
governance (Zambia National Assembly, 2008). To the extent that corporate governance is 
legislated for, this occurs via the Companies Act and other commercial laws including the 
Banking and Financial Services Act and the Securities Act. However, the National 
Assembly Committee on governance pointed out that the Companies Act in its current form 
does not adequately provide for ‘good’ corporate governance practices and therefore calls 
for revision. For developing countries like Zambia, however, a lack of skills and institutional 
capacity represent challenges to any effective enforcement of the law. Similarly, the OECD 
guidelines propose that supervisory and regulatory bodies charged with such responsibility 
should have the power and access to the resources required to discharge their duties 
professionally. 
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The World Bank (2010) - Doing Business report assesses how: confidence in levels of investor protection; 
the ease of doing business; and the ease of starting a business compare across countries. See Appendix 4.1.    
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In this regard, a study by Chulu (2006) finds the current Zambian regulatory framework 
defective in terms of its role as underpinning corporate governance structures, particularly 
with regard to board independence, director duties and enforcement
119
. In addition, while the 
foundations for an efficient system to handle court disputes exist, courts encounter numerous 
challenges in executing their role in practice (Kaufmann et al., 2003). A lack of commercial 
litigation experience amongst practitioners is one factor that impedes on the efficiency and 
transparency of the country’s regulatory system (International Business Publication, 2008). 
Despite the UK Companies Act - on which the Zambian legal system is based - having 
undergone numerous legislative transformations, the 1948 UK Act remains extant in Zambia 
(Mwenda, 2001; Chulu, 2006). Here, Chileshe (1986) argues that:   
“... Shortcomings of certain laws like the Companies Act arose from their having 
been lifted literally from the old British Companies Act enacted in the 1920's and 
partially revised in the 1940s. Transplanting the Act into Zambia and expecting it to 
fit Zambian conditions without suitable changes was most unrealistic” (p. 142). 
 
It follows that business in Zambia is hampered by outdated laws that do not reflect, and 
therefore cannot be applied effectively to, current business practice. Nonetheless, in the 
absence of specific legislation, the Companies Act, Cap 388 of the Laws of Zambia takes 
precedence.  
“The Act provides for the incorporation, management, administration and winding 
up of companies. The Act also provides for the registration of foreign companies 
doing business in Zambia and the registration of charges and matters incidental to the 
foregoing” (Zambia National Assembly, 2008). 
 
Other laws, such as the Banking and Services Act, Cap 387 and the Securities Act, Cap 354 
augment the Companies Act. However, in Zambia corporate governance regulation is vested 
mainly in the LuSE listing rules; although these are available to all companies, monitoring 
and compliance is restricted to companies listed and quoted on LuSE. 
 
                                                          
119
 Wanyama et al. (2009) report very similar evidence for Uganda. 
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4.7.3 Financial Sector Regulation in Zambia 
 
The Zambian financial sector has been heavily affected by recent corporate scandals and 
failures (Maimbo, 2002b). As noted by Chiumya (2004), the regulatory framework 
governing the nation’s financial sector has been extensively reviewed on several occasions, 
with a number of reforms on liberalisation, prudential regulation and supervision. However, 
much of the scholarly literature on failures in the financial sector in Zambia specifically 
incriminates the new reforms for the failures (Brownbridge, 1996; FSSD, 1996; 
Brownbridge, 1998; Maimbo, 2000; Maimbo, 2002a; Mwenda, 2002). For state-owned 
banks, Ngandu (2005) argues that political patronage was a factor in most appointments and 
CEOs appointed in this manner tended to dominate the entire board, disregarding a long-
established corporate governance principle that no one individual or group of individuals 
should have “unfettered powers”
120
 of decision. Similarly, Lungu (2005) points to the - since 
repealed - banking law that accorded politicians (through the finance minister) the power to 
nominate and discard CEOs and give general directives. The legal and regulatory framework 
is currently (as of 2012) composed of the Banking and Financial Services Act; the Bank of 
Zambia Act; the National Payment Systems Act; the Prohibition and Prevention of Money 
Laundering Act; the Bank of Zambia Anti-Money Laundering Directives; and the Bank of 
Zambia Corporate Governance Guidelines (Fundanga, 2010). 
 
4.7.4 Bank of Zambia (BOZ) Corporate Governance Guidelines 
 
Although there is no general agreement on banks’ role in promoting corporate governance in 
client companies (see Tsumba, 2002), implementation of an effective system for sound 
corporate governance in the sector might reasonably be expected to encourage clientele to 
improve their practices. In recognition of the strategic importance of a sound financial 
system in Zambia’s development the government, with the help of the World Bank and the 
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IMF, carried out a comprehensive assessment of the country’s financial sector in 2002. This 
programme gave rise to the Financial Sector Development Plan (FSDP), aimed at addressing 
weaknesses and further strengthening performance and growth. These reforms were 
followed by the establishment, in 2006, of a corporate governance code in the banking 
sector (BOZ, 2006). In the introductory remarks, the code states that: “Banks and financial 
institutions… occupy a special position of trust in the national economy and their corporate 
governance is therefore, a matter of paramount importance” (p. 1). The code is applicable to 
all banks and financial institutions operating in Zambia. Its main areas are: shareholders; 
ethical standards and corporate values; board responsibilities and composition; board 
committees; evaluation of board performance; roles of senior management; reporting and 
disclosure; remuneration; risk management; internal audit; internal control compliance; 
external auditors; stakeholder interests; board relationship with supervisors; and 
transparency (BOZ, 2006). However, FSDP (2004) identify a number of continuing 
corporate governance problems in the banking sector in Zambia, namely: a lack of ‘quality’ 
boards in a number of corporate bodies; the prolonged existence of interim boards; 
inappropriate shareholding structures; the same individuals presenting on several boards; the 
prevalence of dual CEOs; the lack of transparency in the appointment and removal of 
directors and chief executives; and weak legislation regarding private and public sector 
companies’ disclosures. Interestingly, it is a defective and inappropriate legal and regulatory 
framework that has been suggested as being responsible for the more general poor 
performance and failure of state-owned enterprises in Zambia (Mulwila, 1980; Chileshe, 
1986; Mwenda, 2003; Chulu, 2006). 
  
4.8   Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided an account of the literature, rules and regulation relating to 
corporate governance in Zambia. On the basis of this account, the most important 
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conclusions focus on the evident importance of the contribution that corporate governance 
plays in business prosperity and national development. In Zambia, as in many Sub-Saharan 
African nations, the realisation is taking hold that one of the most important tenets of 
meaningful economic development is corporate governance. Although corporate governance 
is a new concept in Zambia, the country has made significant strides in conceptualising the 
notion. In reality, however, it is extra-African stimuli that have led to these shifts in 
thinking, with the failures of major companies (especially in US, Europe and Asia) and the 
frantic efforts made to strengthen corporate governance in their wake acting as a catalyst for 
change in other parts of the world, including Zambia. 
  
As noted in this chapter, Zambia has undergone three distinguishable economic governance 
phases: (i) the market economy established by the colonial administrators, with government 
aiming to provide a conducive environment for business (1960-1969); (ii) the command 
economy, with the state as the major player (1970-1990); and (iii) the return to a market 
economy in 1991. Each phase brought with it its own corporate governance implications and 
challenges. In the absence of a single, comprehensive set of specific corporate governance 
rules, the IODZ corporate governance code, the Banking and Financial Services Corporate 
Governance Guidelines (2006), the Lusaka Stock Exchange corporate governance code, the 
stock market’s listing rules and Zambian laws (as provided for in the constitution, but also 
set out in the Companies Act) have mitigated its absence in the ways outlined here. What is 
clear from a consideration of the chapter as whole is that corporate governance has now 
become a topic of major importance for, and subject of much discussion in, Zambia. Given 
this context, the remainder of this dissertation attempts to explore how the notion is viewed 
at the present time, in terms, particularly, of its inherent nature and its potential role in 
Zambian life via the facilitation and the encouragement of economic growth and 
development. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter Three of this thesis provided an extensive review of the literature relating to 
corporate governance and development, while Chapter Four examined the specific issues 
relating to the corporate governance environment in Zambia. The present chapter identifies a 
number of basic themes in the previous discussions that influence governance and 
development, and attempts to provide theoretical definitions and logically evaluate the 
relationships and factors that underlie the problem statement of the study. The chapter also 
examines some of the theoretical territory influencing ‘good’ corporate governance practices 
and accountability in broader terms. As stated in Chapter Four, since 1991 there have been 
major changes in the governance of the Zambian economy with the notion of accountability 
being central to the reforms taking place in the country (Therkildsen, 2001). Accordingly 
Erkkila, (2007) states that: “Accountability is increasingly becoming a topic of concern in 
governance literature” (p. 2). As pointed out in Chapter Four, the reforms stemming from 
the renewed interest in the governance concept are anchored on the resolve for greater 
accountability and better resource utilisation, assumed characteristics of the private sector. 
Such reforms are also supported by scholarly literature suggesting that private sector 
governance practices would enhance accountability and the control of public expenditure 
(Hopwood, 1990). Similarly, Mkandawire and Soludo (1999) maintain that reform 
initiatives in Africa, in particular the change from government control to private ownership 
of most enterprises, are espoused by the demand for efficiency and accountability and 
reduced corruption. The clear assumption here as alluded to in the previous chapter, is that 
firms under private ownership would be ‘better’ managed than under government control 
where governance and accountability are perceived to be very weak. In this sense, issues of 
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accountability are very much a part of the governance and development relationship via the 
establishment of appropriate institutions and the employment of checks and balances. This 
study therefore conceptualises the problems entangling corporate governance and 
development in Zambian through the accountability lens; the latter’s adoption as the 
theoretical framework that guides the study is explored in detail in the discussion that now 
follows.   
 
The rationale for using accountability as a panorama rests on the theoretical assumption that 
there is no issue more central to good governance than accountability (Ndulu and 
O’Connell, 1999; ECA, 2002). Consequently, there is no issue more central to development 
than good governance (Kilgour, 1998; Kaufmann et al., 1999; Ndulu and O’Connell, 1999; 
Prasad et al., 2003; Akokpari, 2004). Accountability rests on the belief that actions and 
decisions taken by those entrusted with responsibility are subjugated to oversight, in order to 
ensure objectivity and responsiveness to the needs of stakeholders (Morland, 2006) thereby 
contributing to better governance and poverty reduction (Grindle and Mason, 2002; IFC, 
2010; Rahman, 2010). In this context, the philosophical mental construct engages the 
postulate that accountability underpins good governance (Keasey and Wright, 1993). 
Similarly, McIntosh (2002) argues that good governance, accountability and transparency in 
the corporate community have become a public good on which our futures depend. Equally, 
Solomon (2007) points out the importance of accountability in corporate governance 
frameworks. Given the absolute centrality of accountability to discussions concerning 
governance and development, there appears to be a strong justification that addressing the 
issues surrounding accountability is essential in mitigating the challenges facing governance 
and development in Zambia. Indeed, matters of contention encircling governance and 
development are embedded in accountability and, as a consequence, any framework focused 
on dichotomising the governance-development dependency must seek refuge in 
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accountability (Boven (2006). Resultantly, the concept of accountability has received 
growing theoretical appreciation, particularly in the field of social accounting (Gray, 2002). 
  
Erkkila (2007) attributes the growing interest in accountability and governance literature to 
the emergence of new governance paradigms that challenge conventional accountability 
systems. Notwithstanding this change, both governance and accountability are contentious 
notions and hence suffer from a similar limitation in their application as they both have the 
tendency to represent many different things making the two terms susceptible to abuse 
(Boven, 2006). Because of this elusiveness and ambiguity, Boven argues that a number of 
users have sought refuge in accountability “to patch up a rambling argument, to evoke an 
image of trustworthiness, fidelity and justice, or hold critics at bay” (p. 7). The next section 
looks at accountability and some of the basic epistemological assumptions underpinning the 
current conceptions of accountability as a base for the current study. 
 
5.2 The Concept of Accountability 
 
The concept of accountability has always been elusive to define (Schedler, 1999). Mulgan 
(2000) refers to accountability as “a complex and chameleon-like term” (p. 555). This 
difficulty is partly due to the fact that in an accountability relationship, accountability can 
mean different things to different people (Dunne, 2003; Bovens, 2007; Fox, 2010). 
Accountability’s multi-faceted nature makes it even more problematic to deal with in 
practice as a working concept (Dubnick, 2002). Indeed, MacCarthaigh (2005) argues that the 
widened usage of the term ‘accountability’ has made its meaning less clear and more 
problematic in the development of a parsimonious framework. It is because of this 
mystification that some scholars argue that ‘accountability’ if used as a word rather than a 
concept is ambiguous (Brooks, 1995; Mulgan, 2000; Erkkila, 2007). Dubnick (2002) argues 
that treating accountability as a concept rather than a word disposes of ambiguity and 
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incommensurability
121
, and retains its conceptual quality. Following up on the preceding 
arguments, and in the context of the current study, accountability is used as a concept so as 
not to distort its philosophical context as a theoretical framework for research. However, for 
Dubnick, accountability used in the appropriate context:  
“holds the promise of bringing someone to justice, of generating desired 
performance through control and oversight, of promoting democracy through 
institutional forms, and of facilitating ethical behaviour” (p. 2). 
 
As accountability is thus a conditional concept, Scott (2000) argues that clearly stipulating 
‘who is accountable’, ‘to whom’ and ‘for what’, is fundamental. However, the bottom line is 
that while there will always be controversies surrounding accountability, defining its 
parameters is the starting point towards greater conceptual clarity (Scott, 2000). 
 
5.2.1 Defining Accountability 
This section provides an overview of the range of purported definitions of the term 
‘accountability’. Accountability within its parameters overlaps with other terms some of 
which stray some distance from the underlying concept of being called to account for one’s 
actions or inactions (Mulgan, 2000; Boven, 2006). Accountability is sometimes loosely 
defined to connote transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency integrity, responsiveness, 
answerability, controllability and responsibility (Mulgan, 2000; Behn, 2001; Dubnick, 
2002). In this context, Boven (2006) argues that accountability, when loosely defined, 
encompasses other stand-alone notions making its conceptualisation controversially 
problematic. Definitions range from as narrow as just representing “the duty to give an 
account” (Schafer, 1999 p. 9) to broader notions, such as social, economic, political or moral 
propriety (Coy and Dixon, 2004). Similarly, Fox (2010) notes that definitions of 
accountability range from general (broad focus - see Munro, 1996) to narrow (where the 
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Incommensurability is used here to mean the inherent lack of common “language” that permits easy 
translation of the word across contexts and cultures (Dubnick, 2002 p. 4). In certain languages, the word 
accountability does not exist.  
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focus is on specific issues - Berle and Means, 1932). In a narrow interpretation, Pollitt 
(2003) points out that accountability can be viewed as a reciprocal action between the 
accountor and the accountee, where the conduct of the accountor is monitored and evaluated 
by the accountee. However, Schedler (1999) refers to accountability as “a concept whose 
meaning remains evasive, whose boundaries are fuzzy, and whose internal structure is 
confusing” (p. 13). Although different definitions of accountability do exist, the notion that 
it involves two sets of actors remains undisputed. Gagne (1996) believes that the starting 
point to begin considering defining accountability is the identification of the stages of the 
accountability process, i.e. ‘‘who is accountable to whom, for what and under what 
circumstances’’ (p. 213). 
  
Munro and Hatherly (1993) refer to accountability as: “…the willingness and ability to 
explain and justify one’s acts to self and others” (p. 369) while Mulgan (2000) defines 
accountability as: “…a process of being called to account to some authority for one’s 
actions’, or a process of giving an account” (p. 555). However, Wanyama (2006) analyses 
accountability in three different contexts; accountability as the capacity to give an account 
for certain actions or inactions (see Munro, 1996); accountability in the principal-agent 
relationship (see Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; and stakeholder 
accountability (see Tirole, 2001; Solomon, 2007; Brennan and Solomon, 2008). The 
contextual implication for the first and second contexts of accountability is viewed as simply 
the state of being accountable or the liability to be called on to render an account. However, 
such an accountability process calls for some form of a structure that reminds and holds 
someone of the need to be accountable. Similarly, Gray (1992) believes that accountability 
is “concerned with the right to receive information and the duty to supply it” (p. 413). In this 
context, individuals, corporations and states discharge accountability through the provision 
of relevant information to interested parties that may have a legal right and those that may 
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have a moral right. A few years later, Gray et al. (1996) formally define accountability as: 
“The duty to provide an account (by no means necessarily a financial account) or reckoning 
of those actions for which one is held responsible” (p. 38). This form of words suggests that 
accountability should be viewed as all-inclusive notion that goes beyond solely dealing with 
financial concerns. The conventional accountability associated with financial accounting is 
clearly identified as just one type of accountability in the Gray et al. (1996) articulation, but 
Boven (2006) challenges the above type of definition by insisting that accountability is more 
than just the provision of information. For Boven, what makes the actor accountable is the 
possibility of sanctions. 
   
Similarly, some researchers argue that accountability that has no capacity to impose 
sanctions against those who are called to account is not complete (Burritt and Welch, 1997; 
Schedler, 1999; Mulgan, 2000). For Burritt and Welch (1997) giving an account without the 
consequential reparations on the quality of an account is defective; here the authors state 
that:   
“… giving of an account is not enough for an accountability relationship to exist; 
there has also to be a process for holding the accountor to account for actions taken 
and consequences incurred. Hence, enforcement mechanisms are crucial to 
accountability” (p. 533). 
 
Endorsing this line of thought, Mulgan believes that accountability should not end with the 
provision of information, but should instead include sanctions as a punishment for 
unsatisfactory answers. Mainwaring (2003) goes beyond arguing for the provision for 
sanctions by including the legal enforcement dimension of accountability; he contends that 
the enforceability of sanctions through a legalised authority to request answerability adds 
credibility to the accountability process. Correspondingly, Bovens (2005) views 
accountability as composed of three essential factors: the obligation to give an account, the 
accountee’s right to question the accountor and the accountee’s right to implicitly enforce 
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sanctions. In this context, Boven describes accountability as simply: “the obligation to 
explain and justify conduct” (p. 9). According to Tooley et al. (2009) an accountor and 
accountee can be an individual or an agency or even the general public, especially in the 
accountee case. Thus three distinct stages have been identified in the accountability process 
- the obligation to provide an account, the possibility of sanctions and the enforceability of 
sanctions. Gray (1994) also argues that accountability should reflect some notions of 
fairness and justice; the inclusion of the enforceability of sanctions in the definition raises 
this issue directly. In particular, people should not be held accountable and later have 
sanctions imposed on them for matters over which they have very little or no control at all. 
The above reasoning points to the fact that relationships - whether formal or informal - in 
the accountability process have to be clearly identified and established.  
 
While Dubnick (2005) applauds the above definitions, he argues that they do not stress the 
element of personal values and ethics (personal accountability) which he suggests are 
cardinal in any accountability process. Analysing this argument, the accountor appears to 
have two important roles to play in the accountability process; one of self-control 
(responsibility) which is anchored in the notion of personal ethics, and one which specifies a 
duty to another party (accountability). While it is difficult to enforce the former (Likierman, 
1986; Day and Klein 1988)
122
, the latter can be relatively easily (Mainwaring, 2003). 
Notwithstanding this point, the available literature appears to suggest that accountability is 
not only espoused by the duty to provide and the right to receive an account, but also the 
institutional arrangements whereby conceptualisation is influenced by structural changes 
(Peters, 1989; Sinclair 1995; Mulgan, 2000; Dubnick 2005). In this context, different 
institutional arrangements give rise to different types of accountability.  
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Personal accountability is not unambiguous in nature, but often viewed as accountability to oneself or one’s 
conscience (Day and Klein, 1988) 
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5.2.2 Types of Accountability 
 
As alluded to earlier in the chapter, the widespread usage of the term accountability has 
resulted in the emergence of different types (Mulgan, 2000; Behn, 2001). Within the broad 
context of accountability, scholars argue that different categories can be identified based on 
the nature of conduct, obligation, accountee and accountor, both in the private and public 
sectors (Stewart 1984; Day and Klein 1988; Romzek and Dubnick 1987; Sinclair 1995; 
Bovens 2005). The transformation of accountability has witnessed the concept emanating in 
different dimensions (Roberts and Scapens, 1985; Sinclair, 1995). The multi-dimensional 
perspective of accountability has led to the emergence of different types such as political, 
bureaucratic, personal, professional, deliberation, internal, external, public, vertical, 
horizontal and so on. While there are various types of accountability, Jones (1992) contends 
that the process of being called to account to some authority for one’s actions remains 
undisputed. Boven (2006) summarises the various purported dimensions of accountability as 
follows: 
 
Figure 5.1 Types of Accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The figure is constructed based on the details provided by Boven (2006, pp. 12 and 22).   
Based on nature of conduct 
 Financial accountability 
 Procedural accountability  
 Product accountability 
 
Based on nature of obligation 
 Vertical accountability 
 Diagonal accountability  
 Horizontal accountability 
 
Based on nature of the forum 
 Political accountability 
 Legal accountability  
 Administrative accountability 
 Professional accountability 
 Social accountability 
Based on nature of the actor 
 Corporate accountability 
 Hierarchical accountability  
 Collective accountability 
 Individual accountability 
 
1. There is relationship between an actor and a forum 
2. in which the actor is obliged 
3. to explain and justify 
4. his conduct 
5. the forum can pose questions 
6. pass judgement 
7. and the actor may face consequences 
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The classification in the top left rectangle focuses on the identity of the accountee in the 
accountability process (Sinclair, 1995; Behn, 2001; Pollitt, 2003) while the top right 
rectangle classification is based on who the accountee is holding to account (Bovens, 1989; 
Romzek, 2000). Bovens (2005) refers to the bottom right rectangle as directional while the 
nature of conduct is illustrated in the bottom left rectangle. The rectangle in the centre 
prescribes the conditions that need to be met in the accountability process regardless of the 
dimensional perspective and implies that accountability may be dictated or implied by law, 
regulation, or agreement. Endorsing this notion, Ijiri (1975) affirms that “a constitution, a 
law, a contract, an organisational rule, a custom or even an informal moral obligation” (p. 
ix) may confirm the existence of an accountability relationship. Accountability relationships 
can be enforced by both moral and legal rights; for example, Stanton (1997) believes that 
stakeholders with non-binding legal rights can claim the right to accountability based on 
moral courage. 
    
5.2.3 Accountability to Whom and for What? 
 
Earlier in this chapter it was noted that the accountability literature broadly agrees that to be 
accountable is to be responsible to others for what we do (Leat, 1990; Merrifield, 1998). In 
this context, Mashaw (2006) identifies three features of the actions between the accountor 
and the accountee thus: what the accountor is accountable for; how accountability is 
discharged and by what standards. Similarly, understanding one’s responsibility in the 
governance framework helps in identifying to whom and for what the accounter is 
accountable. This point is amplified in the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy (CIPFA) Good Governance Standard for Public Services which states that: 
“Being clear about one’s own role, and how it relates to that of others, increases the 
chance of performing the role well. Clarity about roles also helps all stakeholders to 
understand how the governance system works and who is accountable for what” 
(CIPFA, 2004). 
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However, different perspectives exist conceiving the level of accountability that is expected 
in various situations. Those who demand an account may vary in the nature and veracity of 
sanctions that they can impose on the provider of an account (accountable organisation) 
(Leat, 1990). Individuals, organisations and governments may be held accountable for: (i) 
the proper use of resources, for example, the need to account properly and fully for the 
money spent (fiscal accountability or accounting for probity, Robinson, 1971); (ii) for 
following proper procedures, for example, the need to ensure that projects are carried out in 
an agreed manner (Leat, 1990) (Process accountability); (iii) to improve performance 
(performance accountability) (Merrifield, 1998); (iv) to improve the quality of work, for 
example, to ascertain whether an organisation achieved what it set out to achieve (Leat, 
1990) (programme accountability); (v) the relevance or appropriateness, for example, 
providing the ‘right’ services or doing or saying the right thing (Leat, 1990) (Policy 
accountability/accountability for priorities). Leat (1990) maintains that those who demand 
accountability may differ according to what they regard as important, whether their interest 
is related to matters of probity or whether it encompasses wider concerns relating to matters 
of performance or policy. Similarly, organisations may also restrict themselves to being 
accountable to certain groups for limited matters while accounting more widely for other 
issues. For better understanding of broadened accountability, Stewart (1984) reconstructs the 
different accountability systems in form of a ladder, to which the discussion now turns. 
   
5.2.4 Stakeholder Accountability and Stewart’s Ladder of Accountability 
 
Stewart (1984) maintains that for accountability to be meaningful, recognition of values, 
beliefs and awareness of those to whom the account is provided is critical. For Africa, where 
corporate governance and accountability seems to be influenced by cultural beliefs and 
communitarian values, accountability should be extended to a wider spectrum of non-
shareholding stakeholders (Wanyama, 2006). Although originally conceived within a public 
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sector context, Stewart’s Ladder of Accountability has previously been expanded to analyse 
managerial and commercial notions of accountability (Wanyama, 2006; Fox, 2010). Indeed 
Wanyama (2006) argues that Stewart’s Ladder of Accountability is most suitable for 
analysing accountability (particularly in Africa) in economies characterised by private and 
state-owned enterprises.  Indisputably, it is this distinctive feature of Stewart’s Ladder of 
Accountability that makes it relevant for the study of corporate governance and development 
in Zambia. Focusing on the work of Stewart (1984) Fox (2010) suggests that movement up 
the ladder represents a transition from a more objective notion of accountability 
(accountability by standards) to a more subjective accountability (accountability by 
judgement). According to Wanyama (2006), the first level on the ladder relates to ensuring 
that consumed resources were authorised and utilised for the intended purpose in 
compliance with the law. As noted in Chapter Four, one of the most prominent problems 
affecting Zambia’s development is the presence of rampant corruption. The implication 
here, therefore, is that resources meant for development may not be accounted for because 
of a lack of robust accountability.  
 
Figure 5.2 Stewart’s Ladder of Accountability (1994) 
 
Note: This Table displays the five levels of Stewart’s Ladder of Accountability  
Accountability by Judgement 
Accountability by Standards 
Policy Accountability 
 
Programme Accountability 
 
Performance Accountability 
 
Process Accountability 
 
Accountability for Probity and Legality 
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The second rung of Stewart’s Ladder is process accountability, which deals with accounting 
for processes leading to certain judgements and decisions being made (Lerner and Tetlock, 
1999). Process accountability ensures that those who are called to account follow laid-down 
procedures (Laughlin, 1990). This type of accountability is believed to enhance the accuracy 
of judgements (Siegel-Jacobs and Yates, 1996). However, the consciousness under process 
accountability is that of being accountable for the process and not for the outcome (Scholten 
et al. (2007).  
   
Performance accountability on the other hand is output - or client - oriented (Erkkila, 2007) 
and deals with the responsibility for achieving results. A performance accountability system 
provides the means of measuring results against standards. In this context, it goes beyond 
process accountability (Merrifield, 1998). However, measurement is of particular concern to 
performance accountability, and Merrifield (1998) argues that the following principles must 
be considered when assessing performance accountability: (i) agreement must be reached on 
what constitutes performance; (ii) mutual accountability relationships must be built; (iii) the 
capacity both to perform and be accountable must be developed; and (iv) tools to measure 
performance, involve stakeholders and seek consensus need to be created. Merrifield (1998) 
further argues that agreement on these principles (and clarity about the ultimate goals and 
capacity to achieve them) is fundamental for performance accountability to succeed. In the 
absence of performance benchmarks, or if the stakeholders are not aware of the nature of 
performance measures utilised, Stewart (1984) asserts that attempts to enforce accountability 
are not straight-forward. While company boards may set out objectives and monitor 
management performance (Wanyama, 2006) these issues may be more difficult to co-
ordinate at a governmental level.  
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Merrifield (1998) views programme accountability as a subset of performance 
accountability as it aims to enhance performance. Similarly, Wanyama (2006) finds a very 
thin line between the two as they are both based on achieving the stated objectives and are 
applicable to public and private sectors and the issue of whether or not objectives are 
achieved. Programme accountability receives little attention because its application in many 
areas of work is complex and as a result accountability is mostly demanded by end users and 
not financiers (Leat, 1990).  
 
Policy accountability involves pursuing appropriate policies that suit the needs and priorities 
of society, that is ensuring that appropriate policies and decisions have been taken and 
judging whether they have been effective in attending to their intended objectives. However, 
Stewart (1984) viewed policy accountability in terms of governments pursuing policies in 
the interest of the majority of stakeholders. In this context, Wood (2005) argues simply that 
governments should be held responsible and accountable for policy choices while 
Mainwaring (2003) maintains that people who are elected to government are accountable to 
the governed for their decisions. Thus, political accountability is viewed as a control of 
abuse of political power and therefore prevents government officials from practicing policies 
opposed to good governance. Wanyama (2006) argues, however, that since Stewart’s Ladder 
of Accountability is not restricted to one sector, policy accountability cannot be aligned to 
government policy alone as it is relevant to the public and private sectors as well. In this 
context, executive boards should be accountable for policy choices because of the policy’s 
wider implication for company performance, while governments should be held to account 
for policy failings by means of political checks and balances (Wood, 2005). In this sense it 
can be argued that the quality of policy choices is enhanced by broad stakeholder 
participation (Blair, 2000). Blair further contends that inclusive transparent popular debate 
about policy has remained elusive on the African continent leading to inappropriate policy 
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decisions, allowing most governments to avoid accountability to their electorates (see e.g. 
Wood, 2005). Yet inclusivity and transparency in policy evaluation and implementation is 
considered crucial in enhancing accountability (Wood, 2005). 
  
Stewart’s Ladder of Accountability demonstrates that there are different types of 
accountability at individual, organisation and government levels with varying strengths and 
demands for accountability. They are all inter-linked in one way or another. Clearly all these 
levels of accountability are important, and improvements in corporate governance could be 
made in respect of each. Correspondingly, Ackerman (2003) points out that accountability 
of public officials is the basic pre-condition that guarantees good governance. Having 
discussed the conceptualisation of accountability, the discussion now moves to the latter’s 
links with corporate governance, an issue at the heart of the study’s empirical enquiry. 
 
5.3 Corporate Governance and Accountability 
 
Broad notions of corporate governance have been articulated in detail in previous chapters. 
This section, however, reviews the implications of accountability from a corporate 
governance perspective. The modern corporation and the separation of ownership and 
control espoused by Smith (1838) and Berle and Means (1932): agency theory, as theorised 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976); and stakeholder theory as pioneered by Freeman (1984) are 
some of the leading theories marking the genesis of and catalysts for current debate on 
accountability. The recent past has witnessed an upsurge in research devoted to corporate 
governance in a wide variety of disciplines with a continuum of definitions ranging from 
those focused on addressing the principal-agent problem (Solomon, 2010) to those that focus 
on accountability to a wider constituent group (Dunne, 2003). The growing inter-
connectedness amongst these approaches, coupled with the diversity of interest in the 
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notion, has turned corporate governance into an interdisciplinary subject which perhaps 
requires an interdisciplinary and an anti-traditionalist reasoning (Gilson, 1996).  
Traditionally, corporate governance is rooted in agency-theory logic and is concerned with 
ensuring that the assets of the owners of firms are safeguarded and used efficiently in the 
interests of owners by those entrusted with the control. This construction has the potential to 
create tension between managers and the owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976); indeed it is 
the notion of management providing an account to the providers of finance that gives birth 
to the agency concept (Berle and Means, 1932; Donaldson, 1963; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) and the need for accountability - which many scholars view as the traditional starting 
point for debate about corporate governance (Berle and Means, 1932; Donaldson, 1963; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Hart, 1995; Byrd, et al., 1998). Agency theory, according to 
Brennan and Solomon (2008), has played a significant role in the choice of a theoretical 
framework, particularly in area of corporate governance and accountability. 
  
Proponents of agency theory such as Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the theory gives 
credit to corporate governance as effectual if the suppliers of finance to corporations are 
rewarded accordingly and appropriately. This type of accountability involves the corporate 
form where the principal (owner) demands an account of the agent’s (management) actions 
in a corporate set-up to ensure there is an alignment between the interests of the agent and 
those of the principal. According to Keasey and Wright (1993), accountability is required in 
such an arrangement to allow the principal to monitor, evaluate and control the behaviour of 
organisational agents. By definition, responsibility for corporate governance rests with the 
board of directors. The directors control and direct the company on behalf of shareholders 
and are in turn expected to account for the actions and use of resources. In this context, the 
theory has been cited as explaining controversies surrounding the relationship between 
shareholders and directors in the modern corporation. Corporate governance has 
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conventionally been viewed as a mechanism for resolving the principal-agent dichotomy 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Langevoort, 2001; 
Tirole, 2001; Brennan and Solomon, 2008). For Brennan and Solomon, this contextual 
approach influenced early writers on corporate governance, who viewed it as a cure for the 
tension between management and company owners; most corporate governance reforms, 
particularly in developed countries, are crafted with a view to diffusing this tension (Gilson, 
1996; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Vinten, 2001). Agency theory is thus pertinent to any 
corporate governance debate as it predicts (and influences) the structure and composition of 
boards and (more generally) the balance of power between capital providers and directors 
(Cadbury, 2002). However, Dunne (2003) refers to the traditional corporate governance 
definition that focuses on the relationship between the company and its owners as narrow 
and perhaps outdated. Similarly, Gilson (1996) maintains that such an approach is 
disregarding of corporate governance systems in other countries with different institutional 
characteristics.  
The principal-agent problem is however important when the separation of ownership and 
control is coupled with a lack of (or weak) investor monitoring and protection mechanisms 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Iskander and Chamlou, 2000). The governance implications of 
such a situation are clearly non-trivial; nonetheless, it is agency theory that continues to 
dominate academic analyses of firm behaviour, particularly (but not exclusively) in the 
developed world. Africa has not been immune to this pattern which, when combined with 
the abuse of governance mechanisms, results in frequent conflicts
123
 (Wanyama, 2006). 
Consistent with this argument, in Zambia, where conceptualisation of corporate governance 
is development-oriented and whose institutional characteristics depart extensively from that 
of developed nations; reforms that revolve around the principal-agent theory appear to be 
                                                          
123and as indicated in Chapter Four 
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narrowly-focused. A much wider perspective of corporate governance that is accountable to 
a variety of stakeholders is thus more relevant. While the Cadbury definition of corporate 
governance has formed the basis of corporate governance codes the world over, this study 
adopts Solomon (2010)’s definition, whereby the concept, visualised to encompass checks 
and balances
124
, is anchored on broadened accountability
125
 and social responsibility
126
 in all 
areas of commercial perfervidum aingenium, thereby bringing it in tune with Africa’s long-
standing societal notions of corporation and communitarianism (Wanyama et al., 2009). The 
reason for this choice is that a corporate governance definition for the African context must 
be able to address a wider range of stakeholder interests and discharge accountability to all 
stakeholders. This description fits in well with Solomon’s definition of corporate 
governance.   
5.3.1 Accountability as an Element of Good Governance 
 
Boven (2006) argues that accountability is now viewed as an element of good governance 
both in the public and private sectors and has thus become the focus of much attention. 
Similarly, Keasey and Wright (1993) posit that accountability is essentially a sub-set of 
governance. In fact, Boven observes that most American scholars occasionally use 
accountability to denote good governance. While, Mulgan (2003) contends that 
accountability is a concept associated with governance activities in the context of 
establishing and maintaining some form of governing order. The Audit Commission (2009) 
links both concepts when it defines good governance and accountability thus: “Ensuring the 
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Africa is characterised by opaque governance institutions with barely any checks and balances on public 
accountability, thereby promoting corruption (Shkolnikov, 2002).  
125
Africa has been calling for a broader governance paradigm to accommodate the continent’s complex 
cultural, political and economic factors (Wanyama et al., 2009).  
126
One of the priorities in the King Report of South Africa is social responsibility (IoDSA, 2002). Similarly, the 
privatisation of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) sparked discussions regarding corporate 
social responsibility (Lungu and Kapena, 2010) particularly Li (2010) contends that Chinese companies 
operating in Zambia have earned themselves a bad reputation in this regard. 
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organisation is doing the right things, in the right way, for the right people in a timely, 
inclusive, open, honest and accountable manner” (p.3). The Commission’s view is that if 
scarce resources are to be maximally utilised, and if public money is to be spent 
economically, efficiently and effectively, securing good governance and accountability is 
critical. Accountability is thus viewed as an essential quality of good governance. In this 
sense, researchers in the area of good governance and development appear to suggest that 
accountability underpins economic development (World Bank, 1997; Bresser and Spink, 
1999; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Schedler et al., 1999; Pope, 2000). As a characteristic of good 
governance, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(UN-ESCAP) (2010) believes that accountability ensures that the interests of minorities are 
secured and corruption is minimises. As outlined in the previous chapter, rampant corruption 
has been identified as one of the major problems frustrating development in Africa and 
accountability in this sense may help minimise the opportunities for corruption both from 
the demand and supply side. This need for accountability is expanded upon in the next 
section. 
 
5.4 Accountability, Corporate Governance and Development 
 
For Africa in general, and Zambia in particular, corporate governance is conceptualised in 
terms of a development paradigm (Reed, 2002), focusing on addressing accountability to 
different stakeholders rather than as a solution for an agency problem. Despite 
overwhelming acceptance that corporate governance is a key element in development
127
, 
studies that associate corporate governance with Africa and Zambia’s development in 
particular are very scanty; this study attempts to address this gap. As discussed in Chapters 
Four and Five of this thesis, it is becoming increasingly clear that the upsurge in concern for 
greater accountability in Africa has been driven by a postulated link between ‘good’ 
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As outlined in Chapters Three and Four of this thesis. 
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governance and accountability and economic development. Massive corruption, mis-
management and the disappointing development record are other reasons cited for the desire 
for enhanced accountability (García, 2001). According to the World Bank (1992), 
accountability is a critical factor in enhancing good governance. Similarly, governance 
discussions are incomplete without mentioning accountability (Boven, 2005). The general 
frame of reference is that those entrusted with the control of resources, corporate or 
government, should be held accountable for their actions or inactions. However, in the 
absence of a system of accountability, corruption, bribery, financial crimes and 
mismanagement are the order of the day (García, 2001). There is an assumption that both 
government and private organisations are accountable to wider stakeholder groups that 
depend on them for their psychological and physiological needs (Trinkaus and Giacalone, 
2005). While a number of factors have been cited for Africa’s governance problems, García 
(2001) argues that lack of accountability is one critical factor that frustrates development. 
5.4.1 Key Thematic Issues 
The previous chapters have illuminated a number of themes that catalysed the work 
contained in this thesis. While governance provides a wide conceptual grounding, this study 
focuses on the corporate aspects of the broader notion. As a trademark of corporate 
governance, Gray et al. (1996) argue that accountability brings forth transparency which 
ultimately engages organisations and their actions into unanimity. This conjunction between 
actors and their actions, according to Gray et al., promotes responsibility by diffusing the 
conflict of interest which is at the heart of (for need for) accountability, a process Gallhofer 
and Haslam (1996) and Gray et al. (1996) refer to as ‘emancipatory’ and ‘evolutionary’.  
5.4.2 Corporations as Principal Generators of Economic Wealth 
  
The central theme that appears to be prevalent in the literature here is that corporate 
governance, as a component of (general) governance, plays a critical role in economic 
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development (NEPAD, 2007). This argument is based on the premise that today’s 
corporations have become the wealth generators and are therefore the engines of any 
country’s economy (Wolfensohn, 1999; Oman, 2003; Charkham and Ploix, 2005; Okike, 
2007). Corporate governance has therefore assumed the critical role of enhancing firm 
performance as it affects the financing choices of a firm, shareholder value maximisation 
and, ultimately, affects economic growth. Here, Solomon (2010) argues that the positive 
impact of corporate governance on corporate performance and the well-being of society 
cannot be exaggerated. In this context, scholars postulate that the governance of 
corporations has become a focal point in economic recovery (Ireland et al., 2001; Nestor, 
2001; Oman, 2001; Hart et al., 2003; Coglianese et al., 2004) and therefore the mechanisms 
of their direction and control have become worldwide issues. In the governance and 
development context, firm performance has been identified as being central to development 
(Cadbury, 1992)
128
 and one of the principal objectives of corporate governance is that of 
enhancing firm performance (Oman, 2001). Similarly, McIntosh (2002) emphasises that the 
future of many countries will be modelled on the performance of the corporate community; 
McIntosh argues that poor corporate management in the face of global economic tones is no 
longer an option. From a broader perspective, McIntosh (2002) maintains that ‘corporate 
society’ should be viewed in the context of being part of the solution to economic challenges 
that have enslaved many developing countries. 
    
The state of an economy is usually assumed to rest on the performance of its public, private 
and state-owned enterprises that generate wealth and create employment for the people and 
remove them from poverty (McIntosh (2002). The emphasis therefore should be on the 
(philosophical) aim of establishing an affirmative link between corporate governance and 
corporate performance with a view, as Dunne (2003) argues, to balancing the many 
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Sir Adrian Cadbury points out that “it is the growth potential of such firms which is crucial to improving the 
economic prospects of countries in the course of development” (Claessens, 2003 p.  v).   
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competing considerations of different stakeholders as well as the well-being of society. The 
discussion in Chapter Four suggests that most development problems in Zambia are 
governance-related, accountability’s role as a focus for attempts to reshape and reinforce 
good governance standards is the view taken by this study.  
 
5.5 Why Corporate Governance Matters to Development 
 
A well-established body of research has for some time acknowledged the increased 
importance of a robust corporate governance framework for economic development and 
well-being (see Cadbury Report, 1992; King Report, 1994; CACG, 1999b; OECD, 2004b). 
These widely cited reports and standards embrace development as the fundamental objective 
for corporate governance reform. In the UK context, the Cadbury Report (1992) states that:  
“The country’s economy depends on the drive and efficiency of its companies. Thus 
the effectiveness with which their boards discharge their responsibilities determines 
Britain’s competitive position. They must be free to drive their companies forward, 
but exercise that freedom within a framework of effective accountability. This is the 
essence of any system of good corporate governance” (p. 10). 
  
Similarly, CACG (1999b) links corporate governance to economic development as follows: 
   
“Corporate governance must be seen to facilitate, and engender, economic growth 
and prosperity but not at the expense of integrity. It is on this basis that the emerging 
economies of the Commonwealth should develop sufficiently to participate 
meaningfully in the global economy. This must remain the pre-eminent objective of 
Commonwealth countries” (p. 4). 
 
Consistent with the other reports, the OECD (2004a) argued that: 
 
“Corporate governance is one key element in improving economic efficiency and 
growth as well as enhancing investor confidence” (p. 11). “The corporate governance 
framework should be developed with a view to its impact on overall economic 
performance… ” (p. 17). 
 
There is thus a general understanding that corporate governance is important in helping 
countries create wealth, jobs and long-term competitiveness in the global economy. 
Advocating best practice in Commonwealth Countries, the CACG believes that corporate 
governance should play a greater role in facilitating economic growth and prosperity, a 
process in which transparency and accountability are essential characteristics. 
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5.5.1 Corporate Governance as a Precondition for Attracting Capital 
 
Sir Adrian Cadbury argued that private capital has become the prime source of funds for 
investment
129
. Investors need assurance that their investment will be protected and corporate 
governance plays an important role in creating this confidence. According to the GCGF 
(2003), lenders and investors seek refuge in good corporate governance principles. This 
view was also reflected in a recent McKinsey survey where the findings indicate that the 
majority of investors are willing and prepared to pay a premium for good corporate 
governance practices particularly in developing economies characterised by higher risks of 
investment, while a third of the investors would avoid countries with poor corporate 
governance altogether (McKinsey Consulting Group, 2002). Okeahalam and Akinboade 
(2003) contend that Africa’s perceived status as “a high-risk continent by investors” (p. 11) 
is largely due to its institutional deficiencies. Some of these deficiencies include lack of 
respect for property rights, for example, the grabbing of farms in Zimbabwe
130
. In addition, 
the degree of uncertainty provoked by the political instability that characterises most African 
states appears to discourage long-run investment on the continent (Ndulu and O’Connell, 
1999). 
  
Generally, firms in developing countries rely heavily on national development banks for 
financing (Arun and Turner, 2009). However, Oman (2001) argues that the recent past has 
seen a decrease in this trend with many firms now focusing on corporate governance 
institutions as an alternative structure of re-directing investment finance to firms
131
.  
Similarly, Claessens (2003) asserts that as the allocation of capital becomes more complex, 
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Sir Adrian Cadbury quoted in Claessens (2003 p. v) 
130
The grabbing of farms from most white farmers in Zimbabwe, with the blessing of the government, is one 
such example of a failure to protect property rights; corporate governance can only flourish in an 
environment where property rights are guaranteed (Carver, 2003; Mandaza, 2006; Acocella and Jones, 
2005).  
131
 For example, the setting-up of the Lusaka Stock Exchange in 1994, to facilitate the divestiture of SOEs and 
the creation wide shareholding ownership and the subsequent establishment of a corporate governance code 
in 2005 (LuSE, 2008). 
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the establishment of better corporate governance practices is inevitable as the current 
market-based investment process is underpinned by good corporate governance (Oman, 
2001). Corporate governance plays a central role in helping firms access finance for their 
investment activities at a lower cost especially with the diminishing of traditional sources in 
the face of the liberalisation and deregulation of markets (Oman, 2001; Claessens, 2003). 
This tendency raises another aspect of financing that relates to development. It was pointed 
out in Chapter Four that development aid appears to be a regular feature in the Zambian 
national budget, but with donors demanding far greater accountability and good governance, 
foreign assistance (in so far as it relates to development) cannot be ignored in the corporate 
governance and development discussion, and it is to this matter that the discussion now 
turns. 
   
Development aid has failed to leave a mark in most developing countries (Booth, 2005; 
Lamprecht, 2005) partly due to poor corporate governance practices therein. By improving 
corporate governance, countries become more attractive to development aid (Lamprecht, 
2005); aid which plays an important role in nations characterised by high poverty levels 
(Mistry, 2002). Mistry’s argument
132
 is based on the assumption that it is impossible in 
practice to reduce poverty through private capital; corporate governance therefore intervenes 
in the wastage and misallocation of scarce resources by ensuring an effective and efficient 
allocation (Rahman, 2010). 
 
Sound corporate governance practices are fundamental to Africa’s economic recovery as 
they play a pivotal role in macroeconomic stability, the transparency and accountability of 
public management functions, and the creation of investor confidence (Amoako, 2002; 
OECD, 2004a). According to the OECD (2004a), an effective corporate governance system 
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Observations and recommendations of the Zedillo Panel Report. 
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both at the individual company level and across an economy as a whole, provides safeguards 
that underpin the proper functioning of a market economy, such as lowering the cost of 
capital and ensuring the  efficient utilisation of scarce resources (see Amoako, 2002). 
However, Zambia lacks the institutional capacity to enhance accountability; for example, 
Mohiddin (2008) points out the lack of basic facilities and infrastructure for legislative 
organs in Zambia. Acemoglu (2008) argues that in the context of development, governance 
should be viewed in the context of broad institutional arrangements at the economic, 
political, and legal levels. For Acemoglu, these institutions underpin a country’s economic 
performance; in assessing Zambia’s governance status, in this regard, the World Bank 
(2004b) noted that: 
“One of the most important issues facing Zambia is the inconsistency between the 
legal framework for public finance and the actual structures and incentives in place 
to ensure accountability” (p. 28). 
 
The concerns raised by the World Bank are consistent with the issues that have been raised 
consistently throughout this thesis postulating that perhaps the starting point to begin 
considering corporate governance in developing countries should be institutional reform.  
Here, Nestor (2001) maintains that a lack of proper accountability leads to undermined rule 
of law, increased corruption and bribery and mismanagement in the public sector. 
 
5.5.2  Accountability - Implications for Corporate Governance and Development  
For a long time, the use of the word accountability has been the semantic preserve of those 
who are engaged in researching financial accounting and related corporate topics (Mulgan, 
2003; Bovens, 2005; Brennan and Solomon, 2008). However, the extant literature now 
reflects accountability’s transformation from a perceived financial and corporate sector 
function to an interdisciplinary concept (Bovev, 2005; Watkins, 2007). This shift has 
witnessed accountability emerging as a topical issue in governance literature with debates 
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often encompassing political and economic perspectives. In politics, the persuading view is 
that citizens should hold politicians accountable (Mainwaring, 2003) while in the corporate 
community the managers of corporations should be held accountable for their decisions 
(Keasey and Wright, 1993; McIntosh, 2002). Gallhofer and Haslam (1993) argue that 
accountability gives rise to good governance at all levels: individual (personal 
accountability), corporation (principal-agent theory) and state (political and social 
accountability) as the actors will always strive to embrace good moral and economic criteria. 
Corporate governance research has traditionally focused on accountability in terms of the 
principal-agent relationship, but this thesis focuses on broader aspects of company 
performance and economic performance, consequently driving the debate beyond the 
corporate sector to responsibility and accountability to broader stakeholder constituents. 
    
5.6  Stakeholder Accountability 
In an organisation, the term “stakeholder” is often used to indicate those who have a ‘stake’ 
or a legitimate concern in an enterprise (Merrifield, 1998). Stakeholder is another 
controversial word which can mean different things to different people (Donaldson, 1995; 
Phillips et al., 2003). However, from the governance perspective one of the challenges of 
improving corporate governance revolves around the concept of accountability. The usage 
of stakeholder theory in this study is intended as a means of improving corporate 
governance through the discharge of accountability to a variety of stakeholder groups
133
. 
Sternberg (1997) contends that the more inclusive stakeholder approach appears to have 
gathered a lot of support based on its promise to allow organisations to take on board the 
concerns of all their stakeholders. Recent scholarly literature appears to focus more on 
broadening the corporate governance and accountability base beyond the traditional 
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The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders established by law or 
through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in 
creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially-sound enterprises (OECD, 2004 p.  46). 
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shareholder-centric approach which does not represent the interests of non-investing parties 
and is considered too narrow a view for an economic interpretation of corporate governance 
(Tirole, 2001; Dunne, 2003; Pesqueux and Damak-Ayadi, 2005; Brennan and Solomon, 
2008). Restricting accountability to the traditional principal-agent relationships has the 
tendency to limit the dynamics of the concept because it excludes other legitimate 
relationships. Here, Steinberg (2010) states that: “Unfortunately, accountability to one class 
of stakeholders can impair accountability to other classes” (p. 116). Dunne (2003) argues 
that the principal concern amongst stakeholder theorists is the dominant narrow conception 
which does not take on board other constituents that, along with shareholders, require an 
account from firms. Similarly, Wieland (2005) points out that the stakeholder model is based 
on the premise that a corporation is a ‘social entity’ that is responsible and accountable to a 
broader set of actors than just the suppliers of finance.  
 
However, the trend in recent corporate governance research is for a shift towards a more 
stakeholder-oriented perspective that takes on board non-shareholding stakeholders (OECD, 
2004b; Brennan and Solomon, 2008). The shift has exerted pressure on traditional ways of 
discharging accountability, with scholars beginning to redefine the concept in line with the 
current trend that rejects ‘traditional’ corporate governance’s universalistic context-free 
propositions (see Solomon, 2010’s definition in Chapter Three). Solomon (2010)’s 
definition incorporates the discharge of accountability to all stakeholders and also touches 
on corporate social responsibility by pointing out that companies should act in a socially 
responsible way. Similarly, the Institute of Directors in South Africa (2002) argue that:  
“In adopting a participative corporate governance system…The King Committee 
successfully formalized (sic.) the need for companies to recognize (sic.) that they no 
longer act independently from the societies and the environment in which they 
operate (p. 7). 
 
Tirole (2001) points out that in countries that are traditionally more sympathetic to the 
stakeholder model (such as Germany, France and Japan) the focus of most corporations is on 
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growth and longevity, while profitability is postulated more as an instrument of achieving 
growth rather than as the ultimate goal of the firm. For Tirole, this is manifested in the 
composition of the boards in public corporations, particularly in Germany, to include 
stakeholders such as banks, customers, suppliers and workers. In this context, the principal-
agent relationship in the firm which is characterised by myriad relationships with many 
groups and individuals should be treated as just one relationship in the accountability 
process. As a means of broadening and enhancing accountability beyond non-shareholding 
stakeholders (Gray et al., 1987, Gray, 1992 and Gray et al. 1996) advocate social, 
environmental and sustainability accounting, reporting and disclosure as essential to the 
development of accountability. 
 
Although there are various definitions of stakeholders, Freeman (1984) describes them as 
“any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
organisation’s objectives of the company” (p. 5). Similarly, Gray et al. (1996) define 
stakeholders as: “…any human agency that can be influenced by, or can itself influence, the 
activities of the organisation in question” (p. 45). Cole et al. (2011) argue that while 
different stakeholder groups may monitor and influence the decisions of those charged with 
the responsibility of managing the organisation, different stakeholder groups have different 
levels of interest in the organisation, depending on their incentives and aims. Accordingly, 
from an accountability perspective it can be argued that different stakeholder groups may 
have different preferences based on varying incentives and interests. Some of these 
incentives may be economic in nature. 
 
Proponents of the shareholder model will, however, always question, in ‘whose interest is 
the corporation run’? The following quote demonstrates a shareholder-centric view of the 
relationship between management and the company owners: 
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“There should be no confusion . . . [A] business corporation is organized (sic) and 
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are 
to be employed for that end. The discretion of the directors is to be exercised in the 
choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to . . . other purposes” (Stout, 
2008 p. 165). 
 
Oman (2001) argues that the rationale for the shareholder model is that corporate 
governance mechanisms are meant to protect the owners of capital because non-investing 
stakeholders are adequately taken care of through their contractual relations with the firm. 
Other arguments in favour of the shareholder model are that in the event of liquidation, 
shareholders bear the heaviest risk (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991; Turnbull, 1997). For 
example, Berle and Means (1932) document that between 1900 and 1915 in the US, 
shareholders suffered the heaviest losses due to corporate governance failures in railroads 
(receiverships). In contrast however, the CACG (1999b) argues that the losses through 
company failures are spread across a broad range of stakeholder groups with employees 
losing their jobs, their families losing their livelihood, consumers losing choice of products, 
suppliers losing customers, and the whole economy of a country affected. Nonetheless, the 
debates in favour of and against the shareholder model appear to be very far from conclusive 
with the pendulum of scholarly literature slowly turning against a conception of corporate 
governance that deals solely with safeguarding the interests of shareholders. 
 
5.6.1   Assumptions under a Stakeholder Model 
There is an assumption that as firms increasingly become recognised as wealth and 
economic drivers in ‘strong’ nations, on which citizens depend for their psychological and 
physiological needs, the less likely firms’ traditionally-designed parameters are to be 
feasible (Trinkaus and Giacalone, 2005); this argument is expressed in the following quote 
therefrom: 
“Now included are all those having a traditional legal and financial claim on the 
firm, through those having an explicit social relationship with the firm, to those 
having a simple implicit interest in the firm - an evolution from an economic to a 
stakeholder view” (p. 237). 
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While theory postulates that directors have a fiduciary duty to conduct business in the best 
interest of the corporation’s current and future shareholders today, however, things are 
markedly different and Bhuiyan and Biswas (2007) maintain that good corporate governance 
systems ensure that directors and their companies are not only accountable to shareholders, 
but also to other stakeholders such as employees, creditors, major suppliers and customers. 
Similarly, the OECD (2004b) is of the view that all stakeholder groups that participate in the 
creation of wealth should be appreciated as the success of corporations depends on them as a 
team. For Bhuiyan and Biswas, the implication for accountability is that its scope and 
parameters have also been extended to take in those who may not have a legal or direct stake 
in the corporation. The extension of the accountability net beyond the liberal emphasis on 
the owners is as much a moral obligation as anything else. In this context, accountability is 
also extended to matters other than financial and economic events. While acknowledging the 
deficiencies of Anglo shareholder-centric accountability, Gray et al. (1996) argue that 
accountability for different purposes, for everything and to everyone is impracticable. 
Similarly, Messner (2009) contends that ‘counting on the accountable’ to satisfy multiple 
and conflicting accountabilities is problematic, ethically questionable and perhaps 
unrealistic; he states that:  
“The vulnerability of the accountable self implies that there are limits to 
accountability as an ethical practice - in the sense that too much accountability can 
become an ethically problematic burden for the accountable self” (p. 919). 
  
However, as shown in Chapters Three and Four of this thesis the extant literature on 
corporate governance and accountability on Africa, appears to support the notion of a 
stakeholder approach anchored on discharging accountability with a view to conciliating 
diversified stakeholder needs regardless of whether these are legal or moral contracts. This 
standpoint is consistent with Gray et al. (1987) who argued that casting companies’ 
accountability net wider is postulated on the notion that responsibilities should not be 
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restricted to creating wealth for the owners, but to a wider constituent of stakeholders who 
affect and are affected by companies’ activities. Focussing on the African context, there is a 
general view that transplanting institutional arrangements and corporate governance and 
accountability mechanisms that have worked elsewhere may not fit with the continent’s 
cultural values and will therefore continue to be problematic (Arun and Turner, 2009; 
Wanyama et al., 2009). Similarly, Chapter Four here illustrated that corporations, as 
members of the societies in which they operate, are expected to be accountable to other 
members of the community by aligning their interests with community values (Munro, 
1996). Stakeholder theory fits in squarely with the African communitarian way of living and 
doing business and this issue is now explored in detail. 
 
5.7 Stakeholder Accountability - The African Context 
Africa’s cultural and historic complexities put the continent at variance with the Anglo-
American governance and accountability templates augmented on Western cultural norms 
(Jackson, 2004). For Africa, embracing corporate governance is more of a development-
driven agenda than a dichotomous principal-agent problem; and a developed world 
paradigm may be inappropriate as it is not underpinned by an appreciation of the continent’s 
cultural context (Jackson, 2004). Africa is characterised by manifold ethnic and language 
groupings and Jackson argues that accountability in this context, though complex, should be 
viewed from the perceptions of different stakeholder communities and their influence on 
corporate governance practices rather than being based on the principal-agent approach. 
Ethnicity and diversity in cross-cultural dynamics affect people’s daily lives in Africa, 
which in turn affects the way companies are directed and controlled. Any accountability 
process designed and destined for Africa should consequently be broadened to embrace 
cross-cultural dynamics (Jackson, 2004). 
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Jackson (2004) further argues that Africa’s pre-colonialisation cross-cultural interactions are 
still prevalent in the modern governance arrangements of organisations on the continent. 
Therefore, understanding them and their impact on corporate governance and accountability 
in Africa is essential. Jackson acknowledges that good governance in Africa is a de facto 
legacy of the cultural and socio-economic attitudes of the different stakeholder communities 
and how their relationships are influenced. However, the growing body of literature seems to 
have paid little attention to the African ‘ubuntu’ (communitarian)
134
 philosophy model 
(Mbiti, 1989). Gstraunthaler (2010) affirms that the ‘ubuntu’ concept underlies Africa’s 
style of living and doing business, where all people are postulated to have a responsibility to 
each other. Karsten and Illa (2005) describe ‘ubuntu’ as: 
“…a pervasive spirit of caring and community, harmony and hospitality, respect and 
responsiveness, that individuals and groups display for one another” (p. 607). 
 
Any accountability model for Africa should therefore embrace this collective responsibility 
amongst stakeholders if it is to have relevance in an African context and incorporate African 
values (Jackson, 2004). 
  
5.7.1   A Hybrid Model 
West (2006) maintains that the pressure created by the Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance alongside the social pressures created by the ‘ubuntu’ concept means that 
hybridisation of corporate governance in Africa is both important and within reach. 
Adreasson (2006) points to South Africa as a good test for hybridisation, but Jackson (2004) 
questions how principles of governance developed based on Western cultural frames of 
reference can successfully address Africa’s cross-cultural governance issues more generally. 
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Ubuntu (‘African values’) symbolises an African humanism emphasising empathy, understanding, 
reciprocity, harmony and cooperation. It constitutes a potential guiding principle in African management 
and business practices (Karsten and Illa, 2005).  
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Although La Porta et al. (2000)
135
 prefer to distinguish different corporate governance 
models on the basis of investors’ legal protection, Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that the 
most commonly-debated corporate governance and accountability issues focus on 
distinguishing the concept as reflecting either shareholder or stakeholder models. However, 
acknowledging the limitations of the (biased) shareholder-centric approach, and also the 
difficulties and paradoxical complexities in conceptualising the extreme inclusivity 
stakeholder approach in the African context, some scholars propose an “African model” of 
corporate governance that strikes a balance between them (Adreasson, 2006). For 
Adreasson, a corporate governance model that balances shareholder and stakeholder 
interests and embraces the African values passes the fitness test for the continent and 
addresses the need for hybridisation noted above. 
    
5.8  Limitations of Accountability 
The increased number of recognised stakeholder groups, with varying strengths and needs, 
have resulted in accountability debates shifting and developing (Tinker et al., 1991) in order 
to address the diverse interests of (e.g.) shareholders, employees, communities, society, the 
state, the environments, customers, suppliers, competitors, local government, stock markets, 
industry bodies, foreign governments, future generations, non-human life (see Gray et al., 
1996 p. 45). Accountability relationships have also become more complex; for example, 
Gray et al. (1996) point out the difficulty in identifying the accountor and the accountee in 
the accountability process as they may be simultaneously involved in several relationships 
and can change and swap positions; in one relationship the actor is the accountor while in 
another situation the same actor is the accountee thus complicating the interactions. In this 
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La Porta et al., (1998; 1999; 2000) conclude that ownership dispersion is prevalent in common-law countries 
where investors enjoy better legal protection. They further argue that countries range in strength of 
protection from the stronger common-law system to the weaker French-civil-law countries, with German and 
Scandinavian-civil-law board systems in the middle. The authors suggest that corporate governance models 
can be distinguished on this basis.  
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context, each actor can be both accountor and accountee to each other making it difficult to 
pin point who is accountable to whom and for what.  
 
5.8.1 Accountability - A Function of Financial Accounting 
 
Accountability has traditionally been viewed as a function of financial accounting, with a 
history of contrived silence in other disciplines (Hopwood, 1990; Bovev, 2005). In this 
context, scholars argue that annual financial reports are fundamental in providing an account 
to various stakeholder groups as well as representing a way of discharging accountability by 
directors (Connolly and Hyndman, 2004; Kilcullen et al., 2007; Mack and Ryan, 2007). 
Although accountability now spans almost every area of social science (Mulgan 2000), it 
has always been an aspect of accounting, especially book-keeping (Bovens 2005). The 
recent past has seen accountability slowly moving beyond this tradition (Bovev, 2005; 
Watkins, 2007), i.e. a view that restricts accountability to the stewardship function of 
management with large tracts of business activity remaining skewed towards discharging 
accountability to (powerful) owners of capital and other finance providers. The traditional 
approach confines accountability to accounting figures ignoring other core issues; this Gray 
et al. (1987) therefore propose a broadened accountability framework that takes on board 
varying degrees of non-financial social elements. However, Puxty (1986) argues that 
financial reporting in itself is not adequate to effectuate in this context. Similarly, Messner 
(2009) argues that different stakeholders demand different information, requiring the actor 
to “speak in several languages at the same time” (p. 919), rather than concentrate on 
discharging accountability through traditional financial reporting models as opposed to other 
forms of accountability and accountability channels that go beyond economic decision-
making to shareholders. This suggestion is consistent with the literature on Africa which 
points to an alternative (broad) view of accountability, as noted earlier. 
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5.8.2 Inherent Limitations 
 
It is often assumed that there has to be a recognised contractual relationship between the 
accountor and the accountee in the accountability process (Gray et al., 1996). According to 
Behn (2001), the accountability relationship exists between two parties, groups of people, 
individuals or organisations. Specific relationships determine the types of accountability that 
can be discharged (Bovens 2005), as different relationships demand different types of 
accountor and accountee and, consequently, form of accountability. The main implication is 
that any discharge of accountability outside the contract is purely moral, or based on ethical 
practice (personal accountability). But, Likierman (1986) argues, while responsibilities can 
be distinguished into legal, non-legal, moral and natural varieties, the moral and natural 
variants are difficult to achieve in practice because discharging accountability in this form is 
ex gratia (given as a favour), voluntary (Gray et al., 1996) or reputational (OECD, 2004b) 
making it unlikely to be purposeful without mandatory effect. While accountability can be 
based on legal or moral frames, this basic conception is usually interpreted as implying that 
the justification for accountability exists purely because of mandatory obligation or intra 
legem (within the law). In the absence of a legal relationship, accountability to non-
contractual stakeholders is limited to moral and natural obligations (Tinker et al., 1991), or 
ex aequo et bono (not on considerations of existing law). Similarly, Tricker (1983) posits 
that accountability cannot be expected to occur without the accountor being called to 
account and the contract enforced. However, Fox (2010) points to the challenges posed by 
discharging accountability to non-contractual stakeholders. Correspondingly, Berle and 
Means (1932) maintain that shareholders have special mechanisms of control and 
governance to protect their interests, while other stakeholders (such as employees, lenders, 
suppliers and customers) with contractual arrangements are able to defend themselves 
appropriately through contracts and legal institutions. However, this understanding leaves 
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non-contractual stakeholders with limited options, if any, to protect themselves adequately. 
Under such circumstances, the accountee has formalised power to enforce compliance. 
While the law
136
 stipulates the procedures for stakeholders with a de jure relationship to 
impose sanctions, there are limited mechanisms available for non-contractual stakeholders to 
impose sanctions against a non-performing accountor. It is clear here that from a legal 
perspective, it is essential that a de jure accountee (lex lata) has adequate sanctioning 
powers to hold the accountor to account. Although Gray et al. (1996) go on to argue that de 
jure or ex gratia accountability can still be enforced, there is an acknowledgement of the 
fact that the accountability process in its current form lacks institutional capacity, primarily 
in the broadened aspect. Many other scholars argue that an accountability process without 
the right for the accountor to impose sanctions is incomplete (Burritt and Welch, 1997; 
Schedler, 1999; Mulgan, 2000; Boven, 2005; 2006). 
 
In Figure 5.3 below, Gray et al.’s (1996) model is shown to presuppose accountability 
limiting a relationship between two actors, those with the right to hold others to account and 
those that are accountable. According to Gray et al. (1996) the relationship between the 
accountee and the accountor has to be contractual (those in control and those with contracts). 
Gray et al. (1996) concede that conventional accountability has a tendency to limit itself to a 
restricted set of stakeholders, excluding the state, society, ethics, culture and the 
environment who influence the company’s activities but are non-contractual.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
136
Gray et al. (1996) affirms that in conventional financial accounting the contract between the accountor and 
accountee is governed by the Companies Acts.  
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Figure 5.3    A Generalised Accountability Model 
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Source: Gray et al., 1996 p. 39  
 
 
Gray et al. (1996) argue further that, ex gratia, there may be a tendency for organisations to 
extend accountability only to those stakeholder groups that have a direct concern in 
furthering the interests of the organisation, neutralising the effectiveness of accountability 
where the accountee is able to choose who to account to. For example, Altman (2000) 
contends that defining the community in its stakeholder form (as a stakeholder) and later on 
discharging accountability to this same community on an ex gratia basis may not be 
practicable. 
 
5.8.3 Accountability Expectations Gap 
 
An expectation gap appears to exist within the accountability process between accountors 
and accountees in relation to various issues associated with the provision of information. 
Cooper and Owen (2007) argue that suggesting that someone is accountable for their actions 
is to hold certain expectations about the actor’s responsibility. The accountor’s failure to 
provide information to satisfy the expectations of all the stakeholder groups creates an 
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expectations gap between the accountor and the accountee. For example, a company’s 
failure to provide information about transactions that implicate it in anti-social practices, 
such as money laundering, tax evasion, bribery and corruption, or other social consequences 
(Mitchell et al. 2002) or environmental information (Tilt, 1994; Deegan and Rankin, 1997) 
creates an accountability expectations gap. 
  
The expectations gap may reflect a number of reasons: (i) there may be no contractual 
obligation (Gray et al. (1996); (ii) the accountor may be unaware of the demand for such 
information, or their own individual roles (Gray et al., 1996; Suwanraks, 1999); (iii) cost 
implications in the provision of such information (Bovens et al., 2008); or (iv) simply a 
strong desire to avoid sanctions. Irrespective of the cause, the expectations gap calls for 
accountability mechanisms to bridge the gap between actions and expectations (Scott and 
Lyman, 1968). In this context, Steinberg (2010) questions whether: “[T]he organisation 
(should) be accountable to all its legitimate stakeholders, or should accountability take 
different forms for different classes of stakeholders?” (p. 116). Similarly, Mulgan (2000) 
maintains that unless different channels of accountability are designed for different 
stakeholders, discharging accountability to multiple stakeholders through the same conduit 
is impractical. Patton (1992) contends that the relationship between the accountor and 
accountee has the propensity to influence the information demanded, leading to preferences 
for different types of information, while Bovens (2005) maintains that different accountees 
may have different expectations, based on different relationships. In this context, failure or 
success of accountability can be viewed as a question of expectations. 
  
5.9   Conclusion 
Accountability may be held as the trademark of corporate governance, similarly corporate 
governance is viewed as a crucial element of the broader governance notion. In this regard, 
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the present study views the problems of governance in Zambia in terms of accountability. 
Although different definitions of accountability exist, what remains undisputed is the state of 
being accountable (in terms of the duty to provide an account), liability to be called on to 
render an account and the obligation to bear the consequences for failure to perform as 
expected. Accountability guarantees that actions, transparency, disclosure and decisions 
taken by those entrusted with responsibility are overseen in order to ensure objectivity and 
quick responses to the needs of stakeholders, contributing in turn to better governance.  
Accountability is viewed as a critical element of sound governance practices in both the 
public and private sectors. In fact, one of the major challenges to efforts to improve 
corporate governance revolves around the concept of accountability. Focusing on the notion 
that corporations are wealth generators for sound economies, accountability and sound 
corporate governance practices underpin economic development. However, Africa’s 
ethnicity and cross-cultural diversity appears to side-line the dominant principal-agent 
accountability. It has been argued in this chapter that for Africa, accountability should be 
viewed from the perspectives of different stakeholder communities (and their influence on 
corporate governance practices) rather than the principal-agent approach. This broad context 
affects African daily lives, as well as the management style and business practices extant on 
the continent, and therefore influences the accountability model. 
Stewart’s Ladder of Accountability is of particular relevance to a study such as this which 
attempts to push the boundaries of corporate governance beyond agency theory and firm 
performance to broadened accountability and economic outcomes. In this context, 
accountability in Zambia can be seen in terms of: (i) probity and legality; (ii) process; (iii) 
performance; (iv) programme; and (v) policy. These types of accountability have been 
shown to have a universal application in different sectors of economic activity - private, 
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public and government, and to have direct relevance to the present study. Having explored 
the theoretical underpinning of the thesis the next chapter outlines and discusses the 
methodological and method-related issues that flow from this.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter introduces and describes the methodology and methods used in this study. 
After a long search process the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) - 
Africa’s development framework - has finally acknowledged corporate governance as one of 
the conditions for development both for the continent collectively and for individual 
countries. The concept of corporate governance was introduced in the first chapter of this 
thesis. As noted therein, while extensive research has been undertaken on corporate 
governance, very little has been carried out with reference to its interplay with development, 
particularly in Africa. This context strongly influences the methodological underpinnings of 
this research as set out in this chapter: The chapter explores the study’s various 
philosophical assumptions and the rationale for the methods employed in the collection and 
analysis of empirical data. The discussion is intended to explain the choices made in these 
regards, choices influenced by the desire to contribute meaningfully to knowledge of the 
relationship between corporate governance and development in an emerging country such as 
Zambia.  
 
6.2 Methodological Assumptions  
Methodological assumptions differ from problem to problem with variants reflecting 
researchers’ views about the nature of both social science and society; consequently they 
greatly influence human reasoning in the process of gathering and communicating 
knowledge (Hatch and Cunliffe, 2006). Here, Chua (1986) argues that: “Methodological 
assumptions indicate the research methods deemed appropriate for the gathering of valid 
evidence” (p. 604), although Tsukamoto (2003) suggests that explicating methodological 
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assumptions constitutes a huge challenge for researchers in terms of the philosophy of social 
science research. Although there are no established rules guiding one’s methodological 
assumptions, Morgan and Smircich (1980) contend that research is guided by the 
assumptions that researchers make in terms of the nature of knowledge (and how that 
knowledge can be obtained) and the phenomena to be investigated. These, for Morgan and 
Smircich (1980), form the basis of any research endeavour, regardless of whether it takes a 
qualitative or quantitative form. Similarly, Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that researchers 
always take a position on philosophical underpinnings about the nature of the social world 
and how it should be investigated; for these authors, ontology, epistemology, human nature 
and methodology are some of the basic philosophical assumptions that inform approaches to 
social science research. Correspondingly, Ryan et al. (2002) believe that: 
“…the selection of an appropriate research methodology cannot be done in isolation 
of the consideration of the ontological and epistemological assumptions which 
underpin the research in question. Also, it is relevant to note that methodology is 
concerned with the process of doing research, and as such it has both ontological and 
epistemological dimensions” (p. 54). 
 
Ryan et al.’s view is that an alignment of the three sets of assumptions - ontology, 
epistemology and methodology - is what constitutes the researcher’s philosophical 
positioning.  It should be noted however that different methodological perspectives can 
result in different conclusions being reached from the study of identical phenomena (Deetz, 
1996; Hatch and Cunliffe, 2006). 
 
6.2.1 Nature of Social Science Research 
 
It is commonly argued that research is a process of providing answers to complex situations 
in order to promote better understanding, guide social planning and improve societal living 
standards (Kumar, 2011). In this context, the proper fusion of ontology, epistemology and 
human nature underpin social science research (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). In the same 
vein, Burrell and Morgan (1979) posit that the ontological and epistemological positions 
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taken, coupled with assumptions made about human nature, have a direct influence on 
methodological disposition and, more broadly, underpin social science research. Although 
Burrell and Morgan have tried to simplify the four underpinning assumptions, Landman 
(2003) describes the distinction between ontology, epistemology and methodology as not 
straightforwardly conceptualised. 
  
6.2.2 Ontological Assumptions 
 
Bryman (2001) argues that ontological assumptions are primarily concerned with the nature 
of the world and human beings in a social context. More specifically, ontology relates to the 
study of being or reality, whether reality is viewed as objective and external to human 
beings or is instead created by one’s own consciousness (Mouton and Marais, 1988; Blaikie, 
1993; Wand and Weber, 1993). Likewise, Burrell and Morgan (1979) refer to assumptions 
regarding the nature of the phenomena to be investigated as being of an ontological nature. 
The authors point out that the basic ontological question is:  
“whether the ‘reality’ to be investigated is external to the individual – imposing itself 
on individual consciousness from without – or the product of the individual 
consciousness; whether ‘reality’ is of an ‘objective’ nature, or the product of 
individual cognition; whether ‘reality’ is a given ‘out there’ in the world, or the 
product of one’s mind” (p. 1). 
   
It can be interpreted from the above reasoning that, depending on ontological positioning, 
different researchers might reach different conclusions from the same observations. 
Consistent with Burrell and Morgan (1979), Morgan and Smircich (1980) argue that the 
researcher’s ontological position provides a frame for incorporating the assumptions that are 
inherent to humankind’s view of the world, i.e. whether the world is external to individuals 
(positivism) or, instead, individuals control the environment (anti-positivism). The 
contextual application of ontological assumptions to the present study is that the 
assumptions guide the researcher as to the kind of knowledge that needs to be gathered in 
the area of corporate governance and the consequential ramifications for the country’s 
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development. The fact that different assumptions regarding reality do exist (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994), leads this discussion onto assumptions about how knowledge regarding the 
nature of the world is gathered (epistemology). 
     
6.2.3 Epistemological Assumptions 
 
Epistemology
137
 refers to how knowledge is created (Bryman, 2001; Krauss, 2005). 
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), epistemological assumptions are concerned with 
how the researcher understands and gather knowledge, as well as the manner in which it is 
communicated. The authors refer to epistemology as:  
“…assumptions about the grounds of knowledge – about how one might begin to 
understand the world and communicate this as knowledge to fellow human beings” 
(p. 1). 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) further argue that there are two dimensions to how knowledge 
can be created, i.e. “…whether knowledge is something which can be acquired on the one 
hand, or is something which has to be personally experienced on the other” (p.2). There is a 
strong association between ontology and epistemology as the former focuses on what exists, 
the nature of the world and reality, while the latter concentrates on how what exists may be 
known (Hall, 1990; Usher, 1996). This link implies that epistemological assumptions are 
subdued by those relating to ontology (Guba and Lincoln, 1994)
138
. In this context, 
epistemological assumptions focus on justifying how any claims to know are “knowable” 
(Usher, 1996). Krauss (2005) describes the link as follows:  “Ontology is the philosophy of 
reality; epistemology addresses how we come to know that reality while methodology 
identifies the particular practices used to attain knowledge” (p. 759). Murray and Lawrence 
(2000) extend this association to data collection techniques by stating that: “Ontological 
assumptions will give rise to epistemological assumptions which will have methodological 
implications for the choice of particular techniques of data collection” (p. 124). 
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Epistemology is from the Greek word ‘episteme’ which means knowledge (Mouton and Marais, 1988; 
Krauss, 2005). 
138
In other words, the epistemological question is constrained by the ontological question.  
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6.2.4 Human Nature 
 
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), human nature refers to “the relationship between 
human beings and their environment” (p. 2).  For Burrell and Morgan, this idea is framed on 
the notion that the subject and object of investigation centres on human life and how humans 
respond to the external world (whether mechanistic or deterministic). Burrell and Morgan 
identify two underlying assumptions that can be made about human nature; either the human 
being is controlled by the environment or the human being, as the creator of the 
environment, controls the environment. The two contrasting philosophical perspectives 
(together with ontological and epistemological positioning) guide the methodological 
aspects of research. 
 
6.2.5 Methodology 
 
There is a common view that ontology, epistemology and methodology are intimately 
related (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Ryan et al., 2002; Krauss, 2005). However, the issue of 
methodology focuses on the particular practices that are used to gather knowledge (Krauss, 
2005). Guba and Lincoln (1994) refer to methodology as the way the inquirer goes about 
finding out what can be known. The two authors further argue that not all methodologies are 
appropriate to all research activity, but rather the methodology depends on the researcher’s 
beliefs about ontology and epistemology. Morgan and Smircich (1980) argue that in social 
science research most qualitative research is underpinned by subjectivist judgements made 
by the researcher rather than, necessarily, the appropriateness of research techniques. 
   
6.3 Burrell and Morgan’s Subjective: Objective Dimension 
  
Burrell and Morgan (1979) characterise social science as having two opposing dimensions - 
subjective and objective - with each influencing positions on ontology, epistemology, human 
nature and methodology.  Figure 6.1 below illustrates this framework. 
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Figure 6.1    Burrell and Morgan’s Subjective – Objective Dimension 
 
   Subjectivist                         Objectivist    
   Approaches to             Approaches to 
    Social Science             Social Science 
 
          
        
    
       
 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
 
Depending on the nature of the research and the position taken on the subjective-objective 
continuum, Burrell and Morgan (1979) identify two basic ontological positions: nominalism, 
which is more subjectively inclined, and realism which is aligned to objectivism. The 
authors argue that:  
“The nominalist position revolves around the assumption that the social world 
external to individual cognition is made up of nothing more than names, concepts 
and labels which are used to structure reality” (p. 4). 
 
Consistent with Burrell and Morgan’s view, Niiniluoto (1999) portrays the nominalists’ 
view as involving: “linguistic vehicles for classifying individuals” (p. 29). Nominalism 
incorporates the view that reality is a subjective construction of one’s mind, thereby denying 
the notion of there being a real structure to the world (Husserl, 1970; Burrell and Morgan, 
1979; Siau and Rossi, 2011). In direct contrast realism, a more objectivism-aligned way of 
thinking, holds that reality comprises objectively given immutable objects and structures 
with researchers standing as neutral observers. This view follows from assuming real world 
structural characteristics of hardness and intangibility that exist regardless of individual 
perceptions
139
. 
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In this context, Burrell and Morgan, (1979) note: “Whether or not we label and perceive these structures, the 
realists maintain, they still exist as empirical entities. We may not even be aware of the existence of certain 
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In terms of epistemology, Burrell and Morgan (1979) propose two principal positions, 
namely positivism and anti-positivism. Gale (1979) asserts that positivism - which many 
scholars refer to as the ‘traditional’ research approach - dominates modern scientific 
inquiry
140
 is based on forecasting and elucidating causal relationships among key variables. 
The positivist approach to exploring social reality is based on the philosophical assumption 
that knowledge is best obtained through observations and experiments (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979; Hall, 1990; Wicks and Freeman, 1998; Krauss, 2005). In this context, Krauss (2005) 
argues that positivists tend to disconnect themselves from the world they study. In contrast, 
anti-positivists challenge the properness of causal relationships for the understanding of 
phenomena, instead embracing the assumption that social reality is viewed and interpreted 
by the individual and, in this context, knowledge is acquired through personal experience 
and not superimposed from outside (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Guba and Lincoln, 1994). 
Quite clearly, the epistemology of anti-positivism rejects the practicality and usefulness of 
probing the laws and regularities in the world of social affairs in favour of the alternative 
view that the social world can be better understood through involvement in the study 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
  
As regards assumptions about human nature, Burrell and Morgan (1979) identify two 
opposing views: the objectivist extreme is determinism which postulates a human being and 
his/her activities as being controlled by the environment. In contrast, at the subjectivist 
extreme voluntarism assumes that a human being is completely autonomous. However, 
Burrell and Morgan posit that assumptions about human nature do not necessarily need to be 
located in any of the two extremes with an intermediate position involving a hybridisation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
crucial structures and therefore have no ‘names’ or concepts to articulate them. For the realists, the social 
world exists independently of an individual’s appreciation of it “(p. 4).   
140
But dates back to the sixteenth century 
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both situational and voluntary assumptions about the activities of human beings being 
favoured.   
In the context of methodology, ideographic and nomothetic are the two competing classes of 
assumptions.  According to Burrell and Morgan (1979): 
“The ideographic approach to social science is based on the view that one can only 
understand the social world by obtaining first-hand knowledge of the subject under 
investigation” (p. 6). 
  
The authors emphasise the ideographic notion as being based on a subjective description of 
the researcher’s experience of getting ‘inside’ situations and getting involved in everyday 
flow of life, i.e. “… letting one’s subject unfold its nature and characteristics during the 
process of investigation” (p. 6). In contrast, the nomothetic approach emphasises 
conventional research, research which focuses on natural science techniques as the manner 
of gathering knowledge (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
  
Burrell and Morgan (1979) recognise the influence that the apparent dichotomous nature of 
the subjective-objective dimension can have on the researcher; for example, a subjective 
approach to social science may be characterised by assumptions that are nominalistic, anti-
positivist, voluntaristic and ideographic. Similarly, the objective approach to social science 
may reflect an approach that is realistic, positivistic, deterministic and nomothetic. However, 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that the interaction between the two opposing approaches 
have resulted in the emergence of intermediate positions. The subjective-objective 
conception framework originally meant to clarify methodological assumptions has, 
unwittingly, posed more controversy and represents the most problematic legacy of Burrell 
and Morgan’s work (Deetz, 1996). 
   
6.3.1 Ontology, Epistemology, Human Nature and Methodology - Network  
 
The four sets of assumptions outlined above are interlinked in the sense that ontological 
assumptions are concerned with what is knowable, epistemological assumptions are 
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concerned with how knowledge is knowable, human nature is concerned with human beings 
and their view of the world, while methodology relates to how knowledge is acquired (Hall, 
1990; Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Usher, 1996; Murray and Lawrence, 2000; Krauss, 2005). 
Morgan and Smircich (1980) argue that this form of analysis offers some useful insights 
regarding the implications of locating oneself at a particular point on the subjective-
objective continuum. Moving along the continuum, assumptions undergo a form of 
refinement and the grounds for knowledge at each point differ fundamentally according to 
the particular views held about social reality (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). Effectively the 
assumptions about what is knowable, how it is knowable, how the world is viewed and how 
knowledge is finally acquired are seen as shifting. For Morgan and Smircich, reality is a 
projection of human imagination
141
 (see for example, Laughlin, 1995) because people 
experience reality in different ways as they interact with each other (i.e. subjectivism) as 
opposed to the objectivist view of reality as a concrete structure
142
.   
 
6.4     ‘Order’ and ‘Conflict’ Theories of Society 
To understand the society under investigation, Burrell and Morgan (1979)
143
 propose two 
assumptions about the nature of society: the ‘order’ theory and the ‘conflict’ theory. 
Similarly, Chua (1986) argues that order and fundamental conflict underpin assumptions 
about society. The order-conflict assumptions are espoused by two opposing approaches, 
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Morgan and Smircich (1980) argue that: “The social world and what passes as ‘reality’ is a projection of 
individual consciousness; it is an act of creative imagination and of dubious inter-subjective status. This 
extreme position, commonly known as solipsism, asserts that there may be nothing outside oneself” (p. 494).  
142
Morgan and Smircich further posit that: “The social world is a hard, concrete, real thing ‘out there’ which 
affects everyone in one way or another. It can be thought of as a structure composed of a network of 
determinate relationships between constituent parts. Reality is to be found in the concrete behaviour and 
relationships between these parts” (p.  495).   
143
Burrell and Morgan (1979)’s study in the area of order and conflict was greatly influenced by the work of  
Dahrendorf (1959) which was later criticised by Cohen (1968) for treating order and conflict as separate 
models. In rejecting this notion, Cohen argued in favour of theories embracing elements of both models 
because they are not mutually exclusive. Cohen has also been accused of having misinterpreted the 
distinction between the two theories, thereby losing the radical essence of the conflict perspective (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979). 
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one framed on explicating how and why societies cohere (social order) and those framed on 
“problems of change, conflict and coercion in social structures” (Chua, 1986 p. 10). 
 
Figure 6.2     Two theories of society: ‘order’ and ‘conflict’ 
 
The ‘order’ or ‘integrationist’  The ‘conflict’ or ‘coercion’ 
view of society emphasises   view of society emphasises  
 
Stability      Change 
Integration       Conflict 
Functional co-ordination    Disintegration 
Consensus      Coercion 
  
Source: Burrell and Morgan, 1979 p. 13. 
 
 
Although some commentators claim that the order-conflict debate is a significant 
oversimplification of viewpoints regarding the nature of society, earlier philosophers such as 
Dahrendorf (1959) argue that it provides insights about how different researchers hold 
alternative assumptions regarding the nature of society and, ultimately, how they investigate 
it.  
  
6.4.1 From ‘Order’ and ‘Conflict’ to ‘Regulation’ and ‘Radical Change’ 
  
The arguably oversimplified ‘order’ and ‘conflict’ characteristics of societal theories led to a 
number of limitations being identified in terms of the assumptions made about the nature of 
society (Cohen, 1968; Silverman, 1970). Conceding this fact, Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
contend that: “Many sociologists now regard this debate as dead or as having been a 
somewhat spurious non-debate in the first place” (p. 10). Similarly, other scholars believe 
that the distinction between order and conflict is not detailed enough and appears to be 
oblivious to the notions’ fundamental dissimilarities; as such they are open to 
misinterpretation (Cohen, 1968; Silverman, 1970). While Burrell and Morgan (1979) revisit 
the order-conflict debate and use it as a platform to analyse assumptions about the nature of 
society, they acknowledge the fact that such limitations have shifted attention from the 
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order-conflict debate to subjectivists’ theorising. In this regard - and in an attempt to 
approach the debate more straightforwardly - Burrell and Morgan (1979) propose the use of 
different terminologies in the form of ‘regulation’ sociology; this is concerned with “the 
need for regulation in human affairs: … It attempts to explain why society tends to hold 
together than fall apart” (p. 17) and, in direct contrast, they propose a ‘radical change’ 
sociology, one which is concerned with “… man’s emancipation from the structures which 
limit and stunt his potential for development” (p. 17). The proposed terminology changes are 
aimed at clarity enhancement and reducing the scope for misinterpretations. The 
characteristics of the proposed changes are illustrated in Figure 6.3 below. 
 
Figure 6.3  The Regulation - Radical Change Dimension 
 
The sociology of REGULATION  The sociology of RADICAL CHANGE 
is concerned with     is concerned with 
 
(a) The status quo    (a) Radical change 
(b) Social order    (b) Structural conflict 
(c) Consensus    (c) Modes of domination 
(d) Social integration and cohesion (d) Contradiction 
(e) Solidarity    (e) Emancipation 
(f) Need satisfaction   (f) Deprivation 
(g) Actuality    (g) Potentiality  
 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979 p. 18). 
 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that the two contrasting positions are fundamentally at 
variance, to the extent that they should not be perceived as a mere novelty on a single theme; 
they further argue that the two cannot be given the same level of attention simultaneously as 
“one must always be committed to one side more than another” (p. 19). 
  
6.5   Research Paradigms 
According to Kuhn (1970), a paradigm provides a worldview, or framework, for 
understanding the nature of society and investigating the social world (see Ardalan, 2008). 
Likewise, Morgan (1983) argues that research paradigms not only provide philosophical and 
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methodological underpinnings for conducting research but also act as a podium for 
researchers from which to interpret the social world. Guba and Lincoln (1994) describe a 
paradigm as: 
“… a set of basic beliefs … that deals with ultimates or first principles. It represents 
a worldview that defines, for its holder, the nature of the “world,” the individual’s 
place in it, and the range of possible relationships to that world and its parts” (p. 
107). 
 
Guba and Lincoln (1994) refer to the ontological, epistemological and methodological 
assumptions as the beliefs that both define and support a particular research paradigm. In 
Ardalan (2008)’s view, any research must be underpinned by assumptions that underwrite 
the researcher’s worldview or paradigm; one consequence of this reasoning is that 
alternative paradigms incite researchers to view phenomena differently (Deetz, 1996; Hatch 
and Cunliffe, 2006). 
  
Consolidating the opposing sets of assumptions about the nature of social science (i.e. the 
subjective - objective dimension) and the assumptions about the nature of society (regulation 
- radical change), Burrell and Morgan (1979) brought into being a two-by-two matrix 
conceptual framework. The authors propose philosophical assumptions that situate the 
nature of social science along the subjective-objective continuum and the nature of society 
along the regulation-radical change continuum. Four mutually exclusive positions are 
formulated in this conceptual framework, with each defining a range of intellectual territory 
and alternative views of social reality; these are “radical humanist”, “radical structuralist”, 
“interpretive” and “functionalist”, as illustrated in Figure 6.4 below. 
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Figure 6.4    Burrell and Morgan’s Four Paradigms 
 
  
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979 p. 22) 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) observe that the sociological debate in the mid-20
th
 century was 
more predisposed to defining the subjective – objective dimension than the regulation – 
radical change issue. However, the emergence of Burrell and Morgan’s framework appears 
not to have calmed the debate in this area, and theorists are instead now characterised as 
belonging to one of the four more developed units of sociological thought, namely: radical 
humanists, radical structuralist, functionalists and interpretivists. Within this framework, 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) propose that: “To be located in a particular paradigm is to view 
the world in a particular way” (p. 24), and contend that each paradigm has its own 
(concealed) set of basic assumptions that are fundamentally at odds with the assumptions of 
other paradigms
 144.
 However, questions have been raised as to whether it is possible for one 
to be ring-fenced in a single discrete paradigm without being influenced by other 
neighbouring paradigms (Alvesson and Willmott, 1996). Notwithstanding this debate, 
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“They offer different ways of seeing. A synthesis is not possible, since in their pure forms they are 
contradictory, being based on at least one set of meta-theoretical assumptions. … one cannot operate in more 
than one paradigm at any given point in time, since in accepting the assumptions of one, we defy the 
assumptions of all the others” ( Burrell and Morgan, 1979 p.  25) 
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Burrell and Morgan (1979) acknowledge that the researcher does not necessarily need to 
take an immutable position as there is an allowance for some diversification at the extremes. 
 
From a sociological point of view, the four paradigms are idiosyncratic in nature. The 
functionalist paradigm is entrenched in the sociology of regulation and an objectivist 
orientation which embraces realist, positivist, determinist and nomothetic assumptions 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979); the authors believe that: 
“The functionalist approach to social science tends to assume that the social world  is 
composed of relatively concrete empirical artefacts and relationships which can be 
identified, studied and measured through approaches derived from the natural 
sciences” (p. 26). 
 
Functionalists argue for the furtherance of the state of affairs rather than revolutionary 
change. This perspective reflects a view that the world is objective, existing independently 
of actors and, as such, is more concerned with the reasons for particular behaviour and its 
association with the social world (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Dunne (2003) notes that the 
functionalist paradigm received a lot of attention in accounting and finance investigation, 
particularly towards the end of the 20
th
 century. Consistent with Dunne, Ardalan (2008) 
asserts that the functionalist paradigm is now very popular in mainstream finance research.  
 
In contrast to the functionalist approach, interpretivism side-lines the objective standpoint in 
favour of phenomenological assumptions formulated on the importance of understanding 
society from the point of view of the actors engaged in the performance of social activities 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Researchers in this paradigm take the role of participants rather 
than observers (Ardalan, 2008); moreover as nominalists, those involved   believe that the 
world is socially constructed and that reality is best understood from the point of view of the 
individual involved in the activities being investigated (Siau and Rossi, 2011). Thus, 
proponents of interpretism are anti-positivists in that they believe knowledge to be acquired 
through personal experience and social reality as viewed and interpreted by the individual 
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(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). In addition, interpretivists are voluntarists who believe that 
people are completely autonomous (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) and favour an idiographic 
approach whereby, in order to understand the social world first-hand, knowledge must be 
obtained from the subjects being investigated (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001). In order to 
acquire knowledge and comprehension of the phenomena being investigated, Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) thus argue that interpretive researchers must get ‘inside’ their subjects’ lives. 
  
In the left hand corner of the Burrell and Morgan’s two-by two matrix lies the radical 
humanist paradigm, framed on the sociology of radical change and a subjective position. 
One of the main assumptions underpinning the radical humanist viewpoint is that reality is 
socially created. However, radical humanism is similar to interpretism in the sense that both 
paradigms embrace nominalistic, anti-positivistic, voluntaristic and ideographic assumptions 
about the social world. While interpretivists are concerned with understanding the nature of 
the everyday world, radical humanists render a critique of the existing state of affairs by 
prioritising radical change, modes of domination, emancipation, deprivation and potentiality. 
The radical structuralist paradigm differs from the radical humanist paradigm in that while 
the former takes a subjective position regarding the sociology of radical change, the latter 
takes an objective disposition. The paradigm is anchored on four pillars; totality, structure, 
contradiction and crisis (Ardalan, 2008). For a radical structuralist, relational structuralism 
in the encased realist social world is the basis of radical critique of society (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). 
  
6.6   Divergence in Paradigms 
  
Morgan (1990) argues that while the diversity in paradigms provides insights into 
methodological assumptions about the nature of science society, it also provides 
opportunities and threats. For scientists who embrace the traditional approach to research, 
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Morgan argues that the diversity challenges the legitimacy of what they know and creates 
many complicated problems in terms of theoretical conceptualisation and research 
techniques that need to be addressed. On the other hand, diversity provides opportunities for 
access to new perceptions that may change the way researchers view the nature of science 
and society by offering new structures of assumptions and new ways of understanding 
phenomena (Morgan, 1990). 
  
6.6.1 Censure of the Burrell and Morgan Approach 
 
The work of Burrell and Morgan (1979) has inspired a number of researchers in different 
ways (see Laughlin, 1995). However, as is common in philosophical pursuit, their work has 
not been immune to censure (Chua, 1986). Such criticisms have sometimes come with 
explicit alternative viewpoints (Chua, 1986; Laughlin, 1995; Blaikie, 1993). For example, 
Chua argues that: 
“Each tradition has had its champions, its followers and the critics and there has been 
the inevitable rise and fall in what has been regarded as fashionable approaches” (p. 
1). 
 
The Burrell and Morgan (two-dimensional) classification of social theory is viewed by some 
scholars as too simplistic (Hopper and Powell, 1985; Chua, 1986; Laughlin, 1995; Dhillon 
and Backhouse, 2001). For example, there is an argument that a wider range of alternative 
research perspectives such as post-modernist and feminist assumptions should have been 
integrated (Chua, 1986; Clair, 1999). Chua (1986) appears to downplay the assumptions 
made about the emancipation and autonomy of the individuals (Burrell and Morgan, 1979), 
and doubts the validity of the notion that individuals are influenced by the social 
environment. Deetz (1996) argues that while the grid makes research approaches more 
realistic, the magnitude of divergences is potentially confusing and may result in indisposed 
conflicts and discussions - particularly in current research orientations. Moreover, there are 
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limitations in terms of dimensions of contrast
145
. Dirsmith et al. (1985) explicitly point to 
problems they experienced in applying the regulation-radical change continuum to their 
research while Willmott (1993) critises the “sharpness and uncompromising character of the 
mutual exclusivity thesis” (p. 683). Despite the criticisms, the Burrell and Morgan grid has 
gained pervasive hegemony in modern discussions regarding the foundations of social 
science research and is widely used in the literature (Aldrich, 1992; Deetz, 1996; Goldspink, 
2000). 
 
6.7 Paradigmatic Location for the Present Study  
 
6.7.1   The Interpretive Paradigm 
The discussion in this section outlines the processes and thinking on which choices of 
paradigms and relationships are founded. According to Morgan (1980), the theoretical 
assumptions of qualitative research are consonant with the interpretative paradigm’s 
assumption that social reality is created and sustained through the subjective experience of 
those involved. Taking Burrell and Morgan’s proposal that a researcher can only be in one 
paradigm at a time
146
 the paradigm that underpins the present study is interpretive, 
embracing idealist ontological assumptions, a normative epistemology, voluntaristic human 
nature beliefs and an ideographic methodology.  
6.7.2   The Abstract Connotation - Accountability 
 
The extant literature, particularly in the Western context, assumes that accountability 
predicates good governance (see Keasey and Wright, 1993; McIntosh, 2002). However, 
based on the assumption that a world exists in a particular context, accountability defined as 
‘giving an account and being held to account’ (Schafer, 1999 p. 9) appears to exist within a 
particular context and is subject to different perceptions and interpretations. Notions of 
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Other philosophers claim that Burrell and Morgan’s approach is more inclined to sociological functionalism 
(Chua, 1986; Deetz, 1996; Alvesson and Deetz, 2000). 
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Although Chua (1986) has challenged this assertion.  
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accountability are not alien to Zambia; the concepts have existed (informally) throughout the 
history of the country in a unique social milieu. The challenge for such notions hinge on the 
extent to which they are allowed to critique and influence governance structures in the 
country. In the local set-up, such notions of accountability are normally expressed through 
the Ubuntu Philosophy touched on in Chapter Five. Though not succinctly defined, 
Kwamwangamulu and Nkonko (1999) describe Ubuntu as an African traditional value 
system seemingly at variance with Western values, or according to Binsbergen (2001), as an 
alternative to “extractive capitalism”. Critical reflection suggests that Ubuntu implies an 
accountability framework reflecting fundamental values of transparency, integrity, sharing 
and caring and which allows individuals to feel accountable to each other, principles of 
which delineate good governance. The contradiction in values is largely aligned with the 
broadened stakeholder approach (favoured by most African set-ups) and the principal-agent 
approach that dominates most Western countries, perhaps precisely because Ubuntu is 
culturally specific. However, while most authors argue against implementing corporate 
governance in its Western manifestations, (Boubakri et al., 2005; Wanyama et al., 2009; 
Fan, 2009), accountability appears to have escaped the filtering process which other 
‘imported’ Western concepts go through and poses less challenges in terms of its blanket 
unmodified application in most African societies. 
      
While the Ubuntu notion may have diverse interpretations, this discussion is centered on its 
theoretical and philosophical implications as regards accountability in the Zambian context. 
Ngcoya (2009) argues that the Ubuntu notion is underpinned by the importance of 
community, solidarity, caring, sharing and recognition that human potential can only be 
realised in partnership with others. According to Ngcoya, respect, hospitality, reciprocity, 
connectedness and interdependence are key ethical tools for a sustainable social order. 
Similarly, Ramose (2001) believes that Ubuntu is a fundamental ontological and 
 210 
epistemological classification in the beliefs of the Bantu speaking people
147
. In this instance, 
Ngubane (1979) contends that “Umuntu (the person) cannot exist of himself, by himself for 
himself; he comes from a social cluster and exists in a social cluster” (p. 64). This analogy is 
consistent with Munro and Hatherly (1993)’s approach to accountability which focuses on 
the willingness and ability to explain and justify one’s acts to self and others. 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter Five, the philosophy of Ubuntu, rooted as it is in African 
culture, value systems and beliefs, suggests a governance model for the efficient and 
effective management of organisations and communal resources. In an African context, and 
in Zambia in particular, the infusion of Ubuntu in the governance system, can arguably 
enhance accountability and good governance. The ideals of Ubuntu suggests that 
accountability should be inherent in governance structures, thereby preventing the abuse of 
power and ensuring that power is directed towards the attainment of good governance. 
While accountability (from the Western approach) and Ubuntu (based on the African 
conception) are key elements for any effective governance system intended to deliver 
meaningful development, both paradigms embrace a broad alignment of personal 
accountability (ethical) which is the cornerstone for other forms of accountability. In this 
context, Lynch (1999) argues that Ubuntu denotes and underpins ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ 
behaviour at an individual and organisational level. From a philosophical standpoint, the two 
theories are closely linked and are based fundamentally on giving an account and being held 
to account. Viewed in this context, Ubuntu provides a much broader significance for 
understanding contemporary accountability. However, the contested issue of how to deal 
with the controversies surrounding the blending of contemporary (Western) accountability 
and the ‘Buntu’ way of life remains problematical. In the context of accountability, current 
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While the Ubuntu philosophy emerged from South Africa, Bantu refers to a group of diverse languages 
spoken by hundreds of ethnic groups in Sub-Saharan Africa, stretching from Cameroon to Southern Africa 
indicating that the concept is not confined to the borders of South Africa.    
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thinking points to Ubuntu being highly influenced by Western notions. Notwithstanding this 
situation, the current thesis does not attempt to disentangle the dichotomies encompassing 
the two paradigms. Instead, it tries to demonstrate that in the absence of the contemporary 
notions of accountability that are today considered as drivers of good governance, informal 
traditional alternative philosophies and practices rooted in the cultural beliefs and traditions 
existing in most African societies including Zambia are central to any analysis of behaviour 
and perceptions therein. 
  
6.7.3   Rationale for Interpretive Research Positioning 
 
Interpretive positioning of social science research implies a belief that data alone do not 
speak for themselves, hence the need to be subjected to tacit quality control and judgement 
arrangements. Figure 6.5 illustrates the linkages underpinning the philosophical assumptions 
made here and how this approach is grounded in the interpretive paradigm, and the study’s 
empirical methods and research aims. In the context of the current study, the approach 
permits full consideration of the (often ignored) subjective and human components of 
inquiry regarding the governance and accountability problems encountered in Zambia’s 
development. The challenge for those charged with developing a corporate governance 
system that facilitates development in Zambia is framed by NEPAD and their vision for 
economic development across the African Union outlined earlier. While this aspiration 
remains unattainable in the majority of African nations, including Zambia, the interpretive 
methodological positioning adopted in the current study - linked to its accountability 
theoretical base - is used to try and attain a pervasive understanding of the key issues as 
perceived by the Zambian stakeholders themselves. As outlined in the previous chapter, 
accountability theory underpins the interpretations of empirical data obtained by the 
researcher. However, when the theoretical standpoint is allied to the interpretive approach, 
meaningful insights into how the social reality of corporate governance and development in 
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Zambia are related to one another are gained, by using the theory to underpin a functionalist 
methodology; it is more difficult to see how else such potential richness in the data could 
emerge. Put another way, the accountability theoretical foundation allows the empirical data 
collected from stakeholders in Zambia to be interpreted and given meaning in a social 
context when an interpretivist lens is employed. Such an approach is framed on the 
assumption that the world as it is known to individuals is essentially mind dependent, which 
implies in turn that claims about reality are justified with respect to the reality that 
stakeholders have conception of.  
 
The beliefs of the interpretive paradigm can be developed, as Ting-Toomey (1984) 
proposes, to cover three important aspects of qualitative research; first, as a symbolic 
discourse that consists of the study of texts and conversations; second, as a study of the 
interpretive principles that individuals use to make sense of their symbolic activities; and 
third, as a study of contextual principles such as the roles of participants, the physical 
context and a set of situational events that guide the interpretation of discourse. In adopting 
an interpretive approach and focusing on Ting-Toomey’s three contextual perspectives, the 
present study of corporate governance and development in Zambia should benefit from a 
more realistic feel of the world that cannot be fully experienced from the statistical analysis 
of numerical data common in the functionalist approach. The interpretive paradigm affords 
this researcher the chance to interact with the research subjects in their own language and on 
their own terms (Kirk and Miller, 1986). 
  
While alternative paradigms may be useful in a corporate governance and development 
study, they make different assumptions about reality. The interpretive paradigm in the 
context of this thesis focuses on a proper understanding of Zambian stakeholders’ perceived 
reality about effective corporate governance mechanisms’ role in securing the economic 
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interests of Zambian society. This goal is targeted by exploring the association between 
corporate governance and development. From the researcher’s experience as a Zambian, 
corporate governance is a relatively new concept in the country but, equally, societies’ 
demand for effective governance as well as responsible corporate and governmental 
behaviour (in the absence of effective institutions) entails a construction of reality such that 
the researcher needs to get close to the stakeholders, to interact and learn from them. In the 
context of the preceding discussion, the researcher’s role here is consistent with the current 
study’s philosophical position in that the interpretive posture dictates that the researcher and 
the researched are assumed to be interactively connected to create reality. Moreover, 
recognition of the two-directional nature of the research process is entirely consistent with 
the accountability notion which, as set out in the previous chapter, provides the study’s 
theoretical underpinning. The study attempts to explore corporate governance from an 
economic perspective, whereby the sensitivity and complexity of the phenomena are firmly 
rooted in their theoretical contexts. Given the study’s interpretive approach, the aim of 
understanding the world from a stakeholder perspective through lived experiences, ideas, 
feelings and attitudes coincides with the paradigm. As Hirschheim and Klein (1989) argue, 
assumptions surrounding the interpretive paradigm are underpinned by the subjective 
understanding that characterises people’s social situations. 
  
The current study’s conceptualisation of corporate governance as a broad notion that extends 
beyond the principal-agent relationship entails epistemological reasoning whereby the 
researcher and the researched influence each other in order to capture and interpret multiple 
realities. The ontological assumptions made indicate that in such a set-up realities are 
multiple, experienced differently, and are socially constructed. In this framework, the 
interpretive paradigm provides the conditions necessary to create and give meaning to the 
realities as well as to gain a more inclusive understanding of what stakeholders view as the 
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key issues surrounding corporate governance and development in Zambia; areas of both 
convergence and divergence can be captured in this way and generate a more complete and 
holistic picture of stakeholders’ perceptions (Martin, 2003). However, the broad focus and 
diversity of corporate governance in this instance are less concerned with locating the 
paradigm than with clarifying how the assumptions of the identified paradigm influence the 
study. 
 
The work of Burrell and Morgan has highlighted the basic assumptions (the ontological, 
epistemological, human nature and methodological perspectives) embedded within an 
interpretive paradigm of inquiry into subjective human experience and these are ideal for the 
research questions addressed in this thesis. There is also a growing trend in the usage of the 
interpretive phenomenology in generating knowledge regarding corporate governance, 
accountability and related topics and theories
148
. In addition, the interpretive approach offers 
researchers an opportunity to understand unique views and experiences as well as their 
meanings and environmental interactions. In this context, there is an assumption that human 
action is meaningful and should therefore be interpreted and understood within the context 
of broader social practices (Usher, 1996). Interpretive researchers are thus typically closer to 
the subjective notion of humans both contributing to and reflecting their social situations 
(Hirschheim and Klein, 1989); relevant knowledge is therefore most effectively obtained if 
it is observed in the context of the behaviour and actions of the individuals. Here, Cohen et 
al. (2004) argue that: 
“…humans actively construct their own meanings of situations; meaning arises out 
of social situations and it is handled through interpretive processes; behaviour and, 
thereby, data are socially situated, context-related, context-dependent and context-
rich (p. 137). 
 
According to Cohen et al., human behaviour is dominated by the influence of extant culture, 
attitudes, emotions, values, ethics and authority. An assumption was made in the present 
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For example, Dunne (2003); Wanyama (2006) and Bondamakara (2010). 
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study’s literature review that corporate governance in Africa is influenced (among other 
things) by cultural values and authority. These assumptions appear to fit well with those 
made regarding human behaviour, which Cohen et al. believe are compatible with the 
characteristics of the interpretive research paradigm.  
6.7.4   Summary of the Research Philosophy adopted for this Study 
Figure 6.5 illustrates the linkages between the research purpose, questions, theoretical 
context, philosophical assumptions and the methods adopted in the present study. As 
inspection of the figure highlights, the purpose of the study is to investigate stakeholder 
perceptions about the role of corporate governance in Zambia’s development. To achieve 
this, research questions have been developed that reflect the problem to be investigated and 
the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis. Research questions have been derived from past 
literature on corporate governance and development, Zambia’s background and the 
researcher’s own experience as a Zambian. According to Creswell (2005) establishing the 
research question(s) is a valuable act in terms of guiding the research process. King (2004) 
also argues that research questions are important in so far as locating the views of 
participants and making sense of their lives is concerned. Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2005) 
contend that research questions play a pivotal role in that they have the propensity to provide 
a framework for conducting the study, mark boundaries, drive the methods, dictate the type 
of research design, keep the researcher focused, guide data analysis techniques and stimulate 
research methods (Newman and Benz, 1998; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998).  
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Figure 6.5  Summary Research Philosophy Adopted for this Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The figure summarises the methodological underpinnings and methods adopted for the current study and 
sets them in the context of its broader philosophy and approach.   
Purpose: 
To investigate stakeholder perceptions about the role of corporate 
governance in Zambia’s development 
Research Question: To what extent do 
Zambians understand corporate governance as 
one of the conditions for development? 
 Derived from past literature on corporate 
governance and development and researcher’s 
experience as a Zambian.  
 
Interviews:  
Researcher listens to what people 
themselves say about their lived world 
Theoretical context: 
 Giving an account and being held to 
account 
 Accountability is viewed as affecting 
delivery at individual, corporate and 
national levels 
Questionnaires:  
Invaluable source in collecting data about 
behaviour, attitudes, values and personal 
experiences 
Methodology Human Nature 
Ideographic Voluntary Ant-positivism Nominalism 
Epistemology Ontology 
Methods: Research techniques that are 
in conformity with the research 
philosophy 
Interpretive Paradigm 
 Philosophical Assumptions 
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The authors further contend that to achieve the preceding aims, research questions should be 
well grounded in terms of theoretical positioning as well as the past literature and previous 
experience of the researcher (see King, 2004)
149
.  
 
Figure 6.5 further indicates that both the research questions and the theoretical perspective 
have a direct effect on the type of methodological assumptions made. In turn, the 
philosophical assumptions narrow down to a more appropriate paradigm that supports the 
research, including the way in which data will be collected and interpreted to achieve the 
study’s goals. The framework of accountability ties together the research questions, the 
methodological assumptions and the findings. In particular, accountability theory employed 
in an interpretivist manner points to specific research issues as well as implying the need for 
a (wide) stakeholder-based approach. More generally, the reasoning adopted here is that an 
accountability framework allied to an interpretive methodology serves the function of 
binding together knowledge and providing a framework upon which it can be knowable. 
However, Maanen et al. (2007) argues that theories without methodological implications are 
of inconsiderable relevance. These authors further assume that theoretical underpinning and 
methods are highly interrelated, as methods generate meaningful data
150
; however, they 
acknowledge that while there is a presumed interplay between the two, alliance is not 
straightforwardly conceptualised and hence gives rise to a source of debate among 
researchers. In the context of this study, the relevant implication is that interviews and 
questionnaires are best inter-laced with the help of (accountability) theoretical substance.  
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King argues that research questions should be located in the aims, theoretical framework and philosophical 
position of the research.   
150
“method can generate and shape theory, just as theory can generate and shape method” (Maanen et al., 2007  
p. 1146). 
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6.8    Methods 
 
The focus of this section is on outlining how the underlying methodological assumptions of 
the interpretive research paradigm adopted for the present study - and the characteristics of 
the specific research questions - influence the choice of methods. The thesis’s basic 
methodological assumptions regarding the nature of science and society have been discussed 
in previous sections, and so the present discussion drills down to the selection of research 
techniques that conform to the paradigm in which the research is located. The term ‘research 
method’ relates to any specific technique used in social science research to collect data 
(Bryman, 2001). Investigating the perceived role of corporate governance in Zambia’s 
development necessitates the collection of data from stakeholders in the process. To achieve 
this aim, identifying the most appropriate empirical methods is critical. While research 
methodology is primarily concerned with the philosophical questions about how research 
should be conducted, research methods are the techniques and procedures that are used to 
obtain and analyse data (Saunders et al., 2009). The aim of this section is not to give a 
detailed account of each method in terms of its merits and demerits, but rather to explain 
how they fit with this study’s theoretical and methodological positioning as data collection 
tools in gathering knowledge about corporate governance and development in Zambia. 
  
6.8.1 Data Collection  
 
Beiske (2002) notes that large numbers of data collection methods are available to any 
modern research in interpretive study. These methods range from questionnaires, 
observations and interviews through to case studies. Given this thesis’s interpretive 
approach, it emphases two data collection methods, interviews and questionnaires. Although 
Arnon and Reichel (2009) acknowledge that a mixed methods approach in a single study 
may raise problems of conflict between the techniques adopted, Creswell and Clark (2007) 
argue that the combination of two data collection methods in the same study is no longer a 
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matter of dispute, but is instead an acceptable approach to investigation
151
. While one 
approach may be adequate, Gillham (2000) argues that the multi-method approach to 
research is essential and gives greater authority to the findings, especially if the results of 
different methods fit together. The combining of different methods has the advantage of 
technique complementation (Beiske, 2002; Saunders et al., 2007); for example, the potential 
limitations in depth of questionnaires can be addressed appropriately by structured 
interviews
152
. The mixed-method approach adopted for the present study adds reliability to 
the data collected because the same phenomena are examined using two different research 
methods. By drawing on the strength of each other, Bryman (1988) posits that a two-method 
approach has the propensity to provide a more complete picture of a phenomenon. Similarly, 
Harris and Brown (2010) note that questionnaires surveys and semi-structured interviews are 
often employed to produce corroborative results irrespective of differences in methods of 
data collection, analysis and interpretation (see Denzin, 1970). 
 
6.8.2 Rationale Underlying Simultaneous use of Interviews and Questionnaires 
 
Data collection can be undertaken through the use of a single method or a mixed-methods 
approach. In this regard, the current study employs the latter, specifically semi-structured 
interviews and a questionnaire survey. While some researchers prefer to start with 
questionnaires before conducting interviews (Mushayikwa, 2006; Moscovici, 2008) others 
favour the reverse (Jarratt, 1996) - with some studies settling for a simultaneous approach 
(for example, Hart et al., 1992; Arnon and Reichel, 2009). In the current study, the 
interviews and questionnaire were conducted simultaneously. This choice was largely 
practical; both the study period and the scholarship budget did not provide for the time 
extension and extra budget that would have permitted sequential field work in Zambia. 
                                                          
151
To this effect Denzin (2010) notes that a ‘Journal of Mixed Methods Research’ devoted to publications 
adopting this approach has been established. 
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Jick (1983) also argues that weaknesses in one method are counter-balanced by the strengths of another. 
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However, as Jarratt (1996) argues, the extant literature on methodology provides little clear 
guidance on the “best” mode of method integration. Similarly, Creswell (2003) affirms that 
mixed-method research can be administered sequentially or simultaneously with no 
restriction in terms of order. Equally, Flick (2002) posits that the order of integrating two 
different methods remains unresolved in terms of whether it has to be a ‘one-after-the-other’ 
or a ‘side-by-side’ approach. As regards order, Palinkas and Soydan (2012) contend that 
whether used simultaneously or in sequence the complementarity substance is not 
disoriented. 
  
6.9  Interviews 
The interpretive paradigm has been explained as the philosophical context for the present 
study, with the associated ontological assumption that reality is created by one’s 
consciousness (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Siau and Rossi, 2011). In this context, interviews 
facilitate the interaction and capturing of stakeholders’ views regarding corporate 
governance in relation to their own experiences and perceptions of how it impacts on 
Zambia’s development. Lofland and Lofland (1996) suggest that in order to acquire social 
knowledge (i.e. knowledge relating to human activities, concepts and ways of ‘being’ social) 
the inquirer must get as far inside the mind of other human beings as possible. In this sense, 
the research is not viewed as an abstract notion, but instead involves interactions with others 
and understanding of the way in which actors make the world meaningful in their own terms 
(see Krauss, 2005). Epistemologically, the inquirer and the inquired are interconnected (Al 
Zeera, 2001) co-creating the knower and the known (Krauss, 2005). These assimilated 
paradigmatical notions coalesce here to generate a study of the characteristics of corporate 
governance and its impact on Zambia’s development that is holistic in nature. Similarly, 
Kvale (1996) states that:  
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“If you want to know how people understand their world and their life, why not talk 
with them? In an interview conversation, the researcher listens to what people 
themselves tell about their lived world, hears them express their views and opinions 
in their own words, learns about their views on their work situation and family life, 
their dreams and hopes” (p. 1). 
 
For Kvale, the role of interviews is as a tool to understand the world from the subject’s point 
of view and thereby uncover the meaning of people’s experiences
153
. Interviews have 
increasingly been used as a research method in social sciences (Kvale, 1996); in particular in 
corporate governance related research (Solomon, 2010). Scholars argue that interviews 
enrich the conception of knowledge (Kvale, 1996). 
 
The outcome of the interviews in this study will be a narrative account of the stakeholder 
interviewees’ knowledge and experiences relating to corporate governance and development 
in Zambia. The selection of individuals to be interviewed was based on the nature of the 
stakeholder’s involvement in the governance process, the extent of their association with the 
corporate governance change process in Zambia, their perceived degree of commitment in 
the development process and, finally, their willingness to participate in the research. It is 
hoped that the account which emerges will provide detailed understanding and explanations 
of the interviewees’ subjective experiences, which will then be analysed to identify common 
themes and viewpoints. Once common themes are identified, generalised description is 
attainable; in this context, Husserl (1970) contends that because human beings are to a large 
extent influenced by perceptions of what is real, to understand human motivation subjective 
information is critical. 
  
Interviews are commonly used in the context of inquiries involving stakeholder’s 
perceptions that constitute a research site, and have remained a lead research method in this 
field. Given the methodological assumptions underpinning this study, a semi-structured 
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Kvale (1996) refers to qualitative research interview as a construction site of knowledge. “An interview is 
literally inter view, an interchange of views between two persons conversing about a theme of mutual 
interest” (p. 2). 
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interview method was employed
154
. Questions were specified and the interviewer sought 
more elaboration from the interviewees as a way of enhancing the quality of data. The 
interviews were conducted over a period of two and half months, (1
st
 May 2011 to 19
th
 July 
2011) during which 24 interviews were conducted with individuals from different 
backgrounds and sectors. The design of the interviews was intended to focus on the 
corporate governance landscape and its perceived role in Zambia’s development from the 
perspectives of various key stakeholders within the country. As noted earlier, the topic of the 
present study is twofold, i.e. the extent nature of the country’s corporate governance profile 
and the perceived association between the latter and economic development. For clarity and 
for academic convenience, the interpretations of the interview findings are divided into two 
chapters - Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight. As the first detailed research of this kind in 
Zambia, participants appeared to find the topic not only interesting but relevant to Zambia’s 
economic performance and development. In this context, most interviewees were only 
restricted by time and not ideas. For example, one participant (C01), a senior academician 
interviewed at his residence remarked that “I wish we had the whole day just discussing 
corporate governance and development in Zambia.” The interviewer ended up with large 
bodies of evidence and the split into two chapters was influenced by much of this appearing 
to be both useful and directly relevant to the study. In order to capture the novelty of the 
participant’s views, a systematic review of evidence from all participants was the inevitable 
option. Chapter Seven therefore focuses on findings concerning extant corporate governance 
in Zambia while Chapter Eight concentrates on the association with development as well as 
exploring the perceived importance of accountability to the matters being discussed. 
   
The interviewees were identified in order to facilitate a diversified stakeholder perspective. 
In order for the interviewees to contribute to corporate governance research effectively, the 
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A copy of the semi-structured interviews guiding questions is included in Appendix 6.1  
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selection process was based on capturing individuals with knowledge and experience 
relevant to the subject. To achieve this aim, interviewee selection was broad-based, 
including people from various stakeholder groups such as: members of the Institute of 
Directors of Zambia (IODZ); researchers and academicians; the Government; Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs); the Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE); Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs) from the private and public sectors; regulators; governance consultants; 
international organisations; the National Assembly; multinational companies and 
individuals. Details of the final sample of 24 interviewees are given in Table 6.1 below. 
Table 6.1  The Interviewees 
 Interviewee Sector Interviewee code Experience 
1 Researcher/ Lecturer Academician C01 25 years 
2 Executive Director NGO C02 12 years 
3 Executive Management IODZ C03 8 years 
4 World Bank World Bank C04 15 years 
5 CEO Lusaka Stock Exchange C05 4 years 
6 Executive Director NGO C06 21 years 
7 Executive Management Zambia Business Forum C07 20 years 
8 Executive Director Parastatal Organisation C08 16 years 
9 Past IODZ President Governance Consultant C09 30 years 
10 C.E.O Multinational C10 18 years 
11 IODZ IODZ C11 20 years 
12 Management Government Agency C12 15 years 
13 Executive Director Regulator C13 23 years 
14 Senior Economist Africa Development Bank C14 7 years 
15 Executive Management Economic Commission for Africa C15 30 years 
16 Senior Auditor Office of the Auditor General C16 6 years 
17 Executive Management Private Sector C17 20 years 
18 President IODZ C18 29 years 
19 Researcher/ Lecturer Academician C19 35 years 
20 Economic Committee - Chair  National Assembly C20 24 years 
21 Chairperson - PSDA Consultant, Businessman C21 22 years 
22 Consultant Research and consultancy C22 43 years 
23 Consultant Governance Consultant C23 39 years 
24 Researcher/ Lecturer Academician C24 20 years 
 
Note: The table provides details of the interviewees taking part in the study. The table does not disclose the 
names of individual participants as they were guaranteed anonymity.  
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6.10      The Interview Process and Challenges Encountered 
6.10.1     The Interview Process 
This section highlights the process adopted and problems encountered in conducting the 
semi-structured interviews in Zambia. Based on the literature review, the theoretical 
framework and philosophical assumptions, (see Chapters Three, Four, Five, and Six) three 
sets of questions were developed to answer the research questions of this study: one set 
targeting interviewees in government, its spending agents and SOEs; another focusing on the 
private sector and the LuSE; and a third for NGOs and all other stakeholders not captured in 
the first two categories. Although there are close to 73 languages spoken in Zambia, English 
is the recognised official language particularly in schools and for business purposes (see 
Chapter Two) and as such all the interviews were conducted in English. Confidentiality was 
always reassured in terms of identity and the use of data. The first set of the questions in all 
three categories centred on detecting interviewees’ knowledge of the subject and how they 
viewed the current corporate governance situation in Zambia. This section of interviews was 
arguably the most straightforward and so was undertaken at the start to allow the 
participants to relax into the discussions. The second part focused on the interviewees’ 
perception of corporate governance’s role in Zambia’s development while, given the 
theoretical underpinning of the study, the last part investigated the role played by 
accountability in the participants’ view of governance and development.   
 
The process itself involved identifying potential interviewees, obtaining contact numbers, 
making appointments, arranging interview meeting places, digital voice recording of 
questions and answers, the interview itself and the interviewee filling out a form in terms of 
organisation, position, role, education, qualification and experience. A word of appreciation 
was also given at the end of each session for the interviewees’ commitment. Appointments 
were then arranged with the selected interviewees personally or by phone. Interviews were 
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conducted at times and areas preferred by interviewees. Most of the interviews were 
conducted in interviewees’ official working offices as a way of creating confidence; 
however, one interview was conducted in a garage while mechanics were repairing the 
interviewee’s vehicle and another one was conducted after hours at the interviewee’s 
residence. Two interviewees preferred to be interviewed at 07:00 hours in the morning 
before people started reporting for work. The face-to-face interview duration averaged 1 
hour with the shortest being 30 minutes at a highly sensitive government office where both 
the interviewer and interviewee were watchful and conservative. None of the interviewees 
objected to having the discussions recorded and their particulars matriculated. However, 
four of the interviewees did not want certain parts of the interview to be taped because of 
‘security’ concerns. Three-quarters of the interviewees showed interest in the outcome of 
this research. For completeness and systematic order, the wording of questions was tailored 
according to the sector the interviewee was representing.  
 
6.10.2   Specific Interview Challenges 
Interviews in Africa, a continent which suffers from serious governance and accountability 
deficits (World Bank, 1989; Amoako, 2003; Rossouw, 2005; Wanyama et al., 2009) are 
assuredly problematic because they are generally treated with suspicion and caution by 
potential interviewees (Akokpari, 2004; Ayittey, 2010). Worse still, in the present case, the 
interviews were conducted during the period when the relationship between the Zambian 
government and some key donors was lukewarm, as some of the latter were withholding 
funds over governance - and accountability-related issues. This was further complicated by 
the fact that interviews were conducted just two months before highly competitive 
presidential, parliamentary and local government elections. Political campaigns during this 
period mostly centred on governance, accountability and corruption. As such, in some 
quarters, there was a misrepresentation that the researcher was probing these and other 
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related issues on behalf of the Western countries’ sponsored donors that had been 
spearheading attempts to improve governance and accountability around foreign assistance 
to Zambia. As opposition parties and most NGOs articulated these issues, the government 
viewed anyone holding discussions or making reference to governance as supporting the 
opposing camps and, hence, as unwelcome in government corridors. Equally, on the 
opposing camp, some potential interviewees expressed scepticism; the notion of “are you 
with us or with them?” was evident here. NGOs too were divided between pro-government 
and others. This heterogeneity made the whole process of dealing with stakeholders even 
more complex as each faction had its own reservations. However, individuals not connected 
to these camps and those representing the private sector were never hostile to the extent of 
refusing an interview.  
 
6.10.3   Interview Appointments 
Although the identification of interviewees was relatively easy, several of those who agreed 
to take part changed their minds at the last minute. In other cases it turned out to be a very 
difficult process as the researcher had to go through third parties such as security check 
points, personal assistants and office secretaries; this was the norm in government 
ministries, SOEs, private and large multinational companies where potential interviewees 
did not actually turn up for interviews. It was sometimes due to time factors, while others 
just changed their minds and/or kept shifting the appointment dates. For example, a potential 
Chinese interviewee whom the researcher had a useful conversation with on the phone in 
English viewed everything with suspicion and scepticism and turned down the appointment 
on the pretext that he did not understand the English language. Other potential interviewees 
just disappeared with their contact details. In contrast however, some appointments were 
made and interviews conducted at short notice. 
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6.10.4   Government and Government Departments  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, making an appointment and later conducting an 
interview with government officials was the most difficult part of the fieldwork in Zambia. 
Attempts were made to interview the Minister of Commerce and Trade and the Permanent 
Secretary in the same Ministry, as well as one of the Deputy Ministers of Finance, one of the 
Directors in the same Ministry, the Secretary to the Cabinet, officials in the Ministry of 
Justice under which the governance secretariat is housed and also the focal point for the 
APRM, five SOEs and four government spending agencies. In most cases these efforts 
proved futile despite assurances that the study was being conducted on an anonymous basis. 
The apprehension and fear seemed to be real in government departments; a number of 
potential interviewees cited the politically-sensitive nature of governance - accountability - 
and corruption-related issues in the country as an impediment. Nevertheless, through the 
Clerk of the National Assembly, the researcher was granted access to members of 
parliament. Out of the five members that were contacted, only one Member of Parliament 
turned up for an interview. Government officials who showed interest in interviews 
preferred to be interviewed in their individual capacities and at locations that had nothing to 
do with government. One potential interviewee from government declared that: 
“Issues of governance in general, corporate governance, corruption, accountability 
and transparency are not normally discussed openly in government circles because 
they are viewed as too political and therefore anyone talking about such issues 
negatively are looked at as biting the finger that feeds them. So we are constrained 
because either you keep quiet or you say good things even when you know deep 
down in your heart that things are not alright. If you say anything perceived to be 
negative on these controversial issues, you are immediately linked to the party in 
opposition and you do not support government programmes. This can see you out of 
employment, so our hands are tied.” 
  
This comment gave the researcher the impression that such individuals were keen in 
principle to participate in the interviews but the system did not permit them to do so freely. 
In a twist of events, an SOE manager declined to be interviewed and instead started 
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interviewing the researcher. Notwithstanding these difficulties, those who were interviewed 
expressed their appreciation that a study was being conducted on corporate governance and 
development in a Zambian context.  
 
6.11 Questionnaires 
 
The use of questionnaires as a data collection method has been common in most aspects of 
social science research for many years (Kotzab, 2005). Similarly, Oppenheim (1998) 
maintains that the great popularity of questionnaires in social science research remains 
unabated. Zicmund (2000), De Vaus (2002) and Bless and Higson-Smith (1995) define a 
questionnaire as a “set of questions with fixed wording and sequence of presentation, as well 
as more or less precise indications of how to answer each question” (p.107). As a social 
science research method, questionnaires allow the researcher to collect useful data at a 
reduced cost and are relatively straight-forward from a respondent point of view (Seale and 
Bernard, 1998; Beiske, 2002). While Chesson (1993) warns researchers about the 
complexity in the questionnaire construction process, with a high demand on researcher 
time, Dörnyei and Taguchi (2010) argue that the propensity to capture factual, behavioural 
(i.e. people’s actions, lifestyles, habits and personal history) and attitudinal (i.e. attitudes, 
opinions, beliefs, interests and values) data from respondents merit the employment of 
questionnaires. This characteristic fits well with the interpretive paradigm, whereby relevant 
knowledge is assumed to be obtainable if it is observed in the context of the behaviour and 
actions of individuals. Human behaviour is influenced by culture, attitudes, emotions, 
values, ethics and authority (see Cohen et al., 2004). The interpretive research paradigm’s 
assumptions are framed on the belief that individual participants or stakeholders construct 
their knowledge based on their personal beliefs and experiences in society; the implication 
for epistemology, as argued by Usher (1996), is that human actions have to be interpreted 
and understood within the context of social practices. The aim of the questionnaire used in 
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this study is the capture of information about stakeholders’ beliefs regarding corporate 
governance (including its implications for development in Zambia), with the views 
expressed reflecting the individuals’ personal experiences and societal circumstances. 
  
The questionnaire survey used in the present study is divided into two sections. The first 
section aims to extract information on participating stakeholders’ knowledge of corporate 
governance while the second section is intended to elicit information on participants’ beliefs 
about corporate governance and its implication for development in Zambia. Although the 
questionnaire method is qualitative in nature, a limited degree of quantitative analysis will 
be used in interpreting the results. Miles and Huberman (1974) contend that in qualitative 
studies, researchers are allowed “to use small samples of people nested in their context and 
studied in depth” (p. 27). Despite their limitations, Kotzab (2005) argues that questionnaires 
are highly suitable for, and widely used in, prescriptive research (see Saunders et al., 2007). 
  
6.11.1   Questionnaire Design
155
 
Undeterred by the mixed views in the prior literature regarding how many questions should 
be contained in a questionnaire, Gillham (2000) maintains that other things being equal it 
should be as short as possible. This thinking influenced the design here, although all 
questions were carefully laid out to attempt to ensure that each participator would 
understand them in the same way. According to Collis and Hussey (2009) this is a key 
requirement for a questionnaire survey. The questionnaires were pre-tested for structure, 
suitability of scale, replicability and validity by circulating them within the School of 
Business at the University of Dundee; accordingly, adjustments were made before the actual 
survey was conducted. Although it is almost impossible to eliminate all misunderstandings 
in a questionnaire (Gillham, 2000), pre-testing is a means of detecting faults, ambiguity and 
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A copy of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix 6.2  
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misleading questions before the survey document is actually administered (Williams, 2003; 
Proctor, 2005). Gillham (2000) points out that questionnaires can contain open or closed 
questions; a closed question is one that is accompanied by pre-determined answers, with a 
respondent having a choice of selecting one from a range, or requiring ranking of specified 
factors, whereas open questionnaires contain questions that require respondents to write 
answers as they see fit. Closed questionnaires are relatively easy to administer as they do not 
need the researcher’s presence at the time of filling in (Collis and Hussey, 2009). Although 
closed questionnaires are generally easier to code and analyse, Gillham (2000) contends that 
the originality and discovery elements are affected negatively by the range of possible 
answers that come with them. For closed questionnaires, answers can be as simple as 
choosing between yes and no or selecting a position on the ‘agree - disagree’ continuum. 
Gillham (2000) argues that open questionnaires maintain originality and can lead to greater 
discovery. Given the array of advantages that accrue to closed questionnaires such as time, 
cost, self-administration, respondents’ anonymity, standardisation of questions and easy to 
analyse, the current study employs a closed questionnaire survey approach. However, the 
last part of the survey document offers respondents the opportunity to add information 
relating to the topic that they thought was important, but had not been addressed elsewhere. 
6.11.2   Questionnaire Administration 
Questionnaires were distributed to participants drawn from various diverse stakeholder 
groups on the basis of likely interest in the research topic. Nonetheless, the questionnaire 
distribution process was not straight-forward because, as it is common with most 
questionnaire surveys, participation depends to a large extent on the willingness of 
participators. Williams (2003) argues that if the topics embodied in a questionnaire are 
relevant and of interest to them, stakeholders get excited and this enhances the response rate. 
Buying into Williams’ view, participant selection was influenced by such characteristics; 
 231 
this method is referred to as ‘judgement-based’ or ‘purposive sampling’ (Coviello and Jones, 
2004). Williams (2003) maintains that the approach to questionnaire administration is likely 
to influence the response rate and the quality of data collected; similarly, Gallhofer and Saris 
(2007) contend that the selection of respondents must be conducted in a way that does not 
influence the results. While the researcher bias can occur under purposive sampling, it is 
intended that the approach would not in any way influence the results or subdue 
representativeness in terms of incorporating diverse stakeholder experiences. Though costly 
and time consuming, most of the questionnaires were distributed and collected back 
personally by the researcher although a small number were received by post or e-mail.  
The issues of anonymity and confidentiality were made clear to all respondents through an 
accompanying introductory letter referring to the University of Dundee (see Appendices 6.3 
and 6.4). The assurance of anonymity was enhanced by making demographic information 
optional. Non-traceability by not using the names of participants or any other personal 
means of identification proved to be a crucial factor for government and SOEs’ employees 
in particular. Confidentiality and anonymity of participants’ identities is widely recognised 
as being important in research (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992). This is in line 
with Collis and Hussey (2009)’s view who noted that respondent confidence in anonymity 
enhances questionnaire response rates. Other participants’ identities were concealed through 
the use of codes. 
 
6.11.3   Reliability and Validity 
Reliability is the extent to which the measure gives consistent results under identical 
conditions, while validity is anchored on the accurateness of the measure (Gillham, 2000; 
William, 2003; Cohen et al., 2007). Cohen et al. (2007) maintains that the two notions are 
conceptually different; for example, reliability does not imply validity. Cohen et al. argue 
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that a reliable measure records phenomena consistently, but does not necessarily measures 
what it is supposed to. In this context, it can be deduced that reliability is related to precision 
while validity is concerned with accuracy. William (2003) ends that data collected through 
questionnaires must be valid and reliable if they are to produce quality results. Similarly, 
Gillham (2000) points out that because most respondents are assumed to handle 
questionnaires without much thought, questionnaire data pose quality problems. 
Accordingly, Williams (2003) applauds a view that for the data collected through a 
questionnaire to be intelligible, the testing of both validity and reliability of the measures 
used is paramount. In line with the preceding argument, Cohen et al. (2007) argues that there 
are various classifications of validity and reliability and a complete eradication of either is 
effectively impossible. As the present research is located in the interpretive paradigm, not all 
types of validity and reliability assumptions are relevant. For the purpose of this research, 
reliability is treated as dealing with the consistency of the measures and findings (see 
Bryman and Bell, 2007) while validity is concerned with the requirement that the measures 
employed measure what they purport to measure (see Cohen et al., 2007). Williams (2003) 
states that: “A questionnaire can be said to be ‘valid’ if it examines the full scope of the 
research question(s) in a balanced way, i.e. it measures what it aims to measure” (p. 249). 
Proctor (2005) refers to reliability as the “consistency in reaching the same results when the 
measurement is made over and over again… while validity is the degree to which the 
questions measure what it is supposed to be measuring” (p. 208) (see Collis and Hussey, 
2009; Field, 2009). Proctor (2005) points to questionnaire pre-testing as one way of 
enhancing reliability. Other ways of enhancing reliability and validity include: ‘thoughtful’ 
sampling, appropriate measures and mindfulness of validity and reliability throughout the 
research process (Cohen et al. 2007). Correspondingly, in order to minimise invalidity, 
certain measures were taken into account here, these include: honesty, richness and scope 
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and the objectivity of the researcher. The interview process allowed for an expansive and 
detailed scope without being pressurised by pre-arranged categories of analysis, thereby 
providing depth, openness and detail of qualitative analysis as a complement to the 
questionnaire findings.  
 
6.11.4   Coding 
  
To expedite the analysis process, it is common for questionnaire data to be organised into 
useful classifications, a scheme called ‘coding’ (Williams, 2003). Coding facilitates the 
entering of data directly into data analysis programmes such as Mintab or SPSS. Williams 
suggests that the SPSS is a useful software package for questionnaire surveys because it is 
flexible and easy to use. As explained above, the demographic data was analysed into 
sectors for purposes of this study while the thematic questions were coded according to 
themes, question number and sub-questions or statements. For example, the code ‘CGQ5A’ 
stands for corporate governance (CG theme), question 5 (Q5) and sub-question (A). The 
analysis in this case shows the respondent classification (PVT, SOE, GG, NGO, OS)
156
 
followed by the respondent’s choice on the Likert scale for individual questions. After the 
coding of responses the data was input into the SPSS programme for analysis. The range of 
possible answers were given in a closed-end questionnaire arrangement; the analysis 
therefore focused on finding out which answers were selected and in what order and also on 
detecting possible relationships or patterns in the way respondents answered. Although 
closed-end questionnaires lack the element of discovery and originality - “unless there is a 
very unexpected pattern to the answers selected” - (Gillham 2000, p. 2) as a complementary 
method, Gillham argues that the analysis is not sophisticated as only frequencies and trends 
need to be discovered. It is unsurprising therefore, that the majority of published analyses 
are based on discovering relationships and trends across demographic groupings. 
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 PVT = private sector; SOE = State-Owned Enterprises; GG = Government and spending agencies; NGO = 
Non-Governmental Organisations; OS = Other Stakeholders. 
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6.12 The Co-Relationship: Semi-Structured Interviews and Questionnaires 
 
As noted above, semi-structured interviews and questionnaires complement each other via 
their varied strengths and weaknesses. Interviews, by their very nature, are not designed to 
cover a wider spectrum of potential participators hence the need to employ a questionnaire 
survey that has the propensity to over-ride this limitation. Kratochwill et al. (1999) and 
Busse and Beaver (2000) contend that semi-structured interviews are modifiable and flexible 
as probing - through follow-up or rephrased questions seeking clarification or further 
explanation - can be used to clarify ambiguity in interviewee response. This is an advantage 
over a questionnaire survey where misinterpretations on both sides cannot be corrected 
because they are usually left with respondents to be completed at their own convenience. 
Apart from the complexity in construction, other questionnaire drawbacks in practice can 
include low response rates (Seale and Bernard, 1998; Bell, 1999), a lack of follow-up 
questions, poor clarity of issues (Beiske, 2002; Bell, 1999), inappropriate use of open-ended 
questions and underlying rationales for the outcomes that are not fully explained (Saunders 
et al., 2007). The other demerit of questionnaires is that they do not normally uncover new 
ideas as the researcher determines the questions that are asked and also determines the range 
of answers that can be given. On the other hand, Genesee and Upshur (1996) note that 
questionnaires have an advantage relative to interviews as they can be administered 
simultaneously to many respondents, whereas interviews require that each interviewee take 
part individually. The authors further point out that while interviews can be conducted with 
interviewees who cannot read or write, questionnaire respondents must be literate. The 
current study is based on collecting data relating to stakeholders’ perceptions about the 
association between corporate governance and development in Zambia. To achieve these 
aims, interviewees should obviously be allowed to communicate as freely as possible their 
detailed experiences of human life. In this context, Ohman (2005) argues that 
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questionnaires, by their very nature, are usually too ‘confined’ in terms of revealing broad 
stakeholder thoughts and experiences; as a consequence, interviews are required as a 
complement to surveys as they generate rich data covering stakeholders’ perceptions, 
feelings, experiences, motives, attitudes and knowledge. 
  
The discussion above suggests that, despite the cost implications, semi-structured interviews 
allow relatively great depth and understanding of the issues concerned, thereby 
complementing the (usually) cost-effective questionnaire instrument’s limitations in terms of 
the pre-determined range of answers that respondents choose from. The strengths and 
limitations of both methods indicate that the two can be most effective when employed in 
conjunction with one another. Correspondingly, Bergman (2008) points to mixed-methods 
research design recently seeing a sharp increase in popularity. The fundamental view that 
semi-structured interviews and questionnaires are complementary and not mutually 
exclusive supports their legitimacy and popular use.  
 
6.13  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined in detail the methodological assumptions guiding this study. While 
there are various methodological positions available to social science researchers, the 
present study adopts an interpretive paradigm and the (concealed) set of basic assumptions 
associated with it. The interpretive paradigm creates a conceptual framework within which 
the ontological, epistemological, human nature-related and methodological assumptions 
regarding corporate governance and development can be investigated in a meaningful way; 
this approach blends in well with the present study’s theoretical foundations outlined in the 
previous chapter. As the study investigates stakeholders’ perceptions relating to corporate 
governance and its role in Zambia’s development, interviews and questionnaires are the data 
collection methods considered most likely to be effective in gathering the data needed to 
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address the research questions posed. Exploration and insight rather than experiment is the 
emphasis for data collected and analysed in an interpretive research paradigm anchored on 
the assumption that the social world is created by individuals. In this context, questions that 
deal with understanding phenomena in terms of ‘how’ and ‘why’ can be better addressed by 
interpretive research endeavour. Having outlined the extant literature, theory and 
methodology relevant to the present study, the emphasis now shifts to the empirical results. 
To this end, the next chapter focuses on the analysis of the interview results.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
INTERVIEWS: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ZAMBIA 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This study set out with the aim of assessing the significance and implications of corporate 
governance for Zambia’s development in a broad accountability framework; prior studies 
including (Oman, 2003; Siddiqui, 2010) have noted the particular importance of corporate 
governance for developing nations. Given the detailed and fulsome responses made by the 
interviewees, a decision was taken to present the interview findings in two chapters; views 
regarding the broad notion of governance are outlined in the current chapter and the 
perceived linkage to development is discussed in the next. The rest of this chapter therefore 
outlines the main themes relating to corporate governance experiences that emerged during 
the interviews. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 7.2 focuses on Zambia’s 
corporate governance experience, covering government, public and private sector 
viewpoints; Section 7.3 then considers corporate governance definitions and implications for 
the Zambian environment before Section 7.4 deals with outside influences on local corporate 
governance codes and principles. Section 7.5 is concerned with corporate governance 
compliance in Zambia, while Section 7.6 analyses the forces behind corporate governance 
reforms in Zambia. Section 7.7 concludes the chapter by summarising and reflecting on the 
key findings. 
 
7.2 The Corporate Governance Experience in Zambia 
7.2.1    Governance in Zambia  
As noted earlier in this thesis, the notion of corporate governance has gathered worldwide 
importance over the past twenty years yet the great majority of interviewees suggested that 
in Zambia the concept remains relatively new and, as such, a great majority of Zambians 
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lack meaningful awareness and understanding of its implications for corporations, the 
people and the economic well-being of the country. This finding is consistent with the 
literature review and those of the APRM Zambia Country Self-Assessment Report (2010) 
(see Chapter Four for details on this report). Typical of the views in this regard, interviewee 
C03 articulated that:  
“Corporate governance in Zambia is a green field and a lot needs to be done because 
there are people that are not even aware that there is a thing such as corporate 
governance. For those that have an idea when you talk of corporate governance they 
tend to associate it with corporations and not that every entity is covered under 
corporate governance” 
 
Indeed, an extensive corporate governance literature on Africa locates this deficiency in 
most African countries
157
. However, as an area under intense external scrutiny in so far as it 
relates to foreign aid, the corporate governance landscape is beginning to change, with 
sustained internal pressure mounting across different sectors of the Zambian economy 
(Zambia Country Self-Assessment Report, 2010). With the establishment of the Institute of 
Directors of Zambia (IODZ) as noted by interviewees (C03, C05 and C12) and the corporate 
governance developments taking place both in and outside the country (mentioned by C05, 
C09 and C12) the concept has (according to interviewees C11 and C12 as well) started 
gaining considerable recognition. To this effect, interviewee C09, past President of the 
IODZ, highlighted that tremendous work has been done since its inception in 2000, 
declaring that:  
“We have started a process in our country and we can point to some gains that we 
have achieved in this area. From the late 1990s to date, much has been done but 
much more needs to be done. In particular the government, being a key stakeholder, 
is an area where things are still in a very bad shape. The government has ratified a 
number of international standards on corporate governance, but they do not seem to 
have use for them. Equally, corporate governance has not moved at a fast pace 
particularly in government-controlled enterprises.” 
 
                                                          
157
Zagoub (2011) found similar responses in another African country – Libya.  
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Interviewee C09 appears to suggest that, despite the proliferation of numerous corporate 
governance standards, sharp variances exist between practice and reality. Nonetheless, in 
recognition of, and in line with, current corporate governance developments interviewee 
C23, a governance consultant, pointed to: the establishment of a governance secretariat - 
with a corporate governance annex - by the Zambian government; the introduction of the 
IODZ and the consequential creation of three sets of local corporate governance guidelines 
as evidence of a significant shift in attitudes amongst Zambian authorities.  
7.2.2   Corporate Governance Scope 
As discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, the modern Zambian economy is copper-centric, 
with mining companies continuing to account for over 70% of total export earnings. The 
economic reforms of 1991 focused on relaxing the government’s dominant control of certain 
major firms and saw the state surrendering a number of enterprises - including the mining 
companies - to private investors. Interviewee C20, a former SOE Head, believed that one of 
the reasons for the privatisation of SOEs was to strengthen corporate governance 
frameworks and eliminate ‘negative’ political interference; under government control, 
decisions were not made on a commercial basis, but instead reflected political expedience. 
Effective corporate governance practices were not part of the agenda. In this context, 
interviewee C18, the current President of IODZ, suggested a role for the stakeholder notion 
thus:  
“Under state control we never took business seriously, people did not feel that 
personal touch or personal responsibility because whether they worked or not they 
were still paid a salary at the end of the month. But now people are beginning to 
realise that we need to work very hard to sustain our businesses, and this is where 
corporate governance becomes very important. Once we embed corporate 
governance in our structures and cultures everybody is a stakeholder and therefore 
must play a role in creating wealth”.  
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Equally, the coverage of corporate governance issues in the local media was pointed to as 
part of the problem, particularly with respect to the public media where government has 
enough control to potentially create a vicious circle in terms of openness in the public sector. 
7.2.3   Corporate Governance - Government and Public Sector Perspectives  
As the dominant stakeholder in national economies, governments are now assuming a 
greater and more direct role in corporate governance discussions with a view to restoring the 
corporate integrity and market confidence critical for economic prosperity (Josiah et al., 
2010). It is against this background that government representatives were enlisted as 
potential interviewees here, both in their role in promoting corporate governance across 
Zambia as a whole and also with regard to corporate governance practices within 
government. Interviewee C05, the CEO of the LuSE, noted that there is a general 
misconception that the renewed attention on corporate governance standards only relates to 
the corporate community; on account of this misinterpretation, corporate governance has for 
a long time been stifled in most government-controlled establishments. However, from a 
normative point of view, interviewee C11, representing the IODZ, asserts that ‘good’ 
governance is important for all organisations irrespective of whether they are government-
controlled or private. Both C05 and C11 remarked that apart from being the largest 
consumer of products and services, the Zambian government manages a huge public 
resource base on behalf of the Zambian people - corporate governance in this context is 
therefore critical in the management of the country’s economy. Correspondingly, 
interviewee C19, a highly experienced academic, believed that the fundamental 
responsibility for corporate governance lies squarely with the government. Consistent with 
this view, another academic, C01, stated that: 
“From the government’s point of view corporate governance is extremely important 
because government relies on the corporations to raise revenues, so there is a direct 
relationship between corporate governance in the corporate sector and corporate 
governance in government. No one is exempted from corporate governance, if 
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government is excluded for example, that will be the haven for people to misuse 
public resources”.   
 
In line with C01’s argument, interviewee C21 suggested that: 
 
“The country’s budget is in trillions; therefore the management and application of 
these resources are very important to the well-being of the people and the country. In 
this context, corporate governance is very important in running a government. We 
can simply say government is the biggest company in the country and all its 
decisions affect all other companies. Each Ministry has the potential to do damage in 
this country in the absence of good corporate governance”. 
 
Endorsing this line of thought, interviewees C14 and C18 also subscribed to the notion that a 
robust corporate governance framework is important not only in the context of the running 
of corporations, but beyond the board to include government, NGOs, Unions and 
Churches
158
; it is a joint responsibility between the public and private sectors. For 
interviewee C21, issues of accountability, transparency and disclosure have been a problem 
in most organisations including faith-based organisations, NGOs and elsewhere such as 
within the Football Association of Zambia (FAZ).  
 
While governance codes have been initiated for companies quoted and listed on the LuSE, 
the financial sector and SMEs, interviewee C11 noted that SOEs and government spending 
agencies have not been subject to the new regulations, despite this being the tier which is 
most vulnerable to manipulation. For example, reflecting the lack of strong corporate 
governance principles, three interviewees from very different backgrounds (C18, C20 and 
C22) all acknowledged and justified the current stakeholder outcry regarding the abuse of 
SOEs, some of which have not been audited for as long as 10 years; C20 declared that: 
“SOEs are sometimes abused by our government by asking them to contribute to 
election campaigns for the ruling party. For example, recently the Zambia Electricity 
Supply Corporation (ZESCO), a government-controlled corporation, under 
government instruction was distributing geysers in some areas where they do not 
have running water just to entice the voters. Now the question is if ZESCO has a 
proper functioning board can they approve such a project”?    
                                                          
158
Ronan (2004) noted similar sentiments    
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The current circumstances, according to interviewee C20, represent a huge challenge for the 
public sector because the governance structures are such that the shareholder (i.e. the 
government) is represented by a Minister who, in most cases, brings a political agenda to the 
table, ignoring the broader objectives of which the firms were created. Some ministers are so 
powerful that they can even fire the entire board and constitute another one at a press 
conference. Here, C20 stated that:  
 “The Minister can change the decisions of the board, or can directly or indirectly 
influence decision-making at board level. We have had cases where the Minister 
gives instructions directly to the CEO and CFO and these instructions have to be 
obeyed whether the board approves or not. The board is supposed to be governed by 
resolutions and not individuals. If the boards are left to make decisions and not 
Ministers it will make a lot of difference in terms of corporate governance”.   
  
The failure of oversight by the invisible shareholder (government) as portrayed above is an 
indication that corporate governance in the Zambian public sector - and government itself - 
is defective. Interviewee C09 pointed out, however, that although there are corporate 
governance deficiencies in government, government spending agencies and SOEs, the 
landscape appears to be changing for the better, with the state (slowly) divorcing itself from 
direct appointments of SOE chiefs and board members. Similarly, interviewee C18 believed 
that the situation has improved because government employees are no longer assigned to 
chair SOEs’ board meetings; the chair is now normally elected from board members by 
members themselves and not appointed by the Minister. While this change is likely to 
improve the quality of governance via addressing the independence issue, the selection of 
board members remain a live issue because political appointees in Zambia have failed 
historically to add value to the boards on which they serve, a view supported by the great 
majority of interviewees here. Moreover, despite the government engaging some highly 
qualified staff for senior positions in SOEs, interviewee C20 argued that the level of political 
interference reduces them to the role of political cadres.  
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Notwithstanding interviewees’ caution in recognising improvements, interviewee C23 
applauded the current tendency for government to push for ‘better’ ways of running SOEs 
by ensuring that policies are tailored towards addressing corporate governance issues. 
Interviewee C11 provided an example of this: 
“The government is also doing something to try and strengthen corporate governance 
in the public sector; for example, a Finance Act was passed in 2004 which requires 
the setting up of boards and audit committees in all government spending agencies 
and SOEs. The government’s initiative is being driven by the NEPAD framework” 
 
The establishment of a governance secretariat, acceding to the APRM and consequential 
Governance Country Self-Assessment Report
159
; provide other manifestations of a 
government that is, slowly, beginning to bow down to the overwhelming demands for 
improved corporate governance in Zambia, particularly in the public sector. However, 
interviewee C11 maintained that while several government departments and SOEs have 
taken steps to enhance the enabling environment for corporate governance, negative political 
intervention and significant corporate governance frailty continue to emerge, creating a 
mismatch between practice and reality. 
 
7.2.4   Corporate Governance – the Private Sector Perspective  
From a private sector perspective, there are two major categories of organisations of direct 
relevance to the corporate governance debate in Zambia: companies quoted or listed on the 
LuSE and those that are not. The category of companies falling outside the LuSE can be 
divided further into Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and companies listed outside 
Zambia. Stock exchanges around the world are increasingly becoming promoters and 
sources of corporate governance-related regulations (Berglof and Thadden, 1999; LuSE, 
2008; Mallin, 2009; Solomon, 2010). In this context, the CEO of  the LuSE (interviewee 
C05 in this study) viewed the establishment of the exchange as a means of promoting sound 
                                                          
159
See Chapter Four for details 
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corporate governance practices through compliance with listing rules, especially given 
extant legal and regulatory frameworks in Zambia that contain no specific legislature 
dealing with corporate governance issues. As noted in Chapter Four, the need to improve 
corporate governance in the Zambia private sector has been significantly reinforced by the 
development of three corporate governance guidelines conceptualised as the basis for 
substantive improvements. Despite being highly influenced by international codes, 
interviewee C12 contended that the launch of the codes is well-intentioned, and most of the 
interviewees did indeed believe that the codes are relevant and that a start has been made. In 
this context, C08 stated that: “while we can do much more, for now at least we have 
something to start with and somewhere to start from”. 
 
Outside the LuSE set-up, there are two other corporate governance precepts in Zambia: the 
Bank of Zambia (BOZ) corporate governance guidelines (for the financial sector) and the 
Institute of Directors of Zambia (IODZ) guidelines for SMEs
160
. However, interviewee C05, 
a representative of the LuSE, noted that the SMEs’ guideline is unique in the sense that it is 
not enforceable and is more of an awareness document than a governance compliance code. 
Most interviewees believed that companies outwith the two codes’ scope, are not covered by 
any corporate governance guidelines and, like the public sector, their governance 
mechanisms are regulated entirely by the Companies Act and other commercial laws
161
. As 
for foreign companies not listed on the LuSE, interviewees C09 and C10 believed that they 
are strongly influenced by their parent organisations based outside Zambia here; C10 argued 
that: “when they come to Zambia, they come with fairly well-established corporate 
governance structures because they have been doing it out there”. In contrast, interviewee 
C08, a parastatal executive, remarked that companies based in countries where corporate 
                                                          
160
Details regarding the two sets of guidelines were provided in Chapter Four. 
161
Commercial laws including the Banking and Financial Services Act and the Securities Act; Chapter Four 
contains further details. 
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governance is perceived to be weak lack commitment to the governance philosophy. 
Interviewee C08 cited the example of Chinese companies as a case where very little 
appreciation for corporate governance occurs when investing in Zambia; he pointed to very 
few Chinese companies operating in Zambia even having boards in this context. More 
generally, interviewees C05, C08 and C18 noted that while extensive research has taken 
place in the field of political governance in Zambia, very little has been done in the area of 
corporate governance - hence very little progress has been recorded. Despite this lack of 
attention, they maintained that the last 10 years has seen remarkable corporate governance 
improvements in the private sector. 
7.3 Defining Corporate Governance  
As discussed in Chapter Three, the term corporate governance has still not acquired a 
universally-accepted definition; in practice, the most widely-used definition remains the one 
espoused by the Cadbury Committee Report of 1992, that is: “the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled”. Since 1992, numerous definitions have been put 
forward, but no single form of words has yet been assented to ubiquitously. However, 
whatever the definition, the core elements of accountability, transparency, disclosure and 
fairness undisputedly underpin the broad corporate governance framework (Oman, 2003; 
Sternberg, 2004; Solomon, 2010). In this context, the first question in this part of the 
interviews specifically asked interviewees to define and explain the term ‘corporate 
governance’. Responses to this question, designed to tease out the interviewees’ 
understanding of the concept of corporate governance, suggested that all had at least a basic 
understanding. Consistent with the literature on corporate governance elsewhere, various 
definitions were given ranging from “an anti-theft mechanism” to “a mechanism for the 
well-being of society”. On a different governance continuum, interviewees’ definitions 
ranged from ‘shareholder centric’ to ‘social responsibility and stakeholder accountability’. 
 247 
The specific issues that came out most prominently were stakeholder participation, 
transparency, accountability, checks and balances, disclosure, fairness, social responsibility, 
corruption, human rights and environmental concerns and the creation of wealth for all.  
 
More than 75% of interviewees
162
 defined corporate governance as “the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled”
163
, consistent with the Cadbury (1992) definition and 
earlier empirical evidence in Wanyama (2006) and Bondamakara (2010) for Uganda and 
Zimbabwe respectively. This is the definition adopted by the King I Committee on 
Corporate Governance (1994) on which the extant Zambian codes draw extensively. While 
this fits with prior African studies, it was expected that Africans would side-line it on the 
basis of it being narrowly-focused and liable to direct attention at the principal-agent 
dichotomy (Sheikh and Rees, 1995; Solomon, 2010) thereby ignoring the expansive 
community a characteristic most valued by Africans (Jackson, 2004). However this outcome 
in supporting prior African studies points to the supremacy of Western terminology and 
conceptualisation in the corporate governance debate.  
 
Reciting the Cadbury definition, interviewees C18 and C23 argued that: “There is no need to 
reinvent the wheel”. While this characterisation acknowledges the existence and importance 
of different stakeholder groups, the focus is more on the relationship between the (distant) 
capital owners and the managers. Despite the majority of the interviewees initially reciting a 
Cadbury-style description, further probing revealed that several of them had issues with 
corporate governance mechanisms that only address the relationship between shareholders 
and their agents. In this context, many of the interviewees
164
 argued that in Zambia - a 
country where the majority of companies are family-controlled SMEs and where dispersed 
                                                          
162
Interviewees C01, C03, C04, C05, C06, C09, C10, C11, C12, C13, C14, C18, C20, C21, C22, C23 and C24. 
163
The Cadbury definition “the system by which organisations are directed and controlled” has also been 
adopted by the  Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Zambia Country Self-Assessment Report (2010) 
164
Interviewees C01, C03, C04, C10, C12, C13, C14, C18, C21 and C23. 
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ownership is uncommon - any corporate governance mechanisms should go beyond the 
‘conventional’ shareholder-centric perspective to encompass wider stakeholder inclusivity. 
 
Most of the interviewees appeared to view the conventional definition as a starting point, 
while at the same time arguing that in a Zambian context the concept needs to be fleshed out 
to capture the reality in a meaningful way. In particular, the interviews revealed a perception 
of corporate governance as a concept that extends beyond corporations and their existence, 
to all stakeholders who interact with the firm. This view is consistent with the extant 
literature on corporate governance in Africa (e.g. Wanyama et al., 2009) and other 
developing nations outside the continent. Here, C23 claimed that: 
“Corporate governance goes beyond corporate affiliation to include government, 
trade unions, teachers’ unions, local government, churches and any other 
organisation or institution that has resources at its disposal and has individuals or 
groups of individuals who decide how to apply these resources on behalf of others 
for the betterment of that particular organisation or institution and stakeholders”  
 
Consistent with this line of argument, interviewees C04, C18, C21 and C23 added that 
corporate governance as an inclusivity concept should have as its goal improving the 
standard of living of the people of Zambia and the economy of the country at large. 
Moreover, corporate social responsibility, accountability, transparency, disclosure, 
stakeholder participation, institutional capacity and corruption featured consistently as some 
of the issues that interviewees saw as being critical to any future corporate governance 
framework ordained for Zambia.  
 
Zambia’s apparent desire for broadened corporate governance and accountability appears 
not to be reflected in the nation’s extant corporate governance codes. For example, the BoZ 
corporate governance code defines corporate governance as “the process and structure used 
to direct and manage the business and affairs of an institution with the objective of ensuring 
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its safety and soundness and enhancing shareholder value”. Equally, the IODZ - whose code 
is directed at the SMEs - defines corporate governance as: 
“the process by which company objectives are established, achieved and 
monitored… (it is) concerned with the relationships and responsibilities between the 
board, management, shareholders and other relevant stakeholders within a legal and 
regulatory framework … (it) ensures accountability of the board of directors to 
shareholders and management to the board of directors” (p. 1)
165
.   
 
Taking a broad viewpoint, interviewee C15 advanced the following definition: 
“Corporate governance is concerned with the ethical principles, values and practices 
that facilitate holding the balance between economic and social goals and between 
individual and communal goals. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests 
of individuals, corporations and society within a framework of sound governance 
and common good” 
 
This definition is based on Cadbury 2001’s re-modelled approach to corporate governance. 
While the interviewees appeared keen to engage with questions relating to the governance 
notion, it was clear that they experienced difficulties in generating a precise definition and, 
hence, resorted to recitation of phraseologies already in the public domain. Nonetheless, 
several interviewees took the view that corporate governance should facilitate an 
environment that fosters an effective regulatory framework, one that addresses economic 
and social responsibility, as well as environmental sustainability and accountability to 
different stakeholder groups in a fair and just manner. Similarly, interviewees C01 and C05 
expressed the need for all stakeholders to show interest in governance issues because 
decisions made at corporate and government levels will impact on all citizens as 
stakeholders. 
7.4 International Influence on Zambian Corporate Governance Codes 
As outlined earlier in this chapter, Zambia has three sets of current corporate governance 
guidelines: the BOZ code, which is unique to the supervision of the banks and the financial 
                                                          
165
The preceding definition is also similar to that actualised by the LuSE. 
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sector; the LuSE code, targeted at all companies quoted or listed on the LuSE; and the IODZ 
code which focuses on SMEs. Fifty-four per cent of the interviewees
166
 noted that the three 
codes draw extensively on the multifarious international corporate governance standards 
extant around the world, in particular the King Report of South Africa
167
, which most 
interviewees believed to have domestic relevance given the extent of business ties between 
Zambia and South Africa. However, they also applauded the OECD principles, supporting 
its claims of universal applicability. For instance, C09 stated that:  
“We did not start from ground zero, we had to start from somewhere, and we had the 
UK code, the South African King Report, the New Zealand and the OECD 
guidelines. Much has been drawn from these codes, in particular the King Report. 
There is no way we can ignore what is happening in the international arena on 
corporate governance. The King Report III is particularly relevant.”   
  
More generally, all 24 interviewees acknowledged that though the three Zambian codes 
were drafted by domestic institutions, they essentially represent abstractions from major 
codes in the international arena. This development was not perceived to be particularly 
welcome, although interviewees C09 and C23 contended that the growing interdependence 
of companies and economies around the globe calls for more uniformity in corporate 
governance standards. Interviewees C01 and C05 suggested that such moves represented a 
clear trend towards drafting codes that are hybrids of more than one existing set of rules. 
Interviewees
168
 in support of a hybridised approach maintained that in a global village 
corporate governance does not belong to any one country or group of countries and, as such, 
there is nothing ‘Zambian’ when it comes to business. They further argued that because of 
globalisation, the idea of national standards makes little sense; the tendency for the South 
African King Report to be viewed as a Pan- African code is consistent with this. 
                                                          
166
Interviewees C03, C05, C08, C09, C11, C12, C14, C16, C17, C18, C21, C23 and C24. 
167
The influences of the King Report seem to be permeating to other countries through the links that smaller 
African stock exchanges are developing with the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). This has been 
suggested as being an important link for good corporate governance (UNECA, 2005). 
168
Interviewees C07, C13, C14, C18, C23 and C24. 
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Interviewees’ articulations here appeared to be based on an appreciation that within the 
context of globalisation, the national approach to corporate governance (defined within local 
circumstances in terms of laws and regulation) are increasingly being pressurised by global 
forces; the importing of corporate governance notions, was seen by most as necessary for the 
greater good and well-being of the country.  
7.4.1   Counter Views to Un-remodelled Imported Principles 
Notwithstanding the cautious acceptance of supra-national governance rules discussed in the 
previous section, the perceived strong influence of international standards on Zambian codes 
raised some specific concerns as to whether rules reflecting Western norms are relevant in 
the Zambian environment, where cultural and historic underpinnings differ in substantive 
ways from those in the West. Interviewees opposed to this approach suggested that 
corporate governance standards designed for the Zambian environment should be modified 
to accommodate the Zambian way of living and doing business. In particular, almost half of 
the interviewees
169
 argued that while they do not object to the adoption of foreign codes, 
there is a need for originality in the drafting process to reflect the country’s cultural 
particularity and the level of economic development in the local codes which must in turn 
feed into the international decorum. For example, one of the academics stated that: 
“While the principles remain the same, they must be made relevant to the Zambian 
environment. The US and the UK are not at the same level with Zambia in many 
aspects therefore lifting the standards from such countries and applying them in our 
country in their original form is not the greatest idea” (C 24). 
 
Equally, interviewee C14, a senior economist in the banking sector contended that:  
 
“Most of the codes in Africa, including the King Report, are strongly influenced by 
international codes; foreign structures will continue to influence things in Africa 
because of our historical backgrounds. But we should not throw away individual 
countries’ specific circumstances in preference for codes from countries at different 
levels of economic development” 
 
                                                          
169
Interviewees C03, C07, C09, C11, C12, C14, C16, C17, C18 and C24. 
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However, due to incongruity in economic levels and cultural mismatch, both C01 and C05 
favoured a hybrid approach, one which harnesses best practice from local and international 
codes to bring about a balance appropriate for an environment that is dominated by 
transnational corporations. This way of thinking was consistent with the views expressed by 
C10 and C17, representing multinational companies operating in Zambia but listed on the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE). These interviewees argued that while their companies 
acknowledged their obligations (through their parent companies) to work within the LSE 
guidelines, they also comply with the local codes. Both interviewees claimed to have 
Zambian directors sitting on their local boards to, among other things, ensure that they raise 
issues that concern local environments in terms of cultural values and governance-related 
matters. It is common practice for subsidiary companies operating in Zambia to favour the 
governance practices adopted by their parent companies (see Chapter Four), but in terms of 
relevancy and adequacy, the overwhelming majority
170
 of interviewees believed that the 
Zambian codes are both relevant and necessary
171
.  
7.5       Corporate Governance Compliance in Zambia 
Interviewee C01, a senior academic and researcher, argued that formalised compliance can 
only take place in an environment where corporate governance guidelines have been 
established and recognised, and enforcement can be traced to equally recognisable 
regulatory bodies. In this regard, interviewees C01 and C12 contended that compliance 
motivation is influenced by, among other things, the level of regulatory enforcement and 
other corporate governance benefits. This section of the chapter therefore focuses on the 
issue of compliance with the three extant sets of guidelines in Zambia. One of the points to 
emerge from the discussions was concern that the publication of codes would have limited 
                                                          
170
Interviewees C01, C02, C03, C07, C08, C09, C10, C12, C13, C14, C16, C17, C20, C22, C23 and C24. 
171
Although, interviewee C01 noted that the fluidity and dynamic nature of modern business makes the 
adequacy argument contentious.  
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impact without effective enforcement and compliance
172
. On this subject, interviewee C01 
stated that: 
“Better corporate governance cannot be achieved without better robust regulation 
and enforcement mechanisms. So we need institutions to supervise and regulate 
corporate governance. Even where there are supervisory bodies a number of 
weaknesses have been detected because as a country we don’t have the expertise to 
follow-up issues that relate to corporate governance because they are complicated so 
enforcement is minimal. In Zambia, the pressure for compliance is more strongly 
wielded by the civil society than by any other stakeholder group”  
   
Most interviewees argued that the absence in Zambia of laws and regulatory bodies that are 
specific to corporate governance means that compliance is not guaranteed
173
. 
7.5.1   Compliance with the LuSE and BOZ Codes 
The LuSE and BOZ codes define the standards of conduct and integrity with which relevant 
companies must comply. Interviewee C17 postulated that there is a reasonable likelihood of 
widespread compliance with the LuSE code because the process of listing itself calls for 
adherence to strong de facto governance process. Correspondingly, C5, an LuSE employee, 
contended that because some corporate governance awareness programmes designed for 
quoted companies have been set-up, compliance is now increasing. Interviewees C05, C07 
and C10 all argued that compliance with LuSE rules is not likely to represent a major 
problem for listed firms as most of them are multinational in nature and have been adhering 
to similar requirements abroad. More generally, several interviewees appeared to suggest 
that multinational companies with reasonably strong corporate governance structures do not 
view compliance as a bone of contention because for them it is a norm. Correspondingly, 
C10, representing a multinational organisation declared that:  
                                                          
172
A concern also observed in Uganda by Wanyama et al. (2009). 
173
However, interviewee C20, a member of parliament, pointed to the Companies Act and other commercial 
laws such as the Investment Act, Securities Act and Environmental Act as having some use in mitigating 
against corporate governance-related concerns. On the flip side, C01 and C08 suggested that the general 
nature of the Companies Act and other commercial laws compromises their applicability to specific 
governance issues.  
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“We comply fully; in fact the company has a compliance officer whose role is to 
ensure that we comply with regulation including corporate governance guidelines. 
The position of compliance officer is a senior position because we believe it is a very 
serious role and he reports to the Managing Director. As a company we believe that 
compliance is like the brakes of a car, they need to be serviced so that they are in 
tiptop condition all the time. We are listed in the UK but we also comply with local 
(Zambian) guidelines as well” 
 
As regards the BOZ code, C07, C08 and C12 all argued that compliance is likely to be 
pervasive on account of the BOZ being the Central Bank of Zambia and therefore 
commanding a critical supervisory and regulatory body for companies in the financial 
sector
174
. Given these perceptions, there was a well-grounded assumption that the burden of 
monitoring and enforcing compliance with the two codes rests with their sponsors, and there 
seems to be relatively few contentious issues. 
7.5.2   Organisations outwith the LuSE and BOZ Regimes 
Zambia has a large number of companies that fall outside the LuSE and the BOZ 
compliance catchment boundaries primarily SMEs, SOEs and some foreign companies not 
listed on the local market. According to interviewee C18, the President of the IODZ, SMEs 
form the majority in terms of numbers, hold a critical mass of wealth and are critical for 
Zambia’s future. One of the distinguishing characteristics of this category, according to both 
C18 and C20, is that these companies are too small to be listed on the LuSE, although C14 
and C20 put forward a rationale whereby the standards are simply too demanding for the 
family-held small companies dominant in Zambia. However, it was suggested that the 
numbers and their significance make the SMEs a special category that demands governance 
attention if their contribution to the national economy is to be meaningful. In this context 
C03, an IODZ member, believed that the development of a corporate governance guideline 
specifically tailored for such organisations is required. In addition, interviewee CO3 argued 
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As with the LuSE, to get a banking licence one has to comply with the sectoral corporate governance 
requirements. 
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that corporate governance comes with added costs; while large and multinational companies 
have the financial muscle to absorb these, C07 and C10 argued that in practice SMEs have 
to make a (difficult) choice between the costs and benefits of compliance. 
 
In this vein, C05 and C23 maintained that concerns have been raised regarding whether, 
given their size, SMEs should always have a board. Equally, family-held enterprises were 
perceived as being reluctant to give up some control as they believe that no-one other than 
them (the owners) can do better. Interestingly the issues raised by the interviewees here are 
in line with the early literature on the development of what is now termed ‘corporate 
governance’, including the work of Berle and Means (1932) on ownership and control 
separation. As noted earlier, in recognition of the role that SMEs play in Zambia, the IODZ 
developed a code specifically for the sector but a mix of views emerged from the interviews 
here regarding compliance with the IODZ guidelines. Interviewee C23 (a consultant who 
participated in drafting the IODZ code) acknowledged the mixed picture, holding the 
following two factors responsible for the situation: 
a) The IODZ is not a statutory body like other professional organisations in the 
country such as the Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants (ZICA) or the Law 
Association of Zambia (LAZ) therefore membership is voluntary (C23). 
 
b) In relation to the LuSE and the BOZ codes, the IODZ guidelines were drafted as a 
‘sensitisation’ document rather than as a compliance code, i.e. an awareness 
document to re-orient peoples’ approach to doing business in a globalised economy 
(C23). 
 
This situation means that the code is effectively unenforceable because both the guidelines 
and IODZ membership itself is voluntary, on an ex-gratia basis. Here, C20 added that:  
“The weakness with the IODZ corporate governance code is that the IODZ itself is 
run like an NGO such that their decisions are not binding because even membership 
is voluntary, people join when they want and leave as and when they want so in most 
cases they are not taken seriously”.  
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For most interviewees, the IODZ rules appeared to represent no more than a sensitisation 
guide that intends to educate Zambian SMEs on what corporate governance is; the code was 
viewed by both the sponsors and the target sector as a training manual and not a compliance 
code. Not surprisingly, compliance in this category was viewed as “minimal”. 
 
7.5.3  “Comply or Explain” Versus “Comply or Else”  
The “Comply or explain” approach is a corporate governance regulatory methodology 
whereby guidelines are set out which companies may either comply with or give reasons for 
any areas of non-compliance (Cadbury Report (1992, Section 3.7). On the other hand the 
“comply or else” approach (also known as “comply only”) simply means that failure to act 
in accordance with the law exposes the company to judicial punishment; in short, 
compliance is mandatory
175
. The “comply or explain” approach espoused by the UK 
codes
176
 has influenced those in many other parts of the world including countries with 
advanced and developing economies. In the present study, interviewees took three different 
standpoints on the matter: those in favour of: “comply or explain”
177
; “comply or else”
178
; 
and an approach whereby the core principles of corporate governance should be made 
mandatory
179
 while other aspects remain voluntary
180
. However, the majority consensus 
seemed to be supportive of a hybrid approach underpinned by both mandatory and voluntary 
regulation, ensuring that rhetorical behaviour is subdued.  
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is a mandatory governance code regulating financial practice and corporate 
governance in the US. As far as compliance is concerned, all organisations, large and small, must comply. 
Criminal and civil penalties for noncompliance in the Sarbanes Oxley Act are prescribed.   
176
UK codes dating back to Cadbury are anchored on the assumption that companies should comply with the 
rules or explain why they do not. In this way the code-framers avoid, or perhaps enable, a one-size-fits-all 
approach. Statements of the extent of conformance with the code and the reasons for any non-conformance 
are given in a corporate governance statement which is contained within the annual report.   
177
Interviewees C09, C10, C23 and C24. 
178
Interviewees C02, C06 and C19. 
179
Interviewees C01, C02, C05, C07, C08, C11, C13, C14, C15, C18, C20, C21 and C22. 
180
Four interviewees remained mute on this issue. 
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Interviewee C01, a supporter of a hybrid approach, challenged a mechanism that gives a 
company an option to comply or not. He argued that in Zambia, a country that does not have 
a reputation for strong corporate governance practices, it does not make sense to embrace 
“comply or explain” in totality. He contended further that while ‘enlightened’ dissatisfied 
shareholders in developed countries have other options at their disposal in Zambia, 
shareholders may not have the courage (or propensity) to vote intelligibly to mitigate bad 
executive behaviour. For C02, the critical issue that needs serious consideration is that the 
“comply or explain” principle lacks clarity as to who the inclusivity model proposed by 
most Zambians should be aimed at - apart from the shareholders who have a de-jure 
contract. 
 
In this context, C01, C02 and C11 all gave the example of South Africa, where the drafting 
of the King III Report was conceived as partly reflecting a desire to incorporate some core 
corporate governance principles into the South African Companies Act. This development 
was thought by some to overcome weaknesses detected in the enforcement of standards of a 
non-binding legal nature. In this context, interviewee C01 noted that: 
“In South Africa, disclosure is now mandatory and failure to comply will attract 
penalties because it is now law; equally, in the UK disclosure is mandatory. The 
“comply or explain” view means that you leave it up to the market to decide the 
appropriateness of these principles. We can’t leave it up to the market to decide 
because regulation and supervision in this country is very weak. However, for 
transnational companies listed in countries where shareholder activism is strong, this 
can perhaps work”.  
 
Interviewee C02, a strong supporter of “comply or else”, argued thus:  
“All the codes in this country are voluntary therefore not relevant to this country 
because they do not provide remedies to the communities affected. Anglo American 
Corporation breached the OECD guidelines in a number of areas and complaints 
were made using the complaints mechanism under OECD through the UK contact 
point, but all we received was a wishy-washy response. Anglo argued that they 
cannot be punished on the basis of a voluntary code” (C02).  
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This interviewee contended further that the codes will only be meaningful in Zambia if they 
are connected to the laws of the land, become binding and enforceable. Similarly, C24 
believed that the lack of enforcement mechanisms coupled with the “comply or explain” 
principle has resulted in companies focussing on legal exposures rather than (voluntary) 
governance improvements. These and similar concerns gave rise to several interviewees 
calling for the drafting of corporate governance principles alongside the Companies Act and 
other commercial laws with a view to strengthening practical enforcement mechanisms. 
 
7.6     Drivers of Corporate Governance in Zambia 
A number of factors have driven corporate governance developments around the world, with 
the most common being difficulties in the principal-agent relationship, globalisation and 
high profile company malfunctions (particularly, but not exclusively, in developed 
countries). In Zambia however, the most common catalysts for change identified by the 
interviewees included: economic reinforcement; external influence/donor pressure; 
economic liberalisation and privatisation; company under-performance (both local and 
international); and corruption and globalisation. In the view of many Zambians, the above 
factors have strongly influenced levels of awareness of the corporate governance notion. 
Similarly, the establishment of the IODZ as a lead spearheading group was thought to have 
marked a milestone in the development of effective corporate governance reforms in 
Zambia. The elements perceived by the interviewees are now considered in more detail. 
7.6.1   Economic Reinforcement as a Driver of Corporate Governance in Zambia 
As acknowledged in previous chapters and in earlier sections of this, the NEPAD has 
identified corporate governance as one of the key requirements for meaningful levels of 
development in Africa. In this context, development is now explicitly viewed as the main 
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rationale for pursuing corporate governance change in Zambia and other parts of Africa. 
This point was amplified in a statement by C12: 
“In Zambia we view good corporate governance as a key driver of economic growth 
and development because it is about accountability, transparency, disclosure and 
fairness, all of which we have been struggling to achieve as a country. Because of 
these problems, we have failed to develop our country despite abundant natural 
resources. We experience high poverty levels in the midst of plenty as a result of bad 
governance”.  
   
Although there seemed to be general agreement amongst interviewees that corporate 
governance reflects a business-driven paradigm, C01 maintained that in the Zambian 
situation, attention must also be paid to the application of corporate governance within the 
framework of a broader stakeholder notion, including the national economy and the general 
well-being of the country.  
7.6.2   External Influence /Donor Pressure 
As noted in Chapter Four, Zambia is a major donor aid destination (Burnside and Dollar, 
1997). The majority of the interviewees believed that foreign assistance targeted at 
development can play a significant role in the country’s economic transformation and 
improve the lives of Zambians through access to quality education, clean water/sanitation, 
quality healthcare and robust infrastructure. However, interviewee C19 believed that these 
type of goals will only be achieved under a system of ‘good’ governance and accountability, 
which is precisely what the majority of interviewees argued has been lacking in the country. 
In this regard, interviewee C01 argued that the inclusion by major donor groups of 
governance conditionality in the development assistance eligibility criteria is mainly 
designed to enhance accountability and corporate governance. This architecture represents a 
common basis that most development assistance financiers consider essential for the 
development of good governance practice, particularly in developing nations where 
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accountability institutions are conventionally weak (Akokpari, 2004; Neumayer, 2004; 
Hout, 2007). Interviewee C18 drew attention to one case in point by stating that: 
“After the scandals in the Ministry of Health, the government of Zambia and the 
donor community have entered into a governance plan. One condition of this plan is 
that the government refund the misappropriated funds in the Ministry of Health. On 
the other hand, Sweden and the Netherlands have also attached conditions of 
improved financial governance before they can resume funding the Ministry again”  
  
While the individuals behind the scandal have not been sanctioned, both C07 and C19 
pointed out that reimbursements for the misappropriated funds will ultimately have to be 
paid for by Zambian tax payers. According to interviewees C06, C13 and C18, these events 
resulted in some donors cutting development aid sharply, leading to consequential losses of 
huge foreign assistance. Several interviewees argued further that the goings-on exacerbated 
the donors’ push for good governance and accountability.  
 
In this context, interviewee C12 stressed that while there is a notion that donor assistance 
normally comes with ‘strings’ attached, the government never fully explains what these 
strings are and it is only now that the Zambian people are beginning to understand that, these 
‘strings’ are actually governance and accountability-related. For interviewee C12, it is these 
so called ‘strings’ that cause an inherent tension between the government and donors
181
. 
Interviewees C06, C09, C13, C17 and C22 all believed that, as a complement to private 
investment, development assistance works well in environments supported by effective 
governance practices - however, such efforts are (wrongly) often repelled by the governing 
elite. This tendency perhaps suggests a reason for why development aid has so far failed to 
leave a significant mark on Zambia and most other African countries (Burnside and Dollar, 
1997; Andersson et al., 2000).  
 
                                                          
181
Gruzd (2008) found this to be a dominant characteristic of most African states. 
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7.6.3   Liberalisation of the Economy and Privatisation 
Over the last decade, governments around the world have been withdrawing from active 
business and assuming a ‘facilitator’ role as a way of strengthening governance and 
promoting private sector-driven economies (Buck, 2003; Jailos, 2010). The pressures are 
exacerbated by the increasing profile of corporate governance, the challenges of modern 
business and globalisation (Crane and Matten, 2007). In this regard, interviewees C07 and 
C23 cited reforms and subsequent shifts in the management of the Zambia economy
182
 
which have focused on removing government from the governance of business. A key 
component of these economic reforms was the massive privatisation of SOEs. One of the 
academic interviewees, C01, believed that under the state-control model, the stakeholder 
notion was pursued to its extreme, leading to over-extraction of resources from SOEs in 
order to provide public goods. This interviewee also believed that decision-making in 
Zambian SOEs was in many respects at a crossroad and the balancing of policies between 
the government’s social agenda and economical sustainability was becoming elusive. 
Although the benefits of government-control were shared between economic and social 
goals, it is this over-extraction without re-investment which C01 blamed for the collapse of a 
number of state-owned companies. This type of problem is one of the reasons cited by most 
interviewees for the privatisation of SOEs witnessed in Zambia in recent years. Here 
interviewee C12 stated that: 
“Under government control SOEs were only accountable to the government and the 
party in power and not the institutions and the public at large. Privatisation has 
actually improved governance because people now have a personal touch to these 
companies”  
  
In the same manner, C20 pointed out that recent liberalisation measures such as the removal 
of controls in the financial sector, the reduction in tariff barriers and the encouragement of 
foreign investment were all undertaken on the assumption that greater competition would 
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As noted in Chapter Four, for many years government had controlled over 80% of Zambian industry. 
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exacerbate pressure upon companies operating in Zambia and compel them to seek refuge in 
‘acceptable’ corporate governance practices. 
 
Interviewees C01 and C17 both contended that, given the foregoing circumstances, most 
companies in the Zambian private sector stand in need of corporate conduct that is forged on 
principles of sound corporate governance in their efforts not only to achieve greater levels of 
performance, but also to contribute positively to the economy of the country. Although 
Zambia has seen dramatic changes in the management of the economy, the laws and the 
regulatory governance frameworks have not been developed in line with the move to 
liberalise the economic environment. Interviewee C01 argued that the privatisations should 
act as a catalyst for strengthening of the principles of corporate governance, principles 
assumed to be very limited under state control. Similarly, interviewee C10 maintained that 
the private investment which comes with privatisation often focuses on strong corporate 
governance in terms of assurances and security. 
 
7.6.4   Company Failures (Local and International)  
 
The interviewees believed that failures of high profile companies abroad as well as domestic 
experiences
183
 have had a compelling influence on the corporate governance agenda in 
Zambia. Most took the view that Zambians now realise that in the absence of a robust 
regulatory framework governance mistakes have been inevitable. In this context, C05 and 
C12 held these circumstances responsible for the collapse of companies in Zambia, 
particularly in the banking sector. These local events mirrored in developed nations and 
elsewhere, were believed by interviewee C12 to serve as major drivers of corporate 
governance in Zambia; he stated that: 
“As one of the pioneers of the BOZ corporate governance guidelines, the code was 
an afterthought of the systematic bank collapses that we experienced in the 1990s. 
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See Chapter Four for details.  
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The failures were about, among other things, failure to recover loans, creative 
accounting, unethical conduct both by people working in the banks and by banks 
themselves as corporate entities, management getting heft loans from their own 
banks, incompetent boards of directors just to mention a few. Now when you 
critically look at all these irregularities, they clearly show that corporate governance 
was missing, so we had to bring in a corporate governance code”   
 
As noted in Chapter Four, the establishment of the BOZ corporate governance code was 
intended to address governance breakdowns which appeared to be at the centre of business 
failures, particularly in the banking sector. Interviewees C05 and C23 referred to the 
collapse of high profile companies in the US threatening the entire US economy, arguing 
that for Zambia - whose economy is anchored on a few companies - such failures could be 
catastrophic. In this context, interviewee C23 gave the following example: 
“The pullout from Konkola Copper Mines (KCM) by Anglo-American Corporation 
in 2002 sent economic shock waves across the country. So you can imagine this was 
not a failure per say but just a pull out and people will tell you what happened around 
the Copperbelt and the entire country. There was massive pressure on the Zambian 
economy as people were thinking of what was going to happen to Zambia without 
KCM”   
Similar discernments were also advanced by interviewees C02, C03 and C18 who all 
pointed out that Zambia’s experience of failures impacted negatively on the economy in 
terms of lost revenues through tax, job losses and other social implications. This recognition 
of the impact of company failures on many different stakeholders fits with the notion that 
companies do not exist for the sole benefit of the providers of capital
184
. This evidence is 
consistent with the earlier findings for Uganda reported by Wanyama (2006) which suggests 
that the broad stakeholder notion is seen as important across Africa more generally.  
7.6.5   Corruption as a Driver of Corporate Governance Change in Zambia 
Corresponding with the literature review in Chapter Four, many interviewees
185
 believed 
that corruption remains alive in Zambia and has emerged as one of the major challenges 
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More generally, Shkolnikov (2002) argues that ‘Bad’ or ‘lacking’ corporate governance does not only lead 
to corporate scandals, but has far reaching implications that go beyond the corporations.     
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Interviewees C01, C02, C03, C04, C06, C07, C08, C13, C14, C15, C17, C20, C22, C23 and C24. 
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affecting corporate governance in the country. Interviewees C04 and C06 held gaps in the 
(de facto) weak legal framework directly responsible for escalating levels of the problem. 
Because of the extant inefficiencies and inconsistencies in attempts to challenge corruption 
in Zambia, C24 pointed to embedding appreciation for corporate governance as a practical 
way of improving matters. The inadequacies in the legal path, C24 explained, lies in the fact 
that both parties to corruption benefit with no incentive for any party to refrain from such 
behaviour. Interviewee C20 argued that the proposed shift from a legalistic approach to a 
corporate governance-focussed system, appears to be suggestive of a more modern, 
persuasive methodology, while C23 believed that this shift has the propensity to decentralise 
the ‘fight’ by allowing other stakeholders to participate and thereby complement 
governmental effort. The failures of the Zambian legal framework have encouraged people 
to look to the fresh approach inherent in ‘good’ corporate governance as a method of 
discouraging the vice. Interviewee C07 extended this argument by remarking that:  
“High levels of corruption are a sign of the absence of corporate governance 
therefore successful implementation of corporate governance is an effective way of 
fighting corruption. Abundant and articulate anti-corruption legal provisions do exist 
in this country but the problem has been with the complexity of corruption cases 
coupled with the weak legislative and regulatory framework. When you read the 
Auditor General’s Report, you will be shocked that there are cases where public 
resources have gone into projects that do not exist, so where did the money go? And 
who changed the expenditure rules that you can pay someone before the job is 
done?”  
 
Weaknesses in regulatory enforcement were also pointed to by interviewee C13, who  
stated that: 
 
“In this country we have had corrupt people becoming heroes, and we glorify them. 
This is an indication that we are not getting any better particularly in the public 
sector and government agencies. One weakness is that corruption cases are reported 
to the Anti- Corruption Commission (ACC) and that is where problems start. The 
ACC is not strong enough to handle certain cases especially those involving 
politicians. We have to strengthen institutions of corporate governance and 
accountability if we are to fight the scourge with vigour”. 
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Interviewee C06 argued that the ACC fails in terms of enhancing accountability because the 
key laws on which the institution is anchored offer little in terms of promoting and 
strengthening governance and accountability. Interviewee C06 cited the specific example of 
the lack of an abuse of office clause from the ACC Act. Thus, the extant contingency does 
not seem to create an enabling legal and regulatory environment that empowers key 
stakeholders to tackle corruption without fear of victimisation. In this context, the majority 
of interviewees again suggested that corruption is in fact a driver for change in the sense that 
the calls for robust corporate governance mechanisms are seen as responses to the need for a 
long-term oriented approach to fighting corruption.  
7.6.6   Globalisation as a Driver of Corporate Governance Change in Zambia  
Globalisation has emerged as one of the most broadly debated subjects in recent years, 
chiefly because of its implications for political and economic governance (Haque, 2002). 
According to Hague, divergent perceptions regarding the meaning, intensity, dimension, 
extent, cause, and consequence of globalisation exist. Undoubtedly, the emergence of 
globalisation has witnessed shifts in political economy debates where the role of the state in 
terms of industrial interventions has been minimised or replaced by the market. The shift in 
the wake of globalisation, especially amongst developing economies, is evidenced in the 
privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation intended to transfer socio-economic activities to 
the private sector (Haque, 2001). The context of globalisation has led to political and 
economic governance challenges at both national and global levels (Hague, 2002). Zambia’s 
integration into this new environment has meant that the country has had to submit to 
international standards. Here, interviewee C01 portrayed concern with corporate governance 
as one of the most important impacts of the changing landscape. In particular, he argued that 
the governance dimension has come under the microscope because of trade liberalisation 
and increased international competition for capital, stating that:  
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“Globalisation has brought about competition for international capital and this is 
where the quality of governance plays a role because the owners of capital now have 
got the entire world to shop around. Zambia has undergone reforms such as 
privatisation and liberalisation as part of the new economic policy to attract foreign 
investment. Under globalisation, countries that offer the best in terms of protecting 
investors stand a better chance of luring such investors. In this sense, globalisation 
has become a key driver of corporate governance”. 
 
Interviewee C01 further contended that in this instance corporate governance represents a 
useful framework within which new forms of alliances between governments, corporations 
and other stakeholders can develop. Globalisation has also influenced the debates 
surrounding the issue of domesticated corporate governance guidelines versus international 
codes discussed earlier. In support of a global approach, C10 advocated that Zambia - being 
an active player in the international economy - demands standards that are similar to the rest 
of the world because the ex-ante barriers to the movement of capital across borders have 
collapsed, posing new challenges that require a global approach. This interviewee also 
argued that globalisation has the potential to narrow the gap as regards cultural differences, 
as transactions are more likely to be based on international standards.  
 
More generally, interviewees C01, C07, C10, C11 and C13 all claimed that Zambia cannot 
compete favourably with other countries in the global market if domestic corporate 
governance practices are not in conformity with international standards. According to C14, 
this argument represents straight-forward support for Zambia having extant corporate 
governance guidelines that are in line with international norms; he claimed that: 
“Globalisation has witnessed the proliferation of multinational corporations. Some of 
the principles and assumptions under the new economic order dictate the agenda of 
removing governments in business and instead promoting private sector 
participation. Such arrangements pose a lot of challenges in terms of setting a 
balance between domesticated and international corporate governance guidelines.” 
 
In summary, 50% of the interviewees strongly accredited globalisation with being one of the 
key drivers of corporate governance in Zambia and fully endorse the notion that improved 
corporate governance can contribute to Zambia’s ability to reap its full benefits.  
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7.7    Conclusion 
In Zambia, as in many African countries, corporate governance awareness levels are still 
very low. The natural corollary to this circumstance is the existence of governance 
institutions that lack the capacity to foster the related values of accountability, transparency, 
disclosure and fairness. Although contemporary literature on corporate governance in 
Zambia and elsewhere in Africa acknowledges the novelty of the concept on the continent, 
recent events have demonstrated that corporate governance reforms in Zambia have been 
slowly shifting from the merely rhetorical to the practical. There appeared to be an 
overwhelming consensus amongst the interviewees that corporate governance standards 
should be embedded in all organisational structures at all levels in order for people to fully 
appreciate its benefits. Extant governance institutions in the country have been shown here 
to be perceived as having little practical impact, and it is therefore apparent that the country 
needs to build institutional capacity with the express aim of pushing both corporations and 
the government into accepting and complying with the rules and their spirit. The evidence 
presented here suggests that some of the major forces driving corporate governance in 
Zambia include: economic reinforcement, external influence or donor pressure, liberalisation 
of the economy and privatisation, company underperformance, corruption and globalisation. 
However, in the absence of laws and regulations that are specific to corporate governance - 
coupled with a frail legal system which mediates most corporate governance contested 
issues - the need to review the Companies Act in line with modern corporate governance 
should be prioritised. Perhaps most fundamentally, however, the evidence presented in this 
chapter suggests that there is an underlying need for clearer understanding of the benefits 
that can stem from ‘good’ corporate governance practices, if stakeholders are to appreciate 
the notion’s potentiality. Notwithstanding the multi-faceted nature of impairments on 
corporate governance in Zambia, the interview findings are testament to the fact that serious 
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attempts have been made to improve the de facto situation in the country. The corporate 
governance drivers as proposed by interviewees provide insights into the association 
between corporate governance and the country’s economic development. The majority of 
interviewees have pointed out that a country’s reputation for strong corporate governance 
practices creates investor confidence and therefore acts as a powerful attractant for capital 
flows - corporate governance practices should therefore be salutary for any country’s 
economy. Having presented the findings on the corporate governance profile in Zambia, the 
analysis of the interviews continues in the next chapter with the assessment of perceptions 
concerning the significance and implications of corporate governance for Zambia’s 
development in a broad accountability framework. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
INTERVIEWS: 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN ZAMBIA 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance’s implications, not only for the financial health of corporations but 
also for broader economic development have been explored across nations and via a range 
of methods in recent years (Solomon, 2010). In this regard, prior studies suggest that there is 
a strong relationship between corporate governance and a country’s level of economic 
development (Berglof and Thadden, 1999; Wu, 2005; Wanyama, 2006; Tsamenyi and 
Uddin, 2008; Siddiqui, 2010). The previous chapter of this thesis focused on interview 
findings regarding perceptions of the corporate governance notion in Zambia. The present 
chapter reports on the findings from the same semi-structured interviews, but focuses on the 
relationship between corporate governance and development in the Zambian context. The 
conceptualisation of the issues discussed here is heavily influenced by Africa’s home-grown 
development framework, in particular the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD)’s declaration that corporate governance has recently emerged as one of the 
necessary conditions for Africa’s development. This chapter attempts to capture the 
participants’ views about this notion in the Zambian context. The structure of the rest of the 
chapter is as follows: Section 8.2 discusses the significance of corporate governance to 
Zambia’s development; Section 8.3 focuses on corporate governance and extant 
development status; Section 8.4 explores the notion of “properly run firms” as the drivers of 
wealth; Section 8.5 looks at corruption from corporate governance and development 
perspectives; Section 8.6 then investigates accountability and development while the focal 
point for Section 8.7 is institutional capacity. Section 8.8 puts into the spotlight Chinese 
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investment and corporate governance in Zambia while Section 8.9 attempts to address 
corporate governance benefits and challenges in Zambia.  
      
8.2 The Significance of Corporate Governance to Zambia’s Development 
Several interviewees
186
 maintained that in Zambia, like in many other developing nations, 
the quality of corporate governance is critical to development on the basis of its potential to 
create an enabling environment of greater accountability, enhanced transparency and 
improved disclosure, all of which are essential for effective resource allocation (both in the 
private and public sectors), leading in turn to better economic management and economic 
development. Here interviewee C22, a research consultant, referred to corporate governance 
as one of the many factors that must be seriously considered if Zambia is to meaningfully 
address the development issues that continue to elude the country despite its relative 
political stability. Interviewee C23, a governance consultant, went further, arguing that: 
“I am one of those who believe and recognise that corporate governance is an 
important tool for development because even if a country has good political 
governance, at the end of the day the wealth of the nation which is used in the 
economic development has to be applied in a transparent and accountable manner 
and satisfy the majority of the citizens in the country and this is where corporate 
governance squarely fits into the development equation”. 
 
Interviewee C04 held a view that: 
 “Corporate governance matters for Zambia’s development. There must be some 
level of governance for meaningful development to take place because there has to 
be rules and a way of regulating and enforcing those rules and also a way of 
measuring whether those rules are being followed. As Zambians we keep on asking 
for good governance because we know there is a strong link”. 
  
Interviewees C08, C10 and C14 viewed corporate governance as a mechanism that provides 
a guarantee whereby people charged with the responsibility to manage the economy are 
accountable and transparent with regard to the manner in which resources are allocated 
                                                          
186
Interviewees C01, C02, C03, C06, C07, C08, C10, C13, C14, C15 and C16. 
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across the nation. Interviewee C05, a LuSE executive director, pointed out that even from a 
social-economic viewpoint the absence of strong corporate governance practices has the 
propensity to cause harm to the lives of many Zambians including investors, savers, retirees, 
employees and customers. It was clear that most interviewees believed that improved 
corporate governance could contribute greatly to achieving economic prosperity for Zambia. 
 
At this stage, interviewees were probed on what they perceived to be a suitable definition of 
development in the Zambian context. Several interviewees
187
 deviated from the conventional 
definition of development and instead proposed one which goes beyond statistical 
aggregates to emphasise uplifting the living standards of Zambian citizens. Interviewee C09 
argued that the economy must be managed in the “interest of the people”; development must 
therefore be conceptualised in terms of its propensity to impact positively on the well-being 
of Zambians. Correspondingly, interviewees C06 and C22 held a view that while economic 
development indicators such as GNP and GDP may be necessary, they are not sufficiently 
robust to measure development because they have a tendency to conceal wealth distribution 
inequalities (i.e. the widening gap between the rich and the poor) especially in developing 
countries like Zambia and, consequently, obscure the primary objective of development. To 
cement the preceding argument, interviewees C09 and C22 contended that despite current 
growth in GDP there has been no corresponding change in the economic and social well-
being of the people. The argument advanced here suggests that development as defined by 
GNP/GDP is of limited meaning in the Zambian context because the data itself fail to reflect 
day-to-day realities. Meaningful improvement in the living standards of the Zambian people 
was further explained by interviewees C09, C21 and C22 to mean advancement in the 
quality of education, health care services, as well as access to quality food, water, shelter, 
better working conditions and other social related indicators.  
                                                          
187
Interviewees C01, C03, C04, C05, C06, C07, C09, C10, C13, C14, C16, C21and C22. 
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8.3     Corporate Governance and Extant Development Status 
The concept of corporate governance and its implications for economic advancement is 
relevant for both developing and developed nations (Wu, 2005). Some scholars posit that 
corporate governance is at least as important in developing nations as it is in developed 
economies (Shkolnikov, 2002; Oman, 2003). While research in the area has concentrated on 
developed economies, Lin (2000) posits that the de facto problems of corporate governance 
are more serious in developing nations. Interviewee C01, an academic with extensive 
research experience believed that corporate governance, while being a worldwide 
phenomenon, matters most in practice for countries such as Zambia that are in transition. 
This interviewee’s opinion is consistent with the literature on the implications of corporate 
governance for developing nations. While Berglof and Thadden (1999) contend that the 
essentiality and significance of corporate governance is to a large extent dependent on a 
nation’s level of development, Oman (2003) argues that its importance is likely to be greatly 
appreciated in developing nations; this view is also consistent with prior literature on Africa 
regarding corporate governance and development (Babic, 2003; Oman, 2003; McGee, 2008; 
Siddiqui, 2010). Interviewee C01 argued that through the enhanced accountability that is 
‘packaged’ with it, corporate governance provides safeguards from (scarce) resource 
appropriation and misallocation by egocentric governing elites as is the case in most African 
countries. Most interview participants believed that if the country is to attain meaningful 
development, every resource needs to be accounted for and applied faithfully, especially as 
the country is in an economic transition period. 
  
While the concept of good governance might not be new to Africa, its incorporation into the 
development debate is a rather modernistic one. Regardless of the issues underpinning this 
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debate interviewee C04 - a World Bank representative - suggested that Zambia has finally 
come of age in that the concept now appears to be well appreciated by most citizens. 
Similarly interviewee C09, a past IODZ president, added that while the application may 
differ from economy to economy, the core elements of corporate governance remain the 
same. In this context, C04, an interviewee from the World Bank, stated that: 
“The corporate governance link also depends on where you are in the development 
spectrum, if you are in a country where the governance structures have really 
collapsed, the link is very visible compared to developed economies where 
governance and accountability structures are strong. If you are in Zambia the link is 
there and quite strong and visible”. 
 
Consistent with the literature review in Chapter Three, interviewee C04 seemed to suggest 
that the association between corporate governance and development is more clearly 
noticeable in countries with weak governance structures. Perhaps this is an indication that in 
Zambia which, like most African nations, is characterised by weak governance and 
accountability institutions, improvements in corporate governance practices are likely to 
have an immediate and direct impact on economic performance. This interviewee also 
believed that corporate governance has the propensity to encourage the establishment of 
rules and order in the allocation of resources which should in turn translate into ‘better’ 
accountability and enhanced development. Interviewee C07, an NGO executive director, 
suggested that corporate governance is fundamental in every society - regardless of the level 
of development - because it encourages the efficient use of resources and those charged with 
the allocation of resources are made to account for them in a transparent manner. In this 
regard, interviewee C08, an executive director in a state-controlled company, blamed laxity 
in corporate governance practices for Zambia’s lack of meaningful economic development 
since the country’s independence in 1964; he argued that corporate governance has the 
broader propensity to enhance accountability and transparency in government and the 
corporate community to energise development. As alluded to in Chapter Three of this thesis, 
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the alternative approach to discussing the relationship between corporate governance and 
development involves the notion of a country’s economy depending inter-alia on the drive 
and efficiency of its companies, an issue to which the analysis now turns.  
8.4      “Properly Run” Firms as the Drivers of Wealth  
The notion that ‘properly’ run companies are central to a country’s economic well-being 
(Ireland et al., 2001; Hart et al., 2003) has generated considerable debate in the corporate 
governance arena, with Okike (2007) noting that the idea has received appreciable attention 
in Africa. A question was therefore incorporated into the discussions with interviewees that 
aimed to assess views about the issue in a Zambian context. Interviewee C09 suggested that 
for the notion to be of relevance to the Zambian environment, robust corporate governance 
practices must be alive; in his view, improved corporate governance practices will invariably 
lead to efficiencies in company operations which can in turn lead to profitability and 
increased rewards to employees (as well as generating tax revenues), resulting in enhanced 
economic performance. As a critical tool for development, interviewee C19, a researcher, 
maintained that mechanisms built on the core fundamental principles of corporate 
governance should be able to both provide relief to companies to create wealth and help 
government capture revenues in a transparent and accountable manner. 
 
While the majority of interviewees acknowledged the link between corporate governance 
and economic improvements, a number of reservations regarding its propensity to benefit 
Zambia to any meaningful degree were pointed out. Firstly, supporting the notion in its 
generic form interviewee C14, a senior economist at the Africa Development Bank, stressed 
that: 
“Companies are the building blocks of any economy, they contribute to the treasury 
by paying tax, and they empower local people by providing employment 
opportunities; some of them go beyond the profit motive (particularly in Africa) by 
addressing social issues that the government should have been addressing, for 
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example, helping communities directly in the form of social responsibility. The only 
problem at the moment is that the companies that are able to create meaningful 
wealth are very few. The government should also ensure that agreements with such 
investors are done in an open and transparent manner so that the local communities 
can also benefit”. 
 
While companies are in theory open to public scrutiny, most interviewees expressed a 
concern that the majority of companies that create wealth in Zambia are not under sufficient 
pressure of this type to guarantee fair conduct and operations, suffocating accountability and 
corporate governance. While acknowledging that the notion “properly run firms as the 
drivers of wealth” is critical for the economy, interviewee C03, an executive manager of the 
IODZ, maintained that in the Zambian context the situation lacks credence, as few 
companies demonstrate de facto attentiveness to creating wealth for the nation. Similarly, 
interviewee C20, a Member of Parliament and Chair of the Economics Committee in 
Parliament, acceded that while the link between corporate governance and development was 
very visible, serious governance deficiencies made it inconsequential in the Zambian frame. 
These deficiencies, according to interviewees C02 and C20, draw together the issues 
surrounding accountability, transparency and disclosure and the opaque manner in which 
most companies’ operations are conducted in Zambia. Interviewee C01 believed that the 
mismatch between the designation of the notion and the actuality on the ground could be 
attributed to widespread corporate misconduct and scandals that continued to occur, 
particularly in the mining sector. To this effect, interviewee C23, a governance consultant, 
acknowledged that:  
“Zambia as a developing country needs companies - foreign and local - to drive the 
economy. If our investors come to Zambia, mine our minerals and take all the money 
out of the economy there will be no development in this country. Companies are 
required to conduct themselves properly; they are required to be transparent and 
accountable, protect the environment and contribute to the country’s treasury. All 
those who are in charge of institutions that produce wealth must do it in a transparent 
manner that does not provide opportunities for corruption. This can only be achieved 
if companies operate under the principles of corporate governance”.  
 
 277 
Notwithstanding these concerns, interviewee C23 argued that corporate governance 
sensitisation is now leading many Zambians to realise that companies are critical to the 
future of the country’s economy, not only because they provide employment and contribute 
tax, but because their activities affect the lives of every Zambian. To the extent that these 
companies are not ‘properly’ directed and controlled, interviewee C01 maintained that a 
threat remains regarding the entire Zambian economy and the living standards of its citizens 
- because corporate governance is weak in Zambia, scrutiny, checks and balances are also 
weakened.  
 
8.4.1 The Mining Sector in Zambia - Wealth Creation and Corporate Governance 
The mining sector in Zambia accounts for more than three-quarters of the country’s total 
export earnings (Coldough, 1997; Andersson et al., 2000; Lungu and Kapena, 2010) and, as 
a consequence, it provides the foundation for the country’s economy
188
. The significance of 
mining companies to Zambia’s finances implies that any performance changes in the sector 
will inevitably have a significant impact on the country’s economic performance. Consistent 
with this reasoning interviewee C01, a senior researcher, reported that the performance of 
the mining companies was critical to the country’s development by virtue of them 
accounting for over 70% of the country’s foreign exchange on which the country depends to 
boost other industries. According to this individual, copper production remains dominant in 
Zambia’s national development, and a need for effective corporate governance practices for 
companies in the sector follows from this. Interviewee C23, a corporate governance 
consultant, believed that there should be workable mechanisms to hold the mining 
companies to account if Zambia is to reap the full benefits of its abundant natural resources. 
 
                                                          
188
See Chapter Two and Chapter Four for more details. 
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Most interviewees raised concerns regarding corporate governance in the mining sector in 
Zambia. The majority of participants thought the mining sector was an appropriate reference 
point for discussion regarding the notion of “properly run companies as creators of wealth”. 
Major corporate scandals around the world have put corporate governance under a 
microscope (Vinten, 1994; Leblanc, 2011). In this regard interviewee C15, the executive 
director of the Economic Commission for Africa, stressed that Zambia has been losing 
millions of Zambian Kwacha (ZMK) through corporate malfeasance in the mining sector; 
such events have put the industry in the sights of both local and international observers in 
particular, on account of alleged irregularities in revenue declaration. Several 
interviewees
189
 maintained that as the mining sector plays a pivotal role in Zambia’s 
development such breaches had direct consequences for the country’s economy. Bearing this 
in mind, most of the individuals who took part in the study contended that the notion of 
properly run firms as drivers of wealth - in the Zambian context - is only meaningful if 
robust corporate governance practices exist. Interviewees believed that due to weak 
governance practices in the sector, a number of misunderstandings have emerged ranging 
from, tax evasion, inflated costs, externalisation of revenue, unfair transfer pricing systems, 
manipulated copper export data, poor pay for workers and minimal support for communities 
through to manipulation of financial accounting figures, manipulation of copper prices, 
hiding revenues from taxation, using derivatives trades to shift profits out of Zambia, unfair 
hedging patterns, secret negotiations of development agreements and non-compliance with 
the law and regulation. The next section discusses some of the governance issues raised by 
participants in relation to this list.  
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Interviewees C01, C02, C03, C14, C15, C20 and C23. 
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8.4.1.1 Tax Evasion 
Several interviewees argued that tax evasion has become a concern in Zambia following 
reports that certain companies have been involved in malpractices to avoid paying tax, 
inducing losses of revenue to support government expenditures. Conceptually one would 
expect that mining, being the leading sector in terms of foreign exchange, should also be in 
the lead in terms of contribution to the treasury. In contrast, the tax contribution to the 
treasury is minimal; for instance, interviewees C01, C03 and C20 noted that despite 
accounting for over 70% of total export earnings, the sector only contributes about 10% to 
Zambian exchequer receipts. A participant (who did not want to be recorded for security 
reasons) stated in this context that: 
“The copper export data seems not to be authentic for some companies because, for 
example, while much of the copper is believed to be going to Switzerland, and other 
countries outside Zambia, the Swiss customs data does not show this. The mismatch 
in the data has raised a lot of suspicion as to who is behind this, and can this be done 
without the consent of top politicians? So where is corporate governance and 
accountability? This is a clear indication that issues of accountability, transparency 
and disclosure are missing in the manner Zambian resources - particularly in the 
mining sector - are managed”. 
 
Interviewee C20 held the government and some mining companies responsible for the 
difficulties in tax law empowerment. For this, he pointed to the secretive manner in which 
the two parties have been operating regarding how much the government receives from 
companies. 
  
According to interviewees C01 and C02, a named mining company operating in Zambia is 
alleged to have been manipulating financial accounting figures, resulting in huge tax 
evasion, an act that clearly violates the OECD corporate governance guidelines. Interviewee 
C02 contended that there are also cases of unfair transfer pricing systems being employed 
with copper sales between local companies and their parent and sister companies abroad, a 
practice that is obviously at odd with the ‘arm’s length’ principle. More generally, 
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interviewees C02 and C20 contended that some companies fail to provide honest details of 
increased operating expenses, leading to fraudulently depressed revenue figures. In this 
regard, C02 stated that:  
“Some of these companies subscribe to various codes including the OECD 
guidelines, but look at the scandals being unearthed in terms of tax evasion. So how 
do we get relief as Zambians from those codes? Much as they subscribe to those 
codes it doesn’t work, that is why people are suggesting that we take them to court 
and pin them down on what the law says and not the non-legal binding corporate 
governance codes”. 
 
The safeguard, according to C12, lies to a great extent in corporate governance standards, 
which could play a role here. This interviewee suggested that strengthening standards of 
corporate governance including better monitoring of the tax-paying organisations backed by 
a strong political will, might lead to more scrupulous compliance with tax rules and 
ameliorate disorientations in the tax system. The issues raised here are consistent with the 
views expressed by several authors that tax evasion has become a critical corporate 
governance issue for economies in transition (Johnson et al., 2000; Robinson, 2001; Roland 
and Verdier, 2003).     
8.4.1.2 Unlimited Externalisation of Profits and Revenues 
In a bid to pursue investors, Zambian investment policy was modified with a view to   
promoting a liberal environment for investment (Zambia Development Agency, 2010). In 
this context, interviewee C02 pointed out that currently there are no restrictions in terms of 
the amount of profit and revenue that can leave Zambia. While this approach was intended 
to induce investment, interviewees C14 and C20 challenged the transparency in policies that 
allowed foreign companies to fully externalise income streams. Interviewee C20, a 
Parliamentarian, blamed such a scheme for the liquidity problems and the constant 
weakening of the currency that the country has been experiencing. To this effect, C19, C20 
and C22 all questioned the rationale for an arrangement that leaves the country housing the 
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operations with little more money than that required to settle day-to-day operational 
expenses. Interviewee C20 observed that:   
“The implication is that all the money from copper sales is externalised and they 
only recall that which they require to pay salaries and some petty operating expenses; 
the bulk of the money is deposited elsewhere so at the end of the day much as they 
will say they exported huge tons of copper, the monetary value does not report in the 
country. If the money was deposited in the Zambian banks it would mean that a lot 
of foreign exchange would be involved and this will improve our economy. It also 
affects the exchange rate; despite the reported increased copper production and 
exports our currency seems to be heading the opposite direction, depreciating almost 
every day” 
 
This interviewee pointed out some of the methods allegedly used to facilitate the flow of 
capital out of Zambia, including the practice whereby subsidiary mining companies 
operating in Zambia sell copper to their parent companies at gate price - far less than the 
market price - with the parent company then trading on the London Metal Market. The 
transfer pricing is arguably designed to lower net income for the local subsidiary exporter 
with a resultant reduced tax burden.  
8.4.1.3 Development Agreements  
The 1990s witnessed a sharp fall in the copper price, as well as poor performance more 
generally and a lack of new investment in the mining sector; these trends were a catalyst for 
a series of investor-driven reforms. Interviewee C20 argued that it is these same pro-investor 
driven regulatory frameworks and agreements that unwittingly became the sources of 
corporate governance controversies, while interviewee C18, the current IODZ president, 
blamed closed-door agreements between the government and investors that occurred without 
any input from other key stakeholders. According to interviewee C03, such closed-door 
agreements - which did not reflect the wishes of the majority of Zambians - resulted in huge 
tax concessions, unlimited amounts of profit externalisation and extended periods of carry-
over losses. For instance, C01 stated that:  
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“Companies come to Zambia to take advantage of the weak laws where, for example, 
the first 5 years they are exempted from paying tax; surprisingly, when the 5-year 
period expires the company winds-up and comes back under a different name in 
order to attract another 5-year tax exempt period resulting in the Zambian 
government losing millions of Kwachas in forgone taxes” 
 
Similarly, C02 mentioned that: 
“On top of several exemptions and allowances, some mining firms negotiated for an 
extended carry-over loss period. This cannot work in a country like ours where 
corporate governance is very weak because the mining firms just play around with 
figures so that at the end of the day they report losses and then pay very little or no 
tax at all. There is one mining company in this country whose life-span is believed to 
be lower than the extended loss period agreed with the Zambia government. So what 
is the benefit for this country and where is corporate governance?” 
 
Interviewees noted that in addition to incentives provided for in the Zambia Development 
Agency Act of 2006, certain categories of investors are entitled to negotiate with the 
government for additional incentives (i.e. other than what they qualify for under the Act). 
The secrecy attached to and opaque nature of such negotiations is what most interviewees 
blamed for the establishment of wholesale concessions that do not have the backing of the 
majority of stakeholders. The bone of contention for C02 and C20 appeared to be that while 
accounting standards do allow for losses to be carried forward and offset against future 
profits, the extended carry-over loss period adopted by some firms gives too much room for 
possible manipulation and goes against the dictates of international accounting standards; 
such behaviour is hard to reconcile with any notion of best practice as regards corporate 
governance
190
.  
 
The difficulty with such an arrangement according to interviewee C02, an executive director 
of an NGO, lies with the manner in which the agreements are concerted, i.e. they typically 
lack stakeholder participation and thereby create tension between major stakeholders and the 
mining companies concerned. In particular, he pointed out that: 
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The Investment Act of 2006 provides for carry-forward losses of 10 years for copper and cobalt mining,   
and 20 years for Konkola Copper Mining and Mopani Copper Mining. Other mining is 5 years, non-mining 
5 years, while for farming and non-traditional exports the figure is 5 years (Zambia Development Agency, 
2010 p. 11). 
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“Any corporate governance discussion in this country is not complete without 
reference to development agreements signed between the government and some 
investors. For example, some companies were allowed to pollute free for periods 
ranging from 5 years and were exempted from prosecution. But in terms of the law 
of this land pollution is a crime. We feel that this, on our part, is poor corporate 
governance. Some of these development agreements were signed in secret 
environments without allowing the communities or stakeholders affected by the 
operations of the mining companies to have an input. Even hiding information from 
stakeholders is poor corporate governance”.  
 
These disclosures sharply contrast with the postulated principle and spirit of the notion that 
companies can create wealth and enhance a nation’s economic standing. While some of 
these concessions may have been designed to attract much needed investment, in practice 
they have worked directly against the purposes for which they were designed - whether this 
is through manipulation or by design is another question. Because of these pitfalls, the 
scheme of concessions has undoubtedly raised substantive questions, leading to calls for an 
urgent governance overhaul. More generally, the majority of the interviewees called for 
close monitoring and regulation to ensure that accounting policies adopted by mining firms 
in Zambia are in line with accepted practice and closer to the goals of accountability, 
transparency and disclosure. Against this backdrop, both C14 and C15 believed that a well-
designed accounting system reduces opportunities for manipulation and should help the 
Zambian government capture all revenues. The preceding revelations seem to have drawn 
the attention of many Zambians to how the nation’s mining companies are directed and 
controlled. The participants’ perceptions here suggest that the notion of companies as 
creators of wealth for economic development has lamentably failed in the Zambian context, 
at least for now. 
8.5 Corruption: A Corporate Governance and Development Perspective 
There is a commonly-held view that robust corporate governance can minimise extant levels 
of corruption (Shkolnikov, 2002; Wu, 2005). Interviewees C01, C02, C03, C20, and C22 
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believed that corruption was alive in Zambia - reflecting governance failures - and that this 
was a substantive impediment to development. Interviewee C01 contended here that: 
“Nobody denies that corruption in this country is really at its height. Corruption is 
also a form of theft; resources go into private pockets instead of the public domain. 
Most revenues collected by the government are an understatement of what the 
government should have collected in a corruption-free environment”. 
 
Correspondingly, interviewee C04, from the World Bank, declared that: 
“Corruption is in itself bad governance and it affects development negatively. For 
example, the quality of service delivery is compromised, resources do not reach the 
intended targets. Corruption increases the cost of doing business, projects are 
overpriced, contracts are given to contractors who have no capacity to do the job, 
and many of these contracts are either abandoned or the final works are sub-
standard”. 
 
Interviewee C23 argued that Zambia, like many developing countries, requires scarce 
resources to be applied ‘correctly’ for purposeful development to take place. Corruption in 
this context was viewed as a problem of accountability and a number of interviewees 
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highlighted factors that mitigate against development in the presence of corruption: 
distortions of economic planning (C14); encouragement of poor service delivery (C22); 
propensity for resources meant for development to end up in people’s private pockets (C01, 
C15); development projects being over-priced, putting a drain on (meagre) resources (C04, 
C08); effect on competition (C17); increases in the cost of doing business (C04, C08); 
suppression of laws and regulation (C06); promotion of inefficiencies in the economy (C01, 
C22); and worsening poverty (C02, C03, C08). The interviewees’ arguments against 
corruption evidenced a belief that corporate governance represents the alternative 
philosophy to straightforward confrontational approaches to fighting the ‘scourge’. 
  
Interviewees C01, C14 and C15 maintained that Africa - and Zambia in particular - loses 
vast sums of money each year through corruption; here C15 stated that: 
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Interviewees C06, C08, C14, C15, C17 and C22. 
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“It has been demonstrated that the illicit financial frauds through corruption in Africa 
alone is enough to cover the aid and investment that we get. But the major question 
is, how do we stop those resources from corruptly going out and how do we bring 
those resources back. Do we need revolutions like in Libya for the world to realise 
that this is not good and has been affecting development on the African continent? 
Some African leaders, the outside world and the so called tax havens have 
contributed to this problem”. 
 
Between 1970 and 2008, an estimated US$854 billion had been siphoned out of Africa 
through corrupt means of which Zambia is involved (Cartwright-Smith and Dev, 2008). 
Interviewee C01 argued that examples of how Zambia’s resources have been abused abound 
and if all the money that has been looted were invested back in Zambia, there could have 
been a different way of life for its citizens. Interviewees commonly argued that focusing on 
improving corporate governance standards can help fight corruption and hopefully unlock a 
nation’s prospects for growth.  
8.6      Accountability and Development 
As a generic concept, accountability refers to the state of being called to account for one’s 
actions or inactions (Mulgan, 2000; Boven, 2006). Conventional theory holds that there is an 
express relationship between accountability and governance and this link has become part of 
the modern governance paradigm (Boven et al. 2008). Similarly, the abundant literature 
suggests that there is an express relationship between governance and development (World 
Bank, 1989; Ogendo, 1995; Feinberg, 1998; Kaufmann et al., 1999; Rwegasira, 2000; 
Hyden et al., 2004; NEPAD, 2007; Arun and Turner, 2009). Indeed, Solomon (2010) argues 
that it is the association between accountability and economic development that has put 
corporate governance in the public limelight. To explore the issue of accountability, a 
question designed to detect the interviewees’ opinions about the extent to which the 
perceived governance problems in Zambia were linked to accountability - and how 
accountability can contribute to better governance and development - was included in the 
discussions. This question is theoretically driven in the sense that the present thesis is 
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underpinned by the accountability philosophy. The interviewer’s observation was that all 
participants were able to provide a rational argument about the relationship between good 
governance, accountability and development with the majority clearly believing that there 
cannot be good governance and development without accountability
192
. Typical of this 
perspective is the argument by C11, a member of the IODZ:  
“Accountability is one of the pillars of corporate governance, so the absence of 
accountability means the absence of good corporate governance. We are coming 
from a system of a lack of accountability at almost all levels of the economy. 
Accountability is not just about being accountable for money but also for one’s 
actions. Accountability has become a public good”. 
 
The overwhelming majority of interviewee responses
193
 to this question suggest that robust 
corporate governance is widely seen as being underpinned by accountability and, equally, 
that any debate about governance and development in Zambia is not authentic without 
setting it in an accountability frame. Interviewees argued that the development challenges 
facing Zambia and other African countries often point to a lack of accountability; the fact 
that the Zambian economy has remained fragile despite the nation being favoured with rich 
natural resources was mentioned in this context. While Zambia’s development problems and 
constraints are varied, interviewees believed that the relationship between accountability and 
development remains one of the most critical. Interviewees C09 and C23, past IODZ 
presidents, both argued in favour of accountability at three particular levels; personal, 
corporate and state. In their view, accountability should start at the personal level, which 
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The following are some of the positions taken by interviewees: “accountability in itself is governance” (C01; 
C18); “accountability can contribute to better governance” (C02; C04; C08); “accountability is key in 
corporate governance” (C03; C10; C13; C14); “accountability is important for governance and 
development” (C05; C22); “accountability is a characteristic of good governance” (C06); “accountability is 
part of governance” (C07; C21; C24); “accountability eliminates corruption” (C09); “accountability is one 
of the pillars of corporate governance” (C11; C16; C23); “the whole essence of corporate governance is 
accountability” (C12); “accountability is a sub-set of corporate governance” (C15); “accountability leads to 
better utilisation of resources” (C17); “you can’t have a functioning governance system without 
accountability” (C19); and “lack of accountability in this country is a sign of bad governance” (C20). 
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Interviewees C01, C02, C03, C04, C05, C06, C07, C08, C09, C10, C11, C12, C13 and C14. 
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most interviewees associated with the concept of ethics and integrity. Here, interviewee C23 
maintained that: 
“Accountability is one of the key pillars of corporate governance, at human, 
corporate and at state levels. Unless people who run these institutions at whatever 
level are men and women of integrity with unquestionable ethical standing, corporate 
governance cannot survive. The practice of corporate governance itself depends to a 
greater extent on the individuals running these companies”. 
 
In fact, most interviewees’ rationalisation of the need for accountability was on the basis of 
its influence on the quality of governance and development by subjecting those charged with 
the management and allocation of resources to appropriate checks and balances. 
8.6.1     Accountability at the Personal Level 
Interviewees C03, C18 and C24 contended that accountability at a personal level should be 
the foundation of the whole accountability process. In this, they argued that while 
accountability may be dictated or implied by law, regulation or agreement, on the ground its 
existence rests on individuals. Nevertheless, a good number of interviewees acknowledged 
that personal accountability is controversial and depends on a number of contextual factors 
such as cultural values and beliefs. On this point, interviewee C20 asserted that: 
“There is a strange culture in this country where people do not want to be 
accountable either because of cultural issues or simply because they are doing wrong 
things and if they are to be accountable for the wrong things they will obviously be 
punished. For example, there are serious cases in the Auditor General’s Report every 
year about the lack of accountability in government, parastatals and government 
agencies but people do not seem to be concerned. There is no political will to ensure 
that there is greater accountability”.  
 
Similarly, interviewees C01, C02 and C06 claimed that because of this cultural rigidity, 
people in Zambia do not take accountability seriously - for instance, it is very rare to see 
Zambian managers resigning their positions in government, public and other organisations, 
even if they are involved in scandals or have breached ethical conduct. Here, interviewee 
C01 pointed out that:  
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“We have this tradition where if somebody does something wrong, instead of 
reporting them we prefer to remain mute because if they are fired from work, society 
will condemn the whistle blower for reporting them. It is this silence which becomes 
a big problem for our country and for development. We need whistle blowers and 
there must be somebody to listen and that is where we miss it because there are no 
institutions to listen or it will depend on who the whistle has been blown against. So 
institutions like the Anti-Corruption Commission and the legal system must be above 
board and we must find a way of appointing members to these institutions above 
political affiliation”. 
 
This issue has, according to C01, been largely overlooked in Zambia and is responsible in 
part for low levels of individual accountability in practice. 
8.6.2     Accountability at State level 
Interviewees cited the government, state spending agencies and SOEs as some of the 
organisations with the lowest levels of accountability standards in Zambia. As demonstrated 
in the previous chapter, and earlier in this section, accountability and corporate governance 
were seen by the interviewees as inseparable, with anaemic corporate governance standards 
being associated directly with passive accountability. In this regard, C23 argued that: 
“Huge commentaries on lack of proper accounting for public expenditure, lapses, 
irregularities and misuse of public funds have been raised in the Auditor General’s 
Report, but due to the weak public accountability framework, year in year out, the 
same issues keep on coming out and nothing seems to be done about it. The report is 
just a cry in the wilderness. The government ought to be accountable”. 
 
Interviewees C07 and C20 claimed that a lack of effective accountability systems in 
government led some donor countries to withdraw development funds; in some cases the 
Zambian government even ended up reimbursing donors for the misappropriated funds. In 
support of this assertion, C20 stated that: 
“Recently there were reports of misappropriation of money in the ministry of health. 
The government, through the Ministry of Health, was forced to refund the embezzled 
Global Fund amounting to about US$ 13 million. This also led donor countries like 
Sweden and the Netherlands to withhold huge amounts of money and funding to the 
Ministry of Health. But with all these irregularities no one has been held accountable 
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and unfortunately the tax-payer’s money will have to be used to refund the Global 
Fund
194
. We are not going to develop this country in the absence of accountability”. 
 
Evidence of misappropriation and a failure to apply sanctions is a clear manifestation of an 
accountability framework so weak as to foster significant corruption. Interviewee C02 
explicitly argued that accountability that does not provide for sanctions is not meaningful. 
This reasoning is consistent with evidence reviewed in Chapter Five where scholars argued 
that accountability that has no capacity to impose sanctions as a punishment for 
unsatisfactory answers from those who are called to account is defective (Burritt and Welch, 
1997; Schedler, 1999; Mulgan, 2000; Mainwaring, 2003; Boven, 2006).  
8.6.3     Accountability at Corporate Level 
Corporations are generally expected to be accountable for their actions to all stakeholders 
affected by their operations (King Report, 1994). In the Zambian context, interviewees 
believed that corporate accountability should be extended to non-shareholding stakeholders, 
thereby including environmental and social perspectives. According to interviewee C10, the 
assumption that economies around the world have come to depend on corporations for 
wealth creation and economic prosperity has major implications for corporate 
accountability; similarly, to the extent that corporations operating in Zambia are not 
accountable, C20 remarked that the effects have a direct and substantial impact on the 
economy and society at large. This interviewee also held the lack of accountability in the 
corporate sector in Zambia responsible for current industrial disorientation, particularly in 
the mining sector where some companies have been involved in understating revenues, 
polluting the environment at will, producing misleading accounting reports, evading tax and 
other irregularities all of which have serious implications for economic growth. Interviewee 
C24 extended this argument further by challenging the conventional shareholder-centric 
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The Global Fund is money given to Zambia by different donors to help the fight against HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria. Sweden and the Netherlands are two of the largest contributors to the fund.  
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accountability model pursued by most corporations operating in Zambia. She maintained 
that: 
“As a country we have adopted outside codes in totality without modification. There 
are no new issues that have been added to these codes. In this sense we have ended 
up embracing principles that prioritise companies’ accountability to shareholders and 
disregard other areas of corporate governance such as the companies’ impact on the 
environment and communities in which they operate. They tend to focus purely on 
making money for the owners”   
 
Several interviewees acknowledged that Zambia has also seen increased demand - 
particularly at community and civil society level - for more transparency and disclosure as a 
way of enhancing accountability in the country. In this context, interviewee C01 predicted 
that once government and key businesses begin to disclose the flow of resources, citizens 
will be empowered with vital information on how much the government gets from the 
corporate sector and how this is allocated across the economy
195
. The issue of disclosure is 
now a serious agenda item, not only for Zambia but for the international community as well. 
Here, interviewee C01 stated that:  
“I have argued before the European Commission (EC) that if they don’t force the 
Zambian government and the major corporations operating within Zambia to be 
accountable for the resources that they generate and how they distribute them, the 
EU and other donors will end up paying for this through aid to cover up what this 
government has failed to recover from the corporations operating in Zambia. In this 
regard, the EU, donors and NGOs outside this country have also become interested 
parties in ensuring that the government discloses how much they earn from the 
firms’ operations. If they don’t assist us, they will end up subsidising the government 
where the corporations making huge profits should have paid”. 
 
In this regard, C01 believed that disclosure becomes an important element of accountability 
as citizens will be empowered to demand better accountability - and a better resource 
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This is consistent with the requirements of a new African campaign group called ‘Publish What You Pay’ an 
initiative intended to strengthen accountability through disclosure. PWYP is a worldwide movement for 
greater transparency and accountability in resource-rich, developing nations and has insisted for a decade 
that the proceeds of natural resource wealth, which far exceed aid flows, should help finance development 
rather than fuel corruption and conflict. According to PWYP’s principles, if people know what their 
government is receiving from mineral rights they can have a greater say in how that money get spent; the 
less transparency there is, the easier it is for corruption to seep in and remove away opportunities for 
millions of people to improve their own lives. 
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allocation will emerge. However, when government and industry’s dealings are not fully 
transparent, individuals will naturally be suspicious about their operations and this is when 
corporate governance and institutional capacity come in. The conventional argument, as C04 
indicated, is that accountability can contribute to better governance only when institutions 
and systems exist that have the capacity to hold people and organisations accountable for 
their actions. A lack of accountability also featured highly on the participants’ constellation 
of factors that make corruption difficult to deal with in practice. 
8.7 Institutional Capacity 
Institutional capacity is fundamental to the role of accountability in governance and 
development (IMF, 2000; Haglund, 2008). Equally, the theoretical implication that 
corporate governance matters greatly for developing countries (Babic, 2003; Oman, 2003; 
McGee, 2008; Siddiqui, 2010) is an indication that such nations need to establish institutions 
that promote robust corporate governance systems. Recent evidence suggests that corporate 
governance in transition economies is highly influenced by legal, regulatory and institutional 
frameworks (Wanyama, 2006; Rezaee, 2007; Wanyama et al., 2009) but most interviewees 
in the present study argued that there is no dearth of such institutions in Zambia and the 
main challenge relates to the fact that like other economies in transition, the nation is 
exposed to general weaknesses in terms of resources, enforcement and independence
196
. To 
protect public and private resources from abuse, interviewees C21 and C23 maintained that 
institutions that will embrace accountability at all levels must be put in place - equally, 
people in these institutions require exposure to good corporate governance. Indeed, a 
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The following quotes are typical of those put forward by the interviewees: “Institutions are there but they are 
weak” (C03), “the forms of institutions are there but the substance is not” (C04), “they lack adequate laws 
to back them” (C06), “Zambia lacks institutional capacity” (C07), “We have the institutions, they are just 
weak” (C08), “Institutions are there but they lack capacity to implement and enforce” (C12), “We have 
institutions but they need strengthening” (C13),  “institutions are there but they are very weak” (C14), 
“Institutions are there but they need strengthening” (C19), “accountability institutions are weak” (C18), 
“governance institutions are weak” (C17). 
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number of governance problems experienced in Africa are exacerbated by the effects of 
weaknesses in institutional design for example, Wanyama’s (2006) study of Uganda. 
Strengthening corporate governance frameworks - and building institutional capacity - is 
therefore likely to improve state and firm-level governance practices.  
8.7.1     Legal and Regulatory Arrangements 
The interviewees argued that heightened awareness of the principles of corporate 
governance alone will not in itself generate practical change unless this is accompanied by 
rules and regulations that are enforced in a robust manner. In this regard, enforcement and 
compliance monitoring were seen as playing a critical role in the process in terms of 
levelling the playing field for all participants. Underlying these assumptions, several 
interviewees
197
 observed that the country’s weak corporate governance position was 
compounded by the non-existence of laws and regulations that were specific to governance 
of the nation’s firms. While some interviewees pointed to extant commercial law, 
interviewee C01 perceived the latter’s general nature to mean that it is of little benefit in 
promoting and mitigating complex corporate governance issues in practice. These and other 
concerns prompted most interviewees to propose a fusion of laws and corporate governance 
that matches the demands of globalisation and the liberalised economic environment existent 
in transition countries like Zambia. In this context interviewee C08, an executive director in 
a state-controlled organisation, contended that the extant lacuna in the current legal and 
regulatory framework provided fertile ground for the corporate governance abuses which the 
country has witnessed, particularly in the mining sector. Similarly, interviewee C19 asserted 
that:  
“The governance situation in the country is simply not commensurate because even 
the minimum rules are not being enforced. Having rules is one thing and enforcing 
them is another. For instance, a law has been passed that the minimum wage is K419 
000, this is law but some employers do not apply it and no one seems to be 
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Interviewees C06, C07, C11, C12 and C20. 
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concerned. In some cases the laws are weak, a company pollutes a river and gets a 
charge of K12 million. Meanwhile the destruction to nature is huge, fish, the 
environment, the effect on the people who drink from the polluted rivers. Those who 
run public offices do not feel substantially responsible for their actions”. 
 
Similar sentiments were expressed by interviewees C12, C20 and C22. Interviewee C20 
gave an example of a Parliamentary Committee’s investigation of a mining company that 
did not provide workers with protective clothing despite this being a legal requirement 
because of the dangerous conditions the mine workers were exposed to. Interviewees C01 
and C19 argued that as is common with private capital, the dominant focus is profit and so 
nation’s authorities must ensure that corporate conduct is carefully monitored and regulated 
through appropriate laws. From the interviewees
198
, perspective, the extant corporate 
governance problems in Zambia range from weak legislative and regulatory frameworks to 
non-observance of rules. In this context, the view of a sizeable majority of the interviewees 
was that corporations destined for the Zambian environment must commit themselves to 
comply scrupulously with local corporate governance guidelines as well as national laws 
and regulations. Similarly, Zambia must also update the legislative and regulatory 
frameworks on which the Zambian corporate governance guidelines are founded to match 
the challenges of globalisation.  
8.7.2     Public Accountability: The Office of the Auditor General (OAG) 
The discussions also focused on issues surrounding government and other public bodies’ 
spending; here interviewees C02, C04 and C23 identified the Zambia Public Procurement 
Agent (ZPPA), Energy Regulation Board (ERB), the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), 
the Drug Enforcement Commission (DEC), the Human Rights Commission (HRC) and the 
Office of the Auditor General as some of the key public oversight institutions that can 
provide basic checks and balances in the country. While the majority of interviewees cited 
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parliamentary oversight as essential in providing checks and balances to the executive and 
keeping the government accountable, C04 and C22 both contended that the system in 
Zambia is highly politicised, limited in most cases to budget approval. Supporting this 
assertion, interviewee C23, a governance consultant, argued that the executive often make 
major budgetary changes without the prior consent of parliament; in addition, the 
government sometimes spends vast sums of money outside the budget without disclosing the 
sources of funding to parliament thereby rendering the whole public oversight system 
meaningless.  
 
While interviewees mentioned several different accountability institutions, the OAG 
appeared to be viewed as the most influential when it comes to public accountability. The 
OAG - which draws its mandate from the constitution of Zambia - is charged with the 
responsibility of enhancing accountability and transparency in the management of public 
resources and virtually all the interviewees mentioned it by name. For instance C09, a 
governance consultant and past IODZ president, argued that every year the OAG’s Report 
notes billions of Zambian Kwachas escaping government coffers in an unaccounted manner. 
While acknowledging the significant and critical role that the OAG plays in promoting and 
strengthening corporate governance and accountability in the public sector, interviewees 
C01, C02, C03, C04 and C22 all maintained that the institution lacks the capacity to achieve 
its stated objectives, rendering the report a ‘long, sad story’ and little more than a rhetorical 
document. In this instance, C22, a researcher and consultant, mentioned that: 
“The Auditor General’s Report goes to parliament late and it does not mention the 
names of the culprits. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) report is tabled in 
Parliament; a resolution is passed and sent back to government for action by, the 
same executive that failed to deliver in the first place. How does that help 
accountability? It is supposed to be acted upon within 90 days but it takes not less 
than 6 months. The answers are also irrelevant because they will just put ‘comments 
noted’. The system itself is self-defeating because it produces no results”. 
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Despite highlighting irregularities in the management of public resources, interviewee C02 
argued that the system lacks the capacity for sanctions when unsatisfactory answers are 
given. Similarly, C16, a senior officer in the OAG, pointed out that issues addressed in one 
ministry can reappear in others with more serious implications for accountability, rendering 
the latter a ‘circus’ in government activity. The major weakness, according to C16, lies in 
the OAG’s lack of resources and government support. Here, interviewee C20 suggested that: 
“The Auditor General’s Report shows that there are certain government institutions 
that have collected money and have not banked the same for 500 days. People have 
collected imprest and they have not retired the same for years. In the current report 
some provincial administrative wings cannot account for money that was sent to 
their provinces for feeder roads; others used money meant for capital projects on 
imprest and funeral grants. Even when such anomalies are highlighted in the 
Auditors’ Report nothing has happened. Funds meant for cattle restocking in one 
province and land funds in one district have disappeared”. 
   
Acknowledging the importance of the OAG - and as a way of enhancing accountability - 
interviewee C01 directed attention to the overall objective of improving institutional 
capacity in order to strengthen corporate governance in government spending agencies and 
SOEs; such change, he suggested, is needed as corporate governance failures in most 
developing countries are associated with institutional weaknesses.  
8.8    Chinese Investment and Corporate Governance in Zambia 
Chapter Four outlines the growing influence of China on Zambia’s political economy and it 
was apparent from the interviewees that the influence of Chinese investment
199
 on the 
country’s corporate governance framework is being felt. Interviewee C19 noted that whist 
the increased investment was helpful, it has created friction between several investee 
companies and some sections of Zambian society. The debate about Chinese investment in 
developing countries such as Zambia has focused on issues such as labour and 
environmental law, health and safety standards, and social responsibility, all of which are 
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The last decades have witnessed increased Chinese investment in Zambia, with the stake amounting to more 
than US$2 billion in 2012 (Maimbolwa, 2012). 
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essential features of robust corporate governance systems (Haglund, 2009). These and 
similar matters have become critical governance and development concerns, with several 
interviewees questioning Zambia’s benefit from such investments. The Zambian 
government’s failure to strike a balance between: (i) increased Chinese investment; and (ii) 
the interests of local stakeholders and the consequential impact on overall governance in 
Zambia, poses a series of challenges for corporate governance reforms in the country. In this 
context, the majority of interviewees perceived ‘good’ intentions as underpinning Chinese 
investment in Zambia; however, a sizable number pointed out that most Chinese firms lack a 
strong foundation in corporate governance practices. This perspective is typical in a 
statement made by C19, an academician, thus: 
“If we are to benefit from Chinese investment we must ensure that Chinese firms are 
seriously committed to quality corporate governance practices. The government must 
play a role here so that corporate governance becomes part of the investment 
requirement. This can be captured in the Investments Act in order to level the 
playing field and for the country to benefit from such investment.”  
  
Despite alleged misconduct by most Chinese companies, this interviewee argued that it is 
rare in Zambia to see government and law enforcement agencies taking a ‘hard’ stance 
against bad practices, further raising suspicions about corruption. 
8.8.1     Corporate Governance Sources of Conflict with Chinese Firms 
Although China’s business relationship with Zambia dates back to the 1970s, several 
interviewees believed that there has been a growing interest in issues surrounding Chinese 
firms and corporate governance in the last decade. For instance, interviewees C03, an IODZ 
executive and C22, a researcher and consultant, both attributed the extant governance 
dilemmas to the Chinese procedural approach to investment in Zambia:  
“The Chinese approach is to first of all identify themselves with the political 
governing elite. A delegation of investors comes into this country, instead of visiting 
institutions that are responsible for investment in Zambia such as the Zambia 
Development Agency (ZDA). Investors start by visiting State House, making it 
difficult for the other offices below the President to question anything. Experience 
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shows that the observance of the laws and good corporate governance practices is 
normally very poor for investors that come through State House” (C22). 
 
It was noted by various interviewees that Chinese firms have been cited for bad corporate 
behaviour ranging from: the use of unlicensed guns to shoot at protesting employees (C19; 
C20; C22); poor human rights (C15; C22); low wages and poor working conditions (C19); 
a lack of concern for workers’ health and safety (C20); non-observance of labour and 
environmental laws (C15); an absence of concern with corporate social responsibility (C01; 
C17; C19; C21); the importation of non-skilled labour forces from China (C01; C15; C17; 
C19; 20); the non-submission of funds (pensions) under statutory obligations (C01; C03; 
C17; C19); and, in most cases, the lack of a board of directors  (C01).   For instance, 
interviewee C20 claimed that: 
“There are a number of companies in this country that have ignored the health, safety 
and environmental laws because in some cases the very people who are supposed to 
be enforcing the laws become spokespersons for the investors. We have had cases of 
ministers answering questions on behalf of some companies. For example, in the 
year 2010, at least 11 employees were shot at by management of a Chinese Collum 
Coal Mine in Southern Province with unlicensed arms - to date no one has been 
charged. The government is always siding with the investor, so who is going to side 
with the citizens?”  
 
Ienciu (2012) argues that corporate governance supports an ethical corporate culture, 
inspires ethical behavior and is a commitment to ethical business practice. Failure to commit 
a company to ethical behaviour, therefore suggests non-compliance with good governance 
practices (Solomon, 2007) and the OECD principles explicitly encourage businesses to 
recognise and safeguard stakeholders’ rights and adhere to high standards of corporate 
behaviour and ethics. However, for many interviewees, it was not only issues of unethical 
corporate conduct but other violations of basic human rights that are relevant in the context 
of Chinese investment in Zambia.  
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The participants believed that the corporate citizenship concept relates directly to 
environmental, social and governance responsibilities of a company, meaning that boards 
must also strive to address this dimension in its approach to different stakeholder groups. 
More formally, there is a requirement in the UK’s Turnbull guidance on the Combined Code 
on Corporate Governance for listed companies to seriously consider issues relating to the 
environment, health and safety. However, interviewees C17, C19 and C20 all maintained 
that Chinese firms regularly ignore standards relating to a number of governance issues 
including: pollution
200
; mistreatment of local workers; pay and working conditions; safety 
and environmental standards; and local cultural practices. Interviewee C20, a legislator, 
declared that:   
“As a Parliamentary Committee, we visited a Chinese mining firm operating on the 
Copperbelt; the workers did not have protective clothing and a mining representative 
wanted the committee to tour the mine plant without safety attire. We found this to 
be extremely dangerous because the company was gambling with peoples’ lives, and 
this is what they do with the safety of hundreds of employees’ lives. The toilets and 
showers were made in such a way that miners were exposed as they were using 
them. In another Coal mine in Southern Province, despite working in coal dust 
environments, the workers did not have anything to protect them, no face masks, no 
safety shoes. Miners work in their own clothes”
201
.   
   
It is widely acknowledged that a dedicated, knowledgeable and rigorous board of directors is 
central to an effective corporate governance system (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). 
While there has been a surge of interest in the principles of good corporate governance 
across much of the world, most participants in the present study believed that Chinese firms 
do not consider it prudent to implement corporate governance measures and align their firms 
with global best governance practices. While the above problems may be attributable to 
                                                          
200
For example, interviewee C20 claimed that a Chinese-run mine has been polluting a local stream with black 
sediment from waste coal. The stream is the source of drinking water for the local community and flows 
into Lake Kariba, which provides commercial fishing. 
201
Health, safety and environmental issues have obvious corporate governance implications as was witnessed 
dramatically in the Exxon-Valdez oil spill in Alaska in 1989 and the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico leading to loss of life and devastating environmental damage. BP shareholders have been reported 
as contemplating suing its board of directors for failure to adhere to good corporate governance practices 
(Calkins, 2010). 
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Chinese investment, interviewees were quick to point out that the difficulties were 
exacerbated by underlying weaknesses in Zambian governance and accountability 
institutions. For example, most of the interviewees
202
 argued that the difficulties related to 
Chinese investment in Zambia were partly a local creation. This line of argument was based 
on a perception that where China was investing in countries outside Zambia these problems 
did not occur. For instance: 
“The Chinese are not only in Zambia, they are all over the world, but when they 
come to Zambia things are completely different, they prefer cheap labour, they do 
not observe Zambian labour laws, they want to do simple jobs that Zambians can do 
including that of pushing wheelbarrows and they pollute with impunity. Some of 
these Chinese investors are now raring chickens while others are busy selling cheap 
clothes in the local markets competing with local people in the informal sector. The 
problem is not the Chinese, it is us Zambians, we should set minimum conditions; 
we should engage them on certain conditions” (C23).  
  
The above quote points to (perceived) governance-based sources of conflict. In this regard, 
interviewee C23 argued that extant legislation and regulation set out expected standards of 
‘acceptable’ corporate conduct in various areas; however, as noted earlier in this chapter, 
laws and corporate regulation that lack enforcement are effectively obsolete in Zambia
203
. 
Several interviewees called for a modified legal system that accommodates the fluidity and 
dynamism of modern business in a liberalised economic environment, but has the power to 
influence overseas firm behaviour on Zambian territory. Interviewee C01 argued that 
Chinese authorities take domestic business misconduct seriously, stating that: “In China 
people go to jail for cheating on contracts so why do they do it here”? In this context, a 
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Interviewees C01, C02, C03, C05, C06, C09, C11, C14, C15, C17, C18, C19, C20, C21, C22, and C23. 
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The following two quotes summarise stakeholders’ views about the non-observance of Zambian laws: 
  
“Are the Chinese firms aware that this country has got its own rules and regulations and who is responsible 
for enforcing them? There are a lot of deviations from the law. At this stage government is not really 
concerned about governance issues in private companies. As long as the company is able to employee 
people issues of governance are manipulated” (C03).  
“Sometimes the Chinese investors tend to do things as if there are no laws in this country. When the same 
Chinese go to South Africa they follow the South African laws and elsewhere like the UK, and the USA, 
but in Zambia because of corruption and weak accountability institutions they create their own laws. We 
have laws on safety, environment and labour but they cannot be enforced” (C20). 
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number of interviewees
204
 argued that Chinese investors take advantage of the weak laws 
and accountability institutions found in Zambia to achieve ‘short-cuts’. This assumption is 
consistent with extant literature; for instance, Haglund (2008) argued that the capacity 
constraints in terms of the regulatory framework, coupled with political interventionism and 
the absence of transparency pose significant challenges as regards Chinese investment in 
Zambia. 
 
Interviewees C01 and C17 maintained that because most Chinese investment is arranged 
between the two governments directly, a number of the companies that come to Zambia are 
actually Chinese state-controlled companies. Against this backdrop, the interviewees pointed 
to a common belief that across the globe most SOEs are weak in terms of corporate 
governance standards relative to privately-owned enterprises; as such the Chinese SOEs 
investing in Zambia are not an exception. This is in line with earlier studies such as Haglund 
(2008) who argues that by providing financial support to Chinese investing companies, the 
Chinese government influences corporate governance in such firms; this, he contended, 
empowers the Chinese government to exert control over Chinese firms operating in the 
private sector in Africa. While most multinational companies operating in Africa are private, 
Frost and Ho (2005) pointed out that the largest Chinese multinationals are actually state-
owned. In this context, Tull (2006) argued that China’s interest in Africa is not only 
commercial, but political and diplomatic. The spectrum of corporate misconduct exemplifies 
the modern reality that corporate governance in Zambia requires strengthening to prevent 
such egregious disregard for its principles and, just as importantly, to maximise the financial 
benefits from the Chinese windfall. 
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Interviewees C01, C11, C14, C15, C18 and C21. 
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8.9    Corporate Governance Benefits and Challenges in Zambia 
Interview participants endorsed the view that the propensity of corporate governance 
guidelines being embraced is likely to be small if those affected do not see the benefits. In 
particular, unless stakeholders begin to focus on corporate governance’s benefits instead of 
its costs it is likely to be viewed with widespread scepticism and indifference. Consistent 
with this line of thought interviewee C08, a parastatal executive, suggested that the link 
between corporate governance and development is related to the benefits that accrue when 
widespread engagement is fostered
205
. Interviewees contended that corporate governance 
benefits in this context ranged from enhanced accountability and an improved investment 
climate through to fostering economic development. Interviewee C20 remarked that:  
“There is everything to gain in governing ourselves properly starting at individual, 
corporate and state levels. We slipped from a middle income country in the 1970s to 
a least developed country due to poor governance, especially corporate, because 
politically we have been relatively stable. There are countries that were with us at the 
same level in the Far East but have gone so far ahead. To get rid of poverty we must 
govern ourselves properly politically, economically and in particular corporate 
governance. Good governance is the heart of development”. 
 
Interviewees C15 and C20 believed that some of the benefits of robust corporate governance 
include efficient resource allocation, better economic management and eventual economic 
prosperity; at the same time, common anti-development vices such as corruption, theft, 
misapplication of resources were thought likely to be curtailed. 
8.9.1     Promoting Investment in Zambia 
Interviewees argued that the shortage of capital in many developing nations, including 
Zambia, remains a decisive impediment to economic recovery. Conceptually, corporate 
governance is purported to play an important role in increasing capital flows to firms and 
nations at large, particularly developing countries (La Porta et al., 1998; Klapper and Love, 
                                                          
205
This view was shared by most participants. 
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2004). Many of the interviewees
206
 held the view that corporate governance is indeed 
fundamental in creating a conducive environment for investment, particularly for transitional 
countries like Zambia, leading to better resource allocation, increased productivity, creation 
of employment and year-on-year growth. These individuals argued that the major problem 
affecting Zambia’s economic recovery is the difficulty faced in attracting capital for 
industrial financing, although robust corporate governance practices have the propensity to 
improve the situation by inspiring investor confidence and supporting the private sector. 
Here, interviewee C09, a consultant and past IODZ president, advanced the view that: 
“Sound corporate governance practices lead to investor confidence resulting in 
increased flow of investment. The current increased investment, particularly in new 
mining projects, though mostly attributed to political stability will in the near future 
come to depend on robust corporate governance practices in investee firms. 
Corporate governance should in fact become part of the Investments Act and 
therefore a requirement to invest in Zambia”. 
 
Similarly, C17 believed that: 
“Well run companies can source capital from international organisations such as the 
World Bank, International Finance Corporation (IFC), Africa Development Bank 
(ADB) and others. Such companies with well-established corporate governance 
structures demonstrate capacity to pay back. Before accessing money from such 
lending financial institutions, firms must have passed the corporate governance test 
profile”. 
 
The issue was characterised in unequivocal terms by interviewee C10, a multi-national 
CEO, who argued that: 
“If you are a company looking for funding, governance is a critical issue, whether 
you are looking for funding locally or internationally be it equity or debt. Anyone 
who wants to put money in your business wants to know how well your business is 
run and corporate governance becomes core to investment discussions. African 
economies have been growing, and as economies grow good corporate governance 
practices become critical. There is a positive correlation between company expansion 
and economic growth and governance”. 
 
Interviewees C16, C17 and C18 all asserted that in a global economy investors have the 
whole world to ‘shop around’ in to find the best use for their money, therefore countries and 
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Interviewees C03, C07, C09, C10, C11, C13, C14, C16, C17 and C18. 
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companies that exhibit sound corporate governance qualities are more likely to attract 
capital
207
. 
  
However, some interviewees
208
 were quick to point out that much of the investment in 
Zambia in recent years has gone into green field projects, and has more to do with political 
stability than the underlying corporate governance situation. Here, interviewee C23 
mentioned that: 
“Much of the investment that has been coming to Zambia is in new areas 
(Greenfields) meaning that the investors’ interest in these areas for now is stable 
political governance and poor corporate governance. That’s why we have seen FDI 
coming in despite average corporate governance. But when it comes to foreigners 
partnering with Zambians, investors are particularly concerned about the quality of 
corporate governance. This is a challenge for us to put our corporate governance 
house in order”. 
    
There was general agreement that as investment starts to be made in existing business 
portfolios, corporate governance issues will increasingly be put under the microscope.  
8.9.2     Challenges 
The evidence in this thesis suggests that widespread embracing of the notion that improved 
corporate governance is likely to lead to economic benefits in Zambia has yet to happen; this 
pattern is consistent with the notion that numerous economic and societal challenges still 
characterise developing nations (Nganga et al., 2003; Rossouw, 2005; Wanyama et al ., 
2009). The major difficulties that exist in such environments reflect the fragility of 
governance and accountability institutions that are supposed to act as the building blocks for 
invulnerable corporate governance practices. As the perceptions of interviewees outlined in 
the previous sections make clear, frail legal and regulatory frameworks are seen as 
generating serious compromises for the quality of corporate governance in Zambia. The 
opinions of interviewee C12, a Government agency manager, are pertinent here in 
                                                          
207
While the need for increased investment appears to be pressing, interviewee C20 contended that close 
attention needs to be paid to the manner in which investors’ agreements are designed. 
208
Interviewees C11, C14, C16, C20 and C23. 
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suggesting that these challenges obscure the purported overall benefits of the governance 
concept. One of the challenges, according to interviewee C01, is overcoming international 
corporations’ belief that Zambians are not sufficiently sensitised to the issues underpinning 
corporate governance; as a result, the firms concerned tend to ignore the notion until they 
are challenged. For example interviewee C05, the LuSE Chief Executive, argued that the 
increased realisation amongst companies listed on the LuSE that corporate governance is 
important, has not permeated through to SOEs and the many small, mostly family-held firms 
that operate in Zambia. In this regard, interviewee C11, a member of the IODZ, remarked 
that cost-benefit reasoning, especially in SMEs, appeared to have had a major impact when 
it comes to the faithful observance of corporate governance principles. 
  
Another challenge, according to interviewees C14 and C17, stems from the fact that the 
extant corporate governance codes in Zambia draw heavily on international guidelines, 
leading to some interviewees questioning the relevance of such codes to Zambia. While the 
majority did not appear to see this as a challenge, the argument as presented by these two 
interviewees, related to direct boiler-plating of other nations’ guidelines, with the attendant 
danger of local cultural values - which sometimes run counter to corporate governance - 
being compromised at best. As for the public sector, the biggest challenge according to 
interviewee C11 relates to the governance structures themselves, with government or 
politically connected officials dominating boards and pursuing agendas that are more 
politically-than commercially-driven. Interviewees C07 and C08 both argued that Zambia’s 
emergence from the dominance of state-controlled economic discourse to a system where 
private participation is key has brought about numerous challenges, impacting on business, 
culture and management style all of which in turn have a major influence on corporate 
governance and accountability. However, some Zambian institutions continue to operate 
under an aura of secrecy which appears to be entrenched, a typical reflection of a social-
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centric approach. This situation may well be at variance with the tenets of the modern 
governance disposition. 
8.10      Conclusion 
Despite on-going debate about the extent of governance interplay with development in 
modern-day Zambia, the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that promising strides 
have been made to conceptualise the paradigm in a meaningful way. Most of the 
interviewees appeared able to appreciate the alliance between corporate governance and 
economic advancement; an understanding of the link as one of the essential - but missing - 
ingredients in the country’s search for greater accountability and improved resource 
allocation also emerged. Despite maintaining political stability, the country has failed to 
achieve meaningful economic growth and the views detailed in this chapter suggest a 
widespread perception that long-standing governance weaknesses continue to make 
development elusive. In particular, the interviewees see ‘properly-run companies’ as engines 
for wealth creation and fundamental to Zambia’s recovery. The huge amounts of taxation 
and other revenue that Zambia has failed to capture - and the dwindling economic prosperity 
experienced by the country - was cited by those taking part in the interviews as evidence in 
line with the (conventional) view that poor corporate governance can lead to economic 
mismanagement and consequential losses.  On the basis of the findings, there appears to be a 
need for government, the private sector and non-government stakeholder groups to play a 
more active role in promoting the concept and practice of ‘good’ governance by developing 
a broad understanding of its benefits. Only when the country embraces corporate governance 
standards and the attendant principles of accountability, transparency and disclosure - 
respected by all stakeholders - will meaningful development be attained in Zambia.  
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It was evident from the discussions that Zambia’s macroeconomic distress is seen as being 
exacerbated by weak legal and regulatory systems that are not sufficiently robust to underpin 
an effective corporate governance framework. However, it was acknowledged that while 
corporate governance and accountability can contribute to better governance, they are not on 
their own a panacea for economic development, as political governance must provide the 
necessary platform for the latter’s emergence. Effective corporate governance standards 
have the propensity to energise the investment needed for development and the optimum 
allocation of resources by permeating corporate culture, processes and structures at all 
levels. Strengthening corporate governance standards in Zambia will, ultimately, not only 
enhance the quality of governance, but should also improve relationship with different 
investors including China which is positioning itself to become the major financier of 
Zambia’s extractive industries. Unless Zambians begin to see the benefits of corporate 
governance, evangelising of the concept is likely to prove peripheral and the economic 
changes taking place in terms of the nature of investment flows will not lead to the positive 
impact on widespread Zambian development that would be the case where a robust system 
is in place on the ground. 
 
Having explored the views of a relatively small number of stakeholders in detail in the last 
two chapters, the empirical analysis now moves to consider views of a larger set of 
constituents, via engagement of a questionnaire survey.   
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE ANALYSIS  
 
 
9.1     Introduction 
 
The current study set out to appraise perceptions regarding the nature of corporate 
governance and its relationship with development in the Zambian context. The previous two 
chapters focused on the findings from semi-structured interviews conducted in Zambia 
between May and July 2011. In addition - and as a way of complementing the interview 
findings - the current chapter presents the results from a questionnaire survey administered 
at the same time and in the same country. As highlighted in the methodology and methods 
chapter, the interviews and questionnaire survey were employed simultaneously for 
deliberate reasons. Other than providing large-sample complementarity with the evidence 
from face-to-face interviews, the questionnaire is a practical way of reaching a large number 
of respondents and collecting a significant amount of data in a shorter time-scale than would 
have been possible with interviews alone (Gillham, 2000). The chapter begins by outlining 
the main themes underpinning the questionnaire, the identification of respondent groups and 
data analysis methods. The data collected is then analysed and interpreted in detail in an 
attempt to provide robust evidence regarding how governance, accountability and 
development issues - and the inter-relations amongst them - are viewed in Zambia. 
    
9.2 Questionnaire Development 
The questionnaire was developed in the context of the extensive literature on global 
corporate governance and development, particularly those studies relating to Africa 
generally and Zambia in particular, as well as the objectives of the current research and the 
researcher’s experience as a Zambian. Three sets of questionnaires were designed, each of 
which contained questions targeting a designated stakeholder group. Although many of the 
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questions were appropriate for all stakeholders, minor modifications were made to some to 
accommodate stakeholder specifics. The five major target groups were: the private sector; 
the public sector; government; Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs); and ‘other’ 
stakeholders. The private sector category embraces respondents from employees of the 
Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE) and representatives of companies quoted or listed on the 
market. The category extends to include private companies not listed on the LuSE, Small 
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and agents serving the interests of multi-national 
corporations that may have been listed on exchanges outside the country. The public sector 
category comprises State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), while the government group 
incorporates government and its ministries. The NGO group is made up of all respondents 
that were identified as representing Non-Governmental Organisations
209
 while the ‘Other’ 
stakeholder classification is made up of all stakeholder groups and individuals that would 
not be appropriately classified as representing one of the other four groups; this category 
therefore includes academicians and researchers, consultants, politicians, legislators, 
regulators, international organisations and other individuals not belonging to any of the four 
main categories. The five groups form the key stakeholder groups for the current study; the 
selection of these groups reflects a desire to obtain the views of those likely to have 
informed views on the research topic, but with divergent contexts.  
 
The questionnaire consisted of 20 questions, structured into four parts; a demographic 
section and three thematic sections that address particular corporate governance, 
development and accountability concerns. The study adopts a closed questionnaire (self-
completed) approach based on a Likert scale. As is common with such instruments, closed 
questions were provided, with a range of pre-determined answers offered for respondents to 
select from as they deem appropriate. It is commonly argued that closed questions and 
                                                          
209
Such as the Non-Governmental Organizations Coordinating Council (NGOCC), Transparency International 
Zambia (TIZ), Diakonia Sweden-Zambia Country Office and Zambia Episcopal Conference (ZEC).   
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predetermined answers represent a significant issue as regards evidence originality and 
discovery (Gillham, 2000). Notwithstanding this point, the provision for respondents to 
make comments at the end of the questionnaire, or to express further opinions and thoughts 
not captured via responses to the closed questions should, to some extent, mitigate against 
limitations arising from the lack of freedom to express views freely. Respondents were 
given clear instructions at the beginning and throughout the questionnaire to help them 
navigate their way through the document. A sufficient amount of time to complete the 
questionnaire, together with information about the purpose of the survey, how the results 
would be used and a promise of anonymity and confidentiality were provided to them in 
advance.  
 
The three main themes covered in the questionnaire were: (i) Zambia’s corporate 
governance profile; (ii) the perceived association between corporate governance and 
development; and (iii) a conceptually driven theme of accountability. The first part of the 
questionnaire addressed the respondents’ personal characteristics such as name, organisation, 
experience, job position as well as their role. The second part began with introductory 
questions designed to elicit background opinions about familiarity with the concept of 
corporate governance, as well as the Zambian codes and definitions and their relevance to 
the Zambian environment. The follow-up questions were aimed at exploring issues relating 
to the suitability of Western corporate governance codes to the Zambian situation, as well as 
corporate governance drivers, challenges and benefits. The second theme investigated issues 
relating to the perceived relationship between corporate governance and development while 
the third was intended to draw attention to how corporate governance and development 
interface with accountability. Implicitly, the corporate governance and development 
phenomena are viewed through the accountability framework. As pointed out in Chapter 
Three of this thesis, the extant literature postulates that Africa’s development problems are 
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mostly governance-related (World Bank, 1989). Similarly, a greater part of governance 
literature has identified accountability as a major concern and has since become central to 
most governance reforms (Therkildsen, 2001; Erkkila, 2007); this effectively means that 
discussions on governance and development-related topics - particularly in developing 
nations - are not complete without consideration of an accountability dimension. 
Correspondingly, Wu (2005) argues that the central theme of corporate governance is that of 
promoting accountability. 
 
9.3 Questionnaire Administration 
As outlined in the methodology chapter, the current study employs a mixed methods 
approach, an approach that has regained acceptability and popularity in the recent past with 
a significant number of studies appreciating its benefits in terms of greater understanding 
and validation of results.  
Table: 9.1 Questionnaire Response Classifications  
 
Category 
 
Stakeholder 
Groups/Individuals 
  
No. 
distributed 
No. of 
Respondents 
 
% 
Responding 
 
Private (PVT) 
 
LuSE (PL) 
10 7 
20 31 Multinationals (PM) 
10 7 
Private Other (PO) 
10 6 
Public (SOE) 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
15 8 8 12  
Government (GG) Government and Govt. Agencies 15 11 11 17  
NGO 
 
Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) 
 
10 6 6 9  
Others 
Stakeholders(OS) 
Academics, consultants, 
researchers, politicians, 
legislators, regulators, 
international organisations 
30 20 20 31  
Total  100 65 65 65 
 
Note: The table shows the major categories of stakeholder respondent groups, number of respondents and the 
percentage for each category as distributed. 
 
 312 
 
A total sample of 100 potential respondents across various stakeholder groups was identified 
and the questionnaires were distributed accordingly. As Table 9.1 reports, a total of 65 
responses were received, comprising 20 private stakeholders (PVT), 8 public state-owned 
enterprises representatives (SOE), 11 government representatives (GG), 6 Non-
Governmental Organisations’ advocates (NGO) and 20 others (OS). Most of the 
respondents, and the Institute of Directors of Zambia (IODZ) representatives in particular
210
, 
indicated significant enthusiasm for the topic as it was the first research they were aware of 
that pushed the boundaries of the corporate governance notion beyond the boardroom into a 
broader context. This was also evidenced by the overwhelming number of respondents who 
indicated their desire to obtain a summary of the research findings by providing their e-mail 
addresses at the end of the questionnaire.  
There is no universally-agreed definition of an ‘acceptable’ response rate for questionnaires 
(Baruch, 1999).  However, Baruch believes that a ‘good’ response rate is desirable and a 
common characteristic of successful research. By international standards, the 65% achieved 
here is a relatively high response rate and suggests that the topic in question is of interest in 
Zambia. A related self-assessment questionnaire survey administered by the Africa Peer 
Review Mechanism-National Governing Council (APRM-NGC) in July 2009 in Zambia 
generated a response rate of about 40%
211,212,213
. There are several possible explanations for 
the relatively high response rate here. One may lie in participants’ confidence in terms of 
confidentiality; the questionnaires were carefully prepared so as not to contain any 
                                                          
210
The Institute of Directors of Zambia (IODZ) members who were contacted for the questionnaire survey were 
particularly excited about the topic and expressed this via their willingness to participate. 
211
The questionnaire survey was conducted to detect the general public’s perceptions regarding corporates’ 
adherence to eight governance principles: discipline; transparency; independence; accountability; 
responsibility; integrity and fairness; social responsibility; and efficiency and effectiveness. 
212
Baruch and Holton (2008) report an overall average response rate of 52.7% for over 1600 studies in 
organisational research between 2000 and 2005.  
213
Wanyama (2006) achieved a response rate of 41.4% for a similar study in Uganda while Zagoub (2011) 
reported a 58% response rate for a similar study in Libya.  
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identifying marks such as names, addresses, or occupational details with the provision of 
respondents’ personal details being optional. Respondents were thus intended to be free to 
express their opinions without any unease regarding disclosure of identifying characteristics.  
Another possible explanation relates to the sensitive nature of the research topic
214
; the 
participants might reasonably regard interviews as posing a threat in terms of what they say 
(inadvertently) being used against them in the future, especially after taking into account the 
political, governance and accountability tensions that prevailed in Zambia at the time of data 
collection. In this context, questionnaires have an advantage over interviews in terms of 
participation rates, particularly in government circles.  
The third possible explanation for the high response rate may lie in the personal distribution 
of, and follow-ups on, the questionnaires. The selection process aimed to ensure that 
participants understood the basic thematic issues surrounding the topic and the role of the 
questionnaire, thereby making it less burdensome and, consequently, reducing the number of 
unusable responses to zero. Further, two major corporate governance-related conferences
215
 
attended by the researcher and the Zambia International Trade Fair (ZITF)
216
 facilitated the 
distribution of questionnaires to diverse groups beyond the researcher’s immediate social 
circle.  
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Research on governance and accountability is politically sensitive in Africa as it often exposes governance 
weaknesses and creates tension between leaders and the accountability institutions (Akokpari, 2004; 
Ayittey, 2010).  
215
The ACCA and the Institute of Directors of Zambia organised the “Chief Financial Officers Summit on 
embedding strategic leadership and corporate governance to enhance finance and industry growth in 
Zambia: challenges and opportunities” (on 2 and 3 June 2011) at the Lusaka Southern Sun Hotel. A 
taxation workshop was held at the Edinburgh Hotel in Kitwe in May 2011.  
216
The Zambia International Trade Fair (ZITF) is an annual event organised by the Zambia Industrial and 
Commercial Show Society Limited (ZICSSL). It attracts both local (635 exhibitors in 2011) and 
International (98 exhibitors in 2011) exhibitors. This is a high profile event attracting high ranking 
Government Officials, Diplomats, Heads of International Organisations, and Senior Executives of 
companies. 
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9.4 Questionnaire Response Analysis 
The questionnaire responses are analysed here by a number of key themes; these generally 
correspond to sub-sections of the questionnaire document. The particular categorisation of 
questions is intended to provide for a more rational and consistent outline of respondents’ 
range of perspectives. The analysis starts by examining the demographic information as a 
way of providing context for the analysis that follows. The analysis then moves to the three 
thematic sites of the questionnaire, with questions based on a Likert scale format in most 
cases. The choices on the scale represent the extent of agreement or disagreement each 
respondent felt about a given question or statement. This approach was intended to facilitate 
accurate capture of the respondents’ beliefs, ideas, feelings, attitudes, experiences and 
perceptions about corporate governance, accountability and development in Zambia.    
 
9.4.1   Reliability Testing 
As alluded to in the methodology and methods chapter, questionnaire pre-testing was 
performed as a way of enhancing questionnaire reliability. Statistical testing for reliability 
has become a common practice in research (DeVon et al., 2007) and this section of the 
chapter focuses on the reliability of the measures used in the current questionnaire. While 
there are different ways of statistically testing questionnaire reliability, Cronbach’s alpha 
test
217
 is the most popular approach to testing the reliability of questionnaires (Cohen et al., 
2007). A rate of 70% or higher is generally acknowledged as being ‘acceptable’ in terms of 
internal consistency and reliability (Field, 2009)
218
. The results shown in Table 9.2 indicate 
an alpha coefficient of 88% (0.882), suggesting that the responses are internally consistent.  
 
 
                                                          
217
Cronbach's alpha is a measure of internal consistency, that is, how closely related a set of items are as a 
group. A "high" value of alpha is often used (along with substantive arguments and possibly other statistical 
measures) as evidence that the items measure an underlying (or latent) construct (Cohen et al., 2007). 
218
See also Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) and Faucher et al. (2003).  
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Table: 9.2     Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items N 
0.882 
 
0.887 56 
Spearman-Brown Coefficient based on the Split-Half Test 
 
 
 
Cronbach's Alpha 
 
Part 1 
Value 0.862 
N 28
a 
 
Part 2 
Value 0.766 
N 28
b 
Correlation Between Forms 0.501 
Spearman-Brown 
Coefficient 
Equal Length 0.667 
Unequal Length 0.667 
Guttman Split-Half Coefficient 0.606 
 
Note: This table reports the results of the Cronbach alpha test for reliability and the Spearman-Brown 
Coefficient based on the split-half test for reliability. N = number of items  
 
In addition to computing the alpha coefficient, a split-half test
219
 was also computed; as 
inspection of Table 9.2 reveals results of 86.2% for the first half and 76.6% for the second 
half, with a Spearman-Brown coefficient of 67.7%. Although 70% is often cited as a critical 
value for the coefficient alpha, Kline (2000) argues that in practice values lower than 70% 
are acceptable considering the diversity of the constructs being measured, particularly the 
subjective methodology. Based on this argument the Spearman-Brown Coefficient alpha of 
67% is considered tolerable here.  
 
9.4.2   Normality Test 
All questions in the survey were arranged in a Likert scale fashion, generating ordinal data 
that is statistically not normally distributed (Norman, 2010; Fayers, 2011), rendering 
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The Split-half reliability test involves the correlation of one-half of a test with the other half, measuring 
consistency where a test is split in two and the scores for each half of the test are compared. If the test is 
consistent it leads the experimenter to believe that it is most likely measuring the same thing (Brown, 2010; 
Spearman, 1910; Cortina, 1993). 
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parametric tests inappropriate (Agresti, 2010). The study therefore utilises non-parametric 
procedures in examining the significance of the questionnaire responses, in particular the 
Chi-square, Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests. The Chi-Square statistic tests the 
distributional properties of the responses, while the Mann-Whitney test establishes whether 
two independent samples of observations are drawn from identical distributions. The 
Kruskal-Wallis test allows for comparison of average scores for two or more groups and 
again is often used when analysing ordinal data.  
 
9.4.3   Analysis of Demographic Information 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, demographics are literally a classification of the 
personal characteristics of the participants. Their analysis therefore involves the 
interpretation of the data with a view to eliciting contextual factors that may be useful in the 
analysis of thematic variables (Wanyama et al., 2009). Figure 9.1 below depicts the 
classification of respondents into sector groupings.  
 
Figure: 9.1 Graphical Presentations of Stakeholder Categories  
 
Note: This graph shows the percentage of respondents in each classification. PVT - private sector; SOE - State-
Owned Enterprises; GG - government and spending agencies; NGO - Non-Governmental Organisations; OS - 
Other Stakeholders. 
 
   
Inspection of Figure 9.1 reveals that 31% of the respondents were drawn from the private 
sector (PVT) and another 31% from other stakeholders (OS) while the remaining 38% were 
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divided between government (GG) (17%), State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) (12%) and Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGO) (9%). The respondents from the private sector were 
further categorised as either: (i) Lusaka Stock Exchange (11%), representing LuSE 
employees and companies quoted or listed on the exchange; (ii) agents representing 
multinational companies (11%) and (iii) others (9%), i.e. private respondents not categorised 
as LuSE or multinationals. 
  
The analysis of demographic data in Table 9.3 indicates that respondents in the ‘OS’ 
category had the most work experience, averaging 7.5 years, closely followed by the 
‘SOE’s. The ‘NGO’ and ‘GG’ work experience averages were 6.17 and 6 years respectively 
while the private (PVT) group had the lowest mean of 4.95 years. However, the relatively 
high means for SOE and OS can be attributed to outliers (21 and 25 years respectively) in 
the two categories, suggesting that on average the length of work experience is similar 
across the five categories. The demographic information also appears to show that a great 
majority of respondents across all groups were in management positions, suggesting that 
they were involved in decision-making for their respective organisations and might have 
some interest in corporate governance issues.  
   
Table:  9.3 Respondents’ Work Experience 
Group Number Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
PVT 
SOE 
GG 
NGO 
OS 
20 
8 
11 
6 
20 
1 
3 
1 
4 
2 
10 
21 
10 
10 
25 
4.95 
7.00 
6.00 
6.17 
7.50 
2.665 
6.094 
2.569 
2.137 
5.226 
 
Note: This table details respondents’ work experience in years. N is number of respondents. PVT - private 
sector; SOE - State-Owned Enterprises; GG - government and spending agencies; NGO - Non-Governmental 
Organisations; OS - Other Stakeholders  
 
  
As mentioned in the methodology and methods chapter, most respondents were 
uncomfortable with the idea of disclosing their personal details, for reasons ranging from 
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security to personal. Out of 65 respondents, only 45% provided their names on the 
questionnaire while just 65% disclosed their places of work, suggesting a degree of 
circumspection about the consequences of anonymity being lifted. Although the disclosure 
disquietude appeared to be on the lower side in the PVT, OS and NGO groups, per contra, in 
the GG and SOE categories disclosure of the information was the exception
220
. This 
evidence is consistent with the findings in the interview analysis chapter where most 
participants - particularly employees in government and State-Owned Enterprises - were not 
eager to get involved in discussions relating to governance-based topics for fear of 
victimisation by the elite. Having presented the demographic data, the discussion now 
focuses on the thematic issues of the thesis directly.  
       
9.5    The Concept of Corporate Governance 
The fourth question in the survey document was designed to probe respondents’ familiarity 
with the concept of corporate governance. This section of the questionnaire is essential 
because respondents’ level of familiarity with corporate governance has been shown to have 
profound implications for their responses to related questions (Wanyama, et al., 2009). Basic 
knowledge of corporate governance is thus also likely to influence respondents’ opinions 
about its impact on development. SPSS was used to investigate the extent of familiarity with 
the concept of corporate governance on a 5 point Likert scale. Analysis of the results 
indicates that 55% of respondents claimed to be very familiar with the notion, 39% familiar 
and 6% familiar to ‘some’ extent (see Figure 9.2). This pattern in evidence implies that 
nearly all the respondents had some level of familiarity with the governance concept.  
 
 
                                                          
220
Name disclosure: PVT - 55%; OS - 50%; NGO - 67%; GG - 18%; SOE - 25% 
    Place of work: PVT - 80%; OS - 75%; NGO - 83%; GG - 27%; SOE - 38%   
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Figure: 9.2 Corporate Governance Familiarities 
 
Note: This figure summarises respondents’ familiarity with the concept of corporate governance. 
 
The high level of awareness with the concept can, to some extent, be attributed to the method 
of respondent selection employed in the questionnaire administration. The approach involved 
identifying participants who were likely to have at least a basic understanding of corporate 
governance and therefore have some degree of interest in the research. Notwithstanding the 
impact of inadvertent purposive sampling bias (Tongco, 2007), the findings are relevant to 
interpretation of the rest of the questionnaire in that they will inescapably influence 
respondents’ opinions, attitude and interpretation of the themes. Respondents choosing 1 
(very familiar), 2 (familiar) and 3 (some familiarity) were deemed as being ‘familiar’ while 
those ticking 4 (not familiar) and 5 (not sure) were considered to have been ‘not familiar’ 
with the governance concept. Categorising respondents into these two groups gives a 
cumulative familiarity score of 100%, (i.e. all responses were between 1 and 3) demonstrating 
that all respondents had some basic knowledge about the concept.  
As outlined in Chapter Four, the corporate governance development process in Zambia has 
seen three domestic codes being developed, at different points in time and by different 
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. To investigate the extent of respondents’ awareness of the three codes a 
question was posed that explored levels of familiarity in each case. By virtue of most 
respondents having some level of awareness of the concept of corporate governance, it was 
anticipated that they were also likely to be familiar with the codes - the results obtained 
from the preliminary analysis presented in Table 9.4 support this reasoning. Inspection of 
Panel A of the table reveals that the overwhelming majority of each class of respondent had 
some knowledge of all the corporate governance codes. It was expected that respondents 
from the PVT group were likely to be most familiar with the codes on account of the LuSE 
document being the first to be introduced; in contrast, knowledge of the BOZ code was not 
expected to be pervasive because of its sector-specific nature. Surprisingly, the 5% and 
10% of respondents that were not familiar with the BOZ and IODZ codes respectively 
were also PVT category representatives. The cumulative familiarity frequency scores 
shown in Table 9.4 are high and broadly similar across groups, suggesting that though the 
concept is relatively new in the country, Zambians are making efforts to grasp the basic 
tenets of corporate governance and all the extant codes. In particular, as can be seen from 
Panel B of Table 9.4, the cumulative familiarity frequency scores show that all respondent 
groups were 100% familiar with the concept of corporate governance. Like the PVT group, 
all SOE, GG, NGO and OS respondents were familiar with the concept of corporate 
governance, but their responses differed slightly across the three codes. With regard to the 
LuSE code, familiarity levels ranged from 90% (OS) to 75% (PVT). For the BOZ code, 
familiarity levels ranged from 90% (OS and PVT) to 75% (SOE) while the IODZ code 
generated figures ranging from 85% (OS) to 80% (PVT).    
                                                          
221
These are: the LuSE code, issued in 2005 by the Lusaka Stock Exchange; the BOZ code (2006, Bank of    
Zambia); and the IODZ code (2009, Institute of Directors of Zambia). 
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Table: 9.4  Familiarities with the Corporate Governance Notion and the Three Zambian Codes 
 
Panel A: Knowledge of Corporate Governance Codes 
 
Familiarity Cumulative 
familiarity score 
Mean 
ranks 
K-W 
P-Values 
Mann-Whitney  P-Values 
PVT/SOE PVT/GG PVT/NGO PVT/OS SOE/GG SOE/NGO SOE/OS GG/NGO GG/OS NGO/OS 
CGQ4A    100%ª 1.51b 0.231 0.285 0.365 0.361   0.248 0.893 0.883 0.071 1.000   0.092 0.093 
CGQ5A 83% 2.18 0.401 0.310 0.559 0.282   0.583 0.764 0.889 0.108 0.792   0.241 0.118 
CGQ5B 86% 2.31 0.352 0.381 0.596 0.285   0.290 0.731 0.946 0.142 0.672   0.217 0.108 
CGQ5C 80% 2.42 0.060 0.672 0.797 0.614 0.037* 0.861 0.888   0.025* 0.750 0.031*   0.037* 
 
 
Panel B: Summaries of Familiarity with Corporate Governance and the Three Zambian Codes 
 
 Corporate Governance Concept 
 
LuSE Code BOZ Code IODZ Code 
Very 
familiar Familiar 
Some 
familiarity 
Very 
familiar Familiar 
Some 
familiarity 
Not 
familiar 
Very 
familiar Familiar 
Some 
familiarity 
Not 
familiar 
 
Not 
Sure 
Very 
familiar Familiar 
Some 
familiarity 
Not 
familiar 
Not 
sure 
% % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % 
PVT 55.0 45.0 0.05 35.0 40.0  0.0 25.0 15.0 55.0 20.0 5.0 5.0 20.0 30.0 30.0 10.0 10.0 
SOE 37.5 50.0 12.5 12.5 37.5 37.5 12.5 12.5 37.5 25.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 25.0 25.0 0.0  
GG 45.5 36.4 18.2 27.3 27.3 27.3 18.2 18.2 36.4 27.3 18.2 0.0 9.1 36.4 36.4 18.2 0.0  
NGO 33.3 66.7  0.0  0.0 66.7 16.7 16.7  0.0 50.0 33.3 16.7 0.0  0.0 50.0 16.7 33.3 0.0  
OS 75.0 20.0 5.0 40.0 40.0 10.0 10.0 35.0 40.0 15.0 10.0 0.0 50.0 30.0 5.0 15.0 0.0  
 
Note: This table shows the cumulative familiarity score, mean ranks, Kruskal-Wallis Test p-values and Mann-Whitney Test p-values. An * indicates that there is a significant 
difference between stakeholder groups’ average response at the 5% level. An ª indicates the variable with the highest cumulative frequency score. A 
b
 indicates the variable with 
the highest mean rank. The Likert scale used ranged from 1= very familiar to 5 = not familiar.   
CGQ4A = Familiarity with Corporate Governance; CGQ5A = Familiarity with the Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE) corporate governance code; CGQ5B = Familiarity with the 
Bank of Zambia (BOZ) corporate governance code; CGQ5C = Familiarity with the Institute of Directors of Zambia (IODZ) corporate governance code. PVT = private sector; 
SOE = State-Owned Enterprises; GG = government and spending agencies; NGO = Non-Governmental Organisations; OS - Other Stakeholders. 
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Non-parametric tests such as the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney were conducted to 
analyse the differences between the independent respondent groups. The Kruskal-Wallis 
test was used to investigate if there were any significant differences across respondent 
groups as a whole for each question while the Mann-Whitney test was employed to test for 
differences between pairs of groups. Although the choice of significance levels is 
subjective, the traditional 5% level has been adopted in all statistical tests in the current 
thesis. As inspection of Table 9.4 indicates, the Kruskal-Wallis tests show that there were 
no significant differences between the respondent groups regarding the concept of 
corporate governance and the three codes. However, the Mann-Whitney tests for 
differences between pairs of groups generated some statistically significant differences in 
relation to the IODZ code; the OS findings (where, as in other cases, a high degree of 
familiarity is evident) clearly dominate the results here, possibly reflecting the group’s 
status as the only category that is not based on common characteristics. Specifically, the 
Mann-Whitney tests results indicate that there is a significant difference in opinion 
between the PVT and the OS groups, the SOE and the OS groups, the GG and OS groups, 
and the NGO and the OS groups, with the higher figures being generated by the OS group 
in each case.    
While it is not clear as to why familiarity seems to be high for the OS group, one 
explanation would be that this category comprises respondents such as academics, 
consultants, researchers, politicians, legislators, regulators and representatives of 
international organisations who might be expected to be well versed with issues of 
corporate governance.  Notwithstanding the lack of statistical significance, there are some 
notable patterns in the data; for example, the findings indicate that respondents from the 
PVT category were more enlightened regarding corporate governance and the local codes 
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(in particular the LuSE code) than were their GG, SOE and NGO counterparts, consistent 
with the literature on corporate governance in developing nations (for example, Wanyama, 
2006 in Uganda). Since the LuSE code was the first to be introduced in Zambia, it was 
anticipated that respondents from the private sector might have been pressurised to 
assimilate these corporate governance ideas and hence exert some level of influence on 
familiarity levels in the PVT category. As expected, the PVT respondents were familiar 
with the concept of corporate governance but, contrary to expectations, the results do not 
appear to provide the same degree of support with the three codes. The lack of statistical 
significance means that the levels of familiarity cannot formally be linked to the perception 
of poor corporate governance practices amongst certain stakeholder categories - 
particularly the GG and the SOE groups - as established in the interview findings. The 
reason for the inconsistency is not clear, but may reflect the GG and SOE participants 
having some awareness of the basics, but being prevented by political interference from 
demonstrating this in practice. In the interviews, sound levels of awareness were cited as 
being essential in so far as appointments to decision-making positions are concerned. For 
example, one respondent (SOE 02) stated that: 
“In a number of organisations, people without a basic idea of what corporate 
governance is are appointed to sit on boards. The IODZ should be conducting 
corporate governance induction programmes to orient such people. Others preach 
corporate governance, but do not ‘walk the talk’; others think corporate 
governance is for the private companies only” 
The above quote reveals a perception that apart from professional experience and 
understanding of the business and operations of the company, familiarity with corporate 
governance principles is seen as a necessary - but often lacking - requirement for 
members of boards in the private and public sector. It is commonly acknowledged that 
corporations play a fundamental role in the creation of wealth in an economy 
(Wolfensohn, 1999; Oman, 2003; and Charkham and Ploix, 2005) and that “proper 
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governance of companies will become as crucial to the world economy as the proper 
governing of countries” (Wolfensohn, 1999 p. 421). In this context, directors are expected 
to demonstrate some levels of familiarity with the concept of corporate governance and 
the local codes if their companies are expected to contribute to the well-being of the 
Zambian economy. 
9.6    Defining Corporate Governance 
As Chapter Three indicated, a wide variety of definitions of the term corporate 
governance have been suggested; the extant literature acknowledges that defining 
corporate governance precisely is difficult and to date no universally-accepted 
formulation has emerged (Solomon, 2010). In this regard, respondents were asked to 
disclose the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with five possible corporate 
governance definitions and their significance to Zambia’s development. The proposed 
definitions reflect a wide span of perspectives ranging from the conventional shareholder-
centric approach to a stakeholder bias. The results, as presented in Table 9.5, indicate 
some level of agreement with all the definitions proposed. The definition in CGQ6A: “the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled” (Cadbury Committee, 1992 p. 13 
para 2.5) collected the most scores on the basis of mean ranks - but not cumulative 
agreement scores - suggesting that this definition is widely held. This result is consistent 
with the interview findings, where, although most interviewees did not reflect a principal-
agent bias, they regularly referred to the latter as a de facto definition of corporate 
governance, confirming the hegemony of Western perspectives on corporate governance 
evident in the literature review.  
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Table: 9.5  Defining Corporate Governance 
  
Panel A: Corporate Governance Definitions 
 
CGQ Cumulative 
agreement score 
Mean 
ranks 
K-W 
P-Values 
Mann-Whitney  P-Values 
PVT/SOE PVT/GG PVT/NGO PVT/OS SOE/GG SOE/NGO SOE/OS GG/NGO GG/OS NGO/OS 
6A 86% 1.63 b 0.158 0.233 0.162 0.861 0.353 0.014* 0.261 0.044*    0.416 0.553     0.668 
6B 57% 2.66 0.918 0.747 0.546 0.699 0.770     0.332 0.944   0.734     0.337 0.733     0.685 
6C 85% 1.72 0.103 0.890 0.384 0.125 0.190     0.429 0.264   0.269 0.024* 0.783 0.007* 
6D 71% 2.26 0.188 0.915 0.426 0.307 0.118     0.406 0.445   0.163     0.102 0.515 0.033* 
6E 91%ª 1.66 0.592 0.649 0.259 0.503 0.481     0.614 0.396   0.976      0.137 0.556      0.230 
 
Panel B: Levels of Agreement with Corporate Governance Definitions 
 
 The system by which 
companies are directed and 
controlled 
The way in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return 
on their investment 
A set of relationships between 
company's management, its 
board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders 
The system by which 
companies are directed and 
controlled 
A System of checks and balances, both 
internal and external to companies, 
which ensures that companies discharge 
their accountability to all their 
stakeholders and act in a socially 
responsible way in all areas of their 
business activity 
Agree 
 
Neutral 
 
Disagree Agree 
 
Neutral 
 
Disagree Agree 
 
Neutral 
 
Disagree Agree 
 
Neutral 
 
Disagree Agree 
 
Neutral 
 
Disagree 
% % % % % % % % % % % % % % % 
PVT 80 10 10 50 5 35 80 10 10 60 20 20 90 0 10 
SOE 87 0 13 50 37 13 75 12 13 62 25 13 87 0 13 
GG 100 0 0 73 9 18 91 9 0 82 9 9 91 9 0 
NGO 83 0 17 50 33 17 83 0 17 50 17 33 83 0 17 
OS 85 10 5 50 20 30 90 5 5 85 10 5 95 0 5 
Note: This table shows the cumulative agreement score, mean ranks, Kruskal-Wallis Test p-values and Mann-Whitney Test p-values. An * indicates that there is a 
significant difference between stakeholder groups’ average response at the 5% level. An ª indicates the variable with the highest cumulative frequency score. A 
b
 indicates 
the variable with the highest mean rank. The Likert scale used ranged from 1= strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree.   
CGQ6A = “the system by which companies are directed and controlled”; CGQ6B = “the way in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment”; CGQ6C = “a set of relationships between company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders”; CGQ6D = “set of 
mechanisms through which outside investors are protected against appropriation by insiders”; CGQ6E = “system of checks and balances, both internal and external to 
companies, which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business activity” 
PVT = Private Sector; SOE = State-Owned Enterprises; GG = Government and spending agencies; NGO = Non-Governmental Organisations; OS - Other Stakeholders.
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The high (91%) agreement with the notion in Solomon (2010 p. 6) of governance being a 
“system of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, which ensures 
that companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially 
responsible way in all areas of their business activity” was followed by: “the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled” (Cadbury Committee, 1992 p. 15) (86%), 
“a set of relationships between company’s management, its board, its shareholders and 
other stakeholders” (OECD, 2004b p. 11) (85%), “the set of mechanisms through which 
outside investors are protected against appropriation by insiders” (Nganga et al., 2003 p. 
6) (71%), and “the way in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of 
getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 p. 737) (57 %)
222
. The 
two definitions that appear to be more shareholder-centric thus generated least support, 
suggesting that such definitions do not fit well in an African context.  
The literature review and interview findings presented earlier in this thesis illustrated that, 
in general terms, a corporate governance definition intended for Africa, should not just 
describe directors’ obligations towards shareholders, but must also encompass wider 
implications for economic and social well-being. Therefore any satisfactory definition for 
a country like Zambia must take a wide perspective that not only protects shareholders 
and preserves the reputation of a company and its business, but also enhances its potential 
to achieve economic prosperity. As can be seen from Table 9.5, although CGQ6A had the 
highest overall mean ranking, opinions across respondent groups seemed to be divided, 
with the Kruskal-Wallis statistics proving to be insignificant in all five cases suggesting in 
turn that no particular definition dominates the views of a particular type of stakeholder. 
However, the Mann-Whitney test indicates that there were significant differences between 
                                                          
222
On the basis of mean ranks, the order remains the same except CGQ6A and CGQ6E swap positions.  
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groups SOE and GG, and groups SOE and OS as regards CGQ6A. The test also shows a 
significant level of disagreement between groups GG and NGO, and groups NGO and OS 
regarding their opinions on CGQ6C and between groups NGO and OS on CGQ6D. 
Unlike in Table 9.4 above, the OS groups’ results were found to dominate; however, 
examination of the agreement level data in Panel B reveals a consistent pattern in group 
responses that would suggest identifiable patterns in inter-group differences. 
The questionnaire provided an opportunity for respondents to suggest their own corporate 
governance definitions, but only 4 out of the 65 respondents provided any, thus:  
“Open and transparent ways of communication of policies and procedures on 
organisations for the good of all stakeholders especially for organisations such as 
the mines” (PM 04) 
“It is a system by which institutions account for their actions. How agents remain 
accountable so that their own interests do not supersede the interests of other 
stakeholders and how the organisation engages with the community and extracts 
resources” (PL01) 
“Corporate governance is concerned with the application of resources in an 
accountable and transparent manner so as to benefit all stakeholders including the 
community and society at large. It is about value, practice, ethical principles that 
balance social and economic goals” (NGO 03) 
“Corporate governance is concerned with ensuring that the management hierarchy 
of organisations are transparent and accountable and are subject to checks and 
balances in order for them to operate efficiently and provide benefits to all 
stakeholders. Corporate governance is applicable to all organisations, associations, 
businesses and to the governance of the country as well” (OS19). 
Common to all four definitions were issues surrounding accountability and transparency, 
the balance between social and economic goals and engagement with the community 
where resources are extracted for the good of all stakeholders. However, a closer analysis 
of the suggestions reveals that all the issues advanced in fact fall into the more inclusive 
stakeholder approach offered by Solomon, a definition that was included in the 
questionnaire document.  
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9.6.1   Suitability of the Proposed Definitions to the Zambian Environment  
Since the inception and revival of debate on corporate governance, a Western-centric 
viewpoint has been assumed, although this has not always been explicitly recognised
223
. 
This has led some scholars, particularly in the recent past, to question the universal 
applicability of Western and Anglo-Saxon corporate governance codes (Okeahalam and 
Akinboade, 2003; Fan, 2009; Wanyama, 2009) especially in developing countries like 
Zambia whose level of economic development and cultural norms are at variance with those 
in the West norms in many key respects (Jackson 2004). Having investigated opinions about 
different corporate governance definitions, questions 7 and 8 were designed to extract from 
respondents perceptions concerning the extent of suitability of the five corporate governance 
definitions to the Zambian environment and the results from these are summarised in Table 
9.6. The questions were influenced by debate surrounding the appropriateness to the 
Zambian environment of such definitions, crafted as they are on Western norms. Based on 
the literature review alone it would appear reasonable to predict Zambians to find the 
Western codes inappropriate for the local environment. However, contrary to expectations, 
the results obtained from the preliminary analysis suggest that while there was a range of 
views, all definitions generated responses on the ‘very suitable’ and ‘suitable’ side of the 
relevant continuum, including CGQ7E: “The System of checks and balances, both internal 
and external to companies, which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to 
all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business 
activity”, which received a 100% cumulative percentage suitability score and the highest 
mean rank across all respondent groups (see Table 9.6).   
 
 
                                                          
223
See Rossouw et al. (2002); Okeahalam and Akinboade (2003); Visser (2006); Solomon (2010). 
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Table: 9.6 Suitability of Corporate Governance Definitions to the Zambian Environment 
 
Panel A: Appropriateness of Corporate Governance Definitions in the Zambian Environment 
 
CGQ Cumulative 
suitability score 
Mean 
Ranks 
K-W 
P-Values 
Mann-Whitney  P-Values 
PVT/SOE PVT/GG PVT/NGO PVT/OS SOE/GG SOE/NGO SOE/OS GG/NGO GG/OS NGO/OS 
7A 95.4% 1.49 0.788 0.817 0.404         0.835 0.679 0.324 1.000 0.908      0.363 0.206   0.918 
7B 64.6% 2.23 0.405 0.165 0.514         0.127 0.266 0.379 0.663 0.596      0.249 0.654   0.337 
7C 98.4% 1.60 0.088 0.236 0.812 0.014* 1.000 0.374 0.105 0.236 0.031* 0.812     0.014* 
7D 80.0% 2.05 0.359 0.501 0.499        0.078 0.477 0.954 0.173 0.929      0.059 0.980   0.124 
7E 100.0%ª 1.49 b 0.162 0.118 0.397 0.023* 0.114 0.475 0.411 0.722      0.141 0.617   0.220 
 
Panel B: Frequency – Levels of Suitability of Corporate Governance Definitions to the Zambian Environment 
 
 The system by which companies 
are directed and controlled 
The way in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return 
on their investment 
A set of relationships between 
company's management, its 
board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders 
The system by which companies 
are directed and controlled 
A System of checks and balances, both 
internal and external to companies, which 
ensures that companies discharge their 
accountability to all their stakeholders and 
act in a socially responsible way in all areas 
of their business activity 
Suitable 
 
Not 
Sure 
 
Not 
Suitable Suitable 
 
Not 
Sure 
 
Not 
Suitable Suitable 
 
Not 
Sure 
 
Not 
Suitable Suitable 
 
Not 
Sure 
 
Not 
Suitable Suitable 
 
Not Sure 
 
 
Not Suitable 
% % % % % % % % % % % % % % % 
PVT 90 5 5 70 10 20 100 0 0 80 5 15 100 0 0 
SOE 100 0 0 62 13 25 100 0 0 87 13 0 100 0 0 
GG 100 0 0 73 9 18 100 0 0 91 0 9 100 0 0 
NGO 100 0 0 50 17 33 83 0 17 50 0 50 100 0 0 
OS 95 0 5 60 0 40 100 0 0 80 5 15 100 0 0 
 
Note: This table shows the cumulative suitability score, mean ranks, Kruskal-Wallis Test p-values and Mann-Whitney Test p-values. An * indicates that there is a significant 
difference between stakeholder groups’ average response at the 5% level. An ª indicates the variable with the highest cumulative frequency score. A 
b
 indicates the variable 
with the highest mean rank. The Likert scale used ranged from 1= Very suitable to 5 = Not suitable.    
CGQ7A = “the system by which companies are directed and controlled”; CGQ7B = “the way in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment”; CGQ7C = “a set of relationships between company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders”; CGQ7D = “set of 
mechanisms through which outside investors are protected against appropriation by insiders”; CGQ7E = “a system of checks and balances, both internal and external to 
companies, which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business activity” 
PVT = private sector; SOE = State-Owned Enterprises; GG = Government and spending agencies; NGO = Non-Governmental Organisations; OS  = Other Stakeholders.  
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These results support the literature review and interview findings whereby it was suggested 
that a corporate governance definition for the Zambian environment must take into account 
the country’s specificities. This is also consistent with respondents’ levels of agreement with 
the proposed definition in Table 9.5 above. It was also clear from the interview findings that 
although most Zambians do not decisively promote a particular definition, there is a degree 
of consensus regarding what corporate governance rules intended for Zambia should 
emphasise. In this context CGQ7E, based on describing corporate governance in broad 
terms, fits well with the aspirations of most respondents who believed that a country like 
Zambia needs an inclusive approach to corporate governance. This view is generally 
dominant on the African continent because of its promise not only to embrace African 
cultural values, but also the interests of a variety of stakeholders (see Wanyama et al., 2009). 
The paradigm is therefore in tune with important aspects of African values, culture and 
society such as co-existence, collectiveness and consensus.  
 
Initial inspection of Table 9.6 suggests that CGQ7E: “A system of checks and balances, both 
internal and external to companies, which ensures that companies discharge their 
accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of 
their business activity” (Solomon, 2010 p. 6) was the most popular both in terms of 
cumulative suitability score (column 2) and mean ranking (column 3). However, the 
Kruskal-Wallis test statistics (column 4) in Table 9.6 relating to differences in opinion 
across the five stakeholder groups do not show any significant differences, with all p-values 
greater than 0.05 thus suggesting consistency of opinions across the stakeholder groups. 
However, further analyses of bivariate inter-group differences using the Mann-Whitney test 
statistics indicated four significant results (PVT/NGO; CGQ7C and CGQ7E; GG/NGO; 
CGQ7C and NGO/OS; CGQ7C) but further analysis as presented in Panel B of Table 9.6 - 
Frequency Levels of Suitability of Corporate Governance Definitions to the Zambian 
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Environment - suggests that, as in Table 9.5 the latter findings do not represent evidence of a 
generalisable pattern. This apparent homogeneity in the findings is consistent with the 
notion outlined earlier in the thesis whereby corporate governance is viewed as a new 
concept in Zambia; as such it is justifiable to postulate that all categories may be going 
through a similar corporate governance learning process.   
 
9.6.2 Suitability of Western Corporate Governance Codes to the Zambian   
Environment 
 
 
The preceding discussion focused on the suitability of potential corporate governance 
definitions to Zambian circumstances. A more general, but equally important issue in 
practice given the wide influence of US/UK-generated rules and principles is the suitability 
of such Western corporate governance codes to Zambian conditions. As can be seen from 
Figure 9.3 and Table 9.7 below, respondents overwhelmingly believed that Western codes, 
though drafted on Western norms, are also suitable for the Zambian environment.  
 
Figure: 9.3 Suitability of Western codes to the Zambian Environment.  
   
 
Note: This figure summarises respondents' rating of the suitability of Western corporate governance codes to 
the Zambian environment. 
  
 
Whilst only 18% of respondents perceived that Western codes are “very suitable”, 75% 
believed that they are “suitable” with only 7% suggesting that the codes are not suitable for 
Zambian conditions. While the results were not expected - based on extant governance 
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literature on Africa - they are in harmony with the interview findings where participants 
argued that if Zambia is to take advantage of the benefits of globalisation, endorsing 
international codes is inevitable. However, the results here also appear to be inconsistent 
with prior studies on Africa where Western codes are suggested as being incompatible with 
most African nations’ values (Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003; Jackson, 2004; Fan, 2009; 
Wanyama, et al., 2009), suggesting that attempts to generalise across the continent may lack 
empirical grounding.  
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Table: 9.7 Suitability of Western Corporate Governance Codes to the Zambian Environment 
 
Panel A: Appropriateness of Western Codes to the Zambian Environment 
 
 Cumulative 
suitability 
score 
Chi-
Square 
P-Value 
 
Mann-Whitney  P-Values 
 
PVT/SOE PVT/GG PVT/NGO PVT/OS SOE/GG SOE/NGO SOE/OS GG/NGO GG/OS NGO/OS 
CGQ8A 94% 0.602 0.540 0.332 0.327 0.580 0.245 0.742 0.422 0.175 0.816 0.312 
 
Panel B: Group Classifications - Suitability of Western Codes to the Zambian Environment 
 
  Very suitable Suitable Not suitable Not sure 
Cumulative 
Suitability Score 
Group Classification PVT 15% 85% 0 0 100%  
  SOE 25% 75% 0 0 100% 
  GG 9% 82% 9% 0 91% 
  NGO 33% 67% 0 0 100% 
  OS 20% 65% 10% 5% 85% 
 
 
Note: This table shows the cumulative suitability score, Chi-Square p-value, and the Mann-Whitney Test p-values. The lower part of the table depicts the suitability 
opinions by categories. An * indicates that there is a significant difference between stakeholder groups’average response at the 5% level. 
 
CGQ8A = Suitability of Western Corporate Governance codes to the Zambian Environment. PVT = private sector; SOE = State-Owned Enterprises; GG = Government and 
spending agencies; NGO = Non-Governmental Organisations; OS = Other Stakeholders. 
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Examination of the cumulative suitability scores in Panel B of Table 9.7 reveals that the 
pattern described above was consistent across all respondents groups with individual figures 
of PVT-100%, SOE-100%, NGO-100%, GG-91% and 85% for OS resulting. One possible 
explanation for the high figures for the PVT group is that this category comprises members 
that are likely to be exposed to LuSE corporate governance rules drawn heavily on Western 
codes. Similarly, the PVT category is also represented by agents of multinationals who by 
their very nature are likely to be exposed to various Western codes. For example, one 
questionnaire respondent represented the Zambia National Commercial Bank Plc 
(ZANACO), a subsidiary of the Dutch firm Rabobank which has, apart from endorsing the 
BOZ and LuSE codes, also adopted the Dutch corporate governance code embraced by the 
parent company Rabobank Group
224
. However, the high suitability scores generated by the 
SOE, GG, and NGO categories are less easily explained as the interview findings revealed 
favouring of domestic domestic or hybridised codes
225
. Notwithstanding the preceding 
results, the interview findings demonstrated that while most participants approved of 
Western codes, at the same time they appeared to deviate from supporting their wholesale 
adoption by advocating modifications that take into account certain issues that are specific to 
the Zambian context; in particular, the codes should consider the differing social and 
economic settings which may consequently have an impact on corporate governance.  
  
An explanation for this evidence may lie in the interview findings where participants argued 
that adopting Euro- or Anglo-centric principles of corporate governance without alterations 
may run against the philosophy and values considered to be a fundamental characteristic of 
Zambian culture, resulting in an incompatibility. One other criticism commonly aimed at 
attempts to apply Western corporate governance to Zambia is that they fail to take account 
                                                          
224
See Chapter Four for more details. 
225
Analysis of views across respondent groups regarding the suitability of Western corporate governance codes 
to Zambia suggests that there was no significant variation in opinions across the five categories; the 
Kruskal-Wallis p-value in Table 9.7 is well above the critical value of 0.05. 
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of the country’s unique ability to interpret local experiences. Interviewees argued that in 
failing to recognise this, the Western corporate governance ignore the profound differences 
between the Western culture on which the codes were designed and the Zambian culture on 
which it is to be implemented. Conceptually, the debate lies rather in the differences 
between the shareholder viewpoint and the inclusivity approach which recognises a wider 
group of stakeholders, including the broader community.  
 
9.7 Corporate Governance Drivers in Zambia 
 
A considerable amount of literature in the area of corporate governance has suggested that 
while the cross-border drivers of corporate governance may be common in principle, they 
appear to be inconsistent in practice in different jurisdictions as they tend to be vulnerable to 
diverse factors ranging from levels of development to globalisation (Berglof and Thadden, 
1999; Babic, 2003; Oman, 2003; McGee, 2008; Siddiqui, 2010). Although there is a lack of 
literature specific to Zambia, studies on Africa as a whole suggest potential drivers of 
corporate governance that include: corporate scandals; globalisation; economic 
development; foreign investment; and privatisation (Rwegasira, 2000; Charkham and Ploix, 
2005; Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2005; Tsamenyi and Uddin, 2008; Arun and Turner, 2009; 
Wanyama et al., 2006). To uncover the Zambian stakeholders’ perspectives concerning 
corporate governance drivers, a section of the survey document was specifically devoted to 
extracting this information. Seven questions reflecting the various drivers were proposed, 
with respondents asked to rate the extent of their impact in Zambia. The seven were: (1) 
corporate scandals in Zambia (CGQ9A); (2) corporate scandals elsewhere (outside Zambia) 
(CGQ9B); (3) integration into the global market (CGQ9C); (4) economic development 
(CGQ9D); (5) to attract investment (CGQ9E); (6) privatisation (CGQ9F); and (7) “just 
because everyone is doing it” (CGQ9G).   
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Table: 9.8 Corporate Governance Drivers 
 
Panel A: Agreement with Corporate Governance Drivers 
 
CGQ Cumulative 
agreement 
score 
Mean 
ranks 
K-W 
P-
Values 
Mann-Whitney  P-Values 
PVT/SOE PVT/G
G 
PVT/NGO PVT/OS SOE/GG SOE/NGO SOE/OS GG/NGO GG/OS NGO/OS 
9A 66% 2.23 0.841 0.424 0.464       0.801 0.758 0.892       0.349 0.472   0.418 0.605    0.592 
9B 74% 2.05 0.698 0.540 0.578       0.898 0.496 0.738       0.685 0.279   0.906 0.156    0.555 
9C 86% 1.72 
b 
0.765 0.721 0.300       0.768 0.716 0.475       0.411 1.000   0.141 0.493    0.509 
9D 79% 1.83 0.809 0.869 0.287       0.817 0.340 0.503       0.945 0.600   0.549 0.855    0.644 
9E 88%ª 1.86 0.540 0.693 0.261       0.321 0.870 0.364       0.416 0.566   0.906 0.164    0.239 
9F 59% 2.28 0.200 0.892 0.726 0.035* 0.724 0.690 0.046* 0.729 0.026* 0.948 0.040* 
9G 57% 2.38 0.511 0.308 0.748       0.657 0.411 0.202       0.255 0.085   0.916 0.449     0.819 
 
Panel B: Frequency - Levels of Agreement with Corporate Governance Drivers 
 
 corporate scandals 
in Zambia 
corporate scandals 
elsewhere (outside 
Zambia) 
integration into 
the global market 
economic 
development 
to attract investment privatisation 
 
everyone else is doing it 
Agree 
 
 
Disagree/
Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree/ 
Neutral 
 
Agre
e 
 
Disagree
/Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree
/Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree/ 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Disagre
e/Neutr
al 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
/Neutral 
 
 
% % % % % % % % % % % % % % 
PVT 60 40 70 30 75 25 80 20 85 15 65
b 
35 50 50 
SOE 88 12 63 37 100 0 75 25 100 0 63
C 
37 50 50 
GG 82 18 91 09 100 0 82 18 82 18 64
d 
36 64 36 
NGO 67 33 67 33 100 0 83 17 83 17 17
bcde 
83 50 50 
OS 55 45 75 25 80 20 75 25 90 10 60
e 
40 65 35 
Note: This table shows the cumulative agreement score, mean ranks, Kruskal-Wallis Test p-values and Mann-Whitney Test p-values. The lower part of the table indicates the levels of 
agreement in terms of the seven proposed corporate governance drivers across respondent groups. An * indicates that there is a significant difference between stakeholder groups’ average 
response at the 5% level. An ª indicates the variable with the highest cumulative frequency score. A b indicates the variable with the highest mean rank. The Likert scale used ranged from 1= 
strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree.  
CGQ9A = “corporate scandals in Zambia”; CGQ9B = “corporate scandals elsewhere (outside Zambia)”; CGQ9C = “integration into the global market” CGQ9D = “economic development”; 
CGQ9E = “to attract investment”; CGQ9F = “privatisation”; CGQ9G = “just because everyone is doing it”. PVT = private sector; SOE = State-Owned Enterprises; GG = Government and 
spending agencies; NGO = Non-Governmental Organisations; OS = Other Stakeholders.  
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Table 9.8 compares the cumulative agreement scores for all variables. The results indicate 
that each of the proposed drivers of corporate governance received cumulative agreement 
scores of more than 50%, ranging from 88% (for CGQ9E) to 57% (for CGQ9G). 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test was again employed to detect differences in responses across the 
five stakeholder groups. The results, presented in Table 9.8, suggest that there were no 
statistically significant differences in opinions across the five stakeholder groups. Similarly, 
the Mann-Whitney tests of pairwise differences amongst groups suggest a wide degree of 
consensus except with regard to the driver in CGQ9F - privatisation. Here there were four 
cases of significant differences in average response: (PVT and NGO; SOE and NGO; GG 
and NGO; NGO and OS), suggesting that perceptions regarding the role of privatisation as a 
driver of corporate governance reflect individual backgrounds to some extent. However, 
analysis of levels of agreement across individual groups in Panel B of Table 9.8 fails to 
indicate any underlying pattern in the data.    
 
Although respondents’ opinions are divided, CGQ9E (attracting investment) and CGQ9C 
(integration into the global market) topped the list in terms of cumulative agreement scores 
while CGQ9C (integration into the global market) and CGQ9D (economic development) 
dominated the list as regards mean ranks. This pattern is consistent with the interview 
findings where globalisation, attracting investment and economic development were cited as 
some of the major motivators for the current corporate governance reforms in the country. 
Most interestingly, a great majority of respondents gave the impression that attracting 
foreign investment is crucial because it has the propensity to stimulate economic 
development and it therefore acts as the leading driver of corporate governance development 
in Zambia. As regards corporate scandals in Zambia, respondents believed that the influence 
is phlegmatic because most failures have been politicised with insufficient research linking 
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them to weaknesses in corporate governance. The following comment from one of the 
questionnaire respondents summarises this point: 
“Corporate failures in Zambia have not been documented and analysed in terms of 
corporate governance principles therefore there has been little local support for 
corporate failures as drivers of corporate governance. More work needs to be done 
from a local perspective and experiences” (OS 12). 
 
 
9.8 Corporate Governance Challenges in Zambia 
 
Both the literature review and interview analysis presented earlier suggested that attempts to 
improve corporate governance practices, particularly in developing nations, have faced 
considerable challenges (Pascal, 2002; Babic, 2003; Wanyama et al., 2009). The next part of 
the survey document was designed to investigate the extent to which respondents agreed or 
disagreed with a series of corporate governance challenges identified in the literature and 
considered most likely to be of relevance in Zambia. These were: laws and regulation; 
cultural beliefs and values; political interference; social and ethical factors; corruption; and a 
lack of accountability. Inspection of Table 9.9 indicates majority acceptance that all six 
factors have a bearing on corporate governance practices in Zambia, but lack of 
accountability, corruption, laws and regulation and political interference were of most 
concern, with cumulative agreement scores ranging from 85% to 91% (compared to 68% 
and 74% for the other issues) and means of 1.51 to 1.66 (2.06 and 2.26). Prior studies have 
noted that corruption, accountability and weak legal systems remain strong challenges for 
corporate governance in other developing nations (Amoako, 2003; Brautigam and Knack, 
2004; Rossouw, 2005; Wanyama et al., 2009); according to the interview findings presented 
earlier, the three factors pose severe challenges for corporate governance development 
because they are inter-linked. In particular, the legal and regulatory mechanisms mitigate 
against the likelihood of robust corporate governance systems emerging.  
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Table: 9.9 Corporate Governance Challenges 
 
Panel A: Agreement and Mean Ranks – Corporate Governance Challenges 
 
CGQ Cumulative 
agreement 
score 
Mean 
ranks 
K-W 
P-
Values 
Mann-Whitney  P-Values 
PVT/SOE PVT/GG PVT/NGO PVT/OS SOE/GG SOE/NGO SOE/OS GG/NGO GG/OS NGO/OS 
10A 86% 1.62 0.385 0.441 0.150 0.672 0.083   0.436 0.773 0.469 0.406 0.918 0.385 
10B 68% 2.26 0.908 0.910 0.364 0.948 0.965   0.507 0.892 0.891 0.564 0.385 0.975 
10C 85% 1.66 0.509 0.601 0.165 0.522 0.504   0.083 0.362 0.334 0.659 0.469 0.857 
10D 74% 2.06 0.772 0.542 0.494 0.780 0.433   0.355 0.832 0.317 0.521 0.965 0.497 
10E 89% 1.51 
b
 0.452 0.608 0.122 0.945 0.470   0.054 0.777 0.278 0.343 0.389 0.765 
10F  91% ª 1.52 0.379 0.324 0.287 0.381 0.801   0.054 0.779 0.456 0.118 0.191 0.411 
 
Panel B: Frequency – Levels of Agreement with Corporate Governance Challenges 
 
 laws and regulation cultural beliefs and 
values 
political interference social and ethical 
factors 
corruption lack of accountability 
Agree 
 
Disagree/ 
Neutral 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
/Neutral 
Agree 
 
Disagree/ 
Neutral 
Agree 
 
Disagree/ 
Neutral 
Agree 
 
Disagree/ 
Neutral 
Agree 
 
Disagree/ 
Neutral 
% % % % % % % % % % % % 
PVT 75 15 70 30 85 15 80 20 90 10 90 10 
SOE 100 0 75 25 75 25 63 37 100
 
0 100
c 
0 
GG 91 9 73 27 100 0 73 27 100
 
0 100
c 
0 
NGO 83 17 50 50 83 17 67 33 67 33 67 33 
OS 90 10 65 35 80 20 75 25 85 15 90 10 
Note: This table shows the cumulative agreement score, mean ranks, Kruskal-Wallis Test p-values and Mann-Whitney Test p-values. The lower part of the table indicates 
the levels of agreement in terms of the proposed corporate governance challenges across respondent groups. An * indicates that there is a significant difference between 
stakeholder groups’ average response at the 5% level. An ª indicates the variable with the highest cumulative frequency score. A 
b
 indicates the variable with the highest 
mean rank. The Likert scale used ranged from 1= strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree.   
CGQ10A = “laws and regulation”; CGQ10B = “cultural beliefs and values”; CGQ10C = “political interference”; CGQ10D = “social and ethical factors”; CGQ10E = 
“corruption”; CGQ10F = “lack of accountability”. PVT = private sector; SOE = State-Owned Enterprises; GG = Government and spending agencies; NGO = Non-
Governmental Organisations; OS = Other Stakeholders.  
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The Kruskal-Wallis test statistics indicate that differences in opinions across respondent 
groups as a whole were not significant and the Mann-Whitney test results of pairwise 
differences between respondent groups indicate there were no significant differences 
between pairs of groups.   
 
The interview findings suggested that enforcement remains the primary problem in Zambia; 
the capacity of regulators to enforce compliance with the law appears to be irresolute. 
According to the evidence in Chapter Seven, corruption, lack of accountability, legal and 
regulatory frameworks and institutional capacity rank highly among the factors that affect 
the sustainable observation and practice of corporate governance in Zambia and it is 
therefore clear that the results from the two research techniques are consistent in this respect. 
The relevant literature discussed in Chapter Three also contains common acknowledgement 
of the notion that robust corporate governance requires an effective and appropriate legal, 
regulatory and institutional capacity (Hossain, 1995; La Porta et al., 1997; Kilgour, 1998; 
Nganga et al., 2003; Brautigam and Knack, 2004; Rossouw, 2005; Wanyama et al., 2009). 
However, regarding cultural beliefs and values (CGQ10B), comments made outwith the 
formal closed questions revealed some issues that had not arisen elsewhere; for example,   
“In Zambia, certain cultural values undermine good corporate governance. For 
instance, people view it as inappropriate to question superiors; equally, superiors also 
see it as ridiculous when they are challenged into accountability by juniors.” (SOE 
01): 
 
“Some cultural attitudes hinder corporate governance in Zambia; in some cases the 
chairman of the board is regarded as a “village Chief” and whatever he says must not 
be openly opposed. These “village Chiefs” are usually not the best. Board meetings 
do not discuss real issues affecting the organisation” (SOE 01)    
 
“We still have a problem when it comes to traditional beliefs and practices, for 
example, senior managers often refuse to be audited or guided by persons their junior 
in age and salary scale. Junior officers are afraid of blowing the whistle against 
unethical practices particularly in government and state-owned enterprises.” (SOE 
06)    
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As with the interviewees in Chapter Seven, the questionnaire respondents proposed that the 
key corporate governance principles be embedded into law, with a majority pointing out that 
political interference and patronage continue to pose a threat to robust corporate governance. 
  
9.9 Corporate Governance Benefits 
The extant literature holds that compliance with corporate governance has a wide range of 
benefits including increased transparency and disclosure, improved access to capital, 
reduced chances of conflict of interest, better systems of control leading to enhanced 
accountability, better allocation of resources and higher economic growth (CACG, 1999b; 
Shkolnikov, 2002; Oman, 2003; Prasad et al., 2003). As alluded to in Chapter Four, for a 
country like Zambia that depends heavily on foreign assistance, corporate governance may 
have a role to play in encouraging the flow of development aid (see Burnside and Dollar, 
1997; Akokpari, 2004). For the private sector, robust corporate governance can provide the 
proper incentives for company boards to pursue objectives that are in the interest of the 
shareholders and provide them with both higher returns and greater security on their 
investment (Oman, 2003; Rahman, 2010). Given this background, the questionnaire 
respondents were asked to rate the likely importance of specific corporate governance 
benefits to Zambia. The potential benefits mentioned in the document were: (1) providing 
the degree of accountability necessary for the proper functioning of the Zambian market 
economy (CGQ11A); (2) Zambia’s entry tool into the global pool of capital (CGQ11B); (3) 
Zambia’s national economic development (CGQ11C); (4) alleviation of poverty (CGQ11D); 
(5) efficient allocation of resources (CGQ11E); (6) safeguarding against corruption and 
mismanagement (CGQ11F); (7) making Zambia attractive for investment (CGQ11G); (8) 
lowering the cost of capital (CGQ11H); and (9) lowering the cost of doing business 
(CGQ11I). Table 9.10 summarises the responses.  
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Table: 9.10 Corporate Governance Benefits 
 
 
CGQ Cumulative 
agreement 
score 
Mean 
ranks 
K-W 
P-
Values 
Mann-Whitney  P-Values 
PVT/SOE PVT/GG PVT/NGO PVT/OS SOE/GG SOE/NGO SOE/OS GG/NGO GG/OS NGO/OS 
11A 100%
a 
1.22 
b 
0.324 0.706 0.190 0.134 0.471 0.144 0.103 0.343 0.460 0.437 0.243 
11B 97% 1.34 0.817 0.516 0.434 0.677 0.446 0.922 0.411 0.976 0.378 0.883 0.385 
11C 91% 1.52 0.971 0.552 0.564 0.942 0.625 1.000 0.769 0.908 0.775 0.925 0.806 
11D 72% 1.89 0.792 0.742 0.965 0.246 0.977 0.755 0.215 0.846 0.315 1.000 0.315 
11E 80% 1.86 0.209 0.194 0.057 0.711 0.109 0.783 0.241 0.955 0.104 0.783 0.192 
11F 94% 1.35 0.277 0.337 0.418 0.137 0.703 0.128  0.051
 
0.204 0.281 0.630 0.183 
11G 99% 1.32 0.748 1.000 0.206 0.692 0.727 0.330 0.742 0.795 0.563 0.323 0.879 
11H 68% 2.06 0.298 0.198 0.776 0.237 0.215 0.332 0.107 0.933 0.228 0.380 0.104 
11I 68% 2.06 0.455 0.395 0.241 0.412 0.444 0.929 0.202 0.807 0.102 0.612 0.170 
 
 
 
Note: This table shows the cumulative agreement score, mean ranks, Kruskal-Wallis Test p-values and Mann-Whitney Test p-values. An * indicates that there is a significant 
difference between stakeholder groups’ average response at the 5% level. An 
a
 indicates the variable with the highest cumulative frequency score. A 
b
 indicates the variable 
with the highest mean rank. The Likert scale used ranged from 1= strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree.   
CGQ11A = “providing the degree of accountability necessary for the proper functioning of the Zambian market economy”; CGQ11B = “Zambia’s entry tool into the global 
pool of capital”; CGQ11C = “one of the conditions for Zambia’s national economic development”; CGQ11D = “alleviation of poverty in Zambia”; CGQ11E = “efficient 
allocation of resources in Zambia”; CGQ11F = “safeguard against corruption and mismanagement” CGQ11G = “making Zambia attractive for investment”; CGQ11H = 
“lowering the cost of capital”; CGQ11I = “lowering the cost of doing business”;  
PVT = private sector; SOE = State-Owned Enterprises; GG = Government and spending agencies; NGO = Non-Governmental Organisations; OS = Other Stakeholders.  
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Inspection of the table reveals that all nine statements were supported by a majority of 
respondents, ranging from 100% (CGQ11A) to 68% (CGQ11I). It is therefore evident that a 
wide range of potential corporate governance related benefits are seen as existing in Zambia. 
The Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests indicate that there were no statistically 
significant differences in terms of opinions across the five stakeholder groups. As for the 
notion of companies as creators of wealth, the responses demonstrated a perception that 
corporate governance maintains investors’ confidence, as a result lowering the cost of 
capital. Strong corporate governance maintains investors’ confidence (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997), under such circumstances company can raise capital efficiently and effectively 
because investors prefer to support and invest in companies that are well-governed with 
regard to corporate governance. 
 
There was a perception by some interview participants that corporate governance applies 
only to large, market-listed companies and is of little importance since the country has only 
a small number of such organisations quoted on the LuSE
226
. In this context, some of the 
interviewees believed that the Cadbury (1992) definition of corporate governance “…the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled” justified this type of stand point.  
However, studies have documented that corporate governance cuts across all organisations 
irrespective of their objectives (Cadbury, 1992; Wanyama et al., 2009). A follow-up 
question, CGQ12, was included on whether or not the corporate governance notion relates 
only to companies in the private sector or should instead be extended to government, SOEs, 
NGOs and other smaller organisations. Inspection of Figure 9.4 indicates that there was an 
overwhelming response in favour of the view that corporate governance is relevant across all 
organisations.  
 
                                                          
226
See Chapter Eight for details. 
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Figure: 9.4 Agreement Levels with the Proposition that Corporate Governance is 
Relevant Across all Types of Different Organisations 
 
 
 
Note: This table shows the levels of agreement with the proposition that corporate governance is relevant to 
organisations other than corporations 
 
 
With a 100% cumulative agreement score, the result suggests that Zambians believe 
corporate governance to no longer be confined to corporations and their owners, but to 
instead have become an issue even in NGOs, faith-based organisations (churches) and the 
other not-for profit organisations that dominate in Zambia. The emphasis on accountability, 
transparency, ethics and fairness appears to have made corporate governance an essential 
frame of reference even outside the confines of profit-oriented organisations. 
 
9.10 Corporate Governance and Development 
 
The central research question in this thesis relates to the potential impact of governance 
improvements on developing national economies (Oman, 2003; OECD, 2004a; Okike, 2007; 
McGee, 2008; Siddiqui, 2010). The interview findings in Chapter Eight consistently 
demonstrated that there is a strong perceived relationship between corporate governance and 
development. The next section of the questionnaire therefore attempted to find out from a 
larger sample of individuals the extent to which they believe such an association to exist; the 
idea is framed around NEPAD’s conception that corporate governance is one of the 
conditions necessary for Africa’s development. The investigation began by asking 
respondents (in CGDQ14) to classify Zambia in terms of development. Four stages were 
6%
94%Pe
rc
en
t
100
80
60
40
20
0
AgreeStrongly agree
 
 345 
proposed: (i) under-developed; (ii) in transition between under-developed and developing; 
(iii) developing; and (iv) developed. This question is important given the growing 
recognition that the practice and relevance of corporate governance depends to some extent 
on a country’s level of development (Berglof and Thadden, 1999; Wanyama et al., 2009); 
respondents’ position on this issue may therefore influence their opinions on questions that 
follow.  
Figure: 9.5 Classifying Zambia in Terms of Development Level 
 
 
 
Note: This Figure shows respondents’ opinions regarding Zambia’s level of development 
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 9.5 below, the views regarding Zambia’s level of development 
were not unequivocal, although the majority (58%) of respondents believed that Zambia is 
currently in transition, from under-developed to developing nation status. However, 31% of 
respondents ranked Zambia as a developing nation and only 11% located the country in the 
under-developed category, suggesting that Zambia is viewed by the vast majority of its 
inhabitants as developing or on the way to becoming so. While most nations have devoted 
increased levels of attention to corporate governance - regardless of their level of 
development - there is a growing acknowledgement that corporate governance matters most 
for countries in transition (Babic, 2003; Oman, 2003; McGee, 2008; Siddiqui, 2010). In this 
context, the importance of corporate governance for a country like Zambia that has been 
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undergoing economic metamorphosis - and that is perceived in such a way by most of its 
citizens - cannot be exaggerated. 
 
This study set out with the aim of assessing the association between corporate governance 
and development in the Zambian context. Based on NEPAD’s philosophising, the next 
question (CGQD15) was designed to elicit from the Zambian stakeholders the extent to 
which they agreed with the notion that corporate governance is one of the necessary 
conditions for Zambia’s development. Figure 9.6 below shows that all respondents were in 
agreement with the NEPAD’s assertion that corporate governance is one of the necessary 
conditions for development (46% strongly agree and 54% agree). The overwhelming 
response in favour of the notion suggests the reason as to why economic development was 
found to be viewed among the top corporate governance drivers and benefits in an earlier 
part of the questionnaire (see Tables 9.8 and 9.10) as well as being one of the key factors 
underpinning economic development (see Table 9.11). 
 
Figure: 9.6 Levels of Agreement with the NEPAD Notion 
 
Note: This chart shows respondents’ level of agreement with NEPAD’s idea that corporate governance is one 
of the necessary conditions for development in Zambia. 
 
 
The findings in this regard are consistent with studies of developing countries such as Brazil, 
Chile, India, and South Africa which indicate that corporate governance matters for national 
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development (Oman, 2003). Relatedly, the interview findings in Chapter Eight suggest that 
in Zambia, as in many developing nations, a strong belief exists that the elements of 
corporate governance often held as being most critical (i.e accountability, transparency, 
disclosure and fairness) are important development pillars and have been lacking in the 
country’s search for improved economic prosperity.   
Question 16 of the survey document was designed to find out what respondents thought 
about corporate governance’s role in a range of aspects of economic development. The 
relevant propositions were: (i) Zambia’s economy depends on the drive and efficiency of its 
companies (CGDQ16A); (ii) corporate governance is one of the key elements in improving 
Zambia’s economic efficiency and growth (CGDQ16B); (iii) corporate governance plays a 
critical role in attracting aid to Zambia (CGDQ16C); (iv) corporate governance is an 
essential element in attracting FDI to Zambia (CGDQ16D); (v) corporate governance is 
important in helping Zambia create wealth and long-term competitiveness in the global 
economy (CGDQ16E); (vi) corporate governance plays an important role in creating 
investor confidence in Zambia (CGDQ16F); (vii) corporate governance plays a central role 
in helping Zambian firms access finance for their investment activities at a lower cost 
(CGDQ16G); and (viii) sound corporate governance practices are fundamental to Zambia’s 
economic recovery. The results are provided in Table 9.11 Panels A and B. It should be re-
iterated here that the main aim of the present study is not to formally measure the impact of 
these factors but is instead to establish the extent to which corporate governance is perceived 
as playing a role in Zambia’s development by those most directly affected.   
Inspection of the second and third columns of Table 9.11, Panel A reveals overwhelming 
agreement with all nine statements. Although there were some differences, both the 
cumulative agreement scores (97%) and the mean ranks (1.35) indicated strongest support 
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for the statement in CGDQ16B (“corporate governance is one of the key elements in 
improving Zambia’s economic efficiency and growth”). CGDQ16G “corporate governance 
plays a central role in helping Zambian firms access finance for their investment activities at 
a lower cost” ranked lowest for both the cumulative agreement scores (79%) and the mean 
ranks (1.94). Although the reasons for these specific outcomes are not obviously intuitive, 
respondents appear to be clear at a general level that corporate governance has an important 
role to play in Zambia’s economic development. The Kruskal-Wallis test results revealed a 
statistical significant difference in opinions in only one case, CGDQ16H, (“sound corporate 
governance practices are fundamental to Zambia’s economic recovery”) which had a p-value 
of 0.045. However, the Mann-Whitney test results indicated that respondents’ opinions 
converge in most cases, exceptions being; PVT and SOE (CGDQ16C, CGDQ16D and 
CGDQ16H), PVT and GG (CGDQ16E), PVT and NGO (CGDQ16B, CGDQ16E and 
CGDQ16H), SOE and NGO (CGDQ16G), SOE and OS (CGDQ16C and CGDQ16D), and 
NGO and OS (CGDQ16G). Further analysis of the responses (as per Table 9.11 Panel B) 
indicates that even in these cases, the majority of respondents from each class agreed with 
the statement in question.  
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Table: 9.11 Panel A: Corporate Governance and Development 
 
CGDQ Cumulative 
agreement 
score 
Mean 
rank 
K-W 
P-
Values 
Mann-Whitney  P-Values 
PVT/SOE PVT/GG PVT/N
GO 
PVT/
OS 
SOE/GG SOE/NGO SOE/OS GG/NGO GG/OS NGO/OS 
16A 92% 1.52 0.337 0.081 0.143 0.371 0.163 0.609 0.625 0.430 0.905 0.771 0.944 
16B 97%ª 1.35
b
  0.173 0.104 0.279  0.050* 0.396 0.448 0.386 0.242 0.171 0.665 0.096 
16C 83% 1.78 0.273  0.041* 0.577 0.871 0.908 0.093 0.106  0.046* 0.780 0.669 0.948 
16D 80% 1.88 0.172  0.013* 0.825 1.000 0.418 0.069 0.082  0.050* 0.916 0.756 0.646 
16E 92% 1.55 0.061 0.075  0.042*  0.024* 0.070 0.961 0.411 0.660 0.409 0.583 0.211 
16F 95% 1.49 0.688 0.219 0.574 0.445 0.988 0.543 0.742 0.219 0.811 0.558 0.445 
16G 79% 1.94 0.070 0.154 0.155 0.116 0.244 0.082  0.046* 0.612 0.786 0.069  0.046* 
16H 94% 1.49  0.045*  0.014* 0.086  0.041* 0.160 0.256 0.832 0.108 0.409 0.583 0.211 
 
Note: This table shows the cumulative agreement score, mean ranks, Kruskal-Wallis Test p-values and Mann-Whitney Test p-values. An * indicates that there is a significant 
difference between stakeholder groups’ average response at the 5% level. An ª indicates the variable with the highest cumulative frequency score. A 
b
 indicates the variable 
with the highest mean rank. The Likert scale used ranged from 1= strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree.   
CGDQ16A = “Zambia’s economy depends on the drive and efficiency of its companies”; CGDQ16B = “corporate governance is one of the key elements in improving 
Zambia’s economic efficiency and growth”; CGDQ16C = corporate governance plays a critical role in attracting aid to Zambia”; CGDQ16D = “corporate governance is an 
essential element in attracting FDI to Zambia”; CGDQ16E = “corporate governance is important in helping Zambia create wealth and long-term competitiveness in the 
global economy”; CGDQ16F = “corporate governance plays an important role in creating investor confidence in Zambia”; CGDQ16G = “corporate governance plays a 
central role in helping Zambian firms access finance for their investment activities at a lower cost”; CGDQ16H = “sound corporate governance practices are fundamental to 
Zambia’s economic recovery”.     
PVT = private sector; SOE = State-Owned Enterprises; GG = Government and spending agencies; NGO = Non-Governmental Organisations; OS = Other Stakeholders.  
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Table: 9.11 Panel B: Table of Frequency – Corporate Governance and Development 
 
 Zambia’s 
economy depends 
on the drive and 
efficiency of its 
companies 
 
 
 
 
 
CGDQ16A 
corporate 
governance is one 
of the key 
elements in 
improving 
Zambia’s 
economic 
efficiency and 
growth 
 
CGDQ16B 
corporate 
governance plays 
a critical role in 
attracting aid to 
Zambia 
 
 
 
 
 
CGDQ16C 
corporate 
governance is an 
essential element 
in attracting FDI 
to Zambia 
 
 
 
 
 
CGDQ16D 
corporate 
governance is 
important in 
helping Zambia 
create wealth and 
long-term 
competitiveness 
in the global 
economy 
 
CGDQ16E 
corporate 
governance plays 
an important role 
in creating 
investor 
confidence in 
Zambia 
 
 
 
CGDQ16F 
corporate 
governance plays 
a central role in 
helping Zambian 
firms access 
finance for their 
investment 
activities at a 
lower cost 
 
CGDQ16G 
sound corporate 
governance 
practices are 
fundamental to 
Zambia’s economic 
recovery 
 
 
 
 
CGDQ16H 
Agree 
 
Disagree/ 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
/Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree/ 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree/ 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree/ 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree/ 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree/ 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree/ 
Neutral 
 
% % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % 
PVT 85 15 90
 
10 75
 
25 75
 
25 80
 
20 95 5 85 15 85
 
15 
SOE 100 0 100 0 100
 
0 100
 
0 100 0 100 0 87
 
13 100
 
0 
GG 100 0 100 0 91 9 73 27 100
 
0 91 9 54 46 100 0 
NGO 83 17 100
 
0 83 17 67 33 100
 
0 100 0 67
 
33 100
j 
0 
OS 95 5 100 0 80
 
20 85
 
15 95 5 95 5 85 15 95
 
5 
 
Note: This table shows the levels of agreement in terms of the proposed corporate governance and development factors across respondent groups. 
CGDQ16A = “Zambia’s economy depends on the drive and efficiency of its companies”; CGDQ16B = “corporate governance is one of the key elements in improving 
Zambia’s economic efficiency and growth”; CGDQ16C = corporate governance plays a critical role in attracting aid to Zambia”; CGDQ16D = “corporate governance is an 
essential element in attracting FDI to Zambia”; CGDQ16E = “corporate governance is important in helping Zambia create wealth and long-term competitiveness in the 
global economy”; CGDQ16F = “corporate governance plays an important role in creating investor confidence in Zambia”; CGDQ16G = “corporate governance plays a 
central role in helping Zambian firms access finance for their investment activities at a lower cost”; CGDQ16H = “sound corporate governance practices are fundamental to 
Zambia’s economic recovery”.     
PVT = private sector; SOE = State-Owned Enterprises; GG = Government and spending agencies; NGO = Non-Governmental Organisations; OS = Other Stakeholders.  
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9.11 Corporate Governance and Accountability 
The empirical findings reported so far in the thesis suggest that the influence of 
accountability on corporate governance and development has a pervasive thematic role in 
participants’ perceptions. Consequently, based on the findings in Chapter Seven and Eight 
of this thesis, it appears reasonable to suggest that it is no longer a concealed obiter dictum 
that current corporate governance developments in Zambia are anchored on the desire to 
bring about enhanced accountability: corporate governance and accountability are 
inexorably linked (Oman, 2003; Lungu, 2005; Mallin, 2007; Solomon, 2010). Similarly, the 
extant literature on Africa blames a lack of accountability for the prolonged governance and 
development difficulties on the continent (IoDSA, 2002; Shkolnikov, 2002; Oman, 2003; 
Brautigam and Knack, 2004; Lungu, 2005). Given this context, accountability has been 
adopted as the theoretical base for the current study and the questions that follow were 
theoretically-driven. Respondents were therefore asked to express their opinion on the inter-
relationships amongst the three key themes of this thesis, i.e. corporate governance, 
development and accountability. Based on analysis of the previous literature, the following 
propositions statements regarding accountability, governance and development were 
included in the questionnaire: (i) corporate governance rests on accountability (CGAQ13A); 
(ii) accountability and sound corporate governance practices underpin economic 
development (CGAQ13B); (iii) accountability holds the promise of bringing people to 
justice (CGAQ13C); (iv) accountability plays a critical role in controlling abuse of political 
power (CGAQ13D); and (v) accountability can contribute to better governance in Zambia 
(CGAQ13E). The results are set out in Table 9.12.  
Both the cumulative agreement scores (in the second column - 99%) and the mean rank data 
in the third column place CGAQ13E at the top of the hierarchy in terms of accountability 
statements. The Kruskal-Wallis test in Table 9-12 (column 4) indicates that there were no 
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significant differences in respondents’ opinions among the groups except for CGAQ13E, 
with a p-value of 0.043. The Mann-Whitney tests show that in seven cases, differences in 
average responses were statistically significant, four of them relating to CGAQ13E - 
relatively better governance and accountability. However, the breakdown of frequencies in 
Panel B of Table 9.12 reveals that in virtually all cases each group of respondents agreed 
with all the statements in question. The one exception relates to the SOE group for 
CGAQ13C, the proposition relating to bringing people to justice. This outcome is hard to 
explain although even here half the sample supported the notion in question.  
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Table: 9.12  Corporate Governance, Development and Accountability 
 
Panel A: Agreement Scores, Mean Ranks, Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney Test p-values 
 
CGAQ Cumulative 
agreement score 
Mean 
rank 
K-W 
P-Values 
Mann-Whitney  P-Values 
PVT/SOE PVT/GG PVT/NGO PVT/OS SOE/GG SOE/NGO SOE/OS GG/NGO GG/OS NGO/OS 
13A 99% 1.26 0.508 0.119 0.904 0.859 0.655 0.152 0.215 0.262 0.939 0.630 0.648 
13B 99% 1.46 0.273 0.236 0.473 0.155 0.641 0.105  0.037* 0.149 0.409 0.771 0.289 
13C 79% 1.82 0.379 0.163 0.572 0.426 0.885 0.064 0.116 0.208 0.650 0.487 0.391 
13D 95% 1.34 0.099  0.038* 0.331 0.244 0.541 0.311  0.022* 0.085 0.104 0.613 0.134 
13E 99%ª 1.15
b 
 0.043*  0.033* 0.904 0.430 0.959  0.052*  0.048*  0.022* 0.460 0.936 0.429 
 
Panel B: Frequency – Corporate Governance and Development and Accountability 
 
 corporate governance rests 
on accountability 
accountability and sound corporate 
governance practices underpin 
economic development 
accountability holds the 
promise of bringing the 
people to justice 
accountability plays a critical 
role in controlling abuse of 
political power 
accountability can contribute to 
better governance in Zambia 
Agree 
 
Disagree/ 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree 
/Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree/ 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree/ 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Disagree/ 
Neutral 
 
% % % % % % % % % % 
PVT 100 0 100 0 80 20 95
 5 95
 5 
SOE 100 0 100
 
0 50 50 87 13 100
 
0 
GG 100 0 100 0 100 0 91 9 100
 
0 
NGO 100 0 100
 
0 83 17 100
 
0 100
 
0 
OS 95 5 95 5 75
 
25 100 0 100
 0 
 
Note: This table shows the cumulative agreement score, mean ranks, Kruskal-Wallis Test p-values and Mann-Whitney Test p-values. An * indicates that there is a significant 
difference between stakeholder groups’ average response at the 5% level. An ª indicates the variable with the highest cumulative frequency score. A 
b
 indicates the variable with 
the highest mean rank. The lower part of the table summarises the levels of agreement in terms of the proposed corporate governance and development and accountability across 
respondent groups. The Likert scale used ranged from 1= strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree.   
CGAQ13A = “corporate governance rests on accountability”; CGAQ13B = “accountability and sound corporate governance practices underpin economic development”; 
CGAQ13C = “accountability holds the promise of bringing the people to justice”; CGAQ13D = “accountability plays a critical role in controlling abuse of political power”; 
CGAQ13E = “accountability can contribute to better governance in Zambia”     
PVT = private sector; SOE = State-Owned Enterprises; GG = Government and spending agencies; NGO = Non-Governmental Organisations; OS = Other Stakeholders.  
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As participants indicated a strong link between corporate governance, development and 
accountability, a follow-up question, CGAQ17, was designed to detect the extent to which 
corporate governance difficulties in Zambian were associated with a lack of accountability. 
Inspection of Figure 9.7 reveals that 57% strongly agreed and 38% agreed with the 
hypothesis; the remaining 5% took a neutral stance. This result is consistent with much of 
the evidence reported so far in this chapter and also supports the interview findings. For 
example, the majority of respondents to question CGAQ13 supported the notion that 
accountability can contribute to better governance and development in Zambia; it is clear 
that the respondents believe issues of corporate governance and development to be rooted 
firmly in accountability.  
 
Figure: 9.7 Levels of Agreement with the Notion that Corporate Governance   
Difficulties in Zambia are Associated with a Lack of Accountability 
 
Note: This table shows levels of agreement with the notion that corporate governance difficulties in Zambia are 
associated with a lack of accountability 
 
9.12 Corporate Governance and FDI 
Traditional theories of foreign direct investment (FDI) hold that there is a strong association 
between levels of corporate governance and the inward flow of FDI (CACG, 1999b; Prasad 
et al., 2003).  This explanation is especially relevant for developed countries where there is 
strong evidence that corporate governance influences investment levels (Naidoo, 2002: 
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Ajayi, 2006). A section of the questionnaire therefore focused on the extent to which 
respondents perceived impaired corporate governance and a lack of accountability as 
impinging on the flow of FDI to Zambia. As can be seen in Figure 9.8 below, more than 
three quarters of the respondents (87%) acknowledged the influence of corporate 
governance on FDI flows to Zambia. However, it should be noted here that in the 
interviews, while theoretically acknowledging this association, the interviewees also stated 
that in the Zambian context the notion is only relevant in so far as investment in existing 
projects was concerned - for example, partnering with local entrepreneurs (in joint ventures 
and mergers). The interviewees argued further that most of the overseas investors have been 
‘lured’ into new projects by incentives such as tax-breaks and government subsidies, and not 
corporate governance itself. 
Figure: 9.8 Corporate Governance and the Flow of FDI to Zambia  
 
Note: This table shows levels of agreement with the notion that corporate governance affects the flow of FDI 
to Zambia  
 
As outlined in Chapter Eight, although it is commonly argued that corporate governance has 
the propensity to lower the cost of doing business (Oman, 2001; Claessens, 2003; OECD, 
2004a) and promote accountability and disclosure extent (Solomon, 2010), there appears to 
be strong evidence in Zambia that the increased flow of FDI, particularly in green field 
projects, is influenced by factors other than corporate governance. This perception suggests 
6%8%
65%
22%
Pe
rc
en
t
60
40
20
0
DisagreeNeutralAgreeStrongly 
agree
 
 356 
that while the participants involved do not dispute the theoretical assumption that there is a 
relationship between corporate governance and FDI, they strongly believed that in a 
Zambian context the link is not of primary importance. Similar sentiments were detected 
from respondents regarding corporate governance and development aid. Zambia, like many 
developing countries in Africa, depends on development aid for much of its economic 
resource base (World Bank, 2009b). According to Odén and Wohlgemuth (2011), between 
2000 and 2005 aid accounted for about 43% of the total Zambian government budget. 
However, in the recent past there has been some friction between the government and the 
donor community over issues of governance and accountability (Silwamba, 2009). Given 
this context, and related issues highlighted in the literature review here, a specific question 
(CGAQ19) was designed to capture stakeholder views on the relationship between corporate 
governance and the flow of development aid to Zambia. Inspection of Figure 9.9 indicates 
that 88% of respondents agreed with the notion that corporate governance and accountability 
influence the flow of development aid to Zambia, with only 3% disagreeing. 
Figure: 9.9    Corporate Governance and Development Aid in Zambia 
 
Note: This figure indicates levels of agreement with the notion that the lack of corporate governance and 
accountability affects the flow of development aid to Zambia. 
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The results here are consistent with the interview findings and support previous research 
regarding the issues concerned (see World Bank, 1998). The findings also corroborate the 
strong suggestion in the extant literature whereby development partners are increasingly 
using measures of governance and accountability when deciding on the allocation of 
development aid
227
. Similarly, some international finance organisations are partnering to 
support corporate governance projects in Zambia (Odén and Wohlgemuth, 2011), while 
NEPAD has also been supportive of rewarding countries that adhere to good governance 
principles. Given this background, it is perhaps unsurprising that a significant amount of 
development aid targeted at Zambia has been withheld
228
 on account of governance and 
accountability issues (see Chapter Eight). 
 
9.13 Conclusion 
This chapter set out with the aim of assessing the significance of corporate governance for 
economic development in Zambia via a questionnaire survey. The objective of data 
collection using this method is not the actualities - which are rather difficult to obtain - but is 
instead stakeholders’ subjective perceptions regarding the role of corporate governance in 
Zambia’s future development. As outlined in the methodology chapter, stakeholder views in 
this case have the propensity to draw out individual experiences as people experience social 
reality differently. In this case, data was drawn from five stakeholder groups: the private 
sector (PVT); State-Owned Enterprises (SOE); Government and spending agencies (GG); 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO); and Other Stakeholders (OS). The five groups 
were selected so as to reflect the country’s major stakeholders and obtain a diverse but 
balanced set of views. As subjective perceptions cannot be fully characterised by statistical 
                                                          
227
For example, the World Bank, the European Union and Irish Aid have started explicitly examining    
corporate governance and accountability in relation to their development aid programmes (Burnside and 
Dollar, 1997; Presbitero, 2008; Kaufmann and Kraay, 2010). 
228
The Swedish government and other key donors withdrew their support from the Ministry of Health in 
Zambia over the misappropriation of about K27 billion (£3.5 million) donor funds (Sinyangwe, 2009).  
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analysis of numerical data, this chapter has deliberately not presented a detailed array of 
quantitative results, but has instead attempted to provide an overview of the key themes and 
patterns in responses, in a way that facilitates complementing of the interview findings 
presented in Chapters Seven and Eight. To this end, three thematic areas were covered in the 
survey document; corporate governance, development and accountability.  
 
The findings show that although the concept of corporate governance is at a nascent stage in 
terms of its recognition as a key issue, a large majority of questionnaire respondents from all 
groups had some familiarity with the concept as well as the three local corporate governance 
codes. While those surveyed generally applauded the shareholder-centric approach, 
respondents were biased towards a more inclusive modus operandi for the Zambian context, 
a finding common in most African countries. Economic fragility, corruption, lack of 
accountability and the need to raise finances both at firm and country levels were seen as 
being some of the major drivers for corporate governance reform in Zambia. However, there 
was a perception that the latter faces a plethora of challenges ranging from globalisation, 
weak legal and regulatory systems and a limited capacity to enforce compliance. While 
respondents assented to the theory that corporate governance influences the flow of FDI and 
development aid, the findings suggested a belief that the relationship is weak in practice in 
Zambia, especially as regards FDI. The findings also reveal a widespread opinion that 
‘boilerplate’ Western corporate governance principles are bound to disappoint those hoping 
for a domestically-relevant framework, one that accounts for the philosophy and values of 
Zambian society in terms of social and economic development. However, and most 
importantly given the aims of the present study, the findings reported here clearly support 
the notion that corporate governance matters for national development; this result has 
important implications for developing nations like Zambia, in the sense that improved 
corporate governance offers the hope of increased financial capital inflows both to firms and 
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the nation at large, with the enhanced accountability and transparency leading ultimately to 
economic prosperity.  
 
Having completed the presentation of the empirical findings, the next chapter concludes the 
thesis by summarising and synthesising the main results and implications thereof, as well as 
acknowledging the study’s limitations and making suggestions for further work in the area.  
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CHAPTER TEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
10.1 Introduction 
 
The current study set out to investigate the perceptions of Zambians regarding corporate 
governance’s implications for the country’s economic development. The approach drew on 
the notion that linkages exist between corporate governance systems and development 
outcomes, in developing nations in particular. This chapter draws together the main thematic 
issues covered in the thesis, summarises the findings, outlines the study’s limitations, and 
makes suggestions for both further research and policy responses based on the thesis’s 
contents. 
 
The study employed interviews and a questionnaire survey to examine and analyse the 
perceptions of a demographically-diverse stakeholder base in Zambia. Adopting 
accountability as a theoretical base, the study has drawn attention to the potential 
ramifications of its absence in decisions regarding the allocation of national resources to 
achieve desired development goals. Through the accountability schema the study raises 
debates concerning the importance of ‘good’ corporate governance practices and 
accountability, and whether or not they have been given adequate attention in both political 
and economic reforms intended to streamline the country’s development fortunes. The idea 
was conceptualised following the declaration of one of Africa’s home-grown development 
frameworks, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), that corporate 
governance has now emerged as one of the ‘necessary conditions’ for Africa’s development. 
The key finding of the present study is that Zambians, unreservedly, believe that corporate 
governance has implications for the country’s development and the notion should be 
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considered seriously, particularly via the enhancement of greater accountability and 
transparency to improve the allocative efficiency of resource use and inward capital flows. 
   
10.2 Summary of the Research  
The main objective of the study was to examine the potential role of corporate governance in 
facilitating Zambia’s future economic development; specifically, the study has endeavoured 
to examine and evaluate key stakeholder’s perceptions regarding the linkage between 
corporate governance and development in Zambia in the context of the broad accountability 
notion. To achieve this, the study sought answers to the following research questions:  
 What is the perceived current state of corporate governance in modern-day Zambia? 
 To what extent do the people of Zambia understand effective corporate governance 
as a necessary condition for the country’s economic development? 
 What role do Zambians see for accountability in aiding attempts to better governance 
practices and economic performance? 
An attempt was first made to contextualise the research questions in the first half of the 
thesis, before the issues were examined empirically using a series of semi-structured 
interviews, and a large-scale questionnaire survey. This thesis consists of ten chapters. 
Chapter One provided the introduction to the study in terms of the research topic, focus, 
objectives and questions as well as outlining the structure of the rest of the thesis. Chapter 
Two then outlined some background information about Zambia, the site of the current study, 
regarding its geographical location, relevant history and political, economic, education, legal 
and regulatory environments. The chapter was designed to offer a synopsis of the country 
that would help explain the extant governance situation in the country. The literature review 
was divided into two chapters. Chapter Three discussed the literature on global aspects of 
corporate governance in so far as it relates to African and Zambia. Given the continent-wide 
focus of many of the analyses, this material was designed to highlight corporate governance 
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views that have been expressed about Africa that have direct implications for Zambia. The 
chapter also covered the generic theories that have played a significant role in shaping 
contemporary corporate governance. Chapter Four focussed on corporate governance 
literature specific to Zambia, in the context of three different economic governance episodes 
and the driving force behind reforms, institutional capacity and the country’s own 
experience of corporate failures. Chapter Five discussed the accountability theoretical base 
adopted for this study, upon which the governance issues affecting the country’s 
development were conceptualised. The chapter also touched on a broadened accountability 
which appears to have won the hearts of many Africans as it fits with the continent’s cultural 
context and societal dynamics whereby people are assumed to have a responsibility to each 
other in their daily and business lives. The next chapter, Chapter Six, outlined the research 
methodology and methods on which this research project is anchored. The choice of an 
interpretive methodology to aid understanding of perceptions about the link between 
corporate and economic progression was explained. The role of this methodological 
approach in influencing the selection of specific research tools was then outlined. Chapters 
Seven, Eight and Nine focussed on the analysis of results, the summaries of which the 
discussion now turns to. 
 
10.3 Research Findings    
The questions posed in the interviews and questionnaires were divided into three thematic 
areas: (i) the corporate governance notion in the Zambian context; (ii) the link between 
corporate governance and Zambia’s economic development and; (iii) the role of 
accountability in the context of (i) and (ii).  
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10.3.1   The Corporate Governance Experience in Zambia 
 
There was wide agreement amongst the interviewees that the notion of corporate governance 
is relatively new in Zambia and that the majority of Zambians were still struggling to reach a 
full understanding of what the concept relates to. This lack of awareness made it difficult to 
appreciate the benefits of ‘good’ governance, both at corporate and state levels; indeed a 
small group of respondents harboured the misconception that the implications of corporate 
governance related only to the running companies and did not see the relevancy to the 
debate of the views of those who were not business-oriented or were not involved in 
company management. This simplistic view was consistent with the findings of prior 
research on corporate governance elsewhere in Africa. 
 
While there could be several explanations for the lack of awareness and rigidity in 
embracing the notion, one possible rationale is that Zambia has had long experience of state 
capitalism, characterised by an aura of secretiveness and patronage; this culture is prevalent 
even today in most Zambian companies and society at large. The evidence suggested that 
this was a particularly big issue in the public sector where some individuals still believe that 
SOEs are a de facto extension of the ruling party, with little external accountability in any 
meaningful sense. The problem is seen as being further compounded in Zambia by high 
levels of political interference in SOEs in terms of board domination and political 
appointments. One of the implications of the evidence in this regard is that corporate 
governance awareness programmes in Zambia must change the mind-sets of those who act 
as the architects of corporate culture, to reorient them with contemporary governance 
principles and the tenets of a free market economy in a globalised environment. In this 
regard, participants proposed that the IODZ’s corporate governance sensitisation 
programmes should focus on cultural issues so that people begin to see and appreciate the 
multi-faceted importance of ‘good’ corporate governance. 
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Interviewees were quick to point out that the corporate governance landscape was beginning 
to change and some improvements have occurred, especially in the private sector. This was 
evidenced by the introduction of three local corporate governance guidelines: (i) the Lusaka 
Stock Exchange (LuSE) code in 2005, designed for companies quoted or listed on the 
exchange; (ii) the Bank of Zambia (BOZ) code in 2006, specifically tailored for the financial 
sector and; the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) code in 2009, focussing on small, 
mainly family-held companies which are the largest in terms of numbers. In all three codes, 
the enhancement of transparency and accountability has been accorded central importance. 
Similarly, in the government and the public sector, although the process has been very slow, 
there are signs that the significance of the notion is starting to be appreciated. The 
establishment of a governance secretariat under the Ministry of Justice and the endorsement 
of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) were noted as examples of the 
government’s effort to improve corporate governance practices within its own circles and 
for the country as a whole.  
 
10.3.2   Defining Corporate Governance 
 
Although the term corporate governance is widely used in today’s vocabulary, no single 
definition has yet emerged as being universally superior. The interview findings and 
questionnaire results both indicated Zambian participants’ familiarity with the ‘Cadbury’ 
definition - i.e. “the system by which companies are directed and controlled”. The Cadbury 
formulation appears to have won a lot of support despite it being one of the earliest attempts 
to define corporate governance. This finding provides some support for the conceptual 
premise that there is a lack of research regarding a corporate governance approach reflective 
of the developing world’s context. The result also offers support for prior studies that have 
pointed to the hegemony of Western theories and literature on corporate governance. The 
empirical evidence presented here suggests that the combination of a lack of original 
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research and the influence of outsiders has influenced most African countries to adopt a 
“take it as given” approach without much thought about the realities of day-to-day 
circumstances. This trend perhaps reaffirms prior concerns cited in the literature regarding 
the lack of an accurate description of the scope of the term ‘corporate governance’, although 
its essentiality appears to be well grasped by many in Zambia. The pattern also confirms that 
the surge in corporate governance definitions have not particularly ameliorated the lack of 
clarity surrounding the concept. However, it was clear from follow-up questions that, despite 
participants citing a definition that was theoretically biased towards the agency perspective, 
in practice they subscribe to a broad view with wider implications for the country’s 
economic and social well-being. This viewpoint was framed on the premise that a corporate 
governance paradigm concerned only with ensuring that firms are run in the best interests of 
the suppliers of capital does not fit well with the Zambian environment where the market for 
corporate control is suspect. Although there is a significant strand of literature that supports 
the view that the role of the firm in society is explicitly to create wealth for the owners - and 
thus should focus on achieving this objective - the current research provides evidence that in 
the Zambian context, participants were more comfortable with a system that concerns itself 
with creating a balance between economic and social goals, guaranteeing the efficient 
allocation of resources in an accountable and transparent manner without ignoring 
responsibilities to non-shareholding stakeholder constituents including the environment and 
society in general. This belief is closely related to Solomon (2010)’s view of corporate 
governance - “as the system of checks and balance, both internal and external to companies, 
which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and 
act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business activity” - which takes on 
board corporate social responsibility matters that have been an issue in Zambia, particularly 
in the aftermath of privatisation reforms that saw the state surrender major SOEs to the 
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private sector. In fact, some participants believed that corporate governance was a de facto 
mechanism for enforcing corporate social responsibility with the two being inseparable. 
  
10.3.3   Suitability of Western Codes in the Zambian Environment 
 
On the basis of the literature review presented here, it would appear reasonable to have 
suggested that Zambians might reject Western codes as being at odds with the dictates of the 
country’s culture. To the contrary, the interview findings in fact suggested that the 
dimensionality and growing interdependence of companies and economies as espoused by 
globalisation necessitated uniformity in corporate governance standards. Similarly, over 
80% of questionnaire responses indicated that, although based on a Western prototype, the 
conventional formulation of corporate governance was equally suitable for the Zambian 
environment. Although the questionnaire responses, in terms of their preference for the 
definition and consequential suitability of (Western) norms for the Zambian environment 
appear to run counter to expectations, the interviews, where participants were able to discuss 
the issues in depth, indicated overwhelming support for an inclusive approach based on 
stakeholder assumptions sympathetic to Zambian cultural values of co-existence, 
collectiveness and consensus. Nonetheless, all three extant Zambian codes are essentially an 
abstraction from international codes. Participants also argued that in the new global 
economy, the national-focussed approach is becoming out of date, hence the need for 
international governance standards and guidelines. The questionnaire method’s inherent 
limitation in terms of follow-up questions made it impossible to further probe respondents 
on why they believed Western codes were also relevant in Zambia. However, the interview 
findings again offered a potential explanation whereby in the Zambian context, people are 
more interested in codes that go beyond the principal-agent dichotomy to include a wider 
community. Similarly, participants expressed concerns about how Western codes would 
comme il faut the Zambian milieu which are underpinned by deeply-rooted cultural 
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traditions. With the debate on suitability dividing participants into two groups, it was evident 
that a compromise based on a hybrid approach comprising best practices from local and 
international codes might have genuine potential in Zambia. 
 
10.3.4   Compliance 
The interview findings established that Zambia lacks legislature to deal with specific 
corporate governance issues, resulting in the absence of formalised compliance mechanisms 
especially for organisations outside the scope of the LuSE and BOZ guidelines. This 
evidence should be of material concern for Zambian regulators as the organisations outside 
the LuSE and BOZ represent the majority of Zambian firms, particularly the SMEs, which 
are closely-held and family-managed. Prior studies on governance in Africa indicate that the 
informal nature of closely-held businesses poses huge challenges for corporate governance 
practices. The IODZ code designed for such organisations has not had much impact as the 
code is more of a “sensitisation” document than an observance ordinance. Whilst the debate 
has focused on possible ways of enforcing corporate governance: “comply-or-explain”; 
“comply-or-else”; and the “hybrid” approach, all three Zambian codes adopt a “comply or 
explain” methodology. The participants in the present study were divided on the question of 
the best mode of enforcement: both the interview findings and questionnaire results 
indicated that the majority of participants favoured a method embracing both compulsory 
and voluntary approaches with the core principles embedded in the Companies Act. This 
idea was forged on the understanding that the flexibility resident in the “comply or explain” 
design - though popular in developed economies, particularly in Europe - was not 
sustainable in Zambia, a country that has no reputation for strong corporate governance. 
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10.4 Corporate Governance Drivers in Zambia 
           
The evidence in the prior studies reviewed in Chapters Three and Four of this thesis 
indicates that corporate governance reform drivers in most developing nations are, to some 
degree, inconsistent with those pertaining in developed countries. This finding is consistent 
with prior literature where, for example, Rabelo and Vasconncelos (2002) argue that 
variances exist in the role of and need for corporate governance in developing and 
developed nations, primarily in terms of political, economic and cultural aspects. Both the 
interview findings and the questionnaire results supported the idea that economic efficiency, 
attracting local and foreign investment, globalisation, external pressure, economic 
liberalisation and privatisation, local company failures and corruption are key factors in the 
debate regarding corporate governance reform in developing countries such as Zambia. The 
evidence from the interviews pointed to donor pressure (in so far as it related to external 
financial assistance) and development aid as having played a pivotal role in improving 
governance practices and accountability. 
  
Interview participants pointed to corruption as one of the single greatest impediments to 
corporate governance and economic development in Zambia. There was evidence that the 
complexities associated with corruption are seen as making it difficult to deal with corporate 
governance failings via the legal system, leading to the need for alternative methods of 
enhancing practices. The Zambians consulted in this study believe that the emergence of 
globalisation - and its inherent free market economic assumptions - mean that Zambia risks 
being side-lined economically if the country does not move at a similar pace to the rest of 
the world to adopt the ‘good’ governance behaviour that attracts and protects investment. 
While the country has had its own experience of corporate failures, the evidence here shows 
that the devastating consequences of corporate governance failures, particularly in the US, 
the UK and elsewhere, have provided a persuasive rationale for taking corporate governance 
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seriously in Zambia. However, lack of research - and a failure to document local corporate 
governance failures and their implications - has made it problematic for many Zambians to 
appreciate fully its practical benefits. 
   
10.5 Corporate Governance: Implications for Zambia’s Development 
  
This section summarises the themes and related findings from the empirical analysis that 
attempted to provide answers to one of the key research questions of the current study: “to 
what extent do the people of Zambia understand effective corporate governance as one of 
the necessary conditions for the country’s economic development?” A large and growing 
body of literature has revealed that there is a strong relationship between corporate 
governance and economic performance. Similarly, the NEPAD has acknowledged corporate 
governance as one of the necessary conditions for Africa’s development revival. Empirical 
Chapters Eight and Nine of this study therefore directed significant attention to exploring 
participants’ perceptions regarding this magnum opus. 
 
There was overwhelming evidence from both the interviewees and the questionnaire 
respondents that the quality of corporate governance is seen as critical to Zambia’s future 
economic health. For example, the interviewees argued that the allocation of resources 
across the nation continues to be questionable precisely because of the absence of 
transparent and accountable governance systems. This finding was supported by the 
questionnaire results where 100% agreement was found with the view that corporate 
governance has a strong and direct influence on the country’s economy. The interviewees 
further suggested that a reputation for robust corporate governance in a country instils 
greater investor confidence and unblocks the flow of investment. The participants disclosed 
that issues of accountability and transparency have proved particularly controversial in 
Zambia because corporate governance has not been taken seriously by those charged with 
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the responsibility of making decisions on behalf of others. In this context, the majority of 
questionnaire respondents characterised Zambia as a country in economic transition and 
argued that, at such a stage, the nation’s exhaustible resources needed to be applied in a fair 
and open manner. This finding coincides with the results of prior studies in other developing 
nations which suggest that the fundamental features of accountability and transparency as 
embedded in corporate governance make the concept more significant for countries in 
transition. 
  
10.5.1   Properly Managed Companies as the Drivers of Wealth 
        
The empirical evidence presented in this thesis suggests that there is a visible link between 
corporate governance and economic performance through the notion that “properly managed 
companies are the drivers of wealth” in a nation’s economy. According to the majority of 
participants, this notion is centred on the idea that companies play a pivotal role in the 
economy by empowering citizens through employment while behaving responsibly and 
contributing to the country’s treasury via taxes. However, the participants’ belief was that 
this can only be actualised if companies are directed and controlled with a view to making 
positive contributions to society in various areas of their activity. There was a strong 
conviction amongst the interviewees that companies can improve workers’ welfare and their 
communities, behave ethically, contribute to society at large and still achieve their 
objectives; in short, corporate governance should become an integral part of the wealth 
creation process. This thinking fits well with Solomon’s view of corporate governance 
outlined earlier. As mentioned in the literature review, companies operating in African 
milieus are normally pressured to pursue a communitarian philosophy to fill gaps in social 
and health services and infrastructure for their employees, activities that are traditionally a 
responsibility of the government. The findings here are consistent with prior studies on 
Africa which indicate that multinational companies operating on the continent often get 
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involved in social welfare programmes in the communities in which they operate and make 
a contribution to broader societal goals. 
 
In this regard, the quality of governance in Zambian companies is of absolute importance, 
not only to individual companies but to the entire community and the economy at large. 
Participants noted, however, that it was erroneous to expect companies’ accountability levels 
to grow in the absence of a strong system of corporate governance regulation. Here, the 
findings demonstrate that the de facto governance arrangements in the country were 
problematic and fraught with difficulty in terms of actualising the well-theorised notion. For 
example, participants argued that in the copper-centric Zambian economy, the mining sector 
accounts for over 70% of export earnings, but because of poor governance the entire sector 
only accounted for about 10% tax to the national treasury. This mismatch raises obvious 
questions about the lack of a strong sense of societal accountability in the nation’s mining 
companies. Particular reference was made to a chain of scandals relating to devious revenue 
declaration, tax evasion, inflated costs, unfair transfer pricing systems, manipulated copper 
export data, unfair hedging patterns, externalisation of revenues and secret negotiations of 
concessions, all designed to conceal revenues from taxation and consequently defeating the 
spirit of the notion. Research participants blamed certain government officials and senior 
managers in the sector for designedly choking off corporate governance and accountability 
by pursuing their personal interests. 
  
Participants pointed out that some of the issues giving rise to inappropriate conduct by 
corporations were rooted in the opaque manner in which development agreements were 
negotiated between government representatives and investors. Summing up this discussion, 
one interviewee - a Member of Parliament - argued that the mining sector in Zambia has the 
potential to create much-needed wealth but, directly because of questionable corporate 
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governance practices, the sector was poorly managed with a predictable plethora of 
problems. In this context, the empirical findings presented here regarding stakeholder 
perceptions suggest that while the aim to improve governance may have been theoretically 
sound, in Zambia the outcome was never likely to be optimal. 
   
10.6    Accountability 
Chapter Five provided an extensive review of the accountability literature, in particular its 
relation to corporate governance and development in environments such as Zambia. This 
section summarises the interview findings and questionnaire results as regards the 
significance of accountability in the governance and development paradigm in the Zambian 
context. The findings discussed here attempt to provide answers to the third (theoretically 
driven) research question: “What role do Zambians see for accountability in aiding attempts 
to better governance practices and economic performance”? The questionnaire analysis 
results corroborated the interview findings in suggesting that the strength of corporate 
governance is seen as being located in accountability, with significant implications for 
Zambia’s development flowing from this. In this context, the study views the problems of 
governance in Zambia as a de facto accountability mea maxima culpa. The empirical 
findings suggest that Zambians believe accountability to be the cornerstone of good 
governance, which is in turn the backbone of meaningful development. Here, interview 
participants held accountability shortfalls responsible for most governance and 
development-related difficulties experienced in Zambia, consistent with prior research 
findings in other developing nations. Ninety-nine per cent of questionnaire respondents 
agreed that corporate governance rests on accountability but, equally, accountability was 
viewed as a fulcrum for better governance, underpinning economic development in Zambia. 
These results were supported by interview participants who argued that Zambians cannot 
anticipate economic fortunes in an environment where accountability has been abandoned; 
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they also suggested that any debate about governance and development in Zambia would be 
counterfeit without accountability on the agenda.  
 
Interview participants discussed accountability at three levels - personal, corporate and state 
- arguing that accountability should start at the first of these. At a personal level (also 
referred to as ‘moral’ or ‘ethical’ in the discussions), interviewees argued that unless those 
entrusted with managing resources on behalf of others were men and women of integrity, 
with unquestionable ethical standings, attempts to improve corporate governance were 
destined to fail. The participants suggested that personal accountability provides the 
foundation for all other forms as it is self-regulated. In this context, participants maintained 
that the quality of accountability rests with individuals. However, there was also evidence to 
suggest that Zambian culture exerts significant influence on accountability systems. 
Participants argued that, unfortunately, some of the cultural stances contradicted the 
principles of good corporate governance - for example in some boards, members are not 
traditionally allowed to openly oppose the chairman, whilst in other environments it is 
viewed as inappropriate to ask superiors to account for their actions. 
 
At state level, participants provided evidence that the government and its spending agencies 
and SOEs still harbour debilitated processes, creating problems for accountability ranging 
from lack of proper accounting for public expenditure to irregularities and misuse of public 
funds. Participants presented examples of such irregularities which, in some cases, resulted 
in donor countries withdrawing their support and developmental aid. 
  
Eighty-eight per cent of questionnaire respondents agreed that, in theory, accountability 
influences the flow of development aid in a substantive manner. However, prior studies have 
consistently shown that there has been little agreement on the positive association between 
the two and more research is clearly needed. Notwithstanding this issue, the research 
 375 
participants in the present study provided evidence that donors have now resorted to using 
good governance conditionality as a way of helping Zambia to improve its governance 
standing, a requirement that Zambia has struggled to meet convincingly. The suspension of 
donor assistance due to the country’s non-compliance with good governance conditionality 
suggests that donors are focussed on addressing governance and accountability dilemmas in 
Zambia. 
             
Conventional theories and prior studies have associated levels of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) to the quality of national corporate governance. In Zambia, while participants agreed 
with this theoretical dictum, in practice the notion was not thought to hold; 87% of 
questionnaire respondents acknowledged the theoretical link, but it was suggested that in the 
Zambian context the motivation for increased investment flows is tied more to political 
stability and other incentives such as tax concessions. More generally, at corporate level 
interview participants argued that as long as corporations continue to view corporate 
governance as a narrow “straitjacket”, Zambians at large may not appreciate the benefits. 
Participants believed that companies in Zambia must begin to take on board expectations of 
wider stakeholder groups such as communities. All examples of irregularities given by the 
interviewees pointed to the deficient corporate governance practices in the mining sector on 
which the economy of the country is anchored; this was further compounded by a lack of 
professional expertise. 
 
In terms of public accountability, interviews focussed on accountability for: probity and 
legality; process; performance; programme and policy in the government set-up
229
. In this 
context, the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) dominated discussions concerning public 
accountability, with perceptions evident of a major accountability weakness in the 
                                                          
229
This is consistent with Stewart (1984)’s view of accountability in a public context as analysed in the 
description of Stewart’s Ladder of Accountability in Chapter Six of this thesis.  
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management of public resources. In particular, interviewees (emotionally) contended that 
every year the OAG’s report contained broad irregularities in terms of government 
expenditure, but the government had never taken the issue seriously. Here, the interview 
findings revealed a widely-held perception that corporate governance failures in Zambia are 
a reflection of weak accountability institutions and a lack of political will. 
  
10.6.1   Institutional Capacity 
The interview findings provided strong evidence that institutional capacity is a fundamental 
influence on corporate governance and accountability standards. Participants raised concerns 
regarding weak legal and regulatory frameworks, large ownership concentration, 
underdeveloped stock markets and frequent government interventions as some of the main 
institutional constraints on corporate governance in Zambia. While the literature review and 
interview findings reveal that corporate governance matters most to emerging economies, at 
the same time the evidence indicates that emerging economies like Zambia are seen as being 
bridled with institutional deficiencies, creating a governance web. This incongruity makes it 
highly problematic to implement and deal with complex corporate governance issues. 
Interview participants argued that to enforce the fundamental governance principles of 
accountability, transparency, responsibility and fairness, basic governance institutions must 
be willing to support the basic corporate governance framework. This support, according to 
the interviewees, requires institutional reforms that promote corporate governance and 
greater accountability. Relatedly, the findings indicate that Zambia is less likely to attract the 
required investment to boost the economy in an environment of dysfunctional institutions, 
although participants also recognised that reforming governance and accountability 
institutions is a complex and challenging undertaking - especially in the absence of political 
support - because the process normally involves fundamental change.  
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Participants argued that ‘undependable’ institutions pose considerable problems for 
Zambia’s governance system and, as a result, its development. Institutions that play the role 
of compliance monitoring were seen as being fundamental to the execution of 
accountability. In this regard, the interviewees’ opinions coincided with the evidence of 
robust corporate governance requiring underpinning by strong legal and regulatory 
frameworks. Institutional reform was therefore viewed as a way of strengthening 
accountability and corporate governance in Zambia, a change which many interviewees 
believed to be at the core of development. However, the non-existence of legislature specific 
to corporate governance makes enforcement and compliance monitoring a problematic area 
in Zambia. The issue is further compounded by the general nature of commercial laws that 
mimic corporate governance legislature. According to the evidence obtained here, the 
Zambian legal system is seen as very weak while the enforcement side is also suspect; the 
findings suggest that the majority of participants support the fusion of corporate governance 
and the country’s broader system of company law. 
          
10.7      Chinese Investment and Corporate Governance in Zambia 
 
As mentioned in chapters three and four, and also earlier in this chapter, governance theories 
predict that the level of investment in countries is to some extent underpinned by the quality 
of corporate governance and vice-versa. In this regard, China’s increased investment in the 
mining sector in Zambia has sparked searching questions in terms of business conduct and 
corporate governance practices. While participants acknowledged that the difficulties 
regarding corporate governance practice in Zambia are not confined to Chinese firms alone, 
there was a suggestion that the latter appear to have adopted a business culture that is not in 
congruity with any conventional formulation of what represents ‘good’ corporate 
governance practices. In particular, interviewees labelled most Chinese firms as: having no 
regard for the local laws, which they flout with impunity; ignoring labour and environmental 
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laws; having little concern for the health and safety of their workers, or the communities in 
which they operate; and appearing not to be socially responsible. In fact, Zambia’s 
governance weaknesses were suggested as one of the features that had led to China’s 
increased investment in recent years. 
 
 The interview data provided three potential explanations for the corporate governance 
difficulties with the increased Chinese investment in Zambia. Firstly, it was argued that most 
of the investments are negotiated directly between the two governments and that the 
majority of Chinese firms are part of larger SOEs in China. Thus, by their very nature, the 
firms concerned were not expected to be strong advocates for robust corporate governance 
standards - the literature suggests that corporate governance in state-controlled enterprises is 
often very poor. The absence of boards in most Chinese firms operating in Zambia is a 
manifestation of this. Secondly, the political and diplomatic nature of most Chinese 
investment in the country, coupled with the Zambian government’s interventions, 
compromises enforcement and accountability institutions, thereby weakening commercial 
laws and the regulation of corporate governance. Finally in this context, the research 
participants argued that Chinese firms are seizing business opportunities precisely because 
of the underlying frailty of legal and regulatory systems in Zambia. 
  
10.8   Benefits and Challenges 
 
10.8.1    Benefits  
Prior studies have pointed to a common knowledge that the global ascendancy of corporate 
governance is anchored in the belief that there have been incontrovertible resultant benefits 
in terms of both corporate and national economic growth. The present study has found that 
improved corporate governance is widely viewed as having many benefits for Zambia as a 
developing nation, ranging from encouraging growth of the private sector to increasing 
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investor confidence in the national economy. Both the questionnaire and interview findings 
suggest that the principles of accountability, transparency and fairness that are closely linked 
with corporate governance, offer the basis for robust governance and development in the 
future. More specifically, the participants argued that the inadequacy of resources in Zambia 
means that their successful allocation hinges on an accountable, transparent and fair system. 
The data saw proclamation of benefits such as maintaining investor confidence (by 
providing accountability for the proper functioning of the Zambian market economy), access 
to the global pool of investment capital, mechanisms that guarantee an accountable and fair 
allocation of resources, enhancement of Zambia’s governance reputation for attracting 
investment, as well as a lowering of the cost of capital and the cost of doing business in the 
nation. Those taking part in the study also argued that strong governance minimises wastage 
and corruption and ensures that organisations are managed in a manner that fits the best 
interests of all.  
 
10.8.2   Challenges  
 
The study has found the conceptualisation of corporate governance in Zambia to be 
hampered by a plethora of challenges, most of which are more complicated than those 
encountered in developed nations; these range from cultural rigidity to dysfunctional 
institutional arrangements. Although accountability and transparency are recognised as 
“must haves”, cultural impediments continue to restrict corporate governance 
conceptualisation in Zambian. For example, the interview participants argued that issues of 
corruption, accountability and transparency are not normally discussed at board level, while 
a questionnaire respondent from a government-controlled firm stated that in some 
organisations it was simply a taboo to openly oppose the chairman of the board as he was 
regarded as a de facto “chief”. The results also indicate that some senior managers harbour a 
view that it is inappropriate for a junior employee to challenge superiors on issues of 
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accountability and transparency. In this regard, some senior managers often refuse to be 
audited by persons who are their junior in age or salary terms. Recent evidence in Wanyama 
et al. (2009) suggests that broader cultural norms appear to influence corporate governance 
and pose huge challenges in many African countries. In Zambia, the questionnaire and 
interview findings corroborated this evidence, with participants blaming the country’s 20 
plus years of state capitalism, characterised by an aura of secrecy and patronage. Other 
challenges that participants pointed to included the lack of established institutional 
infrastructure needed to facilitate meaningful corporate governance systems, as well as the 
politisisation of accountability and governance institutions, weak enforcement agencies and 
frail stock markets. 
  
According to participants, other challenges stemmed from the ownership structures common 
in Zambia, where many private companies are owned and controlled by an individual or a 
family. Although the last decade has witnessed improvements, the empirical data gathered 
here suggest that awareness of the potential benefits of strong corporate governance for such 
companies is not pervasive in Zambia. The results also demonstrate that while the country 
has been quick to embrace globalisation and the free market economy, appropriate measures 
have not been taken to modernise institutions in line with the challenges of a liberalised 
environment. However, as was evident throughout the empirical work, corruption is seen as 
the single most fundamental obstacle to good corporate governance practices in Zambia and, 
until this issue is dealt with, it is clear that any attempt to improve practices in Zambia will 
be met with, at best, widespread cynicism. 
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10.9 Policy Implications, Contributions, Limitations and Future Research 
  
10.9.1 Policy Implications  
   
Corporate governance has emerged as a major public policy priority in many developing 
countries and the evolutionary discourse in Zambia has significant policy implications both 
at corporate and state levels. In addition, the recent declaration by the NEPAD that corporate 
governance is fundamental to the recovery of Africa’s lost development opportunities has 
increased awareness that Zambia’s economic fortunes have come to depend on it. 
Understanding of corporate governance, and its effect on the country’s economic 
performance, should therefore guide policymakers on the future direction for the country’s 
economy. The findings from the literature review and the suggestions made by the research 
participants in this study form the basis for policy recommendations on what needs to be 
done to improve corporate governance and, in turn economic performance in Zambia.  
 
(i) This study has found that awareness of corporate governance as a practical concept in 
Zambia is at an initiatory stage and many people are still to develop a firm understanding of 
its consequential implications for Zambia’s economic performance. What is therefore 
required is for the promoters of corporate governance in the country to be recognised and 
given the attention they deserve; in particular the IODZ should be given statutory body 
status, equally so the Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants (ZICA) and the Law 
Association of Zambia (LAZ), through an Act of Parliament so that they have the statutory 
power needed to supervise and co-ordinate corporate governance programmes across the 
country. Here, the interviewees further suggested that the IODZ should be given the 
mandate to scrutinise and identify potential directors and board members, especially in 
public organisations. 
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(ii) In terms of awareness, participants suggested that institutions of higher learning in 
Zambia should introduce corporate governance courses for all students since the subject cuts 
across all disciplines. In particular, universities should consider introducing part-time 
courses for those who are already in employment to supplement the IODZ’s awareness 
programmes. 
  
(iii) Prior empirical evidence suggests that corporate governance is affected by legal and 
regulatory frameworks, but the results of the present study provide evidence that Zambian 
legal and regulatory systems have not been modernised in any meaningful way. Similarly, 
the Zambian parliamentary committee on governance argues in its report that it is difficult to 
supervise and regulate corporate governance in Zambia because the country does not have 
legislature specific to the area. One implication of these findings is that there is a clear need 
for policymakers in Zambia to review the current legal and regulatory systems. The 
Companies Act (supplemented by other commercial laws such as the Securities and 
Exchange Act) and the Banking and Financial Services Act, constitute the principal 
framework for corporate governance in Zambia. However, given the blanket nature of the 
Companies Act, participants suggested three options for policymakers and these should now 
be considered as prorities for Zambia’s regulatory authorities: firstly, embedding of key 
corporate governance principles in the Companies Act. Secondly, a review of current 
corporate law in line with changes in the corporate governance land; participants argued that 
similar ideas were behind the emergence of the King III report on corporate governance in 
South Africa and the same process would be beneficial to Zambia. Thirdly, policymakers 
should consider legislation that specifically deals with issues of corporate governance. Such 
a change will improve supervision and regulation, but it must also address the enforcement 
difficulties the country has faced for many years. 
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(iv) The analysis of the literature prescribed in Chapter Three and Chapter Four suggests 
that corporate governance has important implications for economic development, especially 
in championing the flow of investment finance in emerging nations; however, the interview 
and questionnaire evidence in the thesis indicates that this link is not clearly understood in 
practice. This gap in perceptions has important implications for policymakers in Zambia. 
While the political and economic reforms Zambia has undergone since independence were 
meant to augment economic performance, the results of this study indicate that the corporate 
governance implications are likely to continue to be underestimated unless concerted action 
is taken. This suggestion has important implications for future reforms designed to improve 
Zambia’s economic performance and policymakers should address this by combining 
government efforts with the private sector, alongside the support and involvement of 
society. 
 
(v) The findings presented here suggest that a lack of political will on the part of the 
government has contributed to the lack of a clear conceptualisation of the notion and 
potential role of corporate governance in Zambia. Suggestions were made that government 
should support efforts to improve corporate governance both in the private and public 
sectors; participants pointed to the Zambian government’s status as the de facto biggest 
company in the country, controlling enormous resources on behalf of the citizens, and 
having the potential to strengthen corporate governance and thereby improve economic 
efficiency. There was evidence that the private sector has devised initiatives to train and 
encourage companies through board charters to adopt a robust corporate governance culture. 
However, problems still remain in the public sector. In this context, potentially one of the 
most important policy implications arising from the findings is that good corporate 
governance principles should be incorporated into the ministerial code of conduct. In 
addition, a corporate governance code should be introduced to take care of government 
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ministries, spending agencies and SOEs; the latter category has not been captured by the 
extant three Zambian codes and so development in this area is critical. 
 
Policymakers face a number of challenges in implementing the recommendations made in 
this study. Firstly, it must be noted that the corporate governance system in Zambia and any 
reforms related to it will have implications at the political, economic, legal, cultural, 
historical and international levels. Secondly, citizens must be convinced of the benefits of 
corporate governance before they can support and participate in the evolutionary discourse 
of corporate governance in Zambia. Nonetheless, various reform measures have already 
been initiated in a number of areas and have taken root; resistance to change, while not 
negligible, is not insurmountable. 
 
10.9.2 Contributions to Knowledge 
 
This study has made contributions in a number of areas. Firstly, although the previous 
studies indicate that corporate governance has become a worldwide phenomenon, there is a 
lack of literature on corporate governance practices in emerging post-colonial nations such 
as Zambia. The lack of research and consequential dearth of literature in this context has 
created a vast knowledge gap especially regarding corporate governance’s implications for 
national development. The current study has contributed to filling this gap. Secondly, the 
economic development aspects of corporate governance are better articulated in developed 
economies. As regards Africa, many researchers in this area have focussed their attention on 
the continent as a whole, ignoring the major contextual differences that exist across borders 
in terms of political, economic, legal, cultural and historical circumstances. Thirdly, while 
Zambians appear to support the NEPAD assertion that corporate governance is one of the 
necessary conditions for Africa’s revival, there is a dearth of literature specific to corporate 
governance’s implications for Zambia’s economic health. In this regard, the current study 
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makes a significant contribution to the existing literature by highlighting and analysing in 
depth the corporate governance issues specific to Zambia. 
   
Fourthly, corporate governance has both a narrow and an all-encompassing meaning or 
objective. In its narrow conception, corporate governance focuses on defusing the tension 
between management and shareholders; the existing scant literature regarding corporate 
governance in Zambia is heavily biased in this direction, in particular its implications for 
company structures and performances that can achieve share price maximisation. This 
partiality has contributed to the mistaken belief detected in the interview findings and 
questionnaire survey results that debates about corporate governance relate purely to 
company management. By taking the debate to a level beyond corporate boundaries and 
principal-agent theorising, i.e. to the potential influence on the development of emerging 
economies, the study makes a major contribution to the existing literature in suggesting that 
the driving force for corporate governance reform in countries such as Zambia needs to be 
more developmental-oriented than has been the case to date. 
 
Fifthly, the literature review indicates that robust corporate governance can make a real 
difference to emerging economies when underpinned by effective acountability. On the 
other hand, the empirical evidence indicated that Zambia, like other developing economies, 
is characterised by a corporate governance system anchored on defective institutions. This 
study has made a contribution in this area by suggesting that corporate governance reforms 
in emerging economies should not be considered in isolation, but should instead work in 
concordance with legal and regulatory systems. Finally, the study has found that despite the 
numerous political and economic reforms that Zambia has undergone in search of economic 
prosperity, such reforms did not take corporate governance into account in any meaningful 
way. The current study should remind policymakers in Zambia that corporate governance 
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must be part and parcel of all reforms and that accountability represents the nucleus of the 
economic advancement process.  
   
10.9.3 Limitations 
  
Any research process is subject to limitations and the present study is no exception. The 
most significant of these are outlined here. Previous literature about a given topic provides a 
rich source of information for research, but in the context of the current study there was a 
limitation in terms of the paucity of reliable prior studies specific to Zambian corporate 
governance. The major problem, as the discussion in this thesis has shown, is that the great 
majority of researchers have chosen to write about Africa as a whole and not about 
individual countries. As a result, continent-wide evidence had to be used extensively.   
 
Another limitation stems from the fact that research on governance and accountability-
related subjects are very politically-sensitive in Africa. In this regard, despite confidentiality 
assurances, a number of interview participants were clearly nervous and hence did not want 
to disclose certain information viewed to be ‘sensitive’ on their part, but potentially 
important for this research. This problem was compounded by the fact that the data 
collection exercise in Zambia was conducted two months before local government, 
parliamentary and presidential elections, when issues of governance and accountability 
featured highly in political campaigns. 
   
On a related note, the environment in Zambia at the time of study meant that extensive 
efforts were required to persuade interviewees and survey receipients to take part. In total, 
24 participants were interviewed and 65 questionnaire responses were collected; 
notwithstanding the time involved in achieving these figures, the relatively small number of 
participants means that attempts to generalise from the results need to be undertaken with 
caution. 
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Other limitations related to the specific research methods employed. There is an inherent 
limitation in the use of questionnaires both in terms of design and participant selection. The 
closed questionnaire design used in the current research made it difficult to gather 
information that was rich in depth and detail because the questions, deliberately, reflected 
the researcher’s particular stance on the subject and most of the answers that the respondents 
provided were limited. Similarly, the purposeful (self-selecting) participant selection criteria 
used were very arbitrary and subjective. There is thus a potential limitation in that the 
participants may not have been selected entirely objectively, as it was difficult to involve all 
stakeholder groups, and opinions may be biased in favour of one or more categories of the 
population.  
 
Finally, an inherent limitation of the current study relates to its focus on investigating the 
people’s perceptions of the implications of corporate governance for Zambia’s development. 
In this regard, the findings were of necessity a reflection of those who participated in the 
research. However, most of the views expressed by questionnaire respondents were in 
congruity with the issues raised by interview participants and were similarly echoed in the 
literature review. It is therefore felt that this limitation does not mean that the validity of the 
broad research findings are called into question. 
 
10.9.4 Future Research 
   
The dearth of literature specific to Zambia’s situation on corporate governance is in itself a 
manifestation that very little academic research in general has been undertaken on Zambia, a 
gap which this study has attempted to begin to address. While literature on Africa as a whole 
can be used as a springboard, future researchers should be encouraged to target individual 
countries, as this study has demonstrated that individual African countries have diverse 
political, economic, legal, cultural and historical circumstances. For example, there are 
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countries within Africa that have undergone numerous coup d'états (such as Uganda
230
 and 
Congo), some have been under military rule for sustainable periods (such as Nigeria), some 
are classified as failed states (such as Somalia), some have endured dictatorships for long 
periods (such as Libya), while some have been politically stable since independence (such as 
Zambia, Botswana and Malawi) and others have only become independent in the last 30-35 
years (such as Zimbabwe) and have yet to experience post-colonial stability. There are thus 
unique governance specificities that need to be appreciated for individual countries to 
provide a better and deeper understanding than is achievable by focussing on the continent 
as a whole. Africa, it is argued, has anaemic governance and accountability institutions, but 
it is on these that the quality of corporate governance critically depends. Future researchers 
are therefore encouraged to take up research in this direction. To get a solid understanding 
of the challenges affecting corporate governance in individual African nations, the 
researcher’s experiences here suggest that specific challenges be studied separately to 
understand individual contextual impacts on corporate governance, rather than using a 
wholesale approach. As a result, understanding of nationally-relevant corporate governance 
debates and suggestions for improvements will be facilitated most effectively. 
  
10.10 Concluding Remarks 
 
Zambia’s failure to record meaningful levels of economic development since independence, 
despite several periods of political and economic reforms - coupled with the NEPAD 
declaration of corporate governance as one of the necessary requirements for Africa’s 
renewal - has boosted the corporate governance debate in Zambia. However, being in its 
embryonic stage, conceptualisation of the concept has been very slow and opinions as to its 
meaning and benefits, both to the corporation and the economic well-being of the country, 
are only just beginning to chrystalise. Notwithstanding this torpor, the term “corporate 
                                                          
230
Wanyama et al. (2009) argue that corporate governance in Uganda has been seriously affected by unstable 
political structures. 
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governance” is now in everyday use in Zambia. Robust corporate governance practices 
ensure that individuals and organisations do the right things, in the right way, for the right 
people, in an accountable, transparent, honest and inclusive manner. The findings presented 
here have demonstrated that the factors influencing corporate governance in Zambia are 
multi-farious in nature and do not come in neatly-labelled discrete packages; in fact, the 
complexities in dealing with them imply that they must be understood in a broader context. 
Consideration must also be given to the expectations of the wider stakeholder constituents 
that have less formal relationships with organisations operating in Zambia. The empirical 
evidence in this thesis indicate that Zambians do now realise that an efficient corporate 
governance regime may be an essential requirement if the country is to attract the 
investment needed to generate significant growth. However, to achieve this, an effective 
system of accountability that guarantees actions, transparency and disclosure is also 
essential. The findings indicate that the many challenges concerning corporate governance 
in Zambia in fact revolve around the concept of accountability - in short, accountability and 
good governance underpin economic development and the more pervasive the understanding 
of this notion, the brighter the nation’s future.  
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Appendix 2.1 
 
Acts of parliament and other instruments that impact on corporate governance 
    
a) The Companies Act - An Act to provide for the formation, management, administration 
and winding-up of companies; to provide for the registration of charges over the 
undertakings or properties of companies; to provide for the registration of foreign 
companies doing business in Zambia. 
 
b) The Banking and Financial Services Act - An Act to provide for the regulation of the 
conduct of banking and financial services; to provide safeguards for investors in and 
customers of banks and financial institutions and to provide for matters connected with or 
incidental to the foregoing. These include: Licensing of banks and financial institutions, 
Organisation and administration, Operations, Financial Accountability, Supervision and 
Prudential Regulation, Insolvency Dissolution and Liquidation of Banks and Financial 
Institutions. 
 
c) The Bank of Zambia Act – the supervision of other banks. 
d) Investments Act - An Act revising the law relating to Investment in Zambia so as to 
provide a comprehensive legal framework for investment in Zambia. 
 
e) Privatisation Act - An Act to provide for the establishment of the Zambia Privatisation 
Agency and to define the functions of the Agency; to provide for the sale of shares in 
State owned enterprises; and to provide for matters connected with or incidental to. 
 
f) Registration of Business Names Act - An Act to provide for the registration of business 
names. 
 
g) Accountants Act - An Act to provide for the regulation of the education and training of 
accountants and generally for the advancement of accountancy and allied subjects; to 
provide for the regulation and control of the practice of accountancy; to provide for the 
establishment of the Zambia Institute of Certified Accountants; to define the functions 
and powers of the Institute 
 
h) Insurance Act - An Act to make provision relating to the carrying on of insurance 
business 
 
i) The Patents and Companies Registration Office (PACRO) is a semi-autonomous 
executive agency of the Zambian Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry. Its 
principal functions are to operate a legal system for registration and protection of 
commercial and industrial property and to serve as a legal depository of the information 
tendered for registration. 
 
j) The Competition and Fair Trading Act - An Act to encourage competition in the 
economy by prohibiting Anticompetitive trade practices; to regulate monopolies and 
concentrations of economic power; to protect consumer welfare; to strengthen the 
efficiency of production and distribution of services; to secure the best possible 
conditions for the freedom of trade: and to expand the base of entrepreneurship. 
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k) The Export Board of Zambia - The Export Board of Zambia (EBZ) is a statutory body 
established by government under the 1985 Export Development Act of Parliament. It was 
created solely to spearhead the development, promotion and encouragement of local 
products in foreign markets.  
l) The Securities and Exchange Commission - To promote and maintain a strong and 
facilitative regulatory framework that ensures the orderly development of an innovative 
and competitive capital market for the secure, fair, efficient and transparent issuance and 
trading of securities. 
 
m) Zambia Development Agency Act - An Act to foster economic growth and development 
by promoting trade and investment in Zambia through an efficient, effective and 
coordinated private sector-led economic development strategy. 
 
n) Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) - The Authority is charged with the responsibility of 
collecting revenue on behalf of the Government, maintaining the key principles of 
efficiency in taxation, maintaining equity through a broadened tax base and simplicity of 
tax administration and compliance processes. The ZRA achieves its mandate by 
promoting voluntary tax compliance, trade, border legislation and regulations through 
communication, quality service and enforcement. It also provides efficient tax 
registration, efficient methods of processing tax refunds and trade facilitation. 
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Appendix 4.1 
 
Doing Business in Zambia 
 
The following graphs illustrate how the country’s levels of confidence in terms of: 
Protecting Investors; Ease of Doing Business and; Starting a Business compare with best 
practice in economies. 
Zambia’s Ranking in Investor Protection  
 
Source: Doing Business (2010). 
Zambia’s Ranking in the Ease of Doing Business. 
 
 
Source: Doing Business (2010). 
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Starting a Business in Zambia  
 
 
 
Source: Doing Business (2010). 
 
 
 
Source: Doing Business (2010). 
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Semi-structured interviews - guiding questions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF DUNDEE 
 
Guiding questions for semi-structured interviews  
 
The Perceived Role of Corporate Governance in Zambia’s Development 
 
Shikaputo M. Chanda G. 
PhD Student 
School of Business 
Department of Accounting and Finance  
Dundee DD1 4HN 
SCOTLAND 
United Kingdom 
 
 
Introduction 
 
A number of scholars have argued that the lack of development in Africa - and Zambia in particular - is a result 
of problems with corporate governance. Similarly, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
has identified corporate governance as one of the necessary conditions for development in Africa. The research 
is focused on finding out the current state in Zambia of corporate governance and how Zambians perceive the 
relationship between corporate governance and economic development. 
 
The analysis centres on the drivers of corporate governance in Zambia, the suitability of Western corporate 
governance principles, governance and donor aid and how they may impact on Zambia’s development. 
 
 
SECTION A 
 
Corporate Governance 
 
1. What do you understand by the term corporate governance? 
2. What is your assessment of the current corporate governance situation in Zambia? 
3. Do you think corporate governance matters to a country like Zambia?  
4. What would you point to as the drivers of the current corporate governance developments in Zambia? 
 
Corporations 
 
5. Do you have a corporate governance code or guidelines at your company, if so, what are the main aspects 
highlighted in your code? 
6. To what extent does your company comply with these guidelines in practice? 
7. Are you aware of the LuSE, BOZ and IODZ Codes, what is your assessment of these corporate governance 
codes?   
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8. Are you aware of other codes such as the OECD, King Report, UK, US, to what extent do these external 
codes influence corporate governance in your company? 
9. In your opinion, which code of corporate governance principles is more relevant to your company? 
 
 
 
Lusaka Stock Exchange 
 
10. Why do you think corporate governance is important for the companies listed on the Lusaka Stock 
Exchange? 
11. What do you consider as the many areas of the Lusaka Stock Exchange Code on corporate governance and 
how relevant are they to doing business in Zambia? 
12. Are you aware of other codes such as the OECD, King Report, UK, US, to what extent do these external 
codes influence the LuSE code? 
13. What has been the response from the companies affected by the LuSE Code of corporate governance 
principles? 
14. What is the impact of the LuSE Code on companies that are not listed on LuSE? 
 
 
Government and the public sector 
 
15. Are you aware of the LuSE Code, BOZ Code and IODZ Code; are they relevant and adequate for this 
country?  
16. Are you aware of other codes such as the OECD, King Report, UK, US, how suitable are these – outside - 
codes to the Zambian environment? 
17. In your opinion, which code of corporate governance principles is more relevant to the Zambian situation? 
18. To what extent do you think corporate governance is important for  
 The government in Zambia? 
 Corporate community in Zambia? 
 
Others 
 
19. What can you point to as some of the benefits, if any of implementing effective corporate governance 
practices in Zambia and what are the challenges?  
20. To what extent do you think corruption affects corporate governance in your organisation and doing 
business in Zambia? 
21. Do you think corporate governance in Zambia is applicable to all organisations including the government 
or it should be restricted to the corporate community only? 
22. Does the country have any laws or regulations that are specific to corporate governance? 
23. Which bodies regulate and supervise corporate governance in Zambia, do you think they have the powers 
and resources to enforce the regulations?  
24. How does corporate governance contribute to society’s well being in Zambia? 
 
 
SECTION B 
 
Corporate governance and development 
 
25. Corporate governance has been identified by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as 
one of the conditions for development in Africa. To what extent do you understand the concept of 
corporate governance as a condition for development in Zambia? 
26. What do you think are some of the factors that link corporate governance to Zambia’s development? 
27. To what extent do you agree that sound corporate governance practices are fundamental to Zambia’s 
economic recovery? 
28. To what extent do you think corruption affects corporate governance and development in Zambia? 
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29. The country’s economy depends on the drive and efficiency of its companies. Proper run companies have 
become important to every country’s economy as they are widely viewed as engines for wealth creation. 
Do you agree with this notion? 
 
Lusaka Stock Exchange and Private Companies 
 
30. The country’s economy depends on the drive and efficiency of its companies. Proper run companies have 
become important to every country’s economy as they are widely viewed as engines for wealth creation. 
What do you think is the role of the Lusaka Stock Exchange in the development of this country? 
 
 
Corporations 
 
31. The country’s economy depends on the drive and efficiency of its companies. Proper run companies have 
become important to every country’s economy as they are widely viewed as engines for wealth creation. 
What do you think is the role of your company in the development of this country? 
32. As a company you are a citizen in this country. What is the company’s contribution to the society’s well 
being in Zambia? 
33. Do you have any other comments that you would like to make on the perceived role of corporate 
governance in Zambia’s development? 
 
 
SECTION C 
 
Accountability 
 
34. What is your understanding or interpretation of the concept of accountability in Zambia and to what extent 
do you think the governance problems in Zambia are linked to lack of accountability? 
35. How can accountability contribute to better governance in Zambia? 
36. Does the country have the institutional capacity to embrace corporate governance and accountability? 
 
Lusaka Stock Exchange 
 
37. What is your understanding or interpretation of the concept of accountability under LuSE corporate 
governance code and to what extent do you think the governance problems in Zambia are linked to lack of 
accountability? 
 
Corporations 
  
38. What is your understanding or interpretation of the concept of accountability in your company, and to 
whom is your company accountable? 
39. Is your company accountable to non- shareholding stakeholders? 
40. Do you think that accountability is your company’s responsibility and how can accountability contribute to 
better governance in Zambia? 
41. How do the Zambian cultural values affect the accountability model and the way your company is run in 
Zambia? 
42. There are many different types of accountability of which financial accountability is only one example. To 
what extent is your company accountable in terms of; probity and legality, process, performance, 
programme and policy? 
 
Others 
  
43. How do the Zambian cultural values affect the accountability model and the way businesses are run in 
Zambia? 
44. There are many different types of accountability of which financial accountability is only one example. To 
what extent is the Zambian government accountable in the following areas: 
 the proper use of funds in the manner authorised and that money has been spent as agreed and in 
accordance with any applicable regulation 
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 that adequate and appropriate procedures are used to achieve the economic goals 
 ensure that the government is accountable for the policies that they pursue as well as  policies that 
they do not pursue. 
 
45. To what extent do you think corporate governance and accountability affect the flow of FDI and 
development aid to Zambia? 
46. Since 1991, over 285 companies have been privatised. Do you think privatisation has been one of the 
drivers of corporate governance in Zambia or vice versa? 
47. Do you have any other comments that you would like to make on topic 
 
 
 
 
 
Personal Details for the interviewee 
 
 
1. Name (Interviewee)………….…………………………………………………………. 
 
2. Name of organization (Optional)………………………….………………………......... 
 
3. Position in the Organisation……………………………………………………………. 
 
4. Education Qualification…………………………………….………………………….. 
 
5. Experience (years)...…………………………………………………………………… 
 
6. Please describe your role……………………………………………………………….  
 
7. Date……………………………..…Time……………………………..………………. 
 
8. Can the interview be taped? ............................................................................................ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 449 
Appendix 6.2 
 
Questionnaire Survey Questions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF DUNDEE 
 
Questionnaire Survey 
 
  
The Perceived Role of Corporate Governance in Zambia’s Development 
 
 
Shikaputo M. Chanda G. 
PhD Student 
School of Business  
Department of Accounting and Finance  
Dundee DD1 4HN 
SCOTLAND 
 
 
Dear Participant 
 
I am currently studying for a doctorate degree at the University of Dundee, Scotland, United Kingdom, under 
the supervision of Dr. Bruce Burton and Dr. Theresa Dunne. My study focuses on ‘The Perceived Role of 
Corporate Governance in Zambia’s Development’. The main objective is to explore the perceptions of 
Zambian stakeholders about corporate governance as a tool for development. To achieve these objectives, I 
need to carry out questionnaire surveys in Zambia, and your participation will therefore contribute greatly. 
I very much welcome your views regarding the issues raised in this questionnaire. All information will be 
treated as confidential and will only be used for the purposes of this research. The names and positions of 
participants will not be disclosed. 
Your response to this questionnaire survey will be greatly appreciated. 
 
Shikaputo M. Chanda G. 
For any enquiries please contact: 
mcgshikaputo@dundee.ac.uk / shikaputog@yahoo.com 
United Kingdom +44 (0) 7504277495 
Zambia  +26 (0) 962170090 
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A. Demographic Information 
 
 
9. Indicate your name (Optional)…………………………………………………………. 
 
10. Name of organization (Optional)…………………………………………………......... 
 
11.   Please describe your role……………………………………………………………….  
  
12. Please indicate the category that you belong to by ticking the appropriate box.   
 
 
 
Your Position 
 
Private Government Other 
(indicate) 
Approximate 
number of 
years in 
position 
1 Chairman     
2 Chairman and Chief Executive     
3 Chief Executive Officer     
4 Executive director     
5 Executive Board Member     
6 Non-Executive Board Member     
7 Remunerations Committee Member     
8 Audit Committee Member     
9 Nominations Committee Member     
10 Employee     
11 External auditor     
12 Regulator     
13 Institutional investor     
14 Individual investor     
15 Financial analyst/consultant     
16 Stoke broker     
17 Academician     
18 Corporate legal consultant     
19 Other(Specify) 
………………………………… 
    
 
B. Corporate Governance 
 
13. How familiar are you with the concept of corporate governance? 
Very familiar Familiar Some familiarity Not familiar Not sure 
     
 
 
14. How familiar are you with the following Zambian corporate governance codes? 
Corporate Governance Codes Very 
Familiar 
Familiar Some 
familiarity 
Not 
familiar 
Not 
sure 
Lusaka Stock Exchange Code      
Bank of Zambia Code      
IODZ – SME Code      
 
 
 
 
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15. To what extent do you agree that the term ‘Corporate Governance’ refers to each of the following 
descriptions? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Definition 1 2 3 4 5 
A The system by which companies are directed and controlled      
B The way in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment 
     
C A set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders 
     
D Set of mechanisms through which outside investors are protected 
against appropriation by insiders 
     
E A System of checks and balances, both internal and external to 
companies, which ensures that companies discharge their 
accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible 
way in all areas of their business activity 
     
F Other  
……………………………………………………………… 
     
 
 
16. To what extent do you think the above definitions best fit the Zambian context? 
 
Definition Very suitable suitable Not suitable Not sure 
A     
B     
C     
D     
E     
 
 
17. The implication and importance of corporate governance varies across nations. How do you rate the 
suitability of Western corporate governance codes to the Zambian context? 
 
Very suitable Suitable Not suitable Not sure 
    
 
 
18. To what extent are the following factors viewed as corporate governance drivers in Zambia? 
 
 
 
 
Corporate governance drivers in Zambia 1 2 3 4 5 
Corporate scandals in Zambia      
Corporate scandals elsewhere (outside Zambia)      
Integration into the global market      
Economic development      
Quest to attract local and foreign investment for growth      
Privatisation programme      
Almost everyone is doing it      
 
 
 
 
 
1 = Strongly Agree        2 = Agree        3 = Neutral        4 = Disagree       5 = Strongly Disagree 
 
1 = Strongly Agree        2 = Agree        3 = Neutral        4 = Disagree       5 = Strongly Disagree 
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19. Do you think the following factors affect corporate governance practices in Zambia? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factors affecting Corporate Governance in Zambia 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Laws and Regulation      
2 Cultural beliefs and values      
3 Political interference         
4 Social and ethical factors      
5 Corruption      
6 Lack of accountability      
 
20. To what extent do you agree with the following as being benefits of corporate governance? 
 
 
 
 
Benefits of corporate governance in Zambia 1 2 3 4 5 
1 providing the degree of accountability necessary for the proper 
functioning of the Zambian market economy 
     
2 Zambia’s entry tool into the global pool of capital        
3 prerequisite to Zambia’s national economic development       
4 help in the alleviation of poverty in Zambia      
5 help in the efficient allocation of capital in Zambia      
6 as a safeguard against corruption and mismanagement in Zambia      
7 making Zambia attractive for investment      
8 lowering the cost of capital in Zambia      
9 lowering the cost of doing business in Zambia      
 
 
21. The principles of corporate governance should be viewed as not just being relevant to companies, but to 
many types of organizations be they companies, state enterprises, parastatals and public sector institutions 
including government itself.  
 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
     
 
 
 
22. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
 
 
 
 
Corporate governance and accountability 1 2 3 4 5 
corporate governance rests on accountability 
     
accountability and sound corporate governance practices underpin economic 
development  
     
accountability holds the promise of bringing the people to justice 
     
accountability can play a critical role in controlling abuse of political power 
in Zambia 
     
accountability can contribute to better governance in Zambia      
 
 
1 = Strongly Agree       2 = Agree       3 = Neutral       4 = Disagree      5 = Strongly Disagree 
 
1 = Strongly Agree        2 = Agree        3 = Neutral        4 = Disagree       5 = Strongly Disagree 
 
1 = Strongly Agree       2 = Agree       3 = Neutral       4 = Disagree      5 = Strongly Disagree 
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C. Corporate Governance and Development 
 
23. How would you classify Zambia in terms of development? 
 
Under-Developed Between Under-Developed and 
Developing 
Developing Developed 
    
 
 
24. Corporate governance has been identified by New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as one 
of the conditions for development in Africa. To what extent do you understand the concept of corporate 
governance as a necessary condition for development in Zambia? 
 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
     
 
 
25. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
 
 
 
 
 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
Zambia’s economy depends on the drive and efficiency of its companies.      
Corporate governance is one key element in improving Zambia’s economic 
efficiency and growth 
     
Corporate governance plays a critical role in attracting aid to Zambia      
Corporate Governance is an essential element in attracting FDI to Zambia      
Corporate governance is important in helping Zambia create wealth, jobs and 
long-term competitiveness in the global economy. 
     
Corporate governance plays an important role in creating investor confidence 
in Zambia 
     
Corporate governance plays a central role in helping Zambian firms access 
finance for their investment activities at a lower cost 
     
Sound corporate governance practices are fundamental to Zambia’s economic 
recovery 
     
 
D. Accountability 
 
26. To what extent do you think that corporate governance problems in Zambia are associated with a lack of 
accountability? 
 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
     
 
27. Do you think a lack of accountability and corporate governance affect the flow of FDI to Zambia? 
 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
     
 
28. Do you think a lack of accountability and corporate governance affect development aid flow to Zambia? 
 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
     
 
 
1 = Strongly Agree       2 = Agree       3 = Neutral       4 = Disagree      5 = Strongly Disagree 
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29. Please feel free to add any comments that you think are relevant to corporate governance, accountability 
and development in the Zambian context. 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………….……………………………………………………………………….…… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
30. Are there any other comments that you would like to make? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….….. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….…………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for responding to this questionnaire. If you wish to obtain a summary of the research 
results please write your e-mail address 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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Appendix 6.3 
Introductory Letter - Interviews 
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Appendix 6.4 
Introductory Letter – Questionnaire Survey 
 
